3. Enduring and Current Presence
Much of the US security approach to the Middle East has been dictated by the realities of geography, distance and logistics. American forces in the region routinely undertake a few core activities as part of a distinct, phased campaign. In addition, they carry out one-off discrete operations. The six core activities are best summarized as: 1) shaping operations through military-to-military engagements that attempt to influence political, social and security outcomes, or establish the conditions for other military activities; 2) security cooperation in the form of facilitating weapons sales and training in order to enhance partner military and security capabilities; 3) peacetime shows of force by moving troops or capabilities with the intent of deterring or compelling the behaviour of specific governments or adversaries; 4) peacekeeping and stability operations; 5) special operations raids and limited strikes by drones, piloted aircraft, or missiles from offshore ships; and 6) full-scale combat operations that are intended to destroy the military assets of another country, or to capture and control territory or maritime waterways.
As noted earlier, to effectively conduct any of these six core activities requires reliable and assured access to the Middle East. This mandates a well-established command and control structure, an enduring and tolerated permanent presence (to facilitate the rush of additional forces into a theatre when needed), and host-nation contingency relationships for basing and overflight rights (so the US military has alternatives if it is denied access to first-choice regional countries). These latter rights, while little-appreciated, are essential since they govern and dictate every aspect of how American armed forces can operate inside US bases or another country’s sovereign airspace. For example, host nations can determine the number and type of combat aircraft permitted, the frequency with which those aircraft can fly, the total number of aircraft per mission, the type of surveillance or strike missions that launch from their territory, and even the rules of engagement for aircraft.
Regarding personnel, it is difficult to determine the number of troops, Department of Defense (DOD) civilians, Pentagon contractors, and military capabilities located within the Middle East at any given time. Some personnel are deployed on temporary duty and therefore not included in official estimates. For example, in August 2017, after claiming for over a year that there were only 8,400 US troops in Afghanistan, the Pentagon acknowledged that there were actually 11,000 troops there.23 In addition, there are special mission units operating within the Middle East under covert authorities (operations intended to have plausible deniability by the US government) or clandestine authorities (operations intended to assure secrecy or concealment), making their very presence a highly classified matter.24 Nevertheless, the Pentagon publishes a quarterly document that lists the unclassified total for (almost) every country.25 In addition, the White House is mandated under the War Powers Resolution Act of 1973 to produce a biannual letter to Congress that covers the deployment of all US armed forces that are ‘equipped for combat’.26 Recent troop levels are shown in Map 1, these figures come from two official government data sources, as well as open-source reporting.
It is important to recognize that the number of forces deployed in Middle Eastern countries, including those on active duty, National Guard and Reserves, and DOD civilians grew significantly – by nearly one-third – in mid-2017. In June 2017, there were 40,517 US troops in the Middle East, and by September this figure had jumped to 54,180. In April 2018, it became impossible to know how many troops are presently in the region. For reasons that were never fully explained, the Pentagon unexpectedly stopped releasing US troop data for Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria – America’s three most high-profile, politically controversial and troop-intensive combat zones.27 Pentagon officials have claimed that releasing these data had somehow aided America’s enemies, but did not provide any example or evidence supporting this assertion.
Supporting these troops and weapons systems are thousands of Pentagon contractors, employed by large US firms such as Service Employees International, DynCorp and Triple Canopy. The top areas that require these contractors are: logistics and maintenance, translation services, base support, construction and security. As of July 2018 – again, excluding Afghanistan – there were 22,323 Pentagon contractors working in the CENTCOM area of operations in the Middle East including 9,762 US citizens, 12,020 third-country nationals and 541 host-country nationals.28 This represents a 15 per cent year-on-year increase in Pentagon contractors utilized in the region.29 The deployment of contractors to fulfil missions that 15 to 20 years ago would have been conducted by US troops gives the impression of a smaller American military footprint in the region. Indeed, whenever politicians or media pundits debate putting ‘boots on the ground’ in the Middle East they never mention these essential private sector employees, without whom a range of military operations could not be carried out, or at least not without even greater risks to US troops and overall mission success.
The deployment of contractors to fulfil missions that 15 to 20 years ago would have been conducted by US troops gives the impression of a smaller American military footprint in the region.
