Migrant smuggling and trafficking has flourished through Libya since its 2011 conflict. This article explains how this happened and why European policies aimed at addressing the issue are inadequate.
Migrant smuggling generally refers to the movement of people with their consent; while Trafficking in Persons (TIP) refers to the movement of people against their will – though the distinction is not clear cut and journeys often combine elements of the two. In particular, women have been disproportionately impacted by trafficking.
The three phases
In the first of three phases, the Libyan conflict led to the emergence of armed factions and an economy dominated by violence that has fostered migrant smuggling and trafficking. This led to a smuggling boom in Niger and Nigeria, supporting economic growth in Niger and worsening violence in Nigeria. Increased flows of refugees, migrants and asylum seekers through Libya further expanded the conflict economy.
A pattern has emerged in which Libyan groups seek political and financial support from European policymakers while allowing smuggling to continue
In the second phase, European policymakers sought to reduce irregular arrivals from Libya. Rather than prioritizing efforts to rein in Libyan armed groups, policymakers forged partnerships with them out of perceived necessity. In neighbouring Niger, European leaders pressurized Nigerien authorities to criminalize the movement of people.
These shifts increased the perils faced by those on the move, as migrant exploitation grew in scale and severity. In this phase, the numbers reaching Europe fell, but large numbers of people continued to move. This expanded the level of violence and exploitation suffered by migrants.
In the third and current phase, the numbers of people reaching Europe have rebounded, though remaining below the highs of 2016. A transactional pattern has emerged in which Libyan groups seek political and financial support from European policymakers while allowing smuggling to continue, ushering in a degree of de facto regulation. But this has done nothing to tackle the factors that led to the rise of migrant smuggling in Libya or beyond.
Phase 1: 2011-2017-Expansion and boom
Libya’s agricultural sector had been in decline in the south since the 1990s due to international sanctions. Cross-border trade and smuggling increased dramatically. The conflict in 2011 led to further declines in state-run agricultural projects.
The collapse of the Gaddafi regime and ongoing governance crisis led to the rapid expansion of migrant smuggling networks based in Libya to facilitate maritime passage to Europe. The numbers of migrants entering Italy across the Mediterranean increased from around 28,500 in 2011 to nearly 163,000 in 2016.
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Nationally, rival groups competing for the Libyan state sought to sustain local alliances through patron-client relationships rather than by supporting the wider population. These patronage networks inhibit the rebuilding of the state. At a local level, disputes over the right to govern led to a fragmentation of legitimate authority and a decline of law and order.
This encouraged local communities to develop their own armed factions that soon grew to dominate economic activity in these areas through the establishment of protection markets, and subsequently, their own business ventures.
These dynamics have inhibited a transition to coherent national government. Rival armed groups have fought over strategic transport routes, valuable infrastructure and for influence over state institutions. The illicit economy boomed, with migrant smuggling and trafficking growing rapidly.
Such practices had existed for decades, but not at such scale. The routes from Nigeria to Libya existed in the precolonial era, were entrenched by the transatlantic slave trade and used over the past 50 years by people seeking employment in North Africa or Europe, including low-skilled agricultural workers and later (forced) sex workers to Italy. The networks were scaled up significantly after the Libyan state collapsed post-2011.
The historic legacies, combined with local disputes over land ownership and governance, have created a hostile environment for foreign nationals in Libya. Many Sub-Saharan African people have experienced racist abuse and discrimination. Against this backdrop, the exploitation of and violence against people moving through the country became a defining feature of post-2011 Libya and an important source of illicit revenue.
A Chatham House study estimated that migrant smuggling and trafficking generated $978 million in revenues within Libya in 2016. Smuggling led to wider economic development around illicit markets. In the Libyan city of Kufra, smuggling revenues have in part been invested in local services. More widely, satellite analysis commissioned through the XCEPT programme indicates that artisanal agriculture expanded after 2015 following a period of continual contraction since the 1990s.
Agadez, Niger: the development of a transit hub
Developments in Libya reverberated across the southern border in Niger, where smuggling was socially accepted and akin to a semi-formal industry. Agadez has a long history of transnational trade, labour migration and housing transnational communities.
As barriers to travel through Libya eased, Agadez experienced increased demand for smuggling services and an expansion of smuggling networks. By 2013, an influx of people from throughout West Africa, most of whom wanted to travel to Europe, arrived in Agadez to reach Libya.
Government officials in Agadez openly celebrated the prosperity associated with migration.
These were different cohorts from those who traditionally went to Libya for employment and who engaged in seasonal or circular migration, where they would work in Libya for a time before returning home. The trend towards seeking entry to Europe accelerated through 2014 and 2015.
Thousands of migrants left Agadez for Libya every week, a boon for the Agadez economy. In 2016, an estimated 333,000 migrants passed through the city. ECOWAS citizens were permitted visa-free travel to Libya, where costs for crossing the Mediterranean were falling dramatically, sparking a surge in irregular migration via Agadez to Sebha in Libya.
