While the transatlantic partners share concerns over China and have similar geopolitical, economic and security interests in the Indo-Pacific, Europe and the US differ in their approaches to the region, their prioritization of it and their definition of the most significant issues.
Duplicated efforts, or the ineffective allocation of resources, could prove confusing to Indo-Pacific partners and could test the capacity of countries in the region to process offers for cooperation. Furthermore, uncoordinated transatlantic cooperation, or a failure to develop strategies in the interest of regional partners, could strengthen the perception of a lack of effective alternatives to a regional political and economic architecture. This would create space for Beijing to promote China-centric structures and illiberal values and norms.
Although divergent European and US approaches and, at times, overlapping minilateral initiatives constrain cooperation, they could become complementary and mutually reinforcing – providing partners in the Indo-Pacific with more options, rather than a binary choice between Europe/US or China. Finding such synergies would negate the need for the transatlantic partners to create new, Indo-Pacific-focused structures.
Elements of uncertainty
China’s behaviour will play a major role in determining the outlook for transatlantic cooperation on the Indo-Pacific. Should Beijing act more assertively or coercively – whether in the US and Europe, or in the Indo-Pacific – the US and its European partners would likely seek to coordinate their approaches, aim to assist their regional partners and demonstrate commitment to the rules-based international order. In such a situation, given Europe’s limited ability to contribute to Indo-Pacific security and continued dependence on the US for its own security, there would be a clearer rationale for a Europe–US division of labour in the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific regions.
Although the US has recently recommitted troops, assets and funding for NATO and Ukraine, it plans to operate more in the Indo-Pacific theatre in future – which has implications for the means at NATO’s disposal. In the event of a crisis in Asia, European countries would likely need to backfill US assets in Europe at a time of heightened threat from Russia. Those countries active militarily in the Indo-Pacific as part of national strategies (e.g. France, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK) would also need to decide whether to align closely with US-led regional security structures – although, in practice, they would have little other option.
Meanwhile, competition for attention between the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific theatres has implications for the allocation of European and US military resources. The trajectory of Russia’s war on Ukraine will impact most on the security policies of the EU and European governments. But the two theatres are increasingly linked, not least due to the China–Russia relationship, which – publicly at least – has strengthened since the beginning of the war.
Increased Chinese assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific also impacts the cost/benefit calculations of the countries in that region, which may become more receptive to transatlantic engagement. At the same time, US actions – for example, then House speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August 2022 – could impact regional perceptions of US and its European partners.
The US presidential elections in 2024 are unlikely to fundamentally change the US approach to China and the Indo-Pacific. But the outcome could have significant implications for transatlantic cooperation. A victory for Donald Trump or a candidate with a similar worldview could lead to renewed friction between the transatlantic partners, limiting the scope of cooperation in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. A Trump or Trump-like administration would likely take a more transactional approach to relations with its European partners – for example, demanding greater European alignment with US policy on China and the Indo-Pacific in exchange for US security guarantees.
In addition to the US, current UK political instability could alter the shape of transatlantic Indo-Pacific engagement. Liz Truss was a firm supporter of both increased defence spending and the Indo-Pacific ‘tilt’. In her short time as prime minister, Truss ordered a review of the Integrated Review, which was expected to recommend firmer language around the threat of China. It remains to be seen how Sunak or indeed a future Labour government will approach the Indo-Pacific region, and how domestic economic realities will restrict UK defence and foreign policy budgets.
Focus on cooperation and managing differences
Policymakers across Europe and the US are currently exploring how to align Indo-Pacific-related initiatives in various minilateral groupings by determining the forums and issues where discussions with like-minded partners are most likely to succeed.
There are slight differences between the transatlantic partners on preferred mechanisms for engagement – the US tends towards bespoke partnerships and Europe towards multilateral platforms. However, opportunities for greater alignment do exist, and there is a shared recognition that cooperation and coordination must go beyond information-sharing.
For example, there is potential for greater engagement between the Quad and the ‘Euro Quad’ – with the US, as a participant in both, serving as the conduit. The Quad has adopted a softer approach to security and economics, mostly targeting uncontroversial issues on which the EU, the UK and the US could also cooperate. The success of such an approach will depend, of course, on the political will of Indo-Pacific partners to connect the two formats, especially as they are keen to avoid the perception of targeting China.
The G7 could also become a key platform for transatlantic Indo-Pacific policy engagement, as it has the advantage of including the most influential EU member states, the UK and the US as well as the EU as a non-enumerated member. The only G7 member situated in the Indo-Pacific region (excluding the various territories of France and the US) is Japan, which holds the G7 presidency in 2023. However, representatives from other Indo-Pacific countries – such as Australia, India, Indonesia and South Korea – have joined recent G7 meetings as observers. The G7 already plays an important role in enabling cooperation on climate adaptation and mitigation, green finance and infrastructure. Ways of strengthening this cooperation could include providing adequate funding to nascent initiatives such as PGII, but also using the G7 as a link between external initiatives led by members and observers – for example, the EU’s Global Gateway and the Blue Dot Network of Australia, Japan and the US.
The EU and its member states, the UK and the US all have strong reasons to deepen engagement with the Indo-Pacific. But regional buy-in and policy co-creation will ultimately be critical for the success of individual and, where feasible, coordinated engagement by transatlantic players in the Indo-Pacific.
