As Figure 2 demonstrates, a number of MENA countries – Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Türkiye and the UAE – either already have diplomatic relations with both Iran and Israel, or have official ties with Israel and are in the process of restoring ties with Iran as well. As one of the articles published for this project argued, a key concept in ‘getting the ball rolling’ for a cooperative dialogue is to ‘begin with what (and who) you can begin with’ – in other words, start with a smaller number of interested parties and expand over time.
Cooperative regional forums in other parts of the world have evolved using a similar approach. For example, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) began in 1967 with only five members and a short general declaration committing participants to regular meetings, strengthening regional cooperation, and recognizing mutual interests in addressing common problems. With time, ASEAN expanded to include additional institutional frameworks and member states. Its development included the creation of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994, which incorporated regional and extra-regional adversarial states such as the US and North Korea. ASEAN is not without its critics and limitations, but it has provided an indispensable cooperative layer that, over several decades, has helped turn a theatre for great power rivalry and conflict into a more prosperous and peaceful region. ASEAN has also served as a useful forum for managing relations with external powers, and thus offers lessons for the Middle East as it navigates great power competition.
A new cooperative process in the MENA region could emulate this strategy, starting with a small group of founding participants. With the exception of Iran, MENA states are largely not trying to push external powers out of the region. But they have made it very clear that they do not want to choose sides or have great power rivalries play out on their doorstep in ways that undermine cooperation or increase the prospects for conflict.
Given rising geostrategic rivalries between the US, China and Russia, any new inclusive forum should therefore minimize the role of the major powers. This constraint also makes the involvement of the P5 or P5+1 – the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, plus Germany – unfeasible, though UN backing for layered regional cooperation through the appointment of an envoy could lend important institutional support to a new organization. Facilitator or partnership roles for smaller external powers – whether in Europe or Asia – or for the European Union as a bloc could be more helpful, particularly in functional areas where external actors have particular competence and vested interests. Still, a new forum is more likely to succeed and endure if the momentum and branding are MENA-made and MENA-led.
Because much of the recent political de-escalation has originated in the Gulf, a ‘GCC plus’ formulation could form the starting point for a new initiative. GCC states also have the financial resources and incentives to foster regional cooperation. As explained above, a forum limited to Gulf affairs alone would not easily expand into the sort of inclusive region-wide organization that is ultimately necessary. A better starting point might be a formula that includes the GCC states, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan and Türkiye. If a representative of the Arab Maghreb Union were also added to the grouping, alongside an envoy from other regional initiatives, this could showcase the broader intent of inclusivity.
A grouping of this type would include countries with close ties to Iran, such as Iraq, as well as states that have normalized ties with both Iran and Israel (such as Jordan, Türkiye and the UAE). To avoid the appearance of taking sides on political and territorial disputes in North Africa, as in the case of Algeria and Morocco, an official from the Arab Maghreb Union could initially represent that subregion. Above all, the hope with this sort of formulation is that using a small initial group to foster wider linkages with other MENA countries could lead to its expansion to include adversarial states in the future.
A forum limited to Gulf affairs alone would not easily expand into the sort of inclusive region-wide organization that is ultimately necessary. A better starting point might be a formula that includes the GCC states, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan and Türkiye.
As mentioned, such a pathway implies that some important regional states – notably Iran and Israel – would not join high-level meetings initially. However, there would still be the possibility of lower-level engagement through issue-specific working groups in functional areas of common concern. Even adversarial states that do not recognize each other could participate in technical or non-governmental activities under the cover of a multilateral ‘umbrella’.
A good example of technical cooperation succeeding where formal diplomacy has failed can be found in the Oman-based Middle East Desalination Research Center (MEDRC). This multilateral research institution focuses on addressing freshwater scarcity, and is the only remnant of the multilateral Middle East peace process of the early 1990s. MEDRC continues to operate, with Israeli participation, even though Oman, the host nation, and some other participants do not recognize Israel. Similarly, on climate policy, scientists from Iran, Israel, Lebanon and the Palestinian Territories participate in a forum hosted by the Cyprus Institute, despite Israel’s adversarial relations with the three other parties. Scientists from Egypt, Iran, Israel, Jordan and Türkiye also participate in a research initiative, the Synchrotron-light for Experimental Science and Applications in the Middle East (SESAME), established in Jordan in 2017 under the auspices of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).
