Dr Samir Puri
Well, a warm welcome to members and friends, to Chatham House, where we have been convening on the big issues in international affairs for over 100 years. Thank you for joining us this evening to help us continue this tradition. My name is Dr Samir Puri. I am the recently arrived at Chatham House Director for Global Governance and Security, and I’m delighted to welcome Dr Comfort Ero…
Dr Comfort Ero
Thank you.
Dr Samir Puri
…from International Crisis Group. Before we start the event, just a few housekeeping notes. This discussion is on the record, and it’s being recorded and it’s also being livestreamed, as well. I’d encourage you, if you’re tweeting about this event, to use the hashtag #CHEvents and @ChathamHouse. When we come to the Q&A, in the second half of the event, please raise your hands to ask questions, and if you’re called upon to ask a question, you can stay seated. A microphone will be brought to your chair. Please ask the individual to identify themselves and – before stating your question. Attendees can also submit questions throughout the event using the Q&A box, and it’ll appear at the bottom of their Zoom feed. I’ll ask you to unmute if – to ask your question, potentially, but if you prefer to stay off the microphone, then you can indicate this in the question when you type it in.
Now, I’m going to introduce Dr Comfort Ero…
Dr Comfort Ero
You can call me Comfort.
Dr Samir Puri
…who is – your third visit, I think, in terms of this particular headline event.
Dr Comfort Ero
Hmmm hmm.
Dr Samir Puri
Dr Comfort Ero was appointed Crisis Group’s President and CEO in December 2021. She joined the organisation as West Africa Project Director in 2001, so that’s 20 years already at Crisis Group before you became the President. In that time, you were also the Interim Vice President in January 2021 and Dr Ero has spent her entire career working on or in conflict affected countries. In between her two tenures at Crisis Group, she served as Deputy Africa Programme Director for the International Center for Transitional Justice and prior to that, Political Affairs Officer and Policy Advisor to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General UN Mission in Liberia. She has a PhD from the LSE, University of London, and is also the Chair of the Board of the Rift Valley Institute and sits on the Editorial Board of various journals.
Dr Comfort Ero
Hmmm hmm.
Dr Samir Puri
Now, onto our event, which is, of course, the International Crisis Group’s annual publication, “10 Conflicts to Watch in 2025.” Now, conflict is something that is acute, it’s permissive, it’s pervasive and it’s becoming worse, and I think that’s probably one of the first things I wanted to ask you about. Is because you conduct this exercise every year, what’s your overall impression in conducting this exercise this year, when I’d say concern around armed conflict is as its highest, I think, it’s been…
Dr Comfort Ero
Hmmm.
Dr Samir Puri
…at any stage I can remember? But not only conflicts that are active, but conflicts that could become active.
Dr Comfort Ero
Hmmm.
Dr Samir Puri
And I notice your list combines both categories and types of conflict.
Dr Comfort Ero
No, thank you very much and congratulations to you on your new post here at Chatham House, as well, and it’s a pleasure to be moderated by you. I should clarify that I would love to still be the Chair of the Rift Valley Institute, but I had to step down when I became President, but it’s still an institute that is close to me, as well.
You know, when I reflect back on the, I think, nearly 13 – and I’ve just seen my boss – one of my bosses walk in, as well. When I reflect on the 13 years or so that we’ve been doing the ‘10 Conflicts,’ and bearing in mind that Crisis Group is a conflict prevention organisation, early warning, and, you know, we tend to look to organisations like Chatham House and where I used to be, IISS and others, who focus really on, sort of, the big power of rivalry in geopolitics. But it’s very clear to us at Crisis Group that everything that we do and everything that we focus on, in terms of trying to avert and de-escalate, resolve and warn about conflicts, is really now overshadowed by, sort of, big power rivalry.
And there is an interesting throughline in this year’s theme, which is the return of President Trump, as well. So, when I look at all the ten conflicts, bar two, although given what’s happened now with USAID, there was at least two conflicts that I didn’t think would necessarily have significant impact because of the return of Trump, but I’m, sort of, recalculating my own positions on that. But except for two of those, Myanmar and Sudan, and we can come back to discuss those if you want, it’s very clear to me that there – what binds all these conflicts together is that there’s going to be a definitive change in US policy that will impact a number of the conflicts that we’ve put on our list, for good or bad reasons, as well.
There are reasons – there are – we expect some innovations and opportunities, but it’s also clear already, from the last two and a half weeks that we’ve seen Trump in power, that some of the decisions that he’s taken have glaring repercussions. You know, the idea, also, that a US President would assert the idea of territorial expansion, therefore undercutting one of the key principles of international relations, that he would – that also, I think for most of US’s allies, I thought was a shock therapy, that they are the first point of – in his rearview window, as opposed to adversaries, as well. Sort of, also, I think it’s quite clarifying to see the raft of executive summ – executive orders that have a sheer impact on a number of conflicts that we’re looking at. I also mentioned USAID, as well.
So, for us, it’s about big power rivalry, it’s about geopolitical tensions. It’s very clear that the rulebook is no longer the same, but we do see opportunities. We do see an expectation of change. We do also see that it’s not business as usual, which is not a bad thing. I do think that some of the conflicts we’re looking at, there’s a sense in which they were stuck and that we need to try something different. The question is if what you try is different leads to further mayhem, then we’re really in the wrong direction, as well.
So, the other issue, also, although he’s been in power for two and a half weeks, also, there’s still things that we don’t know. There’s still a lot of uncertainty, but a really good sense, already, is that he did say he was going to move fast on certain conflicts as soon as he came into office. One happened just as he was coming into the office, which is Israel-Gaza. I think there is something worth unpacking there, and then, the one that he’s had to reverse his own timeline is Ukraine, because…
Dr Samir Puri
Yeah.
Dr Comfort Ero
…suddenly, there’s – you know, the aspirations versus reality of governing, sort of, collides straightaway, hmmm.
Dr Samir Puri
Yeah. Well, let’s unpack that right now, because…
Dr Comfort Ero
Yeah, hmmm hmm.
Dr Samir Puri
…one of the challenges, I’m sure, with actually, you know, hitting the final submission for this particular report, is things change…
Dr Comfort Ero
Yeah.
Dr Samir Puri
…really quickly.
Dr Comfort Ero
Hmmm hmm.
Dr Samir Puri
And I think it was released at the start of January.
Dr Comfort Ero
Hmmm hmm.
Dr Samir Puri
And so, just tell me a bit about the Middle East and how much that’s moved on, even since this report has been finalised, but also, why you think it’s moved on in the way…
Dr Comfort Ero
Yeah.