Government officials in Agadez openly celebrated the prosperity associated with migration, as drivers, fixers, landlords who ran migrant houses in neighbourhoods known as ghettos, shop owners, currency dealers, mechanics and restaurant owners benefited.
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Edo State, Nigeria as a point of origin for migrants
Developments in Edo State, a region in southern Nigeria, illustrate the cascading impacts of Libya’s growing conflict economy. Smuggling networks in Nigeria, a point of origin for many of those on the move, expanded along with the shifts in Niger and Libya, further along the route. Incredibly, in 2017, one-in-four households in Benin City (the capital of Edo State) had at least one family member who had sought to travel to Libya.
Movement to the Libyan border was relatively affordable and prices paid to cross the Mediterranean fell dramatically – anecdotal evidence suggested a crossing may have fallen from $1,000 in 2013 to as little as $60–90 in June 2017 – as smugglers used ever-cheaper inflatable boats. The fallout of Libya’s civil war created an environment for a rapid increase in the movement of people from Edo State to Libya.
The prominence of out-migration and trafficking in and from Edo is underpinned by economic inequities. Edo’s agricultural sector – the traditional lifeblood of its economy – remains in need of investment and relies on manual labour.
Yet, such labour is increasingly insufficient for locals to make ends meet. As a result, fewer young people are entering the sector, which is contributing to its decline. Limited economic opportunities are reflected in the rates of un- and under-employment. This has led locals to seek alternative sources of income.
Interviewees in one village in Edo’s countryside said that people with the best housing often had financed it with remittances sent back from family members abroad. Seeking to access such remittances is seen as an economic lifeline.
But sending a young family member abroad to find work and send back remittances is not possible without the capital to fund travel. That leads to debt bondage, where those travelling agree to work to pay off the cost of their transportation, making those on the move more vulnerable to exploitation.
Family pressures may also play a role in encouraging travel. In some cases, where young people resist pressure to leave for Europe, families have used religious curses as a coercion tool. Traffickers have also used curses to intimidate those they traffic, preventing their escape from servitude.
Women are disproportionately impacted by trafficking dynamics. In some cases, women and girls are trafficked by their own families despite the knowledge they will be working as sex workers. Some see no alternative to make ends meet.
Phase 2: Europe intervenes: 2015-2017
Criminalization in Niger
By 2015, migration through the central Mediterranean via Libya and the Eastern Mediterranean via Turkey led to growing hostility among European governments and populations.
In May 2015…the government of Niger…passed Law 2015-36 (which) outlined clear punishments for those engaged in migrant smuggling.
Discussion of a ‘migration crisis’ emerged, and European policymakers targeted the movement of people in northern Niger and on the northwestern Libyan coastline. This succeeded in stemming the movement of people, but had significant second-order effects that further endangered those on the move, entrenching Libya’s conflict economy and criminalizing historic and long-standing cross-border movements via Niger.
A turning point for the migration economy in Agadez came in May 2015, when the government of Niger, in consultation with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and with technical and financial support from the EU and EU member states, passed Law 2015-36. Often referred to as ‘Law 36’, the legislation outlined clear punishments for those engaged in migrant smuggling. In pressing for this, European policymakers were trying to sidestep the policy quagmire faced in Libya. The policy had deep consequences in Agadez.
One humanitarian cost was the increase in migrant deaths in the desert. As early as 2017, the International Organization for Migration and the Nigerien Red Cross reported increased fatalities as smugglers abandoned migrants in the desert when detected by Nigerien authorities and took more perilous routes to avoid detection.
Another was the development of protection markets and the growing presence of armed ‘bandits’ from southern Libya and Chad in northern Niger. These bandits, active along key transit corridors linking gold sites to trading and logistics hubs, have brought heavy weaponry from Chad and southern Libya.
The rise of heavily armed ‘Chadian’ bandits in northern Niger became a source of resentment among local communities, particularly ethnic Tuareg whose ability to move throughout the region and exert control over licit and illicit activities is constrained by their presence. In interviews with Chatham House, several Tuareg leaders stressed a need to ‘securitize’ or ‘militarize’ northern Niger to restore order.
At the time of criminalization, migration was estimated to have provided direct employment for more than 6,565 people and indirect incomes to more than half of all households in Agadez. However, the crackdown in Agadez coincided with a gold rush throughout much of northern Niger, offsetting the economic impact somewhat.
More widely, criminalizing migration eroded trust between local populations and their government, as well as between local officials and the national government. The crackdown disproportionately affected Agadez, home to communities that have traditionally felt marginalized by the government in Niamey.
This in turn reinforced narratives that the national government was willing to sacrifice the well-being of northern communities to ensure that international funds tied to cooperation continued to flow to central government.