In other words, adversarial states can cooperate on certain functional topic areas or even in certain multilateral formats without such joint activities needing direct, official recognition from government. Consequently, the idea of starting ‘where you can’ with a smaller grouping of regional states does not preclude attracting additional participants with creative diplomacy as such cooperation evolves. Ultimately, a smaller grouping is necessary at the outset to create the vision and momentum necessary to attract broader high-level support.
What should be on the agenda?
A new regional forum would need to demonstrate its value to participating states by producing tangible benefits. One of the main critiques of the ‘Baghdad summits’, for instance, has been their inability to translate impressive high-level participation by a large number of regional states into meaningful action. During the research for this paper, participants at multiple project meetings stressed the need to avoid ‘performative’ cooperation in which high-level summitry does not generate sustainable and concrete results; the region does not need another unproductive multilateral institution.
Consequently, it will be imperative to design a process that allows for cooperation on functional issues among both official and non-governmental subject matter experts. One option could be to draw on the discussion formats of previous multilateral initiatives. For example, the Middle East peace process operated working groups broadly modelled on the concept of thematic ‘baskets’ of issues, as used for the 1975 Helsinki Accords. The working groups focused on five areas: arms control and regional security; economic development; water; the environment; and refugees. The current iteration of multilateral Arab–Israeli cooperation through the Negev Forum is similarly structured to allow for the holding of working-level meetings on six functional topics between higher-level summits. The working group structure on functional and thematic areas allows progress to be made in some areas even when efforts are stalled in others.
There is no shortage of topics that could usefully be taken up in a new regional forum. The main requirement is that issues should appeal to a wide range of participants and that action should require cross-border cooperation. But there should not be too many topics, as this would risk diluting policy activity and would create organizational complexity – potentially burdensome in the early stages of establishing and trying to build momentum behind a new forum. Identifying a smaller number of common issues to address may prove more feasible.
The challenge is to identify issues that are not immediately divisive yet are recognized as important for regional security. An underlying principle, and a lesson that has emerged from other global experiences, is that the definition of ‘security’ should be broad enough to accommodate a wide range of issues with potential impacts on regional peace and stability. In other words, security should not just be seen as being about so-called ‘hard’ issues such as weapons and troop numbers. It is also affected by economic disparities, climate change, migration, technology and public health crises. While regional leaders still value traditional concepts of hard security, there is a growing recognition that ‘soft security’ issues pose significant threats to national interests and regional stability.
In recognition of both this shift in regional views and the prior experiences of other dialogues, we recommend largely avoiding the replication of previous agendas where issues like arms control were included at the outset. Allowing other regional and global forums to address more contentious issues – such as the idea of creating a nuclear weapons-free zone in the Middle East – would be more productive than trying to tackle these topics within a new effort. This should not, however, preclude taking up certain elements of prior topics where much productive discussion has already occurred – such as on water and environmental challenges – and adapting those agendas to the current context.
As a starting point, we recommend focusing the substantive agenda of a new multilateral effort on three areas that emerged as priorities during our project discussions and workshops. These areas, which are gaining high-level attention among regional governments, are: (1) coordination on climate change; (2) energy cooperation; and (3) emergency response (including cross-border coordination between authorities dealing with public health crises, earthquakes and maritime incidents).
This list is certainly not exhaustive. It could be refined and expanded once a process is launched. Tourism cooperation, for example, is likely to attract region-wide support, particularly when linked to economic development planning. Missile proliferation is another area of widespread concern that will eventually need a region-wide solution. But there was a convergence of opinion among the experts we engaged that the three proposed topics meet the essential criteria of urgency, region-wide interest and feasibility. Tackling issues that are relatively uncontentious but still important offers a useful starting point for further cooperation. Moreover, climate action, energy policy and emergency response all lend themselves to region-wide linkages, including between the Gulf and North African states.
