Russia’s cyber proxy campaign against Ukraine and the West has exposed a fundamental gap between tactical capability and strategic coherence in Ukraine’s allies. Closing that gap does not require new tools or perfect consensus – it requires the political will to coordinate what already exists.
The recommendations above demonstrate that strategic coherence in the West’s battle against Russian cyber proxies – or indeed against other hostile states using cyber proxies both in conflict and in peacetime – is achievable without awaiting universal or domestic institutional reform or perfect international consensus. It can be built incrementally through deliberate prioritization: core strategic levers that directly degrade proxy capacity; strategic amplifiers that multiply pressure once foundational actions are engaged; and enablers that create conditions for long-term effectiveness.
This hierarchy matters. States that treat all measures as equally urgent risk diffusing effort across initiatives that cannot succeed in isolation. Core levers create operational friction that proxies cannot easily evade. Amplifiers compound that pressure across multiple dimensions simultaneously. Enablers sustain effectiveness over time. Together, they transform isolated functional responses into elements of unified accountability frameworks where attribution leads to consequences, where different tools reinforce rather than undermine each other, and where democratic states demonstrate institutional capacity for sustained collective action. Where resources are limited, we argue that states should prioritize Recommendations A1–A3 (i.e. core strategic levers) as this will create the foundation necessary for amplifiers and enablers to generate sustained impact.
Fragmentation is not an inevitability. It can be overcome by states and institutions prioritizing coordination. Recent developments and experience – from the operation to disable LockBit to multilateral EU sanctions coordination to emerging public–private frameworks – all demonstrate what becomes possible when institutional silos are bridged and actions are synchronized. These are not isolated successes but proof of concept: strategic coherence is feasible when deliberate institutional design is combined with sustained political commitment.
The question is not whether strategic coherence is achievable, but whether democratic governments will prioritize it alongside other demands. States face real constraints: ongoing crises requiring immediate attention; limited budgets; and competing policy priorities. These challenges are significant, yet they do not diminish the need for coordinated action. Continued fragmentation of the response to cyber proxy activity hands a lasting advantage to adversaries who face fewer comparable coordination difficulties. In a domain in which geopolitical power is increasingly exercised through proxies operating in grey zones, this remains a significant strategic vulnerability. States that implement the measures recommended in this paper will demonstrate that democratic governments can sustain coordinated, effective responses to proxy threats – denying adversaries the strategic advantage fragmentation currently provides.
