A series of practical steps can be taken for which the capacity already exists. Stabilization policies must be revised to give greater voice to the population within negotiations. Moreover, stronger connections between reformists across government and society can help foster accountability.
This paper has illustrated that the means via which peace is negotiated will shape the ways in which a state evolves. External actors have played different roles in the development of the current Iraqi, Lebanese and Libyan political systems. In Iraq, Western intervention directly removed the Saddam Hussein regime, while in Libya, rebels drew critical support from a coalition of Western and Gulf Arab states to oust Gaddafi. In Lebanon, inter-elite and sectarian disputes were arbitrated by regional actors, with extensive intervention and interference on the part of Syria.
Despite the varying roles of external actors in securing the elite bargain in each context, support for political settlements among policymakers from the Global North has remained consistent and rarely questioned. This is because their primary objective is to avoid further outbreaks of direct violence. In both Iraq and Libya, stabilization policies continue to support elite bargains that reduce the likelihood of direct violence, even when doing so means overlooking anti-democratic and violent behaviours. In Lebanon, where Western states did not intervene, stabilization policies nonetheless continue to tacitly support the power-sharing system in place, despite the structural violence it has wrought on the everyday lives of people.
These elite bargains have often been celebrated by policymakers and some policy-oriented academics, who argue that a peace settlement is better than continued civil war. However, international statebuilders have struggled to reconcile their dual priorities of maintaining immediate stability, which a political settlement delivers, and promoting genuine democratic reform, which could minimize future violence stemming from corrupt political systems. Many of these policymakers are, of course, not oblivious to the challenges of corruption and the absence of a functional social contract in those countries. Indeed, they offer significant development aid, capacity-building support and technical cooperation aimed at addressing those very challenges. Too often, though, their political approaches work at cross-purposes to these efforts. For example, the provision of technical support to state institutions is not compatible with attempts to broker deals that split resources among rival elites.
International statebuilders have struggled to reconcile their dual priorities of maintaining immediate stability and promoting genuine democratic reform.
Even with a revised approach by external policymakers, the transformation of existing elite-focused settlements into accountable, democratic political systems would be highly challenging. The cumulative effects of structural violence caused by elite capture are more difficult to isolate and demand longer-term policies with less visible immediate outcomes than the cessation of direct violence that can result from elite bargains. Here, capacity challenges and institutionalized constraints within Western states make it more difficult for those states to pursue such policies. The attention of senior Western politicians often moves from one conflict to the next and is fundamentally reactive. Longer-term policies with less visibility also offer less to the short-term and results-oriented policymaker, keen to make an impact during a short period in post. Moreover, there is an understandable desire among policymakers from the Global North to exercise caution. For these reasons, they often end up supporting the status quo out of fear that political change will create further unrest. For instance, at critical junctures like election periods in Iraq, those policymakers have supported status quo administrations despite being aware that these allies are committing human rights abuses against their population.
Nonetheless, a series of practical steps can be taken for which the requisite capacity already exists. The most obvious point of entry is to seek to revise stabilization approaches to consider how an inter-elite power-sharing system affects local populations, and to give greater voice to those populations within negotiations, rather than assuming that a chosen elite will represent the interests of their social support network. However, in contexts where those systems are entrenched – such as those in Iraq, Lebanon and Libya – support should be aimed at increasing accountability within the political system.
Explore how people’s everyday lives are impacted by the political system
A better understanding of the causes and consequences of vertical-structural violence, and its links to the political system, can help policymakers to understand the practical, population-level effects of elite bargains. This must begin by actively collecting data on the structural effects of that system on society and including that data – on key elements such as corruption, transparency and social economic indicators – in assessments of the degree of stability that the political system possesses. This does not constitute a return to the former orthodoxy of the liberal peace model – which involves the simultaneous pursuit of conflict resolution, liberal democracy and market sovereignty – but instead would seek to correct the current policy bias manifested in the sole focus on direct forms of violence. Only through such a prism can a realistic basis for the development of complementary policymaking and programming be provided to support incremental reforms that can benefit the population.
Second, in Iraq, Lebanon and Libya, the networks of elites connected to the political system are not always in formal government positions. Sometimes, powerful brokers outside government or diplomatic channels still act as pivotal decision-makers in systems of corruption. In such cases, the key is to explore how networks of actors have captured government institutions that could otherwise protect citizens. At times, these networks will include parties that purport to be allies, who may promise democracy to international policymakers but may also engage in systemic corruption. There is an inherent tension between the perceived need for policymakers to engage with these political elites to pursue political ends and the funding programmes that seek to counter corruption. For policymakers, therefore, understanding the connectivity of these networks of power and applying greater leverage on allies within a particular system can be important steps to navigating the structural barriers to governance reform.
Develop networks of like-minded reformists to counter vested interests among the elites
Given the complex environment for institution-building in captured states, international policymakers should support a broader strategy for accountability. In Iraq, Lebanon and Libya, the judiciary and other accountability mechanisms have either been captured by the elite who sit inside and outside the government, or they lack the ability to hold key power-brokers accountable. As a result, simply working in a technical capacity with those judges or civil servants currently in post is counterproductive.
In all three of the reference countries, reform-oriented individuals still exist in each layer of the state – the executive, judiciary and legislature – and in society more widely. These are individuals who have proven to be technically capable and therefore indispensable in their roles. They also share a genuine willingness to pursue accountability and reduce corruption. But the nature of elite capture means that these individuals often work in silos, reducing the potential impact of their work, and leaving them feeling isolated and less able to effect change. Efforts to identify these individuals and to increase connectivity and collaboration between them and powerful societal actors, such as journalists, academics and civil society activists, will increase their capacity to contribute to positive change from within the system. The main goal of this strategy of increasing accountability is to support the development of a sustainable network of reformists across state and non-state institutions. Therefore, it should ideally be led by local convening organizations, rather than by international actors directly.
Support short-term, discrete initiatives that work towards long-term goals
The end goal of policymakers’ support for political settlements and the ensuing political systems should be the presence of strong accountability mechanisms. This would, of course, take decades to achieve. The process therefore requires discrete shorter-term policies that strive towards that long-term goal, and that can be championed by diplomats over the course of their short stints in the country. For instance, in Iraq, Lebanon and Libya, targeted support for efforts to increase the state’s transparency, via an access-to-information law or enhanced requirements on public disclosure of budgetary spending, would be of significant benefit and could enhance civil society’s ability to hold state institutions accountable. This could be achieved, for example, through an online initiative that tracks annual budgetary spending to check where state resources are going – to the benefit of the population or that of the governing elites. In any of these initiatives, it is crucial to link them to a broader strategy that seeks to hold to account the elite bargain and, as such, limit its potential to wreak structural violence in people’s everyday lives. The role of international actors in this strategy would be to push their political networks – across the legislature and executive – to support such initiatives and call them out when they block them. Such initiatives should be seen as key aspects of any peace settlement, which otherwise may not seem peaceful to the people who live in it. Where such initiatives are not deemed to be politically possible, such as supporting a political deal that reinforces corruption as the price of alleviating armed contestation, policymakers should explicitly acknowledge the trade-offs of their approach in terms of the medium- and long-term costs likely to be borne by the population.