A further rationale for this starting agenda is that, because mistakes or policy gaps in these fields often have substantial negative effects beyond the MENA region – even globally – this increases the incentives for constructive extra-regional support and disincentivizes potential spoilers. That said, even seemingly less contentious issues are not necessarily easy to address cooperatively; every issue can be politicized and create friction, particularly given inequities across the region and the inevitable prospect of participating countries jostling for a greater say on one aspect of policy or another. Nonetheless, we believe these are issues where transnational cooperation has the potential to create win-win outcomes visible to people on the ground, not just to officials at negotiating tables.
Here are specific examples for a cooperative agenda in the three proposed
topic areas:
Climate cooperation
In terms of urgency, managing the impacts of climate change is widely seen as a regional priority. Throughout our research conversations and workshops, climate-related discussions emerged as an area in which regional cooperation can and should be fostered. The MENA region is a climate change hotspot: it is warming at twice the average global rate, with some parts of the region likely to be unliveable by mid-century. Leaders can try to make progress from inside national policy silos, but the negative impacts of climate change inevitably cross borders, increasing the need for regional cooperation. The timing on cooperation is also optimal, given the region’s current prominence in the international debate on climate change: Egypt hosted the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change’s high-profile COP27 conference in 2022, and the UAE will host COP28 in late 2023.
The Middle East is a climate change hotspot: it is warming at twice the average global rate, with some parts of the region likely to be unliveable by mid-century.
A recent article published as part of this project proposed a number of ideas for climate cooperation in the MENA region, including: the creation of a research, development and innovation hub along the lines of the Cyprus Initiative; a regional food security initiative; joint action on preserving the Mediterranean marine environment; a collaborative forum on climate migrants; and the establishment of early-warning systems for climate-related natural disasters such as flooding. Regional countries with experience in particular areas, or with strong incentives to promote action on them, could take the lead in coordinating governmental and non-governmental efforts within relevant working groups. (Potential examples could include Oman playing a prominent role on water security, or Egypt on food security.) External states or international organizations could partner with regional states to offer support in their own areas of competence.
Energy cooperation
Energy cooperation also offers potential long-term mutual benefit for participating states. The subject is gaining more attention given recent natural gas discoveries in the eastern Mediterranean, as well as the efforts of Gulf states to diversify their oil-based economies. An article in our MENA Cooperative Security Policy Series argues: ‘Energy diplomacy has proven to be highly effective at encouraging cooperation among hostile states and, in turn, enhancing overall regional security. Given the centrality of energy to the well-being of states, energy diplomacy, when deployed deftly, can leverage common vulnerabilities, and stimulate shared economic interests.’
There is a body of existing activity to build on. A number of regional energy deals have emerged in recent years. These include a solar power and water exchange agreement between Israel, Jordan and the UAE, and an Israel–Lebanon maritime border agreement that allows for new gas exploration in Lebanese waters and the potential for further regional energy cooperation. Energy relationships are also growing between Egypt, Israel and Jordan, increasing economic integration between the three countries. In the future it might even be possible to include Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Arab states in the EMGF, which would strengthen linkages between Red Sea and eastern Mediterranean security.
Israel’s membership of the EMGF is significant, as the country’s inclusion in regional energy dialogue will become essential over time, even if popular resistance to cooperation is likely to remain for the foreseeable future due to Israeli policies towards the Palestinians. As one regional expert put it, ‘Israel holds the key to energy cooperation in the region’ because its neighbours will likely have to buy its water or desalination technology in the coming years. Thus, energy cooperation may provide a way of naturally and incrementally incorporating Israel into inclusive regional forums as they expand, without letting high-level political obstacles impede engagement in technical areas.
Emergency response
Finally, the need to improve emergency response coordination and capabilities in the MENA region is generating widespread interest, making this another potentially constructive area for dialogue. A range of issues could be addressed under the umbrella of emergency response. In public health, the COVID-19 pandemic underscored the need for improved coordination between health authorities in different countries. Oman convened a regional meeting in partnership with the World Health Organization (WHO) in 2020, but the effort was a one-off that did not lead to subsequent meetings. The need for more sustainable efforts in this area is clear given the widespread assumption that further public health crises will arise in future. The devastating earthquake in Syria and Türkiye in early 2023 was another reminder that the lack of regional coordination during disasters, whether natural or man-made, is costing lives and damaging livelihoods.
