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1
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United States
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United States
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United States
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United States
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China
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United States
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China
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United States
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2
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China
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China
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China
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China
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United States
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Australia
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Japan
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China
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3
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Japan
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Russia
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Russia
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India
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Japan
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Japan
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United States
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Japan
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4
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India
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India
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India
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Russia
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Singapore
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South Korea
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India
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India
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5
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South Korea
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South Korea
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Australia
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Pakistan
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South Korea
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Singapore
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South Korea
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Australia
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6
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Singapore
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Japan
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New Zealand
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Indonesia
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Australia
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New Zealand
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Indonesia
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Malaysia
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7
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Taiwan
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North Korea
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Japan
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Japan
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Thailand
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China
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Australia
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Thailand
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8
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Australia
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Australia
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South Korea
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South Korea
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Malaysia
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Indonesia
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Vietnam
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South Korea
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9
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Russia
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Singapore
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North Korea
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Australia
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Indonesia
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India
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Singapore
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Singapore
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10
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Indonesia
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Pakistan
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Malaysia
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Vietnam
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India
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Philippines
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Russia
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Indonesia
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Source: Patton, S., Sato, J. and Lemahieu, H. (2024), Asia Power Index: 2024 Key Findings Report, Sydney: Lowy Institute, https://power.lowyinstitute.org/downloads/lowy-institute-2024-asia-power-index-key-findings-report.pdf.
The influence of domestic politics on foreign policy
Historically, clear divisions have existed between South Korean conservatives and progressives with respect to Seoul’s foreign policy postures (see Table 2). While the former have tended to favour stronger ties with the US and more hawkish approaches to North Korea and China, the latter have pursued reconciliation with North Korea, stronger economic engagement with China and greater foreign policy autonomy, often to the detriment of relations with the US. Yet, in addition to the respective government in power, South Korea’s foreign policy postures towards the US, China and North Korea have also been a product of shifts within the East Asian regional security environment and broader international order. Of note, globalization has catalysed ‘the intensification of international and domestic (“intermestic”) linkages’ in South Korea’s foreign policy.
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Roh Tae-woo
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1988–93
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Democratic Justice (Conservative)
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Maintained a strong US–ROK alliance; supported US troop presