Tensions in Tigray could spark war between Ethiopia and Eritrea – disaster must be avoided

Ethiopia’s ambition to secure Red Sea access, Eritrea’s interference in Ethiopia’s internal affairs and a power struggle in Tigray could explode into a wider regional war. Mediation is urgently needed.

Expert comment Published 19 March 2025 Updated 16 April 2025 4 minute READ

Dr Abel Abate Demissie

Associate Fellow, Africa Programme

The threat of war is looming over the Horn of Africa once again, with observers warning of a return to fighting in Tigray, which could also lead to conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea. 

Ethiopia’s ambition to secure access to the Red Sea via ports it lost to Eritrea in the 1990s, alongside Eritrea’s continued interference in Ethiopia’s internal affairs, have led to a dramatic deterioration of the relationship between the countries over the past two years. The mobilization of troops along both sides of their shared border highlights the seriousness of the situation.

With the rules-based international order under significant strain, Ethiopia – the world’s most populous landlocked country, with over 120 million people but no coastline – may consider this an opportune moment to be more assertive in its efforts to break out of its ‘geographical prison’.

Having lost two ports, Assab and Massawa, when Eritrea seceded in 1993, Ethiopia believes it has legal and moral grounds for re-establishing access to the Red Sea. Ethiopia also has financial incentives: it incurs about $1.6 billion per year in port fees to Djibouti and sea access could potentially enhance its economic growth by 25–30 per cent. Eritrea has criticized Ethiopia’s maritime ambitions as ‘misguided and outdated’ and previously issued statements refusing to discuss port deals that undermine its territorial integrity.

In the view of many in Addis Ababa, Ethiopian attempts to find legal routes to secure this access have failed due to Eritrean intransigence. Frustrated, Ethiopia has resorted to disruptive and aggressive diplomacy. Eritrea has responded by fuelling proxy conflict within Tigray, Ethiopia’s northernmost state, which is still suffering the aftershocks of the devastating two-year war that ended in 2022. This standoff could result in another bout of deadly conflict. 

TPLF power struggle in Tigray 

Eritrea continues to play a provocative role in Tigray, where the Ethiopian government was allied with Eritrea in a bloody conflict against the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), in which an estimated 600,000 people were killed between 2020 and 2022. 

While the Ethiopian government and the TPLF signed the Pretoria Agreement to end the war in November 2022, tensions in the region remain high, including between rival factions of the TPLF.

The federal government’s objective should be to protect the Pretoria Agreement, not the interim administration – its mandate will soon expire, and its future makeup can always be renegotiated. 

Eritrea is one of the main drivers of the split between a faction loyal to TPLF chairman Debretsion Gebremichael (TPLF-D) and those around his former deputy Getachew Reda (TPLF-G). 

The Pretoria Agreement mandated the establishment of an interim administration, and Getachew was appointed its president in early 2023, despite commanding minimal support within the TPLF’s rank and file. Getachew has accused his former colleagues of colluding with Eritrea. The federal government shares this view. 

Risks of escalation

The crisis risks escalating beyond Tigray into war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, with spillover in Sudan and across the region.

The Ethiopian federal government believes the TPLF-D’s objective is to unseat Getachew and seize the contested Western Tigray area by force. It regards this possibility as a grave security threat that would effectively terminate the Pretoria Agreement. 

Tigrayan fighters are also playing a significant role in supporting the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) against the Rapid Support Force (RSF) in neighbouring Sudan, where Eritrea also supports the SAF. 

The Ethiopian federal government feels threatened by the presence of Tigrayan forces in Western Tigray, a disputed border area with Sudan. Moreover, credible reports, including discussions with some officials in the region, suggest that Eritrea has secretly discussed a tactical alliance with elements of the TPLF-D, which may seek Eritrean support should tensions with the federal government escalate further.

Eritrea, in turn, aims to leverage this situation to undermine Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s ambitions for sea access by supporting his domestic adversaries. The risk of conflict is high.

Potential solutions to the crisis

Despite this dangerous situation, there are possible pathways to a peaceful solution. One mechanism could be Ethiopia leasing of portions of Eritrea’s underdeveloped shore at a competitive price. Only about 60 km separate Ethiopia’s border from Eritrea’s coastline at the narrowest point. In return, Eritrea would benefit from Ethiopia’s vast market and could be offered shares in big state parastatals like Ethiopian Airlines, which could salvage Eritrea’s bedraggled economy. 

With access to the sea, Ethiopia could also support Red Sea maritime security and strengthen regional stability. At the same time, Ethiopia should continue exploring additional alternative sea access routes in the region to its growing import and export demand, notably through Somalia and Somaliland, in collaboration with Mogadishu and Hargeisa. 
 

A peaceful resolution with Eritrea would also create political space for the Ethiopian government to manage its internal tensions. In Tigray, the federal government faces a difficult choice between the TPLF-D and the TPLF-G. Getachew is considered dependable by the government but lacks the authority and influence to run Tigray. In contrast, the TPLF-D is seen as less reliable but has a well-equipped infrastructure to administer the region and effectively control Tigrayan security forces. 

In either case, the federal government’s objective should be to protect the Pretoria Agreement, not the interim administration – its mandate will soon expire, and its future makeup can always be renegotiated. 

The crisis risks escalating beyond Tigray into war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, with spillover in Sudan and across the region.

As a compromise, the federal government could consider appointing a suitable candidate to replace Getachew, with a primary mission to normalize life in Tigray, facilitate the return of IDPs, implement disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, put a halt to illegal gold mining and, most notably, prepare the ground for regional elections. Currently, Tigray does not have representatives in Ethiopia’s bicameral parliament or representation in the Federal government, which should change as soon as possible. 

International role to play

To prevent conflict, it is imperative to recognize Ethiopia’s legitimate right to reliable sea access and Eritrea’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. 

Ethiopia has long complained about the international community’s lack of focus on its need for sea access, and Eritrea should be convinced to consider mediation platforms that could achieve a win-win solution. 

Key international actors such as Qatar, Türkiye, the US, the EU, and the UK can mediate in close collaboration with the AU to achieve a durable solution for the region. 

Regional stakeholders can also play an important role. Egypt and Saudi Arabia both have significant influence over Eritrea, where they are trying to acquire land on the Red Sea coast, but have been reluctant to push Asmara into talks with Ethiopia due to their own regional interests. 

Saudi Arabia is increasingly competing with the UAE for influence in the region, including over port and trade access, with Abu Dhabi building close relations with Abiy’s government and supporting the RSF in Sudan. Egypt, which supports the SAF, is locked in a long-running dispute with Ethiopia over the Nile waters. Egypt might be convinced to engage with Eritrea if perhaps Ethiopia indicated its readiness to make tangible concessions in this dispute.

Without such committed international attention to foster talks, Tigray and the wider Horn of Africa are at risk of suffering further bloodshed.