Dr Samir Puri
…it has.
Dr Comfort Ero
So, I mean, look, I wouldn’t say it’s necessarily moved on. I think there’s still a lot that we don’t know, and as I speak to you, Prime Minister Netanyahu is in Washington speaking with the President, as well. So, it’s not quite clear what’s going on and what the talking points will be and what the outcome there will be. But Trump was very clear in his own messaging that he wanted – you know, he wants to – first, he wants to be a dealmaker. He wants to be a peacemaker. His legacy, and I think we should take him seriously, at his word, it’s a separate issue as to judging in the quality of the peace-making, but he wants to be a peacemaker. And he said, “All hell will break out with Hamas,” but it was also a clear that he was pressuring the Israeli sides to get some kind of deal. And I think we have to welcome that just after the sheer scale of 15 months of just hell for both sides, as well. So, we have to welcome the fact that we’ve gotten to this moment, as well.
The que – we’re now on day 16, you know, where the tough question comes in about how you begin to work out phase II, which is also to do with the governance and administration. I think there are number of question marks about the humanitarian architecture, about aid delivery, about who you’re going to work with on the Israeli side. There’s a lot of vagueness, and, you know, it’s very rare to see a peace agreement that is so vague, that is flexible, that gives options, and when one of the sides is making it very clear that the option to go to war is still very much on the table. And you also recognise that Hamas, too, also have a – some degree of flexibility, you know, that they may have been damaged, but they’re not out, as well.
So, I think there are lots of things that can go wrong in the peace deal and it’s clear that it is both pressure from the US side, and Trump owns this now. This is Trump at his peak, where he can force a number of actors, but Israel, too, also has its own…
Dr Samir Puri
Yeah.
Dr Comfort Ero
…calculations. Netanyahu certainly wanted to give Trump something of a win. The question now is, what happens next?
Dr Samir Puri
And on that note, in terms of what happens next, so I took really careful note that one of the conflicts you’ve got listed here is to do with Iran.
Dr Comfort Ero
Hmmm hmm.
Dr Samir Puri
And of course, that’s Iran-Israel-US. Is there a risk that as the situation regarding Gaza and Hamas moves onto a different stage, not resolved, but a different stage, that actually, that frees up Israeli and maybe US attention to actually maximise pressure on Iran? Is that why that’s included in the – this 10…
Dr Comfort Ero
Yeah, I mean, the…
Dr Samir Puri
…Conflicts to Watch?
Dr Comfort Ero
You know, another way in which you can read it, also, is that, you know, the message that Trump gave is like, you know, look, keep your eye on the prize, and what is the prize? So, one of it is about Iran and the other one is about, you know, Trump’s other ambitions around normalisation between Israeli and Saudi Arabia.
Let’s focus on Iran. I mean, I think one thing, just stepping back, is to recognise that the region, the Middle East, is radic – vastly different from what Trump left behind in 2020, and then, you know, it was a more assertive, more emboldened, more stronger and confident Iran. It’s very different today, a sense in which it’s vulnerable, lost its axis of resistance. I even had some of my colleagues calling it “the axis of no resistance,” or “Where’s the resistance?” Suddenly, with Assad, your main ally gone, Hezbollah on its backfoot, you know, and all the forward-leaning forces that you had for Iran have been depleted, or weaker, as well.
But I think there – and we say it in the 10 Conflicts and it’s playing out now, there are two choices for Trump. Again, keep an eye on the fact that he really is very serious about the peace-making. The question is whether he has the room for manoeuvre to get there, and understanding the calculations that everybody’s going to be making, particularly Israel, that may want to make that harder for Trump, as well. I mean, I think a wiser counsel around Trump would be to test out – there are two camps right now in Iran. There’s one that wants to double down on more weaponizing around the – its own nuclear capacity. But there’s another camp, and it’s the camp that I would urge counsel to pay attention to, the one that may be interested in some kind of diplomacy or conversations with Trump and the European community.
And I think a wise counsel would suggest that you test out that proposition, you see whether there’s willingness to show transparency around the enrichment, recognise that you in a, sort of, slightly different position, and also, recognise that one thing that you haven’t lost in the last 15 months, which is quite crucial, is that the reproachment with Suda – Saudi Arabia still holds, as well. So, that’s the other fact that has changed since Trump came into power, as well, since Trump came back in the office, yeah.
Dr Samir Puri
And I want to get your views on especially some of the less geopolitically salient conflicts a bit later on.
Dr Comfort Ero
Hmmm hmm.
Dr Samir Puri
But just sticking with Trump and with deals. Of course, “Ukraine and European Security,” that’s how you’ve titled it in the…
Dr Comfort Ero
Hmmm hmm.
Dr Samir Puri
…top ten has come back. Now, we’re all on tenterhooks, aren’t we, in terms of what…
Dr Comfort Ero
Hmmm hmm.
Dr Samir Puri
…can and can’t be achieved? Putting aside the resolve this in 24 hours…
Dr Comfort Ero
Hmmm hmm.
Dr Samir Puri
…what’s your sense now in terms of the elusiveness of a deal?
Dr Comfort Ero
That’s a good word, the ‘elusiveness’ and that’s…
Dr Samir Puri
Yeah.
Dr Comfort Ero
…that is the key. And I think more than any other conflict, this is the one that I think is more worrying, because number one, I think that tea – Trump and his – the team around him, have recognised that, oh, I will deliver a deal on the first day – you know, this is when reality hits you in the face, as well. So, we’ve gone from a 100-day plan to six month plan, and who knows, you know, whether this will be the year of negotiations, either at the table or the battlefield, as well? I think there are three things that are pretty clear to us at Crisis Group that I don’t think should be negotiated away, which is around Ukraine’s own sovereignty, its own ability to defend itself, as well. But I think there has to be a deal, otherwise it will not be sustainable, that, you know, puts, you know, Russia on notice that there is a cost to this kind of aggression.
Now, I think the art is how you strike a balance between deterrence and diplomacy and clearly, a message to Europe that we put out ourselves last November, is that, “Are you ready? Are you ready to also show that you have the capability to defend Ukraine and that you will also answer that question to the United States that you’re no longer reliable just on the US, but you would actually shore up your own defence as well?” It’s a big, tall order, but I think one thing is clear is that the US and Trump is not omnipresent.
Dr Samir Puri
No.
Dr Comfort Ero
So, Europe’s notion that it’s – sometimes it comes across as weak and vulnerable, I think that there have been some significant clarifying moments for Europe. And you saw the conversations yesterday and today around defence capability and defence expenditure, but it’s a wakeup call for Europe that it’s no longer business as usual.
