Following its shock victory in Iraq’s October 2021 election, winning 73 of the 329 parliamentary seats, the Shia Islamist Sadrist movement promised to push Iraq towards a new type of politics by forcing the establishment of a majority government. But in June 2022, after eight months of deadlock with the rival Shia Coordination Framework (SCF) over the formation of a new government, the Sadrist bloc’s leader – the populist cleric Muqtada al-Sadr – withdrew from the process, ordering his parliamentarians to resign. The following month, Sadrist protesters stormed and occupied Iraq’s parliament building. Then, on 29 August, protesters and members of the Sadrist armed group Saraya al-Salam (SAS) again stormed the Green Zone (the fortified international zone of Baghdad), which led to clashes with armed groups linked to the Iran-aligned Popular Mobilization Forces (al-Hashd al-Shaabi – PMF) and at least 22 deaths.
A number of questions arose from these events, chief among which were: why did the Sadrists fail to form a government, and why did Sadr refuse to re-engage with the political consensus underpinning the formation of every Iraqi government since 2003? Sadr appears willing to actively oppose the system he has previously protected in order to achieve his goals. As violence erupted following the occupation of parliament, one US policymaker asked: ‘Can one person hold the whole country hostage?’ Many observers were left wondering to what extent Sadr was really willing to risk the stability of Iraq’s post-2003 political system, and to what ultimate end.
In the past, the Sadrist movement played a key role in stabilizing Iraq’s political system as it came under pressure from the Islamic State crisis, oil shocks, civil unrest and the COVID-19 pandemic. The Sadrists lent their coercive power to the state, and twice redirected anti-establishment protests away from challenging the fundamentals of Iraq’s governing consensus.
Having observed these responses, many doubted that Sadr would use his movement’s electoral victory in 2021 to radically challenge the rules of Iraqi politics and destabilize a system in which his movement had become embedded. And yet, Sadr steadfastly pursued his vision of a ‘majority’ government by allying with Sunni and Kurdish factions to form the Tripartite Alliance and to force out some of Iraq’s most powerful Shia Islamist actors and parties. This project not only broke the norm of political inclusivity which has stabilized Iraq’s elite competition, but also appeared to transgress the Shia-centric vision of the state which has been entrenched in Iraq’s political system. Sadr’s challenge to the established political system, and the pushback from the SCF, propelled Iraq into a new political crisis. His refusal to compromise and back down under pressure, as he has done so often in the past, surprised many, and suggested that Sadr’s role as a guarantor of the political system – in its current form – could no longer be taken for granted.
Sadr has long pursued a strategy of ‘controlled instability’, which relies on limited destabilization of the system at strategic moments to gain popular support and political leverage. But this has ultimately conformed to the fundamental rules of political competition. However, after the October 2021 election, Sadr appeared to take a more radical turn as he sought to further destabilize an already fragmented Shia Islamist elite. In reality, he was pursuing a strategy to reconstruct Shia Islamist power around himself, moving it from Shia-centricity to Sadr-centricity.
This research paper addresses the dilemma which arises when a strategy of controlled instability tips into less controlled destabilization. A key consequence is miscalculation in the management of elite politics, exemplified by Sadr’s decision to withdraw his MPs from parliament. He had hoped that his Sunni and Kurdish allies would follow him. They did not, and instead began negotiating with the SCF, which had gained more MPs following Sadr’s withdrawal. This misstep propelled Sadr into a series of reactionary moves and an escalation of violence in the Green Zone which led to at least 22 deaths on 29 August 2022.
Underneath the surface, however, the Sadrists’ antagonism towards the consensus of elite politics is also being driven by a more bottom-up dynamic which arises from the challenge of managing the movement’s social base. This base – composed of millions of poorer urban Shia – is the key source of Sadr’s political power. To better understand the movement’s followers, and how they shape Sadrist politics, Chatham House commissioned a survey of more than 1,000 Sadrists from Sadr City. Named after Muqtada al-Sadr’s father, Mohammad Sadiq al-Sadr, this is a majority Shia district and Sadrist stronghold in eastern Baghdad. The survey was conducted in mid-July 2022 (see details and findings below). Consequently, as well as addressing elite politics, this paper also presents the findings of this survey and outlines their implications for the Sadrist movement and for political stability in Iraq. It offers guidance to policymakers on the pitfalls of backing individuals in Iraq’s complex networks of power, and argues that reform cannot be pursued through backing different political ‘sides’, but rather through building coherent institutions that can hold the network to account. Box 1 presents the key findings of Chatham House’s 2022 survey of Sadr City residents.
