Over the preceding 15 years, significant changes in the international and regional contexts – specifically US activity – enabled Israel and the UAE to deepen cooperation, culminating in the Abraham Accords.
The Abraham Accords were the culmination of a long process that saw Israel and the UAE’s core interests begin to align, over an extended period. As one interviewee noted: ‘the accords [didn’t] come out of [a] vacuum. It [was the] culmination of 10–15 years of tacit relations between [the] UAE and Israel. It has been evolving and there was a lot of dealing and exchange of views, benefits but it was never official, [though] everyone knew about it’.
The accords made official this long-observed, quiet collaboration between Israel and Gulf Arab states that had been under way since the 1990s. There had not been a uniform GCC policy or approach to Israel. Rather, engagement was bilateral and premised on each GCC state’s own domestic and regional calculations. Incremental changes in the region allowed GCC states to gradually engage with Israel.
The US influence
The Middle East’s strategic significance to the US has been in decline. Since the Obama administration, addressing domestic economic inequities and renewing America’s global economic position have taken precedence. After the onset of President George W. Bush’s costly ‘global war on terror’, the global financial crisis in 2008, growing federal debt and military de-escalation abroad, the US is refocusing on the home front alongside meeting the larger threat coming from China. Donald Trump’s presidency carried forward similar themes and stressed ‘America First’ and ‘burden-sharing’ as a necessary precondition to US international engagement, including in the Middle East.
Ideological contests in the MENA region between secular authoritarian models of governance and political Islamist ones continue, though space for freedom of expression has been closed in almost every state in the region.
Since the 2003 Iraq war and the 2011 Arab Spring, the Middle East region has been mired in conflict, which has been exacerbated by multipolar regional competition. In Iraq, US post-war investment since 2003 has yet to yield a stable government or stem the tide of extremism. US efforts at containment of, or engagement with, Iran have failed to halt the latter’s support for proxy groups in countries beyond its borders – such as in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and Yemen. Ideological contests in the MENA region between secular authoritarian and political Islamist models of governance continue, though space for freedom of expression has been closed in almost every state in the region. Despite patterns of coercion and disregard for human rights, protest movements have gained ground and galvanized popular support outside the region. But wars in Libya, Syria and Yemen continue with no end in sight.
Trump’s 2018 withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) over Iran’s nuclear programme and imposition of ‘maximum pressure’ sanctions led Iran to further undermine stability in the region. Iranian action was not met with a bold US response. The US did not immediately push back against Iran’s June 2019 downing of a US drone, attacks on tankers in the Persian Gulf or a missile attack on Saudi oil facilities in September 2019, which the US blamed on Iran but was actually launched by the al-Houthis in Yemen. This anxiety intensified with the US withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021, which was seen in the region as proof of the US’s abandonment of its partners. US focus on the war in Ukraine over regional challenges related to Iranian influence since early 2022 has only increased concerns that the MENA region is no longer a US priority.
Despite denials from the US, MENA states have reacted to the combination of regional instability and uncertainty over the US position by shifting their own tactics towards de-escalation of regional conflict on the one hand and hedging against US disengagement on the other. US allies in the region, particularly Israel and the UAE, have found themselves frustrated by the shifts and unpredictability of US policy. Securing a stable long-term, security-based relationship with the US is a primary motivation for both states, and considered key for short-term and longer-term regional security management. The Abraham Accords provide a platform for such an arrangement.
Quiet beginnings
After the 1991 Madrid Peace Conference, Oman and Qatar were the first GCC states to engage overtly with Israel, through invitations for official visits and the opening of reciprocal trade offices. Saudi Arabia’s 2002 Arab Peace Initiative (API) was also an important turning point, making Israeli normalization contingent on an overall peace with the Palestinians and the establishment of a Palestinian state. The initiative, announced at the Arab League summit in Beirut, marked a significant departure from the League’s earlier 1967 resolution at Khartoum, which contained the ‘three nos’ against peace, recognition and negotiation with Israel. The 1991 Madrid Peace Conference and the API opened the door to both formal and informal talks between Israel and Gulf Arab states, though for the most part, these remained behind closed doors.
The succession of younger leaders in the GCC has brought to the fore a more open generation that is willing to support efforts at moderating attitudes towards Israel. As one interlocutor put it:
Leadership matters
Normalizing relations with Israel may not have been a priority for the UAE leadership, but their decision to lift certain restrictions on relations helped change the domestic environment and made cooperating with Israel possible. The changes included permitting Emirati businesses to engage with Israeli companies – in effect, breaking the Arab League boycott of Israeli products.