And just one more point, there would’ve been some kind of negotiation this year, regardless of the administration. One is just moving at a faster pace than the other one…
Dr Samir Puri
Yeah.
Dr Comfort Ero
…would have, as well.
Dr Samir Puri
And I think that’s a really important point, is, like, the, you know, the conflict was entering a new phase, anyway.
Dr Comfort Ero
Yeah, hmmm hmm, hmmm hmm.
Dr Samir Puri
And there had to have been some adjustment strategy.
Dr Comfort Ero
Yeah, hmmm hmm, hmmm hmm.
Dr Samir Puri
Very long way from 2023…
Dr Comfort Ero
Yeah, hmmm hmm.
Dr Samir Puri
…counteroffensive and that, sort of, optimism.
Dr Comfort Ero
Yeah, hmmm hmm.
Dr Samir Puri
Now, you’ve mentioned the US is not omnipresent.
Dr Comfort Ero
Hmmm hmm.
Dr Samir Puri
And I think there’s another undercurrent. Certainly, the one around great powers come about…
Dr Comfort Ero
Hmmm hmm.
Dr Samir Puri
…very strongly from the report. Another undercurrent is, sort of, changing balances of global power.
Dr Comfort Ero
Hmmm hmm.
Dr Samir Puri
And Asia features quite prominently…
Dr Comfort Ero
Hmmm hmm.
Dr Samir Puri
…in the report, and of course, you’ve got the Korean Peninsula, and you got China-US. Could you just talk a little bit about the rising salience of Asia?
Dr Comfort Ero
Yeah, hmmm hmm.
Dr Samir Puri
Which is – of course, during the Cold War, was a site of a lot of devastating conflicts.
Dr Comfort Ero
Yeah.
Dr Samir Puri
Less so now, Myanmar aside. Myanmar, of course, is maybe the one that people know the least about it but is actually causing the most destruction in Asia.
Dr Comfort Ero
Hmmm hmm.
Dr Samir Puri
Can you talk a bit about the conflicts you cover in Asia?
Dr Comfort Ero
Yeah. You know, one of the things that worried me when we put this together is that there was so much focus on the big power rivalry and the contestation, and that what overshadows everything is the US-China tension, that, you know, I kept – we kept on keeping an eye on our mission of conflicts that are off the radar. And Myanmar is a classic, sort of, the bread and butter that people are familiar with Crisis Group, that we focus on those, you know, conflicts that are off the radar, that are not on the international agenda, or some that I prefer to say are deprioritised and just in the sheer scale of everything that needs to be done. It was our Co-Chair, Susana Molcorra, who told us last year, “Guys, this is the era of Asia geopolitics. You need to, sort of, start thinking about how it – what it looks like in your, sort of, workplan, as well.”
I mean, for – I think there’s one question at the back of my mind, or one issue that I’m trying to grapple with in terms of understanding that the dealmaker of Trump, the, you know, the – and the art of dealmaking, and for those of you who will be familiar, sort of, with US-China politics, there are two possibilities. One is whether we’ll see, sort of, a Nixon to China moment, and he has, sort of, indicated that he wants some, kind of, reproachment with Xi Jinping. You know, and he’s walked back from his 60% tariff, and you’ve seen that China itself has gone through the WTO, but he still wants that conversation with Xi Jinping.
And can the two leaders – continuing from what Biden did, and I think we should credit Biden for trying to make sure that there was still, sort of, communication between Beijing and Washington, they continue to have that high level talks, agree certain fundamentals between the two leaders. I think the big area will always be Taiwan. The big area will always be how you accommodate, you know, China in this, ge – economical, landscape and rather than trying to constrain it. So, that’s one possibility, which looks a little bit – you know, there’s a lot of possibilities in there, because it would lower the temperature in a number of hotspots in the region.
The other possibility is, you, kind of like, see a reverse Nixon approach, which would be where Trump seeks to – and here’s the link between Ukraine and China, where, you know, in return for Russia, sort of, pulling back, it agrees to freeze the conflict with Ukraine, forces Ukraine to accept that a fifth of its territory is gone. Tries to loosen the relationship between Russia and China and then, tries to, sort of, you know, put a wedge through China and Russia in return for building out different spheres of influence, as well. There will be losers in that, because then, you have question marks about what’s the future of the Philippines, the South China Sea?
Dr Samir Puri
Yeah.
Dr Comfort Ero
And the carefully weaving together of some important regional alliances, like the AUKUS and The Quad, as well, and what that means for China and the region, as well.
Dr Samir Puri
It’s really mindboggling to think of a, like, a reverse Nixon.
Dr Comfort Ero
Yeah, hmmm hmm.
Dr Samir Puri
But the number of pieces that would have to align…
Dr Comfort Ero
Yeah.
Dr Samir Puri
…across multiple chessboards…
Dr Comfort Ero
Yeah, hmmm hmm, yeah.
Dr Samir Puri
…makes it feel like it would be something more out of a, sort of, a fiction novel than reality.
Dr Comfort Ero
Yeah.
Dr Samir Puri
But do you think it’s…?
Dr Comfort Ero
Well, look, you know, what’s really interesting about Trump, and I hate to say, but it’s been quite interesting to see how – what he’s gotten so far from his very bullish diplomacy, if you can dare attach diplomacy to what Trump is doing, at this highly tracsac – transactional. But look what happened with Colombia, look what happened with Canada and look what happened in Mexico. They’re two narratives. Of course, Trump, you know, will come home to his constituency and he says, “I got you that deal. I told you we’re not messing around” and that “I sent out a warning to Canada, I sent out a warning to Mexico.” I think what worries me is that in that fast-paced, sort of, throwing down the gauntlet at everybody, particularly your allies, you create distrust, you shatter years of alliances and relationships. You legitimise certain bad behaviour, but you also – I mean, after, sort of, decades of carefully weaving some very difficult and complex deterrence frameworks, you now sow doubt into those frameworks.
Dr Samir Puri
Yeah.
Dr Comfort Ero
And you give the other side, the adversaries, the chance to test the waters, to say, “Oh, look, the US cannot be trusted amongst its allies. Allies are looking vulnerable. They are – they don’t trust the insurance policy that they have with the US. Will they bet on us?” But also, “Can we also be – you know, go for annexation? Can we wake up one day and say, “I’m going to grab this land?”” So, you are licensing a particular kind of behaviour and you’re unravelling a very carefully constructed deterrent architecture, that by the way, you created and you have been a beneficiary about.