In April 2018, the Pentagon’s quarterly contractor report first acknowledged that contractors were being used in Syria.30 No previous reports had mentioned contractors being used in Syria since President Obama first authorized intervention in the country in the autumn of 2014. However, the Department of Labor Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs annually publishes its own data on the number of US government contractors injured and killed (and the firms they worked for) while working overseas. In the autumn of 2017, the Department of Labor first published data showing that contractors had been injured and killed in Syria during the previous fiscal year.31 Thus, it is possible that the Department of Labor – by routinely publishing its own data – forced the Pentagon to admit that contractors were indeed operating inside Syria.32
Breakdown of US troops deployed in the Middle East
While contractors play an indispensable – though largely hidden – role in sustaining America’s military-led approach in the region, the most politically sensitive aspect for host nations is the troops themselves, who often serve as the default face of US foreign policy. These troops – and the bases, depots, airfields and ports that they build and maintain – represent the multinational edifice sustained through the region that facilitates the US military to conduct its six core military activities. A breakdown of the scope and mission of US troops by country in the Middle East is as follows:
Egypt
The US provides the largest contingent of personnel for the Multinational Force and Observers Mission (MFO).33 The MFO is an independent organization that was established by Egypt and Israel in 1981 to supervise the implementation of the Camp David Accords. Since 2002, rotating Army National Guard infantry battalions have provided the bulk of the US contribution to the MFO mission.34 In addition, a US naval medical research unit – the Pentagon’s largest overseas laboratory – conducts medical research in support of disease prevention for troops deployed throughout the Middle East and Africa.35
Israel
Due to the regional sensitivities surrounding expanding settlements and the military occupation of portions of the West Bank, and strong antipathies towards Israel among other Middle Eastern countries more generally, the US military has long downplayed its active cooperation with Israel. According to American and Israeli national security officials interviewed by the author, the movement of US troops in and out of the country is largely tied to the use of specific ports and airfields in support of discrete military operations. Also, US troops are utilized for largely defensive missions to protect Israel. For example, at Mashabim Air Base in the Negev Desert, several dozen US troops are permanently deployed to support radars and interceptors associated with Israel’s Iron Dome missile defence system.36
Lebanon
In August 2017, after years of refusing to acknowledge the permanent stationing of American forces in country, a Pentagon spokesperson declared, ‘I can confirm the presence of US Special Forces in Lebanon… providing training and support to the Lebanese Armed Forces.’37 In December 2017, the White House biannual War Powers Resolution letter to Congress acknowledged, ‘approximately 100 United States military personnel are deployed to Lebanon.’38
Syria
After multiple pledges between August 2013 and July 2015 that there would be no American ‘boots on the ground’ in Syria, in December 2015, President Obama admitted the existence of a ‘specialized expeditionary targeting force’ in the country.39 Since then – if not earlier – the United States has had both a covert and overt troop presence deployed throughout the country to train, advise and supply partner ground forces. As if to demonstrate the poor transparency of America’s military commitment, on 16 November 2017, the Director of the Joint Staff, Lieutenant General Kenneth McKenzie, claimed there were ‘about 503’ US troops operating in Syria; the following day the Defense Manpower Data Center quarterly report was published, stating there were 1,723; two weeks later, Pentagon officials announced that the figure was 2,000.40 Whatever the actual number, these troops are supported with several temporary military outposts and airfields. In July 2017, Turkish media outlets published a list of a total of nine US military outposts in northern Syria alone.41 Of these, Pentagon officials acknowledged expanding an airfield near Kobani, 90 miles north of Raqqa, for use by military transport aircraft, including C-17 and C-130 military transports.42 The presence of combat troops on the ground has been combined with an extensive US-led air campaign against ISIS that has consisted of more than 15,500 strikes in Syria.43
Jordan
Most US troops in the kingdom are stationed at King Faisal Air Base at Al Jafr, where a Jordanian Air Force guard shot and killed three US Army special forces soldiers in November 2016. In addition, an undisclosed drone and helicopter base in northeast Jordan known as ‘H4’ was established in 2014, and expanded in early 2016, according to satellite imagery.44 Another secret drone base was also reported at Muwaffaq Salti, 33 miles south of the Syrian border.45 Finally, US ground forces – the Central Command Forward-Jordan (CF-J) element – operate from the King Abdullah II Special Operations Training Center (KASOTC) outside of Amman. The KASOTC is a 6,000-acre state-of-the-art training and simulation centre that was partially paid for by the DOD and built on land that was donated by the King.46
Yemen
Until March 2015, approximately 100 US troops and special operations forces had been stationed at Al Anad Airbase in southern Yemen. Those forces were withdrawn amid growing instability and violence resulting from the civil war between Houthi rebels and forces loyal to President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi.47 In late 2016 and early 2017, a handful of US special operations teams were re-deployed to Yemen to develop intelligence assets and situational awareness related to Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS-affiliated groups.48 Making this latest deployment official, in December 2017, the White House acknowledged, ‘A small number of United States military personnel are deployed to Yemen to conduct operations against [AQAP] and ISIS.’49
Iraq
In 2008, the George W. Bush administration and the government of Iraq signed a status of forces agreement that declared, ‘All the United States Forces shall withdraw from all Iraqi territory no later than December 31, 2011.’ The Obama administration fulfilled this agreement, but in June 2014 began re-deploying a few hundred military and intelligence advisers in response to spreading ISIS insurgency. By early 2016, there were as many as 5,000 US combat forces in country, a total that grew to nearly 9,000 by September 2017.50 Presently, the acknowledged US troops in country are primarily stationed at Al Asad Air Base and focused on building-up Iraqi military forces, while maintaining the necessary infrastructure should a substantial amount of US troops and capabilities be required in country in the future.
