Iran’s Foreign Policy Priorities

Adam Ward

Well, good morning everybody and welcome to Chatham House for this meeting on Iran’s Foreign Policy Priorities. We’re pleased to welcome, as our speaker, Dr Seyed Abbas Araghchi, and the Deputy Foreign Minister for Political Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Mr Araghchi is an experienced and a distinguished Diplomat, who’s represented his country as Ambassador to the Organisation of Islamic Conference in Jeddah, to Helsinki and to Tokyo. He was Chief Negotiator with the P5+1 on the nuclear issue, and he’s had departmental responsibility for Asia-Pacific and Commonwealth affairs and for legal and international affairs.

Now, the word ‘priorities’ in the title of this meeting is consequential, because Iranian diplomacy is active on many fronts and has currently to contend simultaneously, with many issues and challenges. One set of issues relates to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the nuclear deal. It’s effectively, in limbo since President Trump has declined to certify that the agreement is in America’s national security interests, and he’s stipulated that what he perceives as its defects, have to be remedied by the 12th of May. A lot of European diplomacy is now focused on keeping America in the deal, or if that proves impossible, trying to ensure that an American exit would happen on terms that do not scupper the agreement as a whole. But this is no small challenge and the risk of an unravelling that could throw diplomacy between Iran and the West into freefall, is real.

A second set of issues relates to the question of the Syrian conflict and to its various contingent effects. One of those has recently been a considerable rise in tensions with Israel. Last weekend’s discussions, at the Munich Security Conference, were illustrative of this.

And a third set of issues relate to what many Analysts see as a spreading and increasingly, energetic regional geopolitical contest between Saudi Arabia and Iran, which pulls in Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen and Qatar. In informal diplomatic and legal terms, we’re often reminded there’s no linkage between the nuclear deal and other elements of Iranian foreign policy, but the psychological, political and strategic linkages are equally often asserted. How then, in this context, does Iran define its priorities and how does it reconcile the various interests it is seeking to promote? What are the choices that it has to arbitrate? And what’s its wider vision for the future of the Middle East? We look forward to the Deputy Foreign Minister’s remarks.

Please note, that the opening statement is going to be fully on the record and it will be live streamed. The discussion period that follows, will be off the record and not live streamed. So, can I now invite the Deputy Minister to address us from the lectern. Thank you very much for being here [applause].

HE Abbas Araghchi

Well, a very good morning, everybody. Ladies and gentlemen, I’m so glad to be with you this morning and I thank Chatham House for inviting me to this gathering.

Well, the questions, which was mentioned actually, take a full lecture each of them, so you don’t expect me to cover all those things in 20 minutes, but I try my best to first, talk about JCPOA, the nuclear deal, and if I have time, also about some regional issues, particularly about the Persian Gulf and what is Iran’s policy in this important region.

Well, on the JCPOA, what I’m going to do is actually address three or four misunderstandings or illusions, which exist about this deal, which has made, you know, its implementation and its continuation very difficult.

The first point I have to say about this or the first mistake is many believe – many think, that JCPOA is an economic deal within Iran and a group of P5+1 or E3+3 or whatever you prefer, you look and usually say E3+3 or I was surprised that it was mentioned P5+1 here, but anyway, it doesn’t make any difference. It is not an economic deal between Iran and P5+1. It is a deal in the non – in the area of non-proliferation. It’s now a part and parcel of non-proliferation regime.

We were able to resolve a very complicated nuclear crisis, which lasted for more than ten years and we did that through negotiations. In peace, a peaceful settlement of a very complicated crisis, which could have turned into a big, you know, and dangerous problem for the whole world, and we were able to resolve that through negotiations, and it is now a part and parcel of non-proliferation regime, and very instruments in non-proliferation. So, it’s not about, you know – for Iran, of course, we would ben – we are supposed to benefit from the sanction lifting because for the measures Iran is taking, in return, it would – sanctions are lifted. But the fact is, we have dealt with a very important question in the field of non-proliferation.

So, for Europeans or for P5+1 or for the world community, when we talk about maintaining JCPOA or to save JCPOA, we are not – it’s not a choice between, for example, Iranian market and the US market. It’s not a choice for economic co-operation, it’s the choice for having a deal, which is directly linked to the non-proliferation regime or to lose it. This is a choice between having security or insecurity at the world level. If we lose JCPOA, we would face another nuclear crisis, which would be very difficult to be resolved this time. So, we are not talking about, you know, economic agreement between Iran and whether companies or banks prefer Iranian market or the US market, this is not the choice. This is a choice for security, not for economy. This is first one.