So, this notion that America, you know, somehow gives us this, like, woe is me, the world is, sort of like, taking advantage of me, you created this architecture and it’s served you very well. And you’re unravelling in it in a very dangerous way that could backfire on you, as well. Because it’s not as if there isn’t another way in which to think about this, especially with your allies, you’ve – who are – and what – you heard what van der Ley [means von der Leyen] and Christine said this week, that they got the message…
Dr Samir Puri
Yeah.
Dr Comfort Ero
…as well. So, a lot of allies are getting the message, but they could also miscalculate, as well.
Dr Samir Puri
And it’s interesting ‘cause it’s also a function of us having this conversation in February 25.
Dr Comfort Ero
Hmmm.
Dr Samir Puri
So, barely a month after the change of administration…
Dr Comfort Ero
Yeah, hmmm hmm.
Dr Samir Puri
…in the US, there’s this optimism around dealmaking…
Dr Comfort Ero
Hmmm hmm.
Dr Samir Puri
…at different levels. There’s also, as you rightly point out, the great fear of, basically, you know, breaching this taboo of territorial change.
Dr Comfort Ero
Yeah.
Dr Samir Puri
And providing potential, you know, conquerors, a narrative that they can…
Dr Comfort Ero
Yeah.
Dr Samir Puri
…point to the US and say that – so, we don’t know where this is going to go. But I want to move onto some of the less geopolitically salient, but nonetheless, really critical conflicts that you cover. You mentioned Myanmar. It – well, I was in Asia myself in February 2021, when the coup occurred.
Dr Comfort Ero
I…
Dr Samir Puri
So, that’s actually now coming onto four years since the…
Dr Comfort Ero
That’s the day I became Vi – Interim Vice President and I got a message, says, “Welcome to the world.”
Dr Samir Puri
Oh, wow, okay. So, you’ve…
Dr Comfort Ero
Yes.
Dr Samir Puri
…actually literally been tracking that in your current position?
Dr Comfort Ero
Yeah, hmmm hmm.
Dr Samir Puri
You’ve got Sudan, as well.
Dr Comfort Ero
Yeah, hmmm hmm.
Dr Samir Puri
And I always think either there are conflicts which are – they involve the resources, the egos of the great powers, and there are those that led – that don’t really do that.
Dr Comfort Ero
Hmmm hmm.
Dr Samir Puri
But Sudan, although it doesn’t have the geopolitical salience of other conflicts, has an immense amount of human suffering…
Dr Comfort Ero
Hmmm hmm.
Dr Samir Puri
…that’s going on. There’s 12 million people have been displaced, and I notice that you mention that, and I just want you to talk us through – especially for those of us who don’t necessarily follow the conflict in Sudan so closely, where you think it’s – why you think it’s so acutely important to highlight it in this report.
Dr Comfort Ero
It’s funny you say we ‘don’t follow’. This country is a penholder at the Security Council on Sudan, so it should, by virtue of that, be at the, sort of, at the top end of concerns. And I don’t know how many times I’ve said it, but, you know, 20 years ago, that we had this big campaign, “Save Dafur.” It was all over, sort of, international media, the humanitarian plight.
Dr Samir Puri
This was the Janjaweed at the time, wasn’t it?
Dr Comfort Ero
Yeah, yeah, yeah.
Dr Samir Puri
Yeah.
Dr Comfort Ero
So, there were – you know, and question marks as to whether it was genocide or not. So, there was a big, sort of, activism, spurred on by various faith groups, activists, human rights groups, what have you, right from Europe through to the US, as well. So – and I think it’s a reminder, also, that the energy – the room is being absorbed by so many other competing interests, that Sudan oftentime, doesn’t get the attention. I would say that it’s deprioritised, not that it doesn’t get attention, because I was in – at the UNGA Week, the UN high-level week in September, there were three or four different meetings on Sudan.
Also, every – virtually every newspaper on the East Coast, so whether it’s Washington Post – bless you – whether it was Washington Post or New York Times, because the Emin of the Emirates and UAE was coming to Washington, they featured Sudan, but in terms of its geopolitical relevance, as well. So, it has geopolitical ramifications. You’ve got a number of countries piling in on either side of the conflict and one of the drivers of this conflict is that both sides have access to manpower, to resources, to money, to – and ammunition, as well. So, that’s the geopolitical tensi – reality. The difference between Sudan 2025 and Sudan 2003/2004 is the constituency of actors. They’re not Western actors who are able to shape, lead, pressure or navigate this crisis. This time, it’s the region, it’s the Gulf and also – and other European actors. It’s also in Asia, as well.
So, that’s the geopolitical factor, but also, I think it’s a – if you wanted to look for an example where there’s a limits of Western influence and pressure, and where the oth – where other actors have a bigger, sort of, pocket of money, this is – Sudan is a classic case of that, as well. And I think one of the things that I was ed – re-editing in my mind, where I, you know, I said to you at the beginning that I didn’t think Sudan or Myanmar would necessarily feel the impact of a Trumpian return, I do actually worry about what it means for the freezing, temporary freezing, of US’s international assistance and aid. Although we’ve seen the caveat around the humanitarian space, as well, but there’s still question marks about what that means for a number of people who work on Sudan, as well.
Dr Samir Puri
It would be remiss of me not to ask, I suppose, a question you probably get asked quite a lot and it’s about the conflicts that haven’t necessarily made the list. So, DRC being one…
Dr Comfort Ero
Hmmm hmm.
Dr Samir Puri
…just in terms of what’s been happening in and around Goma in relation to Rwanda. Maybe talk us through some of the conflicts that didn’t make the list, that you also think are important to highlight. There’s…
Dr Comfort Ero
Oh.
Dr Samir Puri
Ones to watch for this year.
Dr Comfort Ero
I’m looking over at that corner over there, of my colleagues, as well, and their own reactions to this. I mean, if I told you how many emails go past between all of us, and it’s not a beauty contest, but, you know, the litany of conflicts. And yeah, and we were made the offer, because it’s our anniversary year, but, you know, “Do you want to expand it to 11? Do you want to expand it to 14?” I said, “Well, why not 30, given that we’re 30 and given that we do work – cover about 55 conflicts, alive in terms of our staffing being based in those bases and 70 in total?” But we had to be disciplined and – ‘cause we’re very clear, we’re asking you to watch this for various reasons, opportunities, reversals, geopolitical landscape, as well.