Saudi Arabia
In the fall of 2003, the Saudi government and Washington agreed that the US should withdraw its permanent forces from Prince Sultan Air Base near Riyadh, which had served as the US regional headquarters for its air operations. To support counterterrorism strikes in Yemen, the CIA built a covert drone base in southeast Saudi Arabia in 2011, the existence of which was not revealed until 2013.51 In early 2018, a Pentagon official claimed that there were only 50 troops in country, predominantly helping to defend against ballistic missile threats from Houthi rebels in Yemen. However, in May of that year, the Pentagon acknowledged that there were also a dozen Green Berets stationed along Saudi Arabia’s southern border.52
Bahrain
The bulk of the US military presence on the island nation is maintained at Manama’s Naval Support Activity Bahrain, which has been the home of the Fifth Fleet since its re-establishment in 1995. The Fifth Fleet is responsible for patrolling 2.5 million square miles of water – the Persian Gulf, Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Oman and Arabian Sea – and is comprised of rotating carrier battle groups and submarines, as well as permanently stationed amphibious, mine clearing, logistics and maritime surveillance forces. In addition, Shaikh Isa Air Base south of Manama hosts a variety of US military aircraft, including F-16s, F/A-18s and P-3 surveillance aircraft.53
Kuwait
In September 1991, after the US-led Operation Desert Storm that reversed the Iraqi military invasion and occupation of Kuwait, the US and Kuwait signed a wide-ranging defence cooperation agreement. Since then, the US military has enjoyed a nearly unconstrained presence at multiple facilities located throughout the kingdom, including Ali Al Salem Air Base, home of CENTCOM’s primary airlift unit the 386th Air Expeditionary Wing, and Camp Arifjan, the regional headquarters for CENTCOM’s land component command.54
UAE
While the US military has stationed aircraft in the UAE since 1990, after 9/11 the degree of cooperation with the Emirati government has grown dramatically, with former CENTCOM commander General Anthony Zinni describing it as ‘the strongest relationship that the United States has in the Arab world today’.55 Al Dhafra Air Base serves as one of the most critical military facilities for operations throughout the region, the US has maintained a military presence there for over a quarter of a century.56 Owing to its important role in sustaining air operations throughout the region, the Pentagon stores more jet fuel at Al Dhafra than anywhere else in the world.57 In addition, American forces enjoy continuous access to Jebel Ali, a deep-water port near Dubai, which is the US Navy’s most frequently visited foreign port in the world.58
Qatar
After the US military left Saudi Arabia in 2003, its regional headquarters was relocated to the Al Udeid Air Base southwest of Doha.59 The base is now the US military’s largest facility in the Middle East. It hosts up to 10,000 personnel at any time and boasts two 12,000-foot runways on which all military aircraft can operate, as well as the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC). The CAOC, run by the 379th Air Expeditionary Wing, serves as the command centre for all allied surveillance, strike and logistics air operations throughout the Middle East and Afghanistan. In addition, the US Army operates out of Camp As Sayliyah, where there are enough prepositioned logistical supplies maintained to support one armoured brigade.60
Oman
Since 2000, the US military has enjoyed reliable access to Thumrait Air Base and Al Mussanah Air Base, where prepositioned war reserve materiel (WRM) is maintained.
The WRM programme provides logistical support to ensure regional commanders have the necessary resources (fuel, vehicles, munitions, medical equipment and rations) on hand to start and sustain operations before a routine supply chain can be established to the continental United States.61 These WRM stockpiles in Oman – maintained by the defence logistics firm DynCorp – are essential for CENTCOM forces to be capable of implementing a range of contingency and operational plans with little preparation or warning.62
Turkey
Turkey is the only country covered in this paper that has a mutual defence arrangement with the US, which is treaty-bound to defend Turkey if it is attacked.63 (Although other Middle East countries are commonly labelled ‘allies’, none mandates a comparable defence commitment by the US.64) Consequently, Turkey is also the only country in the region where the US routinely maintains nuclear weapons. At Incirlik Air Base, an estimated arsenal of 50 B-61 nuclear gravity bombs are stored on racks in secure underground vaults located beneath protective aircraft shelters.65 However, since the B-61s can only be delivered by US nuclear-capable attack aircraft, which Turkey does not permit to be permanently stationed at Incirlik, in a crisis the United States or other NATO countries would need to fly nuclear-capable aircraft into Incirlik to retrieve and deploy the bombs.66 Incirlik Air Base and Diyarbakir Air Base have been used by the United States for conventional operations, most recently against ISIS.
