To navigate today’s multi-aligned world and mitigate conflict, policymakers must embrace the fluid, networked nature of conflict ecosystems. This means moving beyond state-centric frameworks, bureaucratic silos and outdated notions of spheres of influence, and adopting pragmatic, adaptive strategies.
This report has illustrated how international – particularly Western – policies aimed at resolving conflicts often yield unintended and counterproductive outcomes, for example fostering illicit profit incentives rather than suppressing them. Such policy failures stem in part from a fundamental paradox: while protracted conflicts of the types examined here are inherently transnational, Western foreign policy frameworks remain predominantly state-centric. Diplomatic architectures, foreign policy decision-making structures and strategic incentives largely treat the nation state as the basic unit of international relations. Embassies and diplomatic missions operate on a country-specific basis, often with minimal incentives for cooperation across borders or between competing policy priorities such as security and trade. All this makes it hard to address conflicts that span multiple regions.
This does not mean policymakers are blind to the problems that exist. Over the past decade, international conflict resolution and security policies have increasingly acknowledged the transnational nature of conflicts and the necessity of adapting understanding, strategies and execution accordingly. This suggests that the primary challenge is not a lack of awareness per se but rather the absence of effective systems, structures and tools for policy implementation. Bridging this gap demands fundamental reform in the design and delivery of conflict responses to align with the realities of today’s global system. It involves moving away from policies rooted in a Cold War-era mindset of geopolitical spheres of influence – as actors in conflict-affected states almost always align with a multiplicity of external actors rather than just one – and acknowledging that all blocs are fragmented and increasingly multi-aligned in any given conflict.
The challenge lies in the disconnect between the scale of the problem, the level of ambition set, and the resources and timeframes allocated for resolution. Too often, the urgent political imperative to be seen to ‘do something’ results in short-term, reactive measures such as economic sanctions or military airstrikes. As this report has highlighted, such measures often lead to unintended and counterproductive consequences. A key challenge in international engagement is that conflict mitigation often takes a back seat to other priorities like trade, migration control and economic growth, despite peacebuilding rhetoric suggesting otherwise (see Box 2).
Conventional responses are increasingly ill suited to today’s multi-aligned global landscape, where power is dispersed among adaptable, well-resourced conflict entrepreneurs whose influence extends beyond state boundaries. In situations where policymakers lack sufficient leverage, capacity or a nuanced understanding of the operating environment, acknowledging inaction as a viable option should not be dismissed outright. Ultimately, to avoid self-inflicted failure, policy ambitions must be grounded in pragmatism – carefully calibrated to match both the scale of the challenge and the resources available.
Conventional responses are increasingly ill suited to today’s multi-aligned global landscape, where power is dispersed among adaptable, well-resourced conflict entrepreneurs whose influence extends beyond state boundaries.
Western policymakers often fall into the trap of imposing values, assumptions and frameworks that fail to align with the realities of the environments they seek to influence. This can result in rigid policy approaches that emphasize binary distinctions such as between ‘ally’ and ‘adversary’, ‘state’ and ‘non-state’, ‘pro-Western’ and ‘anti-Western’. Such approaches quickly unravel upon contact with the fluid, multi-aligned ecosystems in which they are applied. For instance, populations that depend on cross-border trade do not necessarily share Western definitions of what constitutes a licit or illicit good. In practice, the same commodities for which Western policies aim to regulate or suppress trade can simultaneously fuel conflict and sustain livelihoods, depending on how such trade operates. As the case studies illustrate, policy oversimplifications can lead to misguided interventions – such as securitizing borders – that fail to account for the complexities of local economies, ultimately reinforcing the very dynamics they aim to disrupt.
Another problem is that international policymaking often operates on the flawed assumption that prosperity and stability are inherently linked. In reality, instability can be lucrative for many conflict actors – including some of the very elites with whom the international community collaborates on policy and programmatic responses. As long as conflict remains a source of wealth and power, attempts to impose stability without addressing the underlying incentives risk reinforcing the status quo.
Finally, international governments are persistently reluctant to acknowledge that they themselves are often active parties in conflicts – whether directly or indirectly. Whether an active choice or not, this approach can lead to unrealistic expectations for funded interventions, resulting in failure to anticipate the risks of involvement. The challenge is compounded by the tendency for Western governments to pursue political, economic and security strategies in isolation, rather than through a cohesive, integrated approach. A clear-eyed assessment of Western governments’ own positions and perceptions within each conflict environment is an essential first step in designing successful interventions.