You know, my colleagues who cover the Central Africa region and also, the Africa Programme, were watching the diplomacy, the summitry, that was taking place between Rwanda and DRC, led by Angola, and they saw a deal, but they saw it, sort of, being – collapsed when Kagame chose not to go ahead with it. So, there are already indications that things were going in the wrong direction, as well, but we had to make a calculation. Look, we – I will admit we replaced the Sahel with Syria, for example, because it was matter of which one provides you both with a sense of opportunity, concern, and has, sort of, serious ramifications. That doesn’t mean the Sahel doesn’t, but you have to choose. You know, there was a minute when Mexico was going to go off the list.
Dr Samir Puri
Yeah, ‘cause you…
Dr Comfort Ero
We weren’t going to put Mexico on the list.
Dr Samir Puri
US-Mexico is on the list, very topical…
Dr Comfort Ero
That was on the list, yeah, and there…
Dr Samir Puri
…right now – right this – now.
Dr Comfort Ero
…was pushback even with – even amongst us, as well. You know, even I hummed and harred, should Mexico have gone on the list, as well? So, there’s no science behind it, so we do make a calculated guest – guess, but it’s also because we know we’re going to put out other lists, as well. So, the other significant list that we put out this – last week, was the “European Union Global Watch List,” with a very clear message to the European Union about places where we think that it has leverage to shape certain things. And certainly, we believe that it had leverage – or has leverage and pressures if it chooses to use it, vis-à-vis The Great Lakes, for example, as well.
Dr Samir Puri
Yeah, and let’s just carry on our discussion just…
Dr Comfort Ero
And also, just to say, just ahead of the Africa Union Summit, there’s a clear message, also, to the Africa Union about how it’s using, or not using, its own diplomacy, its own heft, on a number of conflict that it has a role in. So, you’ll see The Great Lakes mentioned there, and we use other tools. So, there was a statement that was released last week on the DRC and on our podcast of that shows you the magnitude. That even though it doesn’t appear on the watch list, there are other ways in which we address it, as well.
Dr Samir Puri
Yeah, and I was just going to carry on our conversation on the stage just for one moment, before we go to the Q&A, and just last point of interest from me is, really, just the overarching sense of pattern. So, I noted in your last year’s report, you mention that there’s now more conflicts that are being resolved in military ways rather than…
Dr Comfort Ero
Hmmm.
Dr Samir Puri
…through negotiation, certainly compared to the 1990s.
Dr Comfort Ero
Hmmm hmm.
Dr Samir Puri
You’ve talked a bit about the salience of geopolitical competition, great power competition. You’ve mentioned quite a bit about interventions in different ways, by state actors, maybe by proxy, through funding, everything else like that.
Dr Comfort Ero
Hmmm hmm.
Dr Samir Puri
Are there any other overarching trends that you wanted to highlight that have come to your, sort of, attention by doing this work, but also, areas where positive influence can be achieved? You mentioned the African Union, as well…
Dr Comfort Ero
Hmmm hmm.
Dr Samir Puri
…but with that sense of what these trends are, where attention should be going in terms of conflict resolution more generally.
Dr Comfort Ero
Yeah, I mean, so, just on the states, I think what it’s also clear to us is that it’s increasing state assertiveness. So, for a very long time, there was a lot of focus on non-state actors and they’re still there, and some of these non-state actors are proxies for states, as well. But it’s very clear, for anybody who’s any – has any doubt, the state is back in a very powerful way.
Dr Samir Puri
Of course.
Dr Comfort Ero
Both as an actor, shaping facts on the ground, but also as a mediator. So, we’ve seen a number of states who are, you know, wearing the banner of mediators, who have a view on the conflict, as well. So, they’re both part of the conflict, but they also mediate in the conflict.
I do worry about how various leaders may misread, overreact to certain activities. I – as I said at the beginning, it’s a sense of shock therapy for allies, as well, in terms of, “I’m coming after you first, before I go for the adversaries,” as well. So – but also, there is a sense in that you can strike a good deal with those adversaries, as well. And as a conflict prevention organisation, the one thing that is really, sort of, interesting to me, is suddenly, is whether I should now start thinking about trade and tariffs as conflict reducing or conflict inducing, as well. So – and I say that because, you know, a number of states are making the calculations that can, you know, raise the temperature in a way that can cause other sorts of harm, as well.
So, the trade war, if it’s not managed in a way that leads to reproachment, or at least an understanding high-level conversations between Trump and Xi Jinping, what does that mean for the region? A region where China is very anxious about the US having a view on its backyard, as well. I do worry, also, that if you’re licensing the idea of state expansionism, that you start – you know, we see the rebirth, recreation of spheres of influence, as well, and what does that mean, that, you know, one major power in a region can decide the fate of a number of other players in the region, as well? So, there is reason to be worried. The rules are clearly changing. We did say it was an era – a year of lawlessness. “The rules-based order is consigned to the museum,” as one of our trustees said. That’s quite the clarifying message and for anybody who, you know, has any notions of that, this is quite a worrying development, as well. So…
Dr Samir Puri
Well, listen, I’m sure the audience is going to have a lot of questions, including online, as well. So I’ll give you a second to, you know, pour yourself a glass of water and…
Dr Comfort Ero
Oh, thank you.
Dr Samir Puri
…catch your breath if you want.
Dr Comfort Ero
Thanks, yeah, yeah, yeah, that’s super.
Dr Samir Puri
But when the microphone does come to you, you – and so, you can stay seated, please identify yourself and make sure you ask a preferably concise question. But please, you know, feel free to ask about the conflicts that we have discussed, do also ask about conflicts, perhaps, that haven’t been discussed. But also, I would encourage questions on these overarching themes and patterns, ‘cause I think that’s one of the real values of an exercise like this, is actually to be able to take a step back and, you know, if the rules of the road are changing, as they are, 30 years, as you said, in terms of the length of time Crisis Group has existed…
Dr Comfort Ero
Hmmm hmm.
Dr Samir Puri
…that’s the post-Cold War heyday…
Dr Comfort Ero
Yeah, hmmm.
Dr Samir Puri
…and the optimism around mediated solutions…
Dr Comfort Ero
Yeah, hmmm hmm.
Dr Samir Puri
…UN peacekeeping, all that sort of thing. And it’s been a slow slide into this more state-centric world.
Dr Comfort Ero
Hmmm hmm.
Dr Samir Puri
I worked in Donbas in 2014 with the OSCE mission, which was – it was mind-blowing to think that there was an annexation, a territorial annexation of Crimea and parts of Donbas, perpetrated by a major state actor and that they got away with it.