Iran
There are no acknowledged US forces in the country. However, in 2001 and 2002, Iran did consent to its airspace being used during the initial stages of the military campaign to topple the Taliban. To this day, Iran also consents to US forces being transported through its airspace on what are nominally civilian charter flights from Afghanistan to Gulf military airfields.67 Similarly, prior to the 2003 Iraq War, US diplomats received assurances from their Iranian counterparts that if American aircraft accidentally flew over Iranian territory they would not be fired upon.68 Obviously, Iran does not consent to US spy operations, as was evidenced by its downing and capture of an American RQ-170 surveillance drone reportedly monitoring suspected nuclear weapons sites in December 2011.69
Beyond these bases, airfields and ports, the United States has maintained a robust naval presence in the Middle East since the establishment of the Fifth Fleet. At any given time, as many as two of the navy’s three forward-deployed aircraft carriers are also maintained in the region. Each carrier battle group is equipped with up to 7,500 personnel, an aircraft carrier, at least one cruiser, at least two destroyers or frigates, and a carrier air wing of 65–70 aircraft. Each carrier can conduct up to 230 strike sorties a day – in limited surges of a few days or more. In addition, an unknown number of submarines traverse through the region, supporting conventional and nuclear weapons payloads. For example, one Ohio-class submarine can carry up to two dozen intercontinental ballistic missiles, each of which can carry eight independently-targetable warheads that yield 100–475 kilotonnes of explosive power. Though it never formally comments on submarine activities, the Pentagon has been known to regularly rotate nuclear-armed vessels through CENTCOM’s area of responsibility in order to provide flexibility in its strategic nuclear operational plans.
In addition to these conventional and nuclear mobile naval assets, in 2012, the USS Ponce, an amphibious ship, was converted to become a floating base in the Persian Gulf used for counter-mine, helicopter and special operations force missions. In the summer of 2018, this floating ‘forward staging base’, was replaced by the USS Lewis B. Puller, the first purpose-built Expeditionary Mobile Base vessel. The Puller ports in Bahrain but is afloat almost permanently in the Persian Gulf serving primarily as a launch platform for special operations forces, especially Navy SEALs.70
US military operations and shows of force
There is a perception that the US has been ‘at war’ in the Middle East for more than a quarter of a century. The accuracy of this impression depends on whether this concept of warfare is inclusive of the purposeful movement of warships, combat aircraft or troops intended to signal resolve or to compel a government to change its behaviour. Nevertheless, when compared to other regions of the world, the US has used force in the Middle East far more frequently and in support of a broader range of political and military objectives.71 The military operations and shows of force detailed below are not an exhaustive list. According to a Congressional Research Service report of US Armed Forces abroad since 1798 there are dozens of examples within the Middle East alone.72 Rather, what appears below is a distillation of four politically sensitive, strategically consequential, but less well-known activities that American armed forces have conducted in the region over the past few decades. These four instances were chosen for the breadth of the missions (some were stability-focused, others involved kinetic military action), diversity of domains (air, land and sea), and different results (failures, successes and mixed-outcomes). Collectively, they are representative of the broad scope of operations that the US military is capable of routinely undertaking, because of its enduring presence and access.
Lebanon
In 1982, 1,800 US Marines were deployed to Lebanon as part of a multinational force that was tasked to support a truce between Israeli forces, on one side, and militias loyal to the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Syrian military. In September 1983, the USS New Jersey shelled Druze militia and Syrian forces occupying territory that overlooked the Beirut International Airport where the marines were stationed. Six weeks later, a massive suicide truck bomb exploded just outside these marine barracks, killing 241 US military personnel. In retaliation, on 4 December 1983, US combat aircraft bombed several Syrian military installations east of Beirut. Two US planes were shot down in this action, which resulted in the death of one pilot and another held hostage for 30 days. On 7 February 1984, President Ronald Reagan ordered the withdrawal of all US forces from Lebanon within a three-week period. As such, a military operation that was intended to stabilize Lebanon ended up doing the opposite, at great human cost to the US troops deployed there.
Persian Gulf
After six years of both Iraq and Iran attacking oil tankers transiting the Persian Gulf under the flags of numerous countries, in 1987 Kuwaiti tankers began to fly the US flag, which afforded them the protection of US Navy vessels, specifically from Iranian mines and missiles.73 Between July 1987 and July 1988, the US Navy and Iranian forces engaged in a series of tit-for-tat skirmishes: a Kuwaiti tanker with a US flag hit Iranian maritime mines, in response the US Navy seized and sunk an Iranian mine laying vessel; an Iranian missile struck a flagged tanker in Kuwaiti waters, so the US Navy destroyed an Iranian oil platform; and a US destroyer hit an Iranian mine, in response the navy destroyed two oil platforms and sank or disabled six Iranian navy ships. On 3 July 1988, a destroyer, the USS Vincennes, shot down an ascending Iranian Airbus 300 carrying 290 civilians, because the commander of the destroyer believed it to be an Iranian F-14 combat jet descending to attack US Navy ships.74 Within two months of the end of the Iran–Iraq war, Iran ceased its explicit threats and attacks against maritime shipping, and the US mission of escorting Kuwaiti oil tankers concluded soon after. The short-lived ‘Tanker War’ was successful while it lasted, but the US military mission did little to deter longer term Iranian threats to maritime shipping.