Israeli officials had long sought recognition from Gulf Arab states. After Benjamin Netanyahu became Prime Minister again in 2009, he made clear his desire to meet with senior officials from Gulf Arab states to discuss regional security matters. However, the assassination in Dubai, in January 2010, of Hamas senior commander Mahmoud al-Mabhouh – attributed by the Dubai authorities to the Israeli external intelligence agency, Mossad – put back the prospect of a meeting between senior leaders for another two years.
The nature of Israeli–Emirati relations started to change once the Arab Spring took hold and Syria’s president, Bashar al-Assad, crossed Obama’s so-called ‘red line’ on the use of chemical weapons, though few signs of a public Israel–UAE relationship were yet visible. In September 2012, for instance, UAE foreign minister Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan (AbZ) met the Israeli prime minister in New York. During that meeting, AbZ and Netanyahu agreed on the level of threat from Iran’s nuclear programme, but AbZ made clear that there could be no public acknowledgment of this realignment without progress on the Palestinian issue. Nevertheless, the meeting proved instrumental in facilitating further private meetings between senior Israeli and Emirati officials, and in the acknowledgment of Iran as a shared and constant concern.
The signing of the JCPOA in 2015 between Iran and the P5+1 group comprising China, France, Germany, Russia, the UK and the US drew similar public and private responses from Israel and the UAE. Both were alarmed by the development, as neither believed that the JCPOA addressed their own core security interests.
Israel was not against a deal in principle, but objected strongly to the terms of the JCPOA, which it did not consider stringent enough. The government believed that the plan was insufficient to stop Iran advancing quickly towards break-out capability, and that it had effectively legitimized Iran’s bid to become a threshold state. In Israel’s view, neither the conditions, nor the sunset clauses were enough to prevent an Iranian bomb. However, some senior Israeli officials had, at the time, different opinions and publicly supported the JCPOA.
Similarly, the UAE felt that it had been betrayed by its main security partner – the US – as it had not been consulted during the process or involved in the negotiations. Conversations with serving and former officials from signatory countries suggest that this was not, in fact, the case. Many of those interviewed for this paper describe in detail how Gulf Arab countries were frequently consulted. Nevertheless, there remains a strong perception among Emirati policymakers that their interests were not considered. As such, the UAE began a quiet campaign to undermine the JCPOA and highlight how it strengthened, rather than loosened, Iran’s position in the region. This campaign took the form of public diplomacy in Washington, DC and other capitals, and active political and diplomatic lobbying.
Meanwhile, meetings between Israeli and Emirati officials intensified. In 2015, Israeli ambassador to the US Ron Dermer briefed the UAE ambassador to the US, Yousef al-Otaiba, and sought to convince him to align with Israel’s position and actively oppose the deal. Israel had undertaken a public campaign against the JCPOA, and in March 2015 Israeli prime minister Netanyahu accepted an invitation to speak before a joint session of Congress, stating clearly that ‘[t]his is a bad deal – a very bad deal’. Although the UAE chose to lodge its opposition to the agreement in private, Netanyahu’s presentation to Congress proved to be a turning point in Israel–UAE relations.
Towards the end of Obama’s second term as president, US intelligence agencies learned of phone calls between senior Israeli and UAE officials, including direct calls between Netanyahu and a senior Emirati leader. Intelligence agencies also reported that senior leaders of the two countries had met secretly in Cyprus to discuss plans to counter the Iran nuclear deal. According to a former US State Department official, however, neither the Israelis nor the Emiratis informed the Obama administration of these discussions.
The Arab Spring and the JCPOA had, in effect, brought into sharp focus how similar Israeli and Emirati interests had become. However, it was the Palestinian issue that pushed them towards formalizing their relationship. Former Israeli foreign minister Tzipi Livni’s presence at a lunch held in honour of AbZ in New York in September 2016 indicated improving relations between leading personalities. Over lunch, AbZ was reported to have told Livni that other Gulf Arab states were eager to improve relations with Israel, but none of them, including the UAE, would consider normalization unless Israel also took concrete steps towards a two-state solution with the Palestinians. Nevertheless, it was Netanyahu’s election victory in March 2020 and his pledge to annex parts of the West Bank that galvanized the UAE into action, leading to the Abraham Accords.