Dr Comfort Ero
Hmmm hmm.
Dr Samir Puri
And it was – and that was coming off an era of working on 9/11 – post-9/11 conflict, counterterrorism, armed groups. So, we really are in a very, very different…
Dr Comfort Ero
Yeah.
Dr Samir Puri
…world, and of course, states have more destructive potential to wreak havoc against each other than armed groups tend to, just as a general principle.
Dr Comfort Ero
Hmmm hmm.
Dr Samir Puri
So, there’s a lot of, I think, alarm that I would certainly take from this around some of these overarching trends, as well.
Dr Comfort Ero
Hmmm hmm.
Dr Samir Puri
But let’s take a couple of questions in a row. Maybe we can start with the gentleman who’s got his hand up right there.
Nick Westcott
Thank you, Nick Westcott…
Dr Comfort Ero
Ah.
Nick Westcott
…at SOAS. Hi, Comfort. You…
Dr Comfort Ero
I owe Nick a favour, as well, sorry, Nick.
Nick Westcott
You mentioned at the end one of your conclusions, that the slide into lawlessness is set to continue, and I wonder if you think that’s true in two ways. One, there are states that are disintegrating and that’s happening across the Sahel, it looks like it’s happening in DRC.
Dr Comfort Ero
Hmmm hmm.
Nick Westcott
But secondly, it’s the invitation for those states who are not disintegrating and can grab something nearby to do so.
Dr Comfort Ero
Hmmm hmm.
Nick Westcott
Which is – appears to be what Rwanda is doing and may happen. And where it’s not geostrategically critical to one or other of the great powers, that will just continue. So, these, do you think these are the conflicts that are actually going to be most persistent and most difficult to resolve, because nobody has a real interest in resolving them and some even have an interest in them continuing? Thank you. Oh, and you didn’t mention Greenland, no.
Dr Comfort Ero
Oh, no.
Dr Samir Puri
Okay, Greenland, and let’s talk one other, before we come to it, and the lady just right in front, there.
Isabelle
Hi, Isabelle with Constellation Energy. Recently, The Economist put out an article, or maybe, like, a video, about women being involved in ceasefire agreements, and saying that “If there’s at least one woman involved in a peace agreement, it’s way more likely to” you know, “last.” And I was wondering why there aren’t enough women who are involved in peace – creating peace agreements.
Dr Samir Puri
Great. Let’s take those two to begin with. So, we got the persistence of conflicts and in Greenland and women in mediation.
Dr Comfort Ero
I mean, there are lots of factors behind the persistence of conflict, but I want to go back to, you know, one point, is that, as I said, the rules are being written and the principles that would shape and guide relations between states are also being rewritten. We’ve seen already one around, sort of, non-aggression. So, you mentioned Donbas, you know, 2014, you know, and Crimea, and for me, that was when – that was the, sort of, the Original Sin, if you – in contemporary times, if you want to put it that way, as well. So – and when you see the traditional – when you see the rule-makers become the rulebreakers, then it opens the door to all sorts of justifications. “Why can’t I do” – and you can’t lecture anybody anymore. You can’t go round and cite norms and rules to people anymore, because they’ll say, “Well, you did it, why can’t I do it, as well?”
So, it’s been interesting, Nick, to listen to the narrative between – as Kagame’s been trying to explain, his actions and, you know, oftentimes – I mean, generally speaking, states have gone with the justification of the Houthi genocide, sort of, militias remanence in the East, but I think that justification may have run its course, because there are other agendas at play for somewhere like Goma and North-Kivu and South-Kivu.
These are places that are hay – that are wealthy resource, sort of, copper 5%, for – DCR’s renowned for 5% of copper and 6% of coltan reserves in this place. So, you begin to understand why, you know, a leader can say one thing to justify it, but we also know that – the real undercurrent. And the same for Greenland. Yes, in the name of national interest, I can decide that I want to expand my territory into a particular region and make a case for it, so why stop there? The same with Panama, as well. So, you know, that’s the other country, as well. So, the rules are being written, Nick. The question is, who has the capacity to stop anybody from doing what they are doing?
The Africa Union, however, on this particular issue, was very clear that the borders of the colonial period into the post-colonial period, would not be writ – rewritten and here, we see a real violation of one of the core principles of the Africa Union.
Dr Samir Puri
Yeah, and – but the question on the role of women?
Dr Comfort Ero
Oh, yeah. I mean, it’s a good question and to be asking it now is even – bit more complicated, given the pushback we’re seeing in certain areas. You know, there are some women at the table. I think we still need to do better. You have to ask a man – you have to ask the men why women aren’t at the table. I have my own answers, but it’s not one for me to always beat the drum about. But there are a number of important women peacemakers that we see out there. I would want to be careful and not say that, you know, you add women and stir and therefore, you get a peace deal, but you certainly do more – get more nuance. You certainly do get a more inclusive approach. You certainly avoid the elite packed in that you sometimes see in peace deals, and you get to see a peace deal that deals with both the grievances, the root causes of the conflict, and tries to answer the question of accountability, as well.
Dr Samir Puri
Yeah.
Dr Comfort Ero
So, it’s more societal in that respect and we need to, sort of, do – sort of, think through who sits on the table, at different tables, as well. There isn’t just one table.
Dr Samir Puri
Great. Let’s take a pair more here. The gentleman at the very front, with the blue jacket.
Robert Walter
Thank you very much. Robert Walter, I’m a former Member of Parliament here in the House of Commons. I wanted to ask you a little bit about the role of the United Nations in this, because in the latter half of the last century we all made the United Nations a cornerstone of the rules-based order. Trump has shown, really, utter contempt for the UN and its agencies and also, the Bretton Woods institutions. Do you believe, now that the Security Council is toothless, that the United Nations has any role in these conflicts that you highlight?
Dr Comfort Ero
Yeah.
Dr Samir Puri
And we’ll take a question from the lady just there with her hand up, right in the middle.
Nora
Thank you very much. This is Nora with King’s College. I also want to go into a similar direction. So, we’ve looked at, like, big powers and the competition of US and China, but we also spoke about Rwanda and Sudan and the influence of regional advising powers, as, like, the UAE and Saudi Arabia. I want to understand what your take is on regional powers and their rise in the international powerplay and how that also impacts the influence of global powers in these settings, also may be looking at Syria now?
Dr Samir Puri
Super. Thank you, we’ll take these two…
Dr Comfort Ero
Yeah.
Dr Samir Puri
…yeah.