Iraq no-fly zones (NFZs)
In February 1991, after the US-led coalition expelled Iraqi forces from Kuwait, 14 of Iraq’s 18 provinces rebelled and were no longer under the control of the central government. By April, Saddam Hussein’s security forces had crushed the uprisings, including Kurdish fighters in the north and Shia militias in the south. The US issued a demarche warning Iraq not to fly its aircraft over displaced Kurdish civilians, and by July, US, UK and French aircraft began enforcing an NFZ above the 36th parallel over northern Iraq. In August 1992, the coalition began enforcing a similar NFZ beneath the 32nd parallel to protect Shia populations and to deter Saddam Hussein’s ability to mass his armoured divisions to threaten Kuwait.75 The NFZs were effective at denying the Iraqi government the use of airpower over nearly two-thirds of its territory. However, the Iraqi leader still brutally suppressed uprisings by Shia groups in the south and Kurdish fighters in the north with armoured ground forces, all while US pilots orbited overhead with strict orders not to intervene. A decade into their existence, the NFZs would eventually serve a more momentous role: in June 2002, President Bush authorized a secret plan – Operation Southern Focus – that permitted pilots enforcing the southern NFZ to bomb Iraq’s air defence, artillery and command and control assets – in total, 606 bombs hit 391 targets. In effect, due to the access that the NFZs allowed, efforts to change the Iraqi regime commenced 10 months before the ‘shock and awe’ airstrikes and ground invasion in 2003.76
Yemen
On 3 November 2002, the US conducted its first ever non-battlefield drone strike in the Marib Province of Yemen, when a Predator drone launched a Hellfire missile at a vehicle transporting Abu Ali al-Harithi, an Al-Qaeda operational planner, four Yemenis and Ahmed Hijazi, a naturalized US citizen. After a seven-year period of no further counterterrorism strikes, in late 2009, President Obama authorized a new campaign of airstrikes against targets associated with AQAP. The first of these was a navy attack of five cruise missiles armed with cluster munitions against a suspected AQAP training camp in southern Yemen; reportedly 14 militant fighters and 41 civilians, including nine women and 21 children, were killed.77 Since 2009, there have been an estimated 308 airstrikes against suspected AQAP and ISIS-affiliated groups, killing nearly 1,000 people.78 US strikes against AQAP targeted transnational terror threats and those threatening government security forces. While the amount of territory controlled by AQAP and ISIS has decreased since 2002, both remain active and are thriving in Yemen.79
23 Cooper, H. (2017), ‘U.S. Says it Has 11,000 Troops in Afghanistan, More Than Formerly Disclosed’, New York Times, 30 August 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/30/world/asia/afghanistan-troop-totals.html (accessed 23 Aug. 2018).
24 For the distinctions in these authorities, see, DeVine, M. E. and Peters, H. (2018), Covert Action and Clandestine Activities of the Intelligence Community: Selected Definitions in Brief, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 25 April 2018, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/R45175.pdf (accessed 23 Aug. 2018).
25 US Department of Defense (2018), Defense Military Data Center, https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/appj/dwp/dwp_reports.jsp (accessed 4 Jul. 2018).
26 White House (2017), ‘Text of a Letter from the President to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate’, 11 December 2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/text-letter-president-speaker-house-representatives-president-pro-tempore-senate-2/ (accessed 23 Aug. 2018).
27 Copp, T. (2018), ‘Pentagon Strips Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria Troop Numbers from Web’, Stars and Stripes, 9 April 2018, https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2018/04/09/dod-strips-iraq-afghanistan-syria-troop-numbers-from-web/ (accessed 23 Aug. 2018).
28 US Department of Defense (2018), ‘Contractor Support of U.S. Operations in the USCENTCOM Area of Operations’, https://www.acq.osd.mil/log/PS/.CENTCOM_reports.html/5A_July%202018_Final.pdf (accessed 23 Aug. 2018).
29 US Department of Defense (2017), ‘Contractor Support of U.S. Operations in the USCENTCOM Area of Operations’, https://www.acq.osd.mil/log/ps/.CENTCOM_reports.html/5A_July2017_Final.pdf (accessed 23 Aug. 2018).
