Five years on from the start of the Tishreen movement, the current absence of a mass protest movement in Iraq should not be interpreted as a sign that young people have become less ambitious, or more compliant with the system. But there has been a strategic shift in their approach to activism and civic engagement, as a response to the high risks of more direct political confrontation.
The October 2019 Tishreen uprising was a transformative moment in the lives of many young Iraqis, presenting them with a vision of what an alternative Iraq might be. The government’s eventual resignation and the subsequent amendment of the electoral law to allow early elections to take place represented considerable shifts, and opened possibilities for systemic change. This has motivated young Iraqis to continue working for reform in their daily lives, even after the violent suppression of the protests.
Over the past two decades, successive national and international initiatives have failed to adequately address one of the key grievances of young people in Iraq: the lack of opportunities that can properly prepare them for a future in which they can be active participants in government, the economy, environmental politics and wider society. The problem of lack of provision for the country’s youth is particularly acute given that annual population growth in Iraq currently stands at 2.2 per cent (as at 2023), compared with an average of 1.5 per cent for the Middle East and North Africa region as a whole, and 0.9 per cent globally, and more than 60 per cent of Iraq’s population are under the age of 25.
Young Iraqis have been one of the largest groups taking part in the mass protests that have periodically shaken Iraq since 2011, with their numbers gradually increasing between then and Tishreen in 2019. But many analysts have argued that it is difficult to imagine another mass street protest movement gaining traction in the near future, not least because of the authorities’ brutal suppression of the Tishreen uprising, resulting in the death of over 600 protesters, and the eventual co-option of the protests’ momentum by elements of the establishment whose principal interest was in upholding the political status quo.
The shrinking of the civic space in Iraq following the Tishreen protests does not mean that young Iraqis are any less disillusioned with their country’s political and social infrastructure; nor have they lost their ambition to push for change. The current generation – both those who joined or supported the protests five years ago, and younger people who have been inspired by the legacy of Tishreen – are turning to what Ben Kerkvliet calls ‘everyday politics’ to access services, navigate bureaucracy, find meaningful work and pursue their ambitions for a decent life, in ways that might not be considered traditional forms of political expression and participation.
The formative experiences and current grievances of today’s young Iraqis have been shaped by the post-2003 environment, particularly the systemic challenges at the root of the Tishreen protests.
This new generation has little or no personal memory of Saddam Hussein and the Baath regime. The formative experiences and current grievances of today’s young Iraqis have been shaped by the post-2003 environment, particularly the systemic challenges at the root of the Tishreen protests.
While there is a significant body of research examining links between youth grievances and protest movements in Iraq, there is limited research on what comes after such protests for young people, especially when their demands are unmet. This research paper examines what the Tishreen movement has taught young people about calling for reform, and how its legacy has spurred them to contribute purposefully to their society through political activism, entrepreneurship and youth-led civil society movements.
Replacing confrontation with ‘constructive resistance’
While the work and insights of the current generation of youth activists in Iraq might, at first glance, seem less radical than the actions of those who took to the streets in 2019, the anti-establishment and system-changing ideals of the Tishreen movement exert a subtle but powerful influence on how today’s activists frame and engage with their causes. Young people are no less ambitious, or more accepting of the status quo, than they were at the time of the mass protests five years ago. But there has been a strategic shift in their approach, as a response to the high risks associated with more direct political confrontation.
The forms of resistance discussed in this paper are in line with what Sørensen et al. have termed ‘constructive resistance’. By highlighting these practices through the lives and stories of young people in Iraq, the paper sheds light on how, faced with an ever-shrinking civic space, the political radicalism of the Tishreen uprising has taken on new forms.
Overcoming red lines and red tape
The ambition of young people in Iraq who are working for constructive and sustainable change is often frustrated by barriers created and upheld by the current political system – described by many as a ‘red line’ (خط أحمر – khat Ahmar). In this paper, red lines are used to describe the impediments, enforced by state and parastatal groups, that young people encounter, and that prevent them from advancing or achieving their full potential. These red lines take various forms, from the violent suppression of the Tishreen uprising to less overt restrictions on young people’s access to political institutions, jobs and funding for civil society initiatives. For young entrepreneurs in particular, red lines can manifest as red tape.
This paper argues that social, political and economic change can happen through different models of everyday politics and constructive resistance. In other words, groups of ordinary young people, working on similar or complementary activities that challenge existing structures and norms in Iraq, can be among the most important agents of change. Together, they have potential to shift the systemic barriers – the red lines and red tape – that young Iraqis encounter in their efforts to advocate for change and drive incremental reform inside the system.
The next chapter presents case studies that illustrate how young people in Iraq are navigating the political, business and civil society spheres to push for change. Chapter 3 then discusses how the efforts of young activists and entrepreneurs can bring about positive change within their own communities, but also describes how systemic challenges continue to constrain the broader impact of these efforts. Chapter 4 identifies lessons for future policymaking, drawing on the record of past and current youth-oriented interventions and programmes. The final chapter offers a set of policy recommendations, intended to help reform-minded officials within Iraq, international stakeholders, and youth groups themselves, foster an environment in which young people can work together to bring about lasting change in the country.