Although Russia does not have a defined common approach to the polar regions, its postures in the Arctic and Antarctica overlap, and are securitized and increasingly militarized.
Does Russia have a common policy approach to the Arctic and Antarctic regions? The question is all the more relevant as an increasing number of non-polar actors – including China, India, Japan and South Korea – and institutions (notably including the EU) are developing comprehensive policies on the Arctic, as well as on Antarctica and the Southern Ocean.
So far, the Kremlin has yet to formulate a single, united policy concept linking its posture and activities for both poles. However, even if Russia does not have a defined common approach to the polar regions, its postures in the Arctic and Antarctica do overlap. They are securitized and are becoming increasingly militarized.
The drivers of Russian policies in both regions are reflected in existing strategic documents. First, both poles are sources of economic potential. The Arctic accounts for nearly 20 per cent of Russia’s GDP and hosts the Northern Sea Route (NSR), Russia’s main trade route across the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation (AZRF). Meanwhile, the Southern Ocean is Russia’s main fishing ground for krill, and the Kremlin is seeking to revitalize its distant-water fishing fleet and to increase revenues from seafood exports.
Second, Russian polar politics are informed by the construction of external threats to national interests. In the Arctic, the main threat perception relates to the fear of ‘encirclement’ by NATO and its allies – a perception that has become even more topical in the context of Russia’s war in Ukraine and of the potential accession to NATO membership of Finland and Sweden. The 2015 Maritime Doctrine discusses reducing the ‘level of threats’ to national security, while subsequent strategic documents on the Arctic detail the existence of ‘external threats’ to Russian sovereignty over the AZRF, including an increased foreign military presence. In Antarctica, Russia’s agenda is to protect its perceived national interests from tentative territorial claims over the continent by Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) member states.
Third, both poles provide Russia with a unique opportunity to project power and influence through science and exploration (although Russia is no longer a leader in oceanic research). Polar politics feed Russia’s sense of itself as a ‘great power’ – it sees the regions as extreme frontiers to be (re)conquered. Russia is presenting itself as an ‘Arctic civilization’, and in this sense development of the region is a ‘legacy project’ for President Vladimir Putin. The South Pole carries its own symbolic value, especially in the context of the 200th anniversary in 2020 of the Bellingshausen expedition – the first Russian Antarctic expedition, and what is considered by Moscow to be the ‘discovery’ of the continent. The Antarctic also represents a ‘frontier’ for Russian influence, akin to outer space and the deep sea.
Finally, at both poles, Russia must mitigate the impact of climate change. In the AZRF, this essentially means dealing with the consequences for regional security dynamics, as well as protecting the region from the human, social and economic effects – equally for the NSR and for military infrastructure. Climate change is also accelerating Moscow’s efforts to increase its presence in the Southern Ocean and on the continent of Antarctica to safeguard perceived national interests and to reserve the right to make a territorial claim.
Despite these similarities, Russia is approaching the two poles in different ways. A key driver pushing it to ‘reconquer’ the Arctic is homeland security, through what can be called a ‘bastionization’ of Russia’s Arctic territory. The Kremlin views the Arctic as a strategic continuum stretching from the High North in the European Arctic to the Pacific Arctic and the North Pacific. Russia’s Arctic posture is therefore informed by climate change and wider geopolitical tensions.
In strategic terms, Russia’s assessment is that climate change is increasing the human presence in the Arctic – which means more military activity – and is creating a new de facto border along the AZRF that needs to be defended. To deal with these potential vulnerabilities, Russia has made the choice to revitalize its military presence along the AZRF – essentially extending its strategic depth and perimeter control through the creation of multi-layered defence bastions across its Arctic territory. Russia’s posture therefore seeks to contest the presence of other actors by using interdiction capabilities.
In operational terms, Russia is rebuilding its military capabilities and modernizing its regional military infrastructure by using a ‘double dual’ approach. Arctic infrastructure is being used equally for civilian and military purposes (dual-use), while Russia’s military capabilities are blurring the lines between offensive and defensive intent (dual-purpose). The practical implication of this is that Russia is maximizing its options in terms of technology and capabilities. For example, with new surface vessels being built to Russian navy standards, the Coast Guard – under FSB (Russian security services) jurisdiction – increasingly takes a militarized approach to its policing role.
This is compounded by a holistic approach to securitizing the AZRF which includes, among other things: employing a diversity of stakeholders, from military forces to the FSB and National Guard, in the territorial protection of Arctic infrastructure; leveraging modern technology hardened to Arctic conditions to achieve operational superiority; and training of the Northern and Pacific Fleets to ensure the safety of the NSR. Recent speculation regarding the creation of a separate Arctic Fleet within the Russian navy has proved unfounded.
In Antarctica and the Southern Ocean, Russia’s main policy driver is the protection of both commercial and perceived national interests. Citing the structure of the ATS, Russia maintains that it can claim sovereign rights over parts of the continent. Because the region is a ‘frontier’ space, a presence at the South Pole allows Russia to project soft power and accumulate prestige. However, the Kremlin feels marginalized in Antarctic affairs, notably because of geographical distance but also due to the perceived intentions of claimant states to ‘geopoliticize’ the ATS.
The increasing number of countries involved in Antarctic affairs, including China and India, is equally concerning for Russia. Moscow is thinking in terms of contingency planning: it has taken steps to reinforce Russia’s presence in Antarctica to defend its commercial interests, as well as to demonstrate its perceived national interests there. Russian scientific ‘research’ is often code for resource-prospecting, and for intelligence and surveillance activities.
By highlighting the risks of power projection by ATS claimant states and their perceived attempts at extending territorial claims over the continent, Russia seeks to pre-empt any changes within the ATS. Should the current situation change to its disadvantage, Moscow says it reserves the right to make a territorial claim.
For reasons of length and practicality, this paper deliberately considers Russia’s military postures and intentions in isolation from Western responses. To explain Russia’s polar policies, the paper explores both the Arctic and the Antarctic regions, while considering in greater detail Russia’s Arctic sectors from west to east. The paper segments Russia’s polar geography between, on the one hand, three Arctic sectors along the AZRF (the European Arctic, the central Arctic and North Pole approaches, and the Pacific Arctic – with the NSR connecting them); and, on the other, Antarctica and the Southern Ocean.
The paper also examines the wider regional consequences of Russia’s posture and potential security problems – the necessity of managing accidents and miscalculations in polar affairs generally and particularly in Russia–China polar interactions. Finally, it presents a set of policy recommendations aimed at mitigating risks for the US and its allies.