Dr Comfort Ero
It’s a good – so, one thing I would say in terms of all these conflicts, as well, and about Trump and – as well, is that, you know, he’s a symptom of, you know, this current, sort of, disorder and turbulence. I mean, he didn’t create, sort of – and he didn’t lead the demise of multilateralism. It was already in decline, and we should remember that some of the damage that has been done to multilateralism didn’t happen under Republican Government, as well. So, I think we should make sure history recognises that some of these catastrophes, the human suffering, the greenlighting of certain conflicts, the double standards and hypocrisy, I could go on, didn’t all happen on the altar of a Republican government. You know, some of it happened with other administrations. So, I think it’s worth noting that, as well.
There is a – there are some agencies, also, that the US may like to protect and, you know, Elise Stefanik is – I think she’s still down to be nominated. I don’t know if she’s finished, or I don’t know if the Senate has pronounced on her confirmation. She was very clear that they will protect those agencies that they felt were an arm of US policy, as well. So, they – she’s singled out certain agencies that would be shielded, we think will be shielded, from the US, sort of, reach, vis-à-vis the UN, as well. But it’s true that the Security Council, you know, the arm – the chamber of international peace and security, is ever more dysfunctional than it was in the past, as well.
But you know, we’ve seen these kind of crisises before, so this is not unusual, but I think this is the worst that I have seen in terms of multilateralism and the UN admitting itself that it doesn’t have a good response. So, you know, we see the banning of UNRA, the key agency that is supposed to help deal comprehensively with the humanitarian crisis, how does – and humanitarian delivering education for Gaza. How does it do that? We see the Security Council also presiding over turning a blind eye to annexation of the West Bank. How does it then become an arbiter for peace and security? We see that it doesn’t have a good response to a number of the crisises that we see in Sudan. It’s almost marginalised itself out of relevance.
You know, so, even on the conflicts that don’t necessarily have the geopolitical impact that you suggest, as well, there’s a sense in which the Security Council, that the UN becomes, sort of, sidelined. And nonetheless, as I say this, all those who cast aspersions on the UN, all those who shred the Charter of the UN, all those who beat it up, also turn to it to help it with the humanitarian delivery. The trucks that you see going through every single country, they’ve been sanctioned by the UN. So, it’s relevant when it suits the various powers and then, they dismiss it when it doesn’t play to its agenda, as well.
On the question that you asked about ‘regional powers’, I mean, look, I started off my own research looking at the role of regional powers and regional organisations, because nea – at the end of the day, they are key players. They have a view; they create their own facts in the region. We’ve seen this, two regions are in now direct contestation with each other in The Great Lakes, the East Africa community and SADC. You got two leaders who we would normally turn to, to be mediators on the continent, shouting at each other, and the UN – the Africa Union is stuck in terms of what to do.
You raised Syria. I think there’s a possibility there. There’s a good story that you could possibly tell there, and it was very interesting listening to Tom Fletcher the other day, acknowledging that even Julani, AKA al-Sharaa, recognises that he needs to avoid the mistake of Libya, to avoid external actors piling in. He needs to avoid the mistake of Afghanistan, which made it very difficult to work with the Taliban, and also recognised the consequences of an Iraq type of scenario. So, there are lots of options there, if there’s a way in which we can get them to work, you know, more consistently and recognise those challenges, as well.
Dr Samir Puri
Fantastic. I’m going to come back to the room in a moment. You – I think you’ve answered Margaret Novicki’s question that came in…
Dr Comfort Ero
Oh, wow.
Dr Samir Puri
…online, which is on…
Dr Comfort Ero
That’s a very dear friend of mine.
Dr Samir Puri
Oh, yeah, the U…
Dr Comfort Ero
I didn’t realise she was on.
Dr Samir Puri
Oh, right, the UN’s role in resolving these conflicts. I think that was a similar question…
Dr Comfort Ero
That’s right.
Dr Samir Puri
…to one you asked. I’m going to take a couple more really interesting other angles that have come up online. Anna Pröll has asked, “How do you assess Claudia Sheinbaum’s ability to counter Trump’s aggression towards Mexico?” Presumably reference to the deployment, or the stated deployment, of Mexican troops to the border. And Kai Brown-Jacobsen has asked, “We’ve seen a number of armed conflicts and humanitarian crises increase significantly in recent years. How do you assess the world’s capacity for investment in peacebuilding and effective prevention of violent conflicts? What do state and non-state actors need to do to improve these capabilities effectively?”
Dr Comfort Ero
Those are two good questions. I mean, so to go back to the lady who asked about women peacemakers, number one, you’ve got, you know, a significant woman sitting in front of you from Afghanistan who really did try very hard and continues to play a significant role, Fatima Gailani. I think we should recognise her as a key negotiator and brave enough to decide that “I will engage with the Taliban,” as well. So – and then, you have an interesting state leader in the form of the President of Mexico, as well. And this is what I was saying, at the one level, it’s shock therapy to allies, but – and – but it also goes back to my remark that “Trump is not omnipresent.” You know, that the other side does have agency, depending on how they choose to yield and use that agency, as well.
So, you know, she’s been very clear – and it was the same with AMLO, as well, the relationship between her predecessor and Trump was not a good one. There was a lot of shouting and screaming and, you know, sort of, throwing down the gauntlet. But it also speaks to Trump’s style, and it’s important to understand the style of the man and the words of the man. So, the style is to bid high, throw down the big, sort of, hammer, and then you start beginning to negotiate, as well. So, they’ve got a 30-day reprieve. The question is what happens in that 30-day reprieve, as she’s shown herself to be an astute negotiator? Because, you know, there are things that Mexico can also do, it’s not some pushover country, there are things that it could do to also make things very complicated, but she’s also in a very precarious situation at home.
As to – I mean, it ties to the – back to the question about, sort of, the architecture that’s supposed to, sort of, be the arbiter, the crisis management. I mean, this is the year where there’s supposed to be a review of the Peacebuilding Commission. This is the year there’s supposed to be a ministerial on peacekeeping in Berlin. So, these – you know, there’s still value in these instruments in various places. For example, there is a conversation taking place today about whether you rehat the Kenyan Police, International Police Force, into a peacekeeping force, for Haiti, as well. So, despite the gloominess and the question marks about the viability of the UN in the sense of a crisis mode, there are still opportunities for using these instruments very carefully to either avert, de-escalate or to help build the process to resolution.
Certainly, the UN has a potential role that it can play in Syria, for example. When you think about the litany of things that the new authorities need to do, want to do, a National Conference, you’re going to need the UN to help you with that, for example. Aid delivery, you’re going to need the UN to help you with that. So, I wouldn’t necessarily write it off.