The Arab Spring and the JCPOA had, in effect, brought into sharp focus how similar Israeli and Emirati interests had become. However, it was the Palestinian issue that pushed them towards formalizing their relationship.
On taking office, Netanyahu declared his intent to annex approximately one-third of the West Bank. On 28 April 2020, he set a hard deadline of 10 weeks and signalled clearly that annexation would take place on 1 July. According to an interviewee, Netanyahu likely believed that, because of his relationship with Trump and US ambassador to Israel David Friedman, the US would give its blessing or at least would not put up much resistance. Moreover, Trump’s ‘Deal of the Century’, which failed almost immediately, had given rise to an environment in which Netanyahu could push for things that had previously been unthinkable. However, the UAE leadership viewed annexation as a grave threat to regional stability that would empower Iran and political Islamists across the region.
In response to Netanyahu’s pledge, al-Otaiba published an article in Hebrew in Israeli newspaper Yedioth Ahronoth, writing that informal relations between Israel and the Arab world had warmed over recent years. But he also warned against plans to annex parts of the West Bank and argued that such an action would damage the prospect of Israel’s normalization with the Arab world. It was a groundbreaking move and al-Otaiba made the UAE position clear – annexation would end the relationship.
Al-Otaiba had first mooted the idea of normalization between the UAE and Israel in March 2019 during a meeting with Trump’s senior adviser and Middle East envoy, Jared Kushner. The US had been supportive at the time, but Israel’s domestic political environment made normalization seem implausible – indeed, three general elections were held in the following 12 months, each resulting in neither main bloc holding a parliamentary majority. By March 2020, however, Netanyahu’s threat of annexation prompted Kushner and al-Otaiba to consider offering normalization to stop the Israeli prime minister from fulfilling his electoral pledge. Bilateral discussions took place between the US and UAE and the US and Israel, as the Emiratis wanted to ensure that Israel’s commitment would rest with the US and, therefore, be harder to renege on.
Although Trump was neither the architect nor the instigator of the Abraham Accords, his presidency created an environment in which the signatory states were able to challenge the status quo. Trump’s penchant for grand gestures gave Israel and the UAE a world stage to signal their intent to normalize relations and work out the details afterwards. It is revealing that both parties not only needed the endorsement of the US, but wanted it to play a leading role.
Biden’s regional response
On taking office in January 2021, Biden inherited these troubling regional dynamics and a disconnect between intentions and actions. Moreover, for months after coming into office, his administration was preoccupied with the fallout of the transition from Trump’s term in office. The extreme polarization of US politics further impacted policy decisions on the Middle East. Despite promising to reverse Trump’s withdrawal from the JCPOA, the incoming Biden team took months to return to the negotiating table. In Washington, Biden’s team prioritized domestic politics and delayed development of their approach to Iran. The June 2021 Iranian presidential election, which saw Ebrahim Raisi elected, also resulted in a similar delay.
During their first year of office, the Biden team also refused to refer to the Abraham Accords by name, because of Trump’s role in brokering the deal. To distance himself from Trump and his administration’s close ties to the GCC, Biden approached Gulf politics and particularly relations with Saudi Arabia’s crown prince Muhammad bin Salman Al Saud (MbS) tentatively. However, after the one-year anniversary of the accords, Biden began to see normalization as a durable opportunity, acknowledging that a new regional landscape was being formed among US partners. The arrangements and relationships under way were also considered beneficial for the US’s broader global objectives. The US National Security Strategy (NSS) released in October 2022 anchors the US position to a ‘new framework for US policy in the region based on America’s unparalleled comparative advantage in building partnerships, coalitions, and alliances to strengthen deterrence, while using diplomacy to de-escalate tensions, reduce risks of new conflicts, and set a long-term foundation for stability’. The NSS makes clear that, notwithstanding geopolitical priorities with China and Russia, the US intends to continue to have a presence in the MENA region. Moreover, the strategy aims to create a deliberate role for the US through CENTCOM, while also being directed to empowering indigenous regional efforts that could over time secure longer-term security arrangements.
Despite the recalibration of US priorities, as outlined in the October 2022 National Security Strategy, the challenge for Washington is that it has, since the end of the Cold War, been the principal guarantor of regional stability in the Middle East. The Gulf Arab states, Israel, Egypt and Jordan have relied on close ties with the US to contain Iran, combat extremism and protect energy flows from the region. As US interests have begun to gradually shift, unwinding this dependency has proven challenging both for US policymakers and regional leaders.