30 Ibid. Unusually, in July 2016, the Pentagon announced that Six3 Intelligence Solutions, Inc. had been awarded a contract to perform intelligence analysis services in ‘Germany, Italy, and Syria’, which was the first time that Syria had been acknowledged as a location that uses contractors. But, two weeks later, the Pentagon published a correction claiming that the Six3 Intelligence Solutions contract, ‘incorrectly announced where work will be performed. The announcement should have read that work will be performed in Germany, Italy, and Kosovo.’ Kosovo had replaced Syria. See, US Department of Defense (2016), ‘Contracts’, 27 July 2016, https://www.defense.gov/News/Contracts/Contract-View/Article/873473/ (accessed 23 Aug. 2018); US Department of Defense (2016), ‘Contracts’, 10 August 2016, https://www.defense.gov/News/Contracts/Contract-View/Article/910906/ (accessed 23 Aug. 2018).
31 US Department of Labor (undated), ‘Defense Base Act Case Summary by Nation: DBA FY2017 REPORT BY NATION (10/01/2016–09/30/2017)’, https://www.dol.gov/owcp/dlhwc/dbaallnation(fy2017).htm (accessed 23 Aug. 2018).
32 Inquiries made by the author to the relevant Department of Labor and Pentagon personnel could not determine why the Pentagon suddenly acknowledged contractors that it had previously hidden.
33 MFO (undated), ‘MFO Troop Contributors’, http://mfo.org/en/contingents (accessed 23 Aug. 2018).
34 Greenhill, J. (2017), ‘National Guard Contributes to U.S.-Egypt Strategic Partnership’, National Guard Bureau, 25 May 2017, https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1194485/national-guard-contributes-to-us-egypt-strategic-partnership/ (accessed 23 Aug. 2018).
35 US Navy (undated), ‘Naval Medical Research Unit—No. 3’, Fact Sheet, https://www.med.navy.mil/sites/nmrc/news/SiteAssets/Pages/Fact-Sheets/NAMRU3.pdf (accessed 24 Sep. 2018).
36 Vandiver, J. (2017), ‘U.S. Troops Deployed to Israel to Get New Barracks’, Stars and Stripes, 19 September 2017, https://www.stripes.com/news/us-troops-deployed-to-israel-get-a-new-barracks-1.488440 (accessed 23 Aug. 2018).
37 The New Arab (2017), ‘U.S. Special Forces operating in Lebanon “close to Hizballah”’, 6 August 2017, https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2017/8/6/us-special-forces-operating-in-lebanon-close-to-hizballah (accessed 23 Aug. 2018).
38 White House (2017), ‘Text of a Letter from the President to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate’, 11 December 2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/text-letter-president-speaker-house-representatives-president-pro-tempore-senate-2/ (accessed 23 Aug. 2018).
39 Korte, G. (2015), ‘16 Times Obama Said There Would Be No Boots on the Ground in Syria’, USA Today, 30 October 2015, https://eu.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/onpolitics/2015/10/30/16-times-obama-said-there-would-no-boots-ground-syria/74869884/ (accessed 23 Aug. 2018).
40 US Department of Defense (2017), ‘Press Briefing by Pentagon Chief Spokesperson Dana W. White and Joint Staff Director Lt. Gen. Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr. in the Pentagon Briefing Room’, 16 November 2017, https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/1374801/department-of-defense-press-briefing-by-pentagon-chief-spokesperson-dana-w-whit/ (accessed 23 Aug. 2018); Garamone J. (2017), ‘Pentagon Announces Troop Levels in Iraq, Syria’, Department of Defense News, 6 December 2017, https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1390079/pentagon-announces-troop-levels-in-iraq-syria/ (accessed 23 Aug. 2018).
41 Andalou Agency (2017), ‘U.S. Increases Military Posts Supporting PKK/PYD in Syria’, 20 July 2017, http://aa.com.tr/en/americas/us-increases-military-posts-supporting-pkk-pyd-in-syria/863895 (accessed 23 Aug. 2018).
42 Copp, T. (2017), ‘U.S. Expands Air Base in Northern Syria for use in Battle for Raqqa’, Stars and Stripes, 3 April 2017, https://www.stripes.com/news/us-expands-air-base-in-northern-syria-for-use-in-battle-for-raqqa-1.461874 (accessed 23 Aug. 2018); Hendi, A. A. and Babb, C. (2017), ‘U.S.-Led Coalition Boosting Airfield Capabilities in Syria’, Voice of America, 31 March 2017, https://www.voanews.com/a/us-led-coalition-increasing-airfield-capabilities-in-syria/3791891.html (accessed 23 Aug. 2018).
43 US government data compiled by Airwars, https://airwars.org/ (accessed 13 Jul. 2018).
44 Axe, D. (2017), ‘Satellites Reveal U.S. Military Bases Emerging in the Desert’, The Daily Beast, 11 July 2017, https://www.thedailybeast.com/satellites-reveal-us-military-bases-emerging-in-the-desert (accessed 23 Aug. 2018).