Overcoming bureaucratic obstacles
Beneath these policy challenges lie specific bureaucratic obstacles. Chief among these is the lack of effective mechanisms to identify, assess and resolve policy inconsistencies between government departments, and between the thematic and regional units into which bureaucracies are often organized. While structures such as the UK Integrated Security Fund (ISF)’s Portfolio Boards, which have regional or thematic strands, are intended to foster coherence, their agendas are often too broad given the time available for meaningful discussion. As a result, complex transnational policy dilemmas are frequently oversimplified to facilitate decision-making.
Moreover, the prevailing bureaucratic approach within Western government tends to be one of tacit internal non-interference – where departments implicitly agree not to challenge each other’s objectives or resource allocations, even at the expense of overall policy coherence. This reluctance to engage in constructive friction may avoid bureaucratic deadlock, but it reinforces fragmented responses to conflicts where the discipline of negotiating cross-sectoral and cross-departmental solutions is demanded.
The result of these bureaucratic silos – whether geographical or thematic – is a lack of opportunity or incentive to bridge policy divides. Even when there is clear awareness of transnational dynamics – such as the well-established migration route from Edo State in Nigeria through Niger into Libya and onward to Europe – often no formal structure exists to coordinate policy or programmatic interventions. This fragmentation is largely a product of institutional design. In the UK’s Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), for instance, policy on Nigeria and Niger falls under West Africa-focused departments, while Libya and Algeria are managed within Middle East and North Africa divisions. Different departments in the FCDO, as indeed in other Western foreign ministries, operate under distinct regional strategies, country business plans and funding streams, making coordination the exception rather than the norm. As a result, interventions often remain siloed, failing to reflect the multi-aligned realities of conflicts and crises that do not adhere to bureaucratic boundaries.
Competition between thematic priorities presents similar challenges. Domestic political imperatives, such as curbing migration or countering terrorism, can drive overly securitized responses. Policies are frequently designed by thematic experts with limited understanding of the political economy of the region for which a particular programme is intended. As a result, interventions are not only prone to failure but can inflict unintended harm. For instance, in an effort to curb irregular migration to Europe, the EU externalized border control through agreements with Libya, Sudan and Turkey. These policies often relied on local actors with questionable human rights records, such as some Libyan armed groups, to implement the agreements. While it has reduced the flow of migrants, the de facto outsourcing of border control has also led to human rights abuses, including the imprisonment, torture and exploitation of migrants. Ultimately, this approach has intensified the very conflict dynamics that initially contributed to the surge in irregular migration from Libya. Yet, the prevailing pressure to be seen to take decisive action often outweighs more nuanced, context-driven approaches, sidelining arguments for strategies that prioritize long-term effectiveness over immediate political optics.
Policies are frequently designed by thematic experts with limited understanding of the political economy of the region for which a particular programme is intended. As a result, interventions are not only prone to failure but can inflict unintended harm.
These challenges are compounded by the constant rotation of staff within government departments, the fluidity of the operating environment and the ever-evolving – and often divergent – objectives dictated by political imperatives. Each stakeholder approaches transnational conflicts through a different geographical or thematic lens, making it unsurprising that forging a cohesive, strategic response to complex conflicts remains elusive.
Overcoming fragmentation requires more than just institutional adjustments. It demands strong leadership in the relevant ministries. Senior officials must champion a more integrated, cross-departmental approach and foster an enabling environment in which transnational collaboration is not only encouraged but structurally embedded. In the UK context, Foreign Minister David Lammy’s vision of progressive realism has provided a theoretical basis for responding to these challenges: he has emphasized a pragmatic form of foreign policy that prioritizes multilateral cooperation, strategic engagement and long-term stability over short-term political gains. Without moving beyond rhetoric to concrete commitments, policy responses will continue to be reactive, siloed and ultimately inadequate in addressing the complexities of modern conflict economies.
In summary, transnational engagement is neither simple nor straightforward. It is resource-intensive, demands compromise and requires navigating divergent institutional cultures, each shaped by its own incentives and political imperatives. Effective collaboration across borders is not just a matter of coordination – it necessitates a fundamental shift in approach, one that embraces adaptability, long-term commitment and a willingness to bridge institutional divides.
