The five scientists featured in this paper are undoubtedly Xi’s political protégés; they have worked with him closely in the past, and their loyalty and successful track records as, variously, heads of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), president of a top university and provincial party secretaries – all with a strong focus on scientific innovation – are now being rewarded with political influence. While Xi has successfully managed to eliminate political rivals and consolidate his paramount authority over the past decade, he also needs to have experienced ‘enablers’ to ensure his political and economic mandate is fulfilled. Xi is therefore likely to have high expectations that the scientist members of the Politburo will deliver his highly ambitious agenda to boost China’s innovation capabilities.
For the 20th Politburo, the scale of the domestic innovation and self-reliance challenge is vast. To start with, there has been a structural shift in how innovation policies and talent-reshoring programmes are decided and delivered. The centrality of the CPC under Xi’s leadership has blurred the line between policies run by government departments, both at national and provincial level, and the policies overseen by the party. This has been reflected in an unprecedented level of political intervention in science policies and research programmes – in contrast to the 1990s and early 2000s, when scientists worked in a more politically neutral environment.
The centralization of party authority under Xi Jinping may have the effect of discouraging homegrown innovation as well as critical thinking that challenges conventional theory and practice.
The unintended consequences of this shift in the relationship between party, state and science reach far beyond the scientific community, as young Chinese STEM (science, technology, engineering and mathematics) graduates have increasingly begun to favour jobs in the civil service, seeing these as the best route to lifelong financial security, rather than work for research institutes or small start-up companies. Furthermore, small and medium-sized tech companies are concerned about policy uncertainties and inconsistencies arising from political intervention from ideologically focused party officials. This centralization of party authority may have the effect of discouraging homegrown innovation as well as critical thinking that challenges conventional theory and practice.
Although Xi has made clear his ambition for China to find its way to scientific self-reliance, in reality the country’s successes thus far in science and technology are – as for its peers and competitors – a direct result of frequent exchanges and connectivity with the scientific community globally. Each of the newly appointed scientist members of the Politburo has substantial experience of either studying or working abroad, and is fluent in one or more foreign languages. Their time spent overseas has certainly helped them rise to prominence in their specialist field before entering politics and in time reaching high office within the CPC. But the challenge for Xi and the scientists within the Politburo now is how far the drive for ‘self-reliance’ can go in delivering China’s desired scientific breakthrough by overcoming the country’s reliance on imports of critical technology components.
While the new scientist members of the Politburo have mostly come with strong domestic political experience, they have also contributed to China’s external engagement through their various professional roles and experience in their earlier careers as scientists. Some have, in the past, either worked with or directly competed against peers and counterparts in the US and Europe. As such, it may appear reasonable to speculate as to whether these new entrants to the Politburo may favour a diplomatic ‘reset’ with Western advanced economies. It would be a mistake to conclude that fluency in foreign languages or time spent abroad has shaped their fundamental ideological beliefs and political preferences. But one thing that is certain is that their overseas experience, whether positive or negative, will ultimately be reflected in their policy decisions for China’s domestic scientific innovation, as well as in Beijing’s wider foreign policymaking, over the coming decades.
This research paper addresses the question of how the make-up of the 20th CPC Politburo, with a particular focus on the new scientist appointees, sheds light on Xi’s stated ambition to prioritize innovation in pursuit of China’s scientific and technological self-reliance. The analysis draws on publicly available secondary sources, records of speeches made by Xi and the newly appointed Politburo members, and policy documents published by the Chinese government. An examination of the wider composition of the current Politburo is followed by a discussion of the scientific chokepoints for China. The paper then goes on to assess the politics associated with scientific self-reliance; the context for talent-grooming and reshoring; and the politics of building a digital economy in line with the party’s preferences. In the concluding section, the paper reflects on the significance of the new appointments to the Politburo and the wider implications for China’s political economy.