45 Offiziere.ch (2016), ‘Predators Join Reapers at Jordan’s Muwaffaq’, 7 June 2016, https://www.offiziere.ch/?p=27938 (accessed 26 Sep. 2018).
46 Eells, J. (2003), ‘Sleep-Away Camp for Postmodern Cowboys’, New York Times Magazine, 19 July 2003, https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/21/magazine/sleep-away-camp-for-postmodern-cowboys.html (accessed 23 Aug. 2018).
47 Lackey, K. (2015), ‘US Forces Evacuating Yemen Air Base’, Defense News, 22 March 2015, https://eu.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2015/03/21/yemen-us-military/25138325/ (accessed 23 Aug. 2018).
48 Author interview with Pentagon official, March 2017.
49 White House (2017), ‘Text of a Letter from the President to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate’, 11 December 2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/text-letter-president-speaker-house-representatives-president-pro-tempore-senate-2/ (accessed 23 Aug. 2018).
50 Thompson, M. (2016), ‘Number of U.S. Troops in Iraq Keeps Creeping Upward’, Time, 18 April 2016, http://time.com/4298318/iraq-us-troops-barack-obama-mosul-isis/ (accessed 23 Aug. 2018); Copp T. (2017), ‘26,000 U.S. Troops in Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria, DoD Reports’, Military Times, 27 November 2017, https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2017/11/27/26000-us-troops-total-in-iraq-afghanistan-and-syria-dod-reports/ (accessed 23 Aug. 2018).
51 Miller, G. and DeYoung, K. (2013), ‘Brennan Nomination Exposes Criticism on Targeted Killings and Secret Saudi Base’, Washington Post, 5 February 2013, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/2013/02/05/8f3c94f0-6fb0-11e2-8b8d-e0b59a1b8e2a_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.bb58fbbcb26e (accessed 23 Aug. 2018).
52 Cooper, H., Gibbons-Neff, T. and Schmitt, E. (2018), ‘Army Special Forces Secretly Help Saudis Combat Threat from Yemen Rebels’, New York Times, 3 May 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/03/us/politics/green-berets-saudi-yemen-border-houthi.html (accessed 23 Aug. 2018).
53 Katzman, K. (2014), ‘Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy’, Congressional Research Service, 11 June 2014, pp. 22–23, http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/53b5055c4.pdf (accessed 24 Sep. 2018).
54 Gittler, J. (2003), ‘War HQ in Kuwait to Move from Camp Doha to Arifjan’, Stars and Stripes, 1 August 2003, https://www.stripes.com/news/war-hq-in-kuwait-to-move-from-camp-doha-to-arifjan-1.10194 (accessed 23 Aug. 2018).
55 Chandrasekaran, R. (2014), ‘In the UAE, the United States has a Quiet, Potent Ally Nicknamed “Little Sparta”’, Washington Post, 9 November 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/in-the-uae-the-united-states-has-a-quiet-potent-ally-nicknamed-little-sparta/2014/11/08/3fc6a50c-643a-11e4-836c-83bc4f26eb67_story.html?utm_term=.16f35a517982 (accessed 23 Aug. 2018).
56 Pawlyk, O. (2017), ‘Air Force Acknowledges Clandestine Base in UAE’, Military.com, 28 August 2017, https://www.military.com/dodbuzz/2017/08/28/air-force-acknowledges-clandestine-base-in-uae (accessed 23 Aug. 2018).
57 Pawlyk, O. (2017), ‘Inside the Air Force’s Largest Fuel Farm in Fight vs. ISIS’, Military.com, 19 August 2017, https://www.military.com/daily-news/2017/08/19/inside-air-forces-largest-fuel-farm-in-fight-against-isis.html (accessed 23 Aug. 2018).
58 Katzman, K. (2017), ‘The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy’, Congressional Research Service, 2 November 2017, p. 20, https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=805660 (accessed 23 Aug. 2018).
59 Gordon, M. and Schmitt, E. (2003), ‘U.S. Will Move Air Operations Base to Qatar’, New York Times, 28 April 2003, https://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/28/world/aftereffects-bases-us-will-move-air-operations-to-qatar-base.html (accessed 23 Aug. 2018).
60 Katzman, K. (2018), ‘Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy’, Congressional Research Service, 13 August 2018, p. 15, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R44533.pdf (accessed 23 Aug. 2018).
61 US Air Force (2015), ‘Air Force War Reserve Materiel (WRM) Policies and Guidance’, Air Force Instruction 25–101, 14 January 2015, http://static.e-publishing.af.mil/production/1/af_a4/publication/afi25-101/afi25-101.pdf (accessed 23 Aug. 2018).
