The war in Sudan is one of the African Union’s (AU) most consequential failures of political leadership. Sudan has spiralled into the world’s largest humanitarian emergency: two-thirds of the country’s 53 million people now require humanitarian assistance; more than 13.6 million are displaced; and nearly half of the population face severe food insecurity. The level of devastation goes far beyond a conventional civil war.
The upcoming AU summit in Addis Ababa on 14–15 February is an opportunity for decisive AU leadership on Sudan – it must not be missed.
Sudan has exposed the AU’s structural weaknesses
For nearly three years, the AU has struggled to find a coherent political strategy on Sudan. Early diplomacy, normative consistency and broad engagement with partners have proved insufficient. The AU has been reactive, fragmented and increasingly peripheral to competing diplomatic tracks. Internal divisions and a lack of robust enforcement mechanisms has left it unable to secure a ceasefire, protect civilians or generate meaningful leverage over the two warring parties; the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).
The election of a new AU Commission (AUC) – the AU’s secretariat and executive branch – last year briefly raised expectations of renewed continental leadership. But little has changed. The renewed push to reopen the AU Liaison Office in Port Sudan – a city controlled by the SAF – and decision to uphold Sudan’s suspension from all AU activities following the 2021 coup have failed to achieve political influence and protect civilians. The suspension has also created structural ambiguity: the AU must still engage the de facto authorities it has formally excluded.
This tension was laid bare when AUC Chair Mahmoud Ali Youssouf’s publicly endorsed the Port Sudan peace initiative. By endorsing a process led by the SAF-aligned administration, Youssouf openly contradicted the AU’s own norms relating to coups and other forms of unconstitutional changes of government (UCGs), thereby weakening the credibility of Sudan’s suspension. Sudanese civil society reacted sharply, interpreting the endorsement as further evidence of bias.
Institutional inconsistency has created space for diplomatic manoeuvring around established norms at precisely the moment when clarity and assertiveness are most needed.
A crowded mediation landscape lacking direction
The diplomatic environment surrounding Sudan has become increasingly congested, without a clear centre of gravity. The AU asserts that it alone has the legitimacy to convene Sudanese stakeholders without privileging armed groups or external agendas. Yet it has struggled to consolidate parallel initiatives under an authoritative AU-led process.
The US-led Quad (comprising the US, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Egypt) remains the most influential forum for ceasefire and humanitarian talks. Its influence, however, has frayed as Washington’s attention has shifted elsewhere. Tensions between the UAE and Saudi Arabia have further slowed progress.
The AU-led Quintet (comprising the AU, UN, Arab League, EU and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)) is designed to unify major multilateral actors around an AU framework. Instead, it has highlighted the AU’s inability to impose coherence across external partners. Coordination problems – including with the Quad – inconsistent engagement and divergent political priorities have prevented it from providing strategic direction. The EU, the AU’s biggest partner, remains divided on strategy and overstretched by crises closer to home. The result is an uncoordinated diplomatic arena that empowers both the SAF and RSF to resist meaningful concessions.
Internal incoherence and institutional fatigue
The AU’s internal mechanisms are also struggling to find a coherent approach. An AU high-level panel (HLP) on Sudan was established in January 2024 but it was doomed from the outset. It lacked the political weight to advance its mandate, complicating AU efforts to secure meaningful engagement with Sudanese civilian actors and backing from civil society.
The panel has gradually faded into the background, signalling institutional fatigue and a growing sense within some AU circles that although Sudan is undoubtedly a humanitarian emergency, it is no longer a political priority. This retreat is profoundly misaligned with the scale and urgency of the crisis, and risks further eroding confidence in the AU’s leadership.
The ad hoc presidential committee of the AU’s Peace and Security Council (PSC), led by Uganda, faces similar credibility issues. Kampala is viewed by many Sudanese civilian actors as leaning towards the RSF. Overlaps between the committee and the high-level panel have created competing channels of engagement – and another obstacle for AU effectiveness.
Egypt’s role further complicates an already fragmented AU response. Cairo is widely perceived by Sudanese civilian and political actors as aligned with the SAF. Egypt is currently the chair of the AU PSC and has made a renewed push to reintegrate Sudan into the AU – after unsuccessful attempts during its previous stint as chair in October 2024. The PSC statement following its 12 February ministerial meeting on Sudan reinforces concerns that council deliberations are being shaped by regional power plays rather than adherence to AU norms. By referring to SAF as the ‘transitional government of Sudan’, the council has effectively moved to legitimize one side of the conflict.
Egyptian officials are also reportedly advocating for Kamal Idris, prime minister of the SAF-aligned administration, to attend the upcoming AU summit. Such moves risk further eroding confidence in PSC neutrality at a moment when assertive leadership and collective resolve are urgently needed.
Extraordinarily high stakes
The 2026 AU summit presents a narrow but critical window to reset the continental response. Without decisive action, Sudan risks irreversible fragmentation: de facto regional administrations could consolidate, national institutions could collapse entirely, and cross-border spillovers could intensify.
A reset requires a minimum of three urgent steps. First, the AU must reassert its primacy and enforce diplomatic coherence. It must consolidate all diplomatic tracks under a unified continental strategy to ensure alignment with its decisions on Sudan. The AU should support the Quad’s ceasefire and humanitarian negotiations and propose linking these efforts to an AU-led political process. This would help prevent parallel diplomacy from diluting leverage.