The second mistake is JCPOA is not linked to any other question, any other issue. We decided – by we, I mean, Iran and JCPOA participants, P5+1. We decided intentionally, to delink Iran’s nuclear programme from any other issue, being regional issues, Iran ballistic missile issue, whatever and that was for a reason. We only focus on Iran’s nuclear programme, try to find a solution for that. Otherwise, I’m sure we would still have negotiating if we wanted to have a package of everything, regional issues, ballistic missiles, nuclear programme of Iran, everything. So, we decided, intentionally, for a good reason, to separate Iran’s nuclear programme from any other issue, focus on that and find a solution, and we were successful because of that. So, it will be a big, big mistake if now, anybody tried to link JCPOA to any other issue, to Iran ballistic missile, for example. To regional issues, Syria, Yemen, other things, it will be a big mistake. Not only you will lose JCPOA, we cannot help other issues and we would make other issues even more complicated and more difficult to be resolved. So, it would be for the benefit of everybody if we continue the same line, separate JCPOA from any other issue, deal with other issues separately. And when I say that, I don’t mean that we don’t want to deal with other issues, of course those which are a matter of concern for everybody should be addressed, should be dealt with, but in their own chance.

The third point or the third mistake about JCPOA, which is also very important, is that there is no sense of closing the JCPOA, although the US administration, President Trump, some are talking about closing in the JCPOA and why JCPOA is not a permanent deal, it’s just for ten years, for example. But this is not true. There is no sense of closing the JCPOA and Iran’s commitment in the JCPOA, not to go for nuclear weapons, is permanent. I can read it for you from the text of the JCPOA, just see the preface, it’s very clear. It says that, “Iran reaffirms that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapons.” This is a very clear commitment by Iran in the deal, in the very first paragraph. It is repeated again in the preamble and general provisions that, “Iran reaffirms that under no circumstances, will ever – will Iran ever seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapons.” So, the sentence has even repeated twice and is very clear that there is no end to this commitment by Iran, and what is our expectations? Again, I read from the JCPOA. “Iran envisions that this JCPOA will allow it to move forward with an exclusively peaceful indigenous nuclear programme, in line with scientific and economic considerations, in accordance with the JCPOA and with a view to building confidence and encouraging international co-operation.” So, it’s very clear, Iran’s commitment in the JCPOA is permanent. There is no sunset clause. There is no sunset to this commitment.

But yes, there are some time limit restrictions for Iran in the JCPOA. For example, we have accepted to limit the amount of our enriched materials stockpile to only 300 kilograms for 15 years. This is a restriction, and time limit restriction, and it will be ended after 15 years. Or the number of centrifuges for eight years should be so-and-so, for ten years, it will be increased, and then, there is no limit after a certain number of years. But these limitations or restrictions for Iran is only for confidence building. We have accepted some restrictions in our nuclear programme to build confidence and when these restrictions are finished, it doesn’t mean that Iran can go for the bomb. It means that Iran would become a normal member of NPT, but still a member of NPT, and still committed to its obligations in the NPT.

There were some concerns about Iran’s nuclear programme, some questions, some ambiguities, okay, we accepted, we entered into a nuclear negotiation, we come to a conclusion. In the deal, we accepted restrictions for our programme, for the sake of confidence building, but it doesn’t mean that these restrictions will be forever. Confidence building measures are time limited. For a certain period of time, you do something to build confidence, then it is finished, then you become a normal member. So, this is the idea. After ten years, in some cases after 15 years, all those restrictions are finished, but Iran’s commitment would remain in place. Iran would become a normal member of NPT, doesn’t need to do any confidence building measures anymore, and can enjoy its rights in the NPT, as long as it is obli – it is committed to its obligations in the NPT.

Even more, according to the JCPOA, we are now implementing J – implementing additional protocol. I’m sure all of you know about it. We are now implementing additional protocol provisioning. In six years’ time from now when we get to the transition day in the JCPOA – there are different days in the JCPOA, one of them is transition day, which is almost six years from now, in that day, if US and EU fulfil their commitment, Iranian Parliament is supposed to ratify additional protocol. So, in that date, additional protocol would become permanent for Iran, a permanent commitment for Iran. Additional protocol is a very robust and tough mechanism for inspections, as you all know, and if you know there is no exit in additional protocol. You can exit from NPT, but you cannot exit from additional protocol, once you ratify that. So, even these, kind of things, would become permanent for Iran.