62 DynCorp International (2014), ‘DynCorp International War Reserve Materiel Program is Committed to Continuous Improvement’, 16 September 2014, http://www.di-atworknow.com/operations-maintenance/war-reserve-materiel-program (accessed 23 Aug. 2018).
63 US Department of State (2018), ‘Collective Defense Arrangements’, https://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/collectivedefense/ (accessed 4 Jun. 2018).
64 Bahrain, Egypt, Israel, Jordan and Kuwait have all been designated a ‘Major Non-NATO Ally,’ which allows for greater cooperative research and development related to defence technologies, streamlined security assistance and enhanced counterterrorism cooperation. See, ‘US Code of Federal Regulations 22, sec. 120.32: Major non-NATO Ally’, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2016-title22-vol1/pdf/CFR-2016-title22-vol1-sec120-32.pdf (accessed 23 Aug. 2018). In 2014, Congress passed a law that was subsequently signed by President Barack Obama, which declared Israel to be a ‘major strategic partner of the United States’, which had no practical change on the already close connections between the countries. See, Public Law (2014), ‘United States-Israel Strategic Partnership Act of 2014’, 19 December 2014, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-113publ296/pdf/PLAW-113publ296.pdf (accessed 23 Aug. 2018).
65 Kristensen, H. M. (2015), ‘Upgrades at U.S. Nuclear Bases in Europe Acknowledge Security Risk’, Federation of American Scientists, 10 September 2015, https://fas.org/blogs/security/2015/09/nuclear-insecurity/ (accessed 23 Aug. 2018).
66 Woolf, A. F. (2016), ‘U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Turkey’, CRS Insight, Congressional Research Service, 2 August 2016, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/IN10542.pdf (accessed 23 Aug. 2018).
67 Rosen, A. (2014), ‘This Loophole Lets the U.S. Use Iranian Airspace to Fly its Personnel to and From Afghanistan’, Business Insider, 9 September 2014, https://www.businessinsider.com/the-us-flies-its-personnel-over-iran-2014-9?IR=T (accessed 23 Aug. 2018).
68 Khalilzad, Z. (2016), The Envoy: From Kabul to the White House, My Journey Through a Turbulent World, New York: St. Martin’s Press.
69 Lister T. (2011), ‘Crashed Drone Was Looking at Iran Nuclear Sites’, CNN, 15 December 2011, http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2011/12/15/crashed-drone-was-looking-at-iran-nuclear-sites/ (accessed 23 Aug. 2018).
70 US Navy (2017), ‘Navy to Commission USS Lewis B Puller (ESB 3)’, 16 August 2017, http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=101985 (accessed 23 Aug. 2018).
71 Torreon, B. S. (2017), ‘Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798–2017’, Congressional Research Service, 12 October 2017, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42738.pdf (accessed 23 Aug. 2018).
72 Ibid.
73 O’Rourke, R. (1988), ‘The Tanker War’, Proceedings, Vol. 114/5/1023, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1988-05/tanker-war (accessed 24 Sep. 2018).
74 Evans, D. (1993), ‘Vincennes: A Case Study’, Proceedings, Vol. 119/8/1086, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1993-08/vincennes-case-study (accessed 24 Sep. 2018).
75 In September 1996, the Clinton administration would unilaterally expand the northern edge of this southern NFZ to the 33rd parallel in response to an Iraqi military ground offensive against the Kurds in the north.
76 Knights, M. (2005), Cradle of Conflict: Iraq and the Birth of Modern U.S. Military Power, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, p. 257; Gordon, M. (2003), ‘U.S. Air Raids In ‘02 Prepared For War in Iraq’, New York Times, 20 July 2003, https://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/20/world/after-the-war-preliminaries-us-air-raids-in-02-prepared-for-war-in-iraq.html (accessed 23 Aug. 2018).
77 Human Rights Watch (2013), ‘Between a Drone and Al Qaeda’, 22 October 2013, https://www.hrw.org/report/2013/10/22/between-drone-and-al-qaeda/civilian-cost-us-targeted-killings-yemen (accessed 23 Aug. 2018). At the time, US officials denied America’s role in the attack, with CENTCOM commander General David Petraeus describing his command’s role as only providing ‘firepower, intelligence, and support’, author interview with David Petraeus, 10 February 2010.
78 The Bureau of Investigative Journalism (2017), ‘Drone Wars: The Full Data’, 1 January 2017, https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/stories/2017-01-01/drone-wars-the-full-data (accessed 2 Jul. 2018).
79 Raghavan, S. (2018), ‘A Defiant Al-Qaeda: U.S. Airstrikes are Pounding the Group in Yemen, Yet the Militants Fight on Fiercely’, Washington Post, 6 July 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/world/wp/2018/07/06/feature/as-a-u-s-shadow-war-intensifies-in-yemen-al-qaeda-is-down-but-not-out/?utm_term=.df94749b74ea (accessed 23 Aug. 2018).