Emergency response to maritime incidents is another obvious target for region-wide cooperation. Notable progress was made on this topic as part of the multilateral peace process in the early 1990s, and the need to improve preparedness continues to generate interest at the non-governmental level. One track 1.5 initiative sponsored by the Swiss ministry of foreign affairs and two NGOs – Search for Common Ground and the EastWest Institute – convened a meeting of former naval officers and maritime experts from nine countries (including Iran, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia) to discuss how to prevent unintentional incidents at sea. Participants also included representatives from external powers (including China, India and the US) that operate warships or military aircraft in the sea areas surrounding MENA states. The participants agreed to a document on incidents at sea; in the view of the organizers of the initiative, the document is now ready for track 1 action.
How should regional actors build a ‘layered’ cooperation format in practice?
Taken together, the three above-mentioned areas – climate change, energy and emergency response – offer a robust menu for regional cooperation. However, the most challenging part of building a new forum will be to put theory into practice. Agreeing on an organizational structure and convening format, on the scope of activity and specific policy areas to be addressed (and avoided), and above all on membership will be a cooperation challenge in its own right. In this section, we provide a menu of options for guiding this process and allowing regional states to capitalize on the current de-escalatory political environment.
Moving beyond theoretical discussions to make a new forum operational will require regular ministerial engagement from all initial participant states. Without this buy-in and consistent high-level investment of time and political capital, the effort risks emulating other ‘performative’ initiatives and summitry, rather than creating productive channels of communication and cooperation.
Although the initiative must be MENA-led and -managed, international envoy-level backing from the EU or UN will be needed to shepherd the process. Former political leaders and respected diplomats from Europe or Asia could be called on to facilitate back-channel negotiations, or to engage in shuttle diplomacy to build commitment and coordination. Such facilitators will need extensive experience of Middle East affairs, and will also need to have built up a wide base of trust around the region. Leaders from ‘middle powers’ such as Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, South Korea or Switzerland, rather than from the great powers, are most likely to be seen as non-aligned and are therefore more likely to be trusted. Being seen to be neutral will be key to building confidence that external players – despite their necessary facilitating role – do not have an ulterior agenda beyond that of supporting the cooperative process.
To demonstrate inclusive intent and transparency, these envoys and participant states should communicate their plans and objectives to all states and organizations in the region, making it clear that inclusivity is the priority and ultimate goal. Representatives from the ‘Baghdad summit’, Negev Forum, Arab Maghreb Union and Arab League could be invited as observers; this would demonstrate a commitment to cooperation across the region.
Agreement on core principles in a founding document will be essential. Principles such as respect for sovereignty and non-interference in the affairs of other members could inform a joint code of conduct to be observed by all. The founding declaration could also state the parties’ commitment to preventing armed conflict, resolving disputes peacefully, and promoting cooperative relationships and norms through dialogue mechanisms and action on common regional challenges. Confidence and trust should be reinforced by agreeing how the forum would protect and uphold such principles. Agreement on a definition of cooperative security would also have value in outlining the initiative’s broader vision and objectives. Above all, a founding document for a new forum, which could be called the MENA Forum (or MEF), should commit the parties to regular dialogue and leave the door open to other countries to join as and when they are ready to adhere to the norms it embodies.
It will also be necessary to roll out a specific coordination process for the thematic areas of climate, energy and emergency response, harnessing existing technical and track 2 discussions. It could be useful to emulate track 2 and 1.5 discussions in other contexts, where such channels have been used to draft documents that serve as a reference on common principles. The founding charters or related documents of other regional organizations or non-governmental efforts could help guide and shape the founding charter for the MEF. A ministerial meeting could then be convened at which the initial members of the new forum could announce the pre-negotiated wording of a founding declaration.
Lastly, identifying a MENA location – agreeable to all participants and perceived as neutral – at which to convene the first meeting will build confidence in the process. Ideally, participants could agree on one location for regular meetings, but alternatively a rotating format could be adopted in which each participant state would host the forum in turn.