You all know that there are some conditions set by the US President and he has set an ultimatum. To change these provisions, make these clauses permanent, means killing of the deal, there is no doubt about that. We accepted ten to 15 years of restrictions for confidence building, and it doesn’t mean that we have to build confidence forever, it’s ridiculous. When this confidence building period is finished, Iran would become a normal member of NPT, can – should enjoy its rights in the NPT, should remain committed to its obligations in the NPT.

Well, having said that, I would like to add a very important point that JCPOA is a successful story for you, for P5+1. Why? Because Iran has fully complied to its obligations. There are nine consecutive reports by the IAEA, Director General of IAEA, who is the judge in this game, verified and confirmed that Iran is fully compliant to its obligations. There is no single failure in the – from the Iranian part and verification by the Agency is very tough, very robust. Every milligram of our material is counted, every spare part of our centrifuges, our machines, are under supervision, under monitoring. There are inspections on a daily basis. The Agency is doing its job in a very tough manner and they have found nothing. They have found that Iran is fully compliant to its obligations in the JCPOA, and there are reports, nine reports, confirming that.

But as far as Iran is concerned, JCPOA is not a successful story. Why? Because Iran is not benefiting from the sanction lifting. In full, I don’t say that we are not benefiting at all. We are fully compliant to our obligations. We want to fully enjoy the dividends of the deal, the dividends of sanctions lifting, which is not the case right now, for a very simple reason. The US is not complying its obligations in the JCPOA. They are even violating JCPOA, on a daily basis almost. Now, it’s no more than a year that President Trump has announced that he wants to destroy the deal, tear it off, fix it, change it, end it, whatever. First of all, all these statements by President Trump and other officials in the administration are in violation of the deal. Violation of the letter and text of the deal, not in the spirit. JCPOA is not a spiritual deal, you’re nothing about the spirit and we are not talking about the spirit of the deal, although the spirit is also violated by the US, but even the text, the letter of the deal is violated.

Let me to read it out from the text, which is very interesting. If you just see paragraph 26, 28, 29 [pause]. Paragraph 28, “The E3/EU+3 and Iran commit, commit to implement this JCPOA in good faith and in a constructive atmosphere.” Is this a constructive atmosphere created by President Trump and the new US administration? They have created an atmosphere of uncertainty about JCPOA. It is like a poison for business community to work with Iran, because they are kept – for more than a year, they are kept in confusion, whether JCPOA is to survive or not, whether the President certify Iran’s compliance or not, and whether the President extend the waivers or not. So, he has kept everybody in waiting. This is not constructive atmosphere needed by the JCPOA or asked by the JCPOA and needed for a successful implementation of JCPOA.

It continues, paragraph 28, “And to refrain from any action inconsistent with the letter, spirit and intent of this JCPOA that would undermine its successful implementation. Senior Government officials of the E3/EU+3 and Iran will make every effort to support the successful implementation of this JCPOA including in their public statements. Including in their public statement,” so if any public statement by President Trump when he say that, “I’m going to – this is a very bad deal. This is the worst deal ever, I’m going to tear it off. I’m going to fix it,” all these statements are clearly, a violation of paragraph 28, and he has done it, for example, in the General Assembly in front of all countries.

This Saturday, General McMaster violated deal in Munich Conference when he asked all participants not to do business with Iran. Let me to read it out for you [pause]. You know, they have committed themselves to refrain from anything, which prevents normalisation of trade and economic co-operation with Iran. This is a commitment, clear commitment in the JCPOA, they shouldn’t prevent normalisation of trade and economic co-operation with Iran. So, all these things by the US Administration are a violation of the deal, very clearly, and as a result, an atmosphere is created and instead of a constructive atmosphere, we have now a destructive atmosphere, preventing banks, companies, business entities to work with Iran. So, Iran is not benefiting from sanctions lifting in full, and I don’t think the deal can survive in this way, even if the ultimatum is passed and sanctions are – and the waivers are extended, and still if the same policy of confusion, uncertainty about JCPOA continues, if companies and banks and other business entities are not working with Iran, we cannot remain in a deal, which there is no benefit for us, it’s a fact.

