It is important for Israel’s leaders to recognize clearly that their country’s central conflict is with the Palestinians, not with the Arab states (or Iran).
Introduction
This briefing forms part of phase one of the Chatham House project ‘Israel–Palestine: Beyond the Stalemate’. It aims to evaluate peace efforts that have taken place in the past 25 years, from the 1993 ‘Oslo I’ agreement, which established the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) as a negotiating party with Israel, up to and including the 2017 Paris conference. A companion paper will examine the ways in which regional states have contributed to Israeli–Palestinian peacemaking to date, and the potential of such efforts to achieve more.
The purpose of the paper is not simply to analyse why previous endeavours have not produced the desired outcome, but to identify lessons that could inform future discussions of ways of reaching a solution to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. As well as considering what political leaders on both sides might do differently, the paper seeks to stimulate a debate about what other actors (for example, Israeli and Palestinian civil society, business and religious leaders) might do to support such efforts.
With these objectives in mind, the paper is intended for those already engaged in consideration of policy towards the conflict. It is not meant to be an introduction to the subject for those with no previous knowledge of it; nor is it a comprehensive review of all attempts to end the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.
Those trying to achieve peace between Israel and the Palestinians have sought to devise ways of tackling the core issues of the conflict, namely Jerusalem, refugees, security, borders and settlements. In so doing, they have been operating in a reality in which the parties are not two states but rather an occupying state and an occupied people (albeit one organized into a proto-state entity). This context, moreover, is one in which the state concerned – Israel – has a privileged relationship with the US, the most powerful international actor involved in Israeli–Palestinian peace efforts.
Several different approaches have been adopted over the past quarter of a century. Before examining these various approaches in more detail, we can summarize them as follows:
- The Oslo approach, which was incremental, avoided spelling out the shape of a final agreement, and depended on the progressive building of confidence between the parties;
- The Camp David 2000 approach, which represented an attempt to reach a conflict-ending agreement that would resolve all the core issues at a single summit meeting;
- The Arab Peace Initiative (API), a regional approach, which offered incentives to Israel to go beyond a purely bilateral agreement with the Palestinians;
- The Roadmap to Peace, in part a resurrection of the incrementalism of Oslo but with the ultimate destination of a two-state solution spelt out;
- The Geneva Accord, an unofficial but very high-level ‘Track II’ initiative;
- The Gaza disengagement, a unilateral approach that was mainly about managing the conflict rather than making peace;
- The Annapolis conference and subsequent Abbas–Olmert talks, which together were an attempt to revive peace talks within the framework of the Roadmap;
- The Kerry initiative, which marked a further attempt (following the Oslo process, Camp David 2000 and Annapolis) at third-party facilitation rather than a proactive drive for peace; and
- The Paris conference of January 2017, a reassertion by the international community of the principles that might form the basis for a two-state solution.