Recommendations: strategies for pragmatic engagement, accountability and reform
To respond effectively to the challenges outlined above, governments need tools and mechanisms to think, plan and deliver conflict mitigation transnationally. They also need to anticipate institutional disincentives that might hinder transnational responses, so that such obstacles can be managed. The following proposals are presented for policymakers, both in the West and elsewhere, to consider:
- Adapt conflict analysis by taking a transnational approach. To enable more effective and coherent responses, conflict analysis methodologies must evolve beyond their current state-centric focus. While the UK’s Joint Analysis of Conflict and Stability (JACS) and analogous processes in other capitals already acknowledge transnational factors, efforts are particularly needed to ensure the effective implementation of analysis and recommendations, not only within the focus country but also beyond. At present, such processes often conflate cross-border, regional and transnational dynamics, reducing a highly diverse set of geopolitical variables into a single analytical component: the ‘nation-state’. Existing approaches also tend to concentrate on local conflict actors, often sidestepping scrutiny of external partners whose economic engagements may, directly or indirectly, sustain the conflict. Fully adapting processes such as the JACS for a multi-aligned, transnational context would require conflict to be analysed more as an interconnected system than as a series of isolated national challenges. This idea is referenced but not fully developed within current guidance.
Mapping how transnational conflict drivers and participants interact, and treating these as variables in interconnected systems, could yield significantly different insights from those of state-centric analyses (which often prioritize the perspectives of elites in national capitals). Moreover, if certain actors or conflict drivers stabilize one context while destabilizing another, policymakers must consciously weigh trade-offs between competing policy outcomes. A truly transnational methodology would not only enhance understanding but would ensure that interventions are designed with their system-wide impact in mind. - Leverage economic power in conflict response. Policymakers must engage with the often-overlooked economic dimensions of stabilization and peacebuilding. All three case studies in this report show that sanctions (often applied haphazardly or primarily to satisfy domestic imperatives to ‘do something’) have backfired, contributing to the evolution of conflict ecosystems and exacerbating harm to local populations. Interventions need to create incentives for peaceful cooperation rather than relying predominantly on sanctions. Efforts must be made to create viable alternative livelihoods by investing in local infrastructure, supporting sustainable industries, and providing access to education and skills development. Fostering legitimate economic opportunities can help divert populations from conflict-driven economies and reduce the hold of armed groups and illicit activities. Policymakers must carefully weigh the trade-offs involved, ensuring clear expectations and consequences for partners while leveraging financial tools such as sanctions to discourage engagement with harmful supply chains.
Sanctions and other economic levers can still play a meaningful role in disrupting violence, but only when applied strategically, aligned with broader policy goals, with consideration of their potential impact on local populations, and when directed towards a clearly defined end state. For example, policymakers could more successfully target illicit sectors where fewer vested interests are involved and, crucially, where local livelihoods are less likely to be disrupted. Prioritizing efforts to deter financial or insurance crimes might have a stronger and more immediate beneficial impact on local economies. In contrast, activities like smuggling subsidized fuel involve a wider range of participants, and often provide employment and benefits to many along the way. For maximum impact at minimal cost, policymakers should focus on bottlenecks where rent-seeking is most damaging to local communities. - Broker influence through pragmatic, multi-aligned engagement with allies and adversaries. The rise of multi-aligned actors in transnational conflict ecosystems requires external governments and institutions to engage continuously and strategically with allies and adversaries alike. This means investing in more creative and less rigid network-building, and recognizing that alliances are not absolute – an ally may diverge on certain issues, just as an adversary may align on others. The transactional nature of conflict economies demands nuanced diplomacy. Western engagement with regional allies must account for such countries’ evolving regional priorities, while adversarial actors such as Iran require a pragmatic approach that balances deterrence with dialogue.
A more sophisticated conflict mitigation strategy could involve targeted dialogue on areas of mutual interest – such as regional security frameworks or economic livelihood initiatives – while simultaneously countering destabilizing activities through coalition-building and strategic pressure. Building networks to broker consensus on specific policy themes is critical, as coalitions will shift depending on the issue at hand. Regional organizations such as the Gulf Cooperation Council or the African Union can serve as useful platforms to ensure efficiency and coherence, potentially fostering common positions that would mitigate policy fragmentation. To avoid the Western tendency to conflate stability with prosperity – or to impose external values on complex transnational contexts in an uneven way – greater opportunities should be created for regional representatives to shape policymaking. An analytical approach that presents actors and incentives as they truly are, rather than as Western policymakers wish them to be, will ensure more grounded, effective strategies.