Well, let me to finish on JCPOA now. Have some words on regional issues [pause]. Well, I don’t want to enter into details on what is going on in Syria and Yemen and other places. Maybe during question and answers we can have more discussion about that, and my general comment is that Iran is for peace, stability and security of the region, and we see that as our own peace and stability and we have tried hard to help stability and security of the region. All of you know how hard we’ve fought with terrorist elements in Iraq, in Syria and other places.

It was only because of Iran which Daesh was defeated, and you don’t have now. the so-called Islamic State in Damascus or border or other places. So, we consider peace and stability in the region as our own. We consider, or we believe that there is no military solution for any problem in our region, it’s a fact, and I hope that others in our region, in our neighbourhood, can say the same. There is no military solution, nowhere. We should all go for political settlements. This is our policy and we proved that in the JCPOA when we entered into negotiation about a very important programme of us, our nuclear programme, in good faith. We negotiated in good faith. We come to a solution in good faith. We implemented the deal in good faith, although it was not the case in the other side. So, this is our policy and we are ready to help a political solution for each and every problem in our region.

We believe that we need dialogue and we believe that we should start from the Persian Gulf, which is more achievable. Problems in the greater area of West Asia or Middle East or whatever, is too complicated, too difficult, but we believe that we can start from the Persian Gulf to have some, sort of, regional dialogue and this is more achievable. An idea has been presented by our Foreign Minister, just this Sunday in Munich Conference, for a regional dialogue forum in the Persian Gulf and we believe that it would have its direct effect in the neighbouring area as well.

So, let me to read some parts of our Minister’s speech in Munich Conference, which I believe is very, very important as an idea to promote peace and stability in this region. Well, I just go to some certain important paragraphs, “Iran believes that our Persian Gulf region requires a fresh regional security architecture. We believe in and have proposed creating what we call a strong region as opposed to a strong man in the region. A strong region very small and large nations, even those with historical rivalries, contribute to stability.”

“This is simply recognising the need to respect the interest of all stakeholders, which by its very nature, will lead to stability, while hegemonic tendencies by any regional or global – or global power will, by its very nature, lead to insecurity.”

“In a quest to create our strong region, we need to be realistic and accept our differences. We need to move from collective security and alliance formations to inclusive concepts, such as security networking, which can address issues that range from divergence of interests to power and size disparities. Security networking is a non-zero-sum approach that accepts that security is indivisible.”

“Immediately after the JCPOA – after the conclusion of JCPOA, Iran sought to use the same approach for the Persian Gulf and proposed to create a regional dialogue forum. That proposal, unfortunately, fell on deaf ears. But it is still on the table, as far as we are concerned. It is the only way out. It could become, if our neighbour join us, a forum that will be used as an instrument for helping, organise and advance dialogue at all formal and informal levels in our region.”

“The parameters of Iran’s proposed regional architecture are simple, but effective. Rather than trying to ignore conflicts of interests, it will accept differences. Being premised on inclusivity, it can act as a firewall to prevent emergence of an oligarchy among bigger states, and importantly, it allows the smaller states to participate and have their interest protected.”

“Like the Helsinki process, the future security architecture in the Persian Gulf should be based on the ticket principles and CBM baskets. All countries around this strategic yet volatile waterway should be able to enter by committing to a series of common standards enshrined in the UN Charter, such as sovereign equality of states, refraining from the threat or use of force, peaceful” [pause] – sorry, everyone – “peaceful resolution of conflicts, respect for their territorial integrity, inviolability of borders, non-intervention in the domestic affairs of states, and respect for self-determination within states.”

“We also recognize that we need confidence-building measures in the Persian Gulf, from joint military visits to pre-notification of military exercises, and from transparency measures in armament procurements to reducing military expenditures, all of which could eventually lead to a regional non-aggression pact. We can begin with easier to implement issues, such as the promotion of tourism, joint investments, or even joint taskforces on issues ranging from nuclear safety to pollution to disaster management to drug combatting, etc.”

“At a time when we are dangerously close to escalating conflicts that will affect our children and grandchildren, we encourage our counterparts in the Persian Gulf to join Iran in making these proposals a reality.”

Thank you so much [applause].

Adam Ward

Thank you very much. We now begin the off the record…