Dr Samir Puri
Such an important point. Our…
Dr Comfort Ero
Hmmm hmm.
Dr Samir Puri
…eyes are always drawn to the UN Security Council, but the UN…
Dr Comfort Ero
Hmmm.
Dr Samir Puri
…is far more than just that.
Dr Comfort Ero
Yeah, hmmm hmm.
Dr Samir Puri
It remains one of the first responders, a…
Dr Comfort Ero
Yeah.
Dr Samir Puri
…first choice for many crises and conflicts. I think the gentleman in the grey jacket, just here, had his hand up, waiting patiently.
Len Nambi
Thank you. I’m [Len Nambi], a former Minister from Liberia, and she very well-articulated all the conflicts that are actually happening now, but when I look in West Africa, I see what’s happening in the Sahel, Niger, Burkina Faso, the rollback of democratic institutions, constitutional rule, is like dominoes falling, you know. So, are we going to wait until the other countries fall before we describe those as conflicts? You know, because there’s Sierra Leone, yes, they did have an elections, still very early and complicated, and the opposition leader had to leave the country. Liberia, yes, series of elections, still just a post-conflict country. But when are we going to start seeing the potential conflicts, the early warning signs, instead of waiting for them to actually become conflicts when the signs are there?
You know, there’s Burkina Faso, before, they had many elections after inquiry. We had Niger, a series of elections, Mali. They are all run by the junta now. Guinea, you know, the signs were there, but we have – do we wait until they actually become conflicts before we project them at the fora such as these? Thank you.
Dr Samir Puri
Thank you very much, and we’ll take question from the gentleman here in the blue jacket.
Veraim Aziz
[Pause] Thank you very much. [Veraim – 57:15] Aziz. You talk about the – you listed Syria and Iran and Palestinian and Israel, as well, in Middle East, that – but there is another conflict which is the Kurdish conflict. You know, a part of the Syria, a part of the Iran, part of Kurd in Iraq, part in Turkey, and there is a armed conflict, as well, how you are assessing that as a conflict in the Middle East? And we saw some development or some progress in Turkey right now, and there is a worries in Syria for withdrawing the Trump – the troops in Syria in the Kurdish area in the North. And in Iran, as well, there is a worried about the Kurdish there. Thank you very much.
Dr Samir Puri
And I’m going to take a third question, as well. The lady in the front row, just here. There we are.
Caitlin Vito
Thank you so much for squeezing me in. Thank you, both. This has been a fascinating conversation. Caitlin Vito, a member. Would you be able to say a few words to the muddying of the information space that we’ve seen and the impact that it’s having across the conflicts that we’ve discussed and the impact that it’s having on your work and how you’re tracking it day-to-day? Thank you.
Dr Samir Puri
Great, and I’m just going to add online, Chiara Spadaro has also asked, “What is the role of disinformation in these conflicts? Do you see disinformation as a tool used by countries directly or indirectly involved in the conflicts?” So, a really important point. So, let’s take those three questions.
Dr Comfort Ero
Yeah, so it goes back to that list. If I had one more thing that I could list, I would talk about – last year, we talked about in – disinformation, but it’s just the power of technology today. You know, the FT wondered whether Trump was the real ‘technoking’, as opposed to the Elons and the Mark Zuckerberg and the – there’s something to be said about that.
Look, I – you know, on – you know, West Africa was where it all started for me and to see, sort of, the reversal of fortunes. You know, I was a peacekeeper in Liberia, and I first started in Sierra Leone. So, to see the investment that was made in the region, sort of, unravel in this way, is worrying, but I think more worrying for me is to see the unravelling of the peace and security architecture of the region in the form of the Economic Community of West African States. So, you know, this is a regional body that became the poster child for what the Africa Union is today, and it has struggled, along with the UN, and it’s not – you know, it’s hard to tell the story of West Africa, or even a number of places beyond West Africa, without recognising that one of the most significant events that has happened in the last three years is the way in which France and other international actors have been kicked out of the regions that were traditionally – they would shape politics in the region.
So, it’s an indictment on a number of external actors, starting with France, with Europe, but also West Africa and ECOWAS itself. It’s also a recognition that Nigeria, you know, as a regional superpower, no longer is able to, sort of, nudge, you know, and encourage certain good behaviour in its region. It’s also acknowledgement that the other – two other significant powers that normally shaped West African politics, Libya is in crisis and Algeria is missing in action, as well. But it’s also a recognition that after eight years of international action, the Malians, themselves, the Burkina, despite the horrible news that’s coming out of there, Niger, they said they want to take agency. They want to take back control. I hate to say it, they want to decide their future security, because they haven’t seen the gains from eight years of international intervention. So, I think we have to recognise that.
And then, the last word I would say is that, look, for an organisation that spends a great deal of its time trying to fact verify, you know, we’re very careful about what we say and I think what worries me is just the litany of disinformation that can do more harm to a conflict as it evolves, and makes the life of mediators very difficult. And as an organisation that’s also suffered and been a victim…
Dr Samir Puri
Yeah.
Dr Comfort Ero
…of that, I see the downsides of – it’s a double-edged sword. You know, social media is both a good thing, but it also – there’s a negative and how you manage that becomes crucial.
Dr Samir Puri
And we’re almost out of time. Do you have a quick word…
Dr Comfort Ero
I do.
Dr Samir Puri
…on the Kurdish…
Dr Comfort Ero
Yeah.
Dr Samir Puri
…issue, just…
Dr Comfort Ero
No.
Dr Samir Puri
…in the last minutes?
Dr Comfort Ero
I think one of the – so, one of the challenges going forward, is this balance between Turkey and its backing of the SNF and then, the Kurdish forces as well. No, that – I think that conversation is going to be very contingent, also, on the conversation between Julani and the new authorities and various minority groupings, as well. Not just for Syria, but you see, with Turkey, that sees this very much as its moment, as its moment of ascendency. But I think there’s a realisation by the Syrians themselves that they have to weave an – a new fabric that deals with the various constituencies, including the Kur – the various Kurdish forces in the country, as well.
Fantastic. Listen, let’s all thank Comfort for what has been a really wide-ranging discussion [applause]. And of course, to thank all of you who attended in person, all of you who attended online. My apologies if we didn’t get to your questions in time, but I think an enormous amount to chew over and an enormous amount to be concerned about, but thank you for the insights, yeah, great.
Dr Comfort Ero
Thank you.
Dr Samir Puri
Brilliant, that was fantastic.