Engaging with Western-proscribed armed groups presents significant challenges, as it may legitimize violent actors and undermine Western security frameworks. However, in a rapidly changing, multi-aligned world, many of these proscribed groups are, in fact, crucial pillars in local economies and the global economy. Ignoring such actors risks further destabilizing conflict zones, while engaging with them – albeit cautiously and strategically – can open pathways for dialogue, economic cooperation and long-term peacebuilding. Balancing these risks with the practical realities of global interdependence is a delicate but necessary challenge for policymakers in today’s changing geopolitical landscape, where the old Cold War-era mentality of strict alliances and adversarial positioning is less applicable. - Coordinate transnational analysis across policy agendas and government departments. The adoption of transnational conflict analysis could help to align competing policy agendas within Western governments. It could also enable government agendas to align with those of private sector actors operating in conflict environments. A first step would be for governments to expand and pool analytical expertise across departments, particularly on policy areas where conflict intersects with illicit financial flows and serious organized crime. Governments often possess valuable intelligence on the connections between political elites and criminal networks, on the mechanisms enabling illicit financial flows, and on the intermediaries who facilitate these processes.
The problem is often not a lack of information but restricted access to it – whether due to material being classified, bureaucratic silos impeding the sharing of intelligence, or compartmentalized systems failing to present analysis in useful formats. Policymakers tackling illicit financial flows or organized crime from a domestic perspective often lack the contextual, institutional and geographical understanding needed to design effective interventions. Too often, their efforts remain narrowly focused on working with formal government actors – some of whom may themselves be directly or indirectly involved in sustaining conflict economies.
By improving information-sharing, and fostering internal collaboration between policymakers with both international and domestic remits, governments can develop more coherent, cross-cutting strategies that address national security threats without neglecting the economic underpinnings of conflict. Opportunities also exist for governments to exchange information and best practice, benefiting international and domestic actors alike. Integrating insights across domestic and foreign domains would enhance the effectiveness of responses, ensuring that policies reflect the realities of transnational conflict rather than remaining constrained by bureaucratic boundaries. - Incentivize transnational initiatives through resource allocation. Beyond changes in thinking and planning, more effective resource allocation is needed to facilitate peacebuilding reform. To counter the natural bilateral (i.e. state-to-state) focus of Western foreign ministries, dedicated taskforces or implementation teams could be established to break down country-specific silos and drive coordinated action. Building on the creation of ‘special envoys’ for conflict-affected regions like the Horn of Africa and the Sahel, senior officials overseeing multiple countries could form networks to champion transnational perspectives and foster innovative, cross-border approaches.
Additionally, cross-government funding mechanisms could allocate more resources to transnational initiatives rather than to bilateral programmes. This model has proven effective in addressing priority issues around women, peace and security, among other examples. If applied more widely, it could help to ensure that transnationalism is not just a principle but a funded priority. - Strengthen accountability mechanisms. Political settlements and ceasefires must encompass more than just elite bargains on power-sharing and political transition; they must include robust governance reforms, with enforceable measures that enhance accountability. Agreements must address the underlying power dynamics at play. Transnational conflict economies are not driven solely by coercion; they also depend on public justification and perceived legitimacy. Smugglers, for instance, often frame their activities as efforts to rectify historical wrongs – whether related to the legacies of colonialism or to inequitable development policies – and view themselves as unconstrained by Western-imposed rules. They rarely even identify themselves as ‘smugglers’, while their activities often provide livelihoods for poor communities. These narratives help armed groups garner local support and sustain their authority. Ultimately, the true check on their activities lies in civil society. Whether an economy is licit or illicit, what matters most to the public is its impact on communities – whether it benefits or harms them.
Civil society organizations (CSOs) and local journalists can play a crucial role in ensuring accountability, and preventing conflict economies from becoming further entrenched. By amplifying local voices, civil society can expose damaging practices, push for reforms and ensure that economic structures serve the public interest. Western governments can support these accountability mechanisms, but need to recognize and anticipate the risks involved. These risks include CSOs losing credibility with local populations as a result of being perceived as agents of foreign influence. To prevent this from happening, indirect levers will often work best: for example, quietly fostering connections between civil society and local reformist elements, supporting stronger on-the-ground monitoring and investigative journalism, and ensuring affected communities have a platform to challenge economic exploitation. By taking such steps, policymakers will have a better chance of embedding accountability within economies, reducing the space for conflict-driven exploitation and reinforcing more sustainable state-building.
