The election of the progressive Lee Jae-myung as South Korean president, following the ouster of his predecessor, Yoon Suk Yeol, comes at a critical moment for South Korea, as the country faces increasing regional and global challenges.
The removal from power of South Korean president, Yoon Suk Yeol, on 4 April 2025, was one of the most turbulent junctures in democratic South Korea. Yoon’s abortive invocation of martial law on 3 December 2024 marked the first time that martial law had been declared since South Korea transitioned to democratic rule in 1987. While martial law lasted for a mere six hours, having been quashed by members of the National Assembly, the incident further entrenched existing political polarization across the country, particularly between the left-leaning progressive Democratic Party and the conservative People Power Party led by then-president Yoon. Yet, although the collapse of Yoon’s presidency highlighted the resilience of South Korea’s democracy, it served as a precursor for a recalibration of South Korean leadership.
A snap presidential election on 3 June 2025 resulted in the left-leaning Democratic Party candidate, Lee Jae-myung, becoming South Korea’s 14th president, and the ninth in democratic South Korea. Marking the end of three years of conservative rule, Lee’s election was the second occasion whereby a progressive South Korean president had taken office following the impeachment of a conservative president, the first being the election of Moon Jae-in in 2017 after the removal of Park Geun-hye. Lee has repeatedly framed his foreign policy agenda around the idea of ‘pragmatism’, namely, balancing national interest while navigating a complex range of regional and global challenges.
Prior to his election, Lee attempted to rebrand his image from that of a left-wing populist to a ‘centrist conservative’. Yet, his election triggered concern both within and beyond South Korea, given his previous criticisms of the US and its Northeast Asian alliances; calls for greater engagement with China at the expense of Seoul’s ties with Washington; and desires for cooperation with North Korea.
Drawing upon extensive interviews – including with former and current government officials – across the political divide, this research paper argues that despite the changes in leadership and rhetoric, South Korea’s foreign policy will be marked by greater continuity than change, at least in the short term. Even though political partisanship may shape the initial tone of foreign policy, external structural changes are likely to constrain Seoul’s room for manoeuvre. Such continuity will primarily be driven by three interlinked factors: first, the policies of President Donald Trump’s administration and its transactional approach to alliances; second, the intensification of Sino-US competition; and third, the growing security threats from a nuclear North Korea. These dynamics are likely to limit Lee’s ability to depart considerably from the foreign policy course pursued by his predecessor. Nevertheless, the one area in which Lee will seek to differentiate himself pertains to inter-Korean relations, even if Seoul’s intended approach of reconciliation looks unlikely to catalyse substantive change in relations with Pyongyang.
This research paper argues that despite the changes in leadership and rhetoric, South Korea’s foreign policy will be marked by greater continuity than change, at least in the short term.
The arrival of the Lee administration comes at a precarious juncture for South Korea. Firstly, the US’s foreign policy towards the Korean Peninsula remains unclear, despite the recent trade negotiations between Washington and Seoul following the initial imposition of tariffs on South Korean imports to the US in April 2025. At the same time, the Trump administration’s transactional approach towards its alliance with South Korea will pose a core challenge for Seoul. Secondly, South Korea will remain caught in the intensifying great power rivalry between the US and China, given Seoul’s critical role in international supply chains and regional and global security arrangements. These factors would force any South Korean government – progressive or conservative – into an unavoidable quagmire. Thirdly, relations between North and South Korea have plummeted in recent years, with Pyongyang showing few serious intentions of reviving dialogue with Seoul or Washington, despite expanding North Korean cooperation with Moscow amid the ongoing Russia–Ukraine War. Irrespective of Lee’s aim to meet Kim Jong Un, as the South Korean president outlined during his first bilateral meeting with US President Donald Trump on 25 August 2025, Pyongyang’s current lack of interest in reciprocating any goodwill gestures from Seoul looks to limit the longer-term success of any such initiatives.
As the Lee Jae-myung government has sought to adjust to changing geopolitical realities, South Korea’s foreign relations have been preoccupied by trade negotiations with the US, which saw a preliminary agreement reached on 31 July 2025, and a final accord achieved on 29 October. At the same time, Lee has made clear his objective to pursue a ‘pragmatic’ foreign policy that features the broad goals of advancing the US–South Korea alliance, managing South Korea’s ties with Russia and China, and resurrecting dialogue with North Korea. Not only are these objectives ambitious, but there remains a chasm between the rhetoric of the Lee government and its ability to implement its foreign policy vision in practice.
While South Korea’s foreign policy dilemmas are primarily driven by the US, China and North Korea, South Korea must also contend with frosty relations with Japan, which have long been characterized by the legacies of historical grievances and resulting mistrust. Although recent summits between Lee Jae-myung and then-Japanese prime minister, Shigeru Ishiba, augured positively for reconciliation, Ishiba’s subsequent resignation has exerted further pressure on South Korea to strengthen its trilateral cooperation with Japan and the US, which noticeably entered a new era of cooperation under previous administrations led by Joe Biden, Fumio Kishida and Yoon Suk Yeol. The positive first meeting between Lee and the newly elected Japanese prime minister, Sanae Takaichi, saw the two leaders recognize that despite differences on ‘pending issues’ – most likely referring to historical disputes – Seoul and Tokyo should strengthen diplomacy and ‘develop the bilateral relationship in a future-oriented and stable manner’.
In addition to navigating these challenges, South Korea aspires to increase its global status beyond that of a middle power and recipient of security guarantees from the US. As part of this goal, Seoul must diversify its geopolitical strategy by engaging with minilateral institutions such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), strengthening relations with European partners, and playing a proactive role in the fields of emerging and critical technologies, supply chain resilience, and regional and global security. Although the Lee administration has predictably abandoned the rhetoric of South Korea’s role as a ‘global pivotal state’ pursued by his predecessor, South Korea’s global ambitions look only to continue in the longer term.
Thus, as this paper argues, the effects of domestic political change on South Korean foreign policy are likely to be constrained by the dynamics of regional and global pressures. For all the Lee administration’s desire to differentiate its foreign policy from that of its conservative predecessor, the importance of the US–South Korea alliance, risks of entrapment in Sino-US rivalry, and the ongoing challenge of a nuclear North Korea together ensure that South Korean foreign policy looks to exhibit greater continuity than change, at least in the short term. Inter-Korean relations may form an exception to this trend, although the longer-term consequences remain uncertain. Understanding the factors driving and limiting South Korea’s foreign policy decision-making is crucial for examining both the trajectory of the country’s global influence, and the prospects for stability in Northeast Asia.