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Intervention in the Mediterranean and engagement with Libyan authorities
Two further changes significantly shifted the status of migrant smuggling on the Libyan coastline. First, on 2 February 2017, Italy signed a memorandum of understanding with the Government of National Accord in Tripoli, followed a day later by the Malta Declaration signed by EU leaders in Valletta.
European state rescue missions withdrew from Libyan waters, while NGO rescue missions were prevented from operating in Libyan waters.
Over 2017–2018, the Libyan Coast Guard became responsible for search and rescue missions near the Libyan coast. Over this period, European state rescue missions withdrew from Libyan waters, while NGO rescue missions were prevented from operating in Libyan waters.
The European naval mission Sophia, which had rescued about 48,000 migrants in the Mediterranean between 2015 and 2018, was replaced by a new mission, Irini, in 2020. Irini suspended deployment of naval forces and relied solely on unmanned aerial vehicles not equipped for sea rescues.
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Article part 4 contd.
Second, a market for ‘anti-smuggling’ emerged on Libya’s northwest coastline over summer 2017. Armed groups that had facilitated migrant smuggling sought to evade UN sanctions. A conflict ensued in the Libyan coastal city of Sabratha lasting 19 days and armed groups complicit in smuggling posed as actors trying to prevent it.
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Source: UNHCR, IOM
Arrivals to Italy from Libya fell from 162,895 in 2016, to 108,409 in 2017 and 12,977 in 2018. But the numbers of migrants traversing Libya did not immediately fall. A large number of migrants were already present in Libya and other areas used by smuggling networks were not directly affected. This led to a spike in the numbers of migrants in Libya, and an increase in migrant detentions.
Phase 3: Regulation (2018-2024)
In the years since, numbers of migrants arriving in Italy have rebounded, reaching 49,740 in 2023, still well below the 2016 high. The EU has defended the partnerships developed with Libyan authorities as supporting the rule of law and compliant with EU laws. The reality has been murkier.
Armed groups have profited from both prevention and facilitation of irregular migration.
In particular, the penetration of Libyan state institutions by armed groups and the development of a conflict economy meant that the EU’s partners were themselves deeply involved in smuggling.
The changes provided financial support for migration management without removing financial incentives for migrant smuggling. Armed groups have profited from both prevention and facilitation of irregular migration at the same time.
The balance between the two created some regulation of migrant smuggling without stopping it. It also provided further resources for armed groups by financing detention centres, training and equipment. Arbitrary detentions increased, and a system of ‘abuse for profit’ whereby migrants were exploited, extorted and in many cases sexually abused grew dramatically.
Locally, where the presence of large migrant communities has caused tension, the armed groups presented themselves as guarantors that migrants do not remain in communities. All the while, they have cut deals with smugglers who bring migrants to the communities in the first place.
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Where next?
Smuggling delivers economic benefits to communities at departure points, transit hubs and populations in countries of origin.
Remittances have become a key source of income in Nigeria, while smuggling supports a wider economy in localities that are neglected by Libya’s central government.
Smuggling has stimulated the economies of these places. But the human cost of such activities is high for migrants who suffer systemic rights violations and abuse. A culture of impunity for such actions has prevailed. Policies focused solely on countering criminality miss such nuances that illustrate the need for broader solutions, including local development and peacebuilding.
The need for a true ‘whole-of-route’ approach
The development of migrant smuggling shows how a conflict’s second-order effects can have impacts thousands of miles away. The rise of Mediterranean crossings stimulated European policy responses to target transit points in the Mediterranean Sea and in Northern Niger.
De-facto regulation of Mediterranean crossings is regarded as a relative success by EU policymakers, but has not prevented regular disasters at sea and avoidable loss of life.
Framed as rule-of-law interventions, these approaches addressed the symptoms rather than causes. Flows have been reduced through a series of transnational bargains that entrench conflict and ultimately make it harder to resolve. The resulting de facto regulation of Mediterranean crossings is regarded as a relative success by EU policymakers, but has not prevented regular disasters at sea and avoidable loss of life.
To date, international approaches have sought to isolate choke points in the movement of people. A more effective policy approach would be to assess how smuggling and trafficking intersect with local dynamics in the places that the practices traverse.
In 2023, the EU laid out its intent to develop a ‘whole-of route’ approach to tackling irregular migration, but this does not extend beyond combatting trafficking and the rescue and return of migrants.
A truly ‘whole-of-route’ approach would need to be broader to be effective. It must contain a wider suite of policies beyond enforcement. That should include peacebuilding activities, local development and governance support so that it reduces demand and tackles the enabling environment within which criminal groups operate. As it stands, current policies run the risk of disrupting smuggling journeys only temporarily, with migrants bearing the worst impacts.
More directly, current policies have incentivized transactionalism in transit states. The huge funds that are being doled out to pay off states is no solution for irregular migration, and harms local populations in Libya. Those funds would be better invested elsewhere.
This article was produced with support from the Cross-Border Conflict Evidence, Policy and Trends (XCEPT) research programme, funded by UK International Development. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the UK government’s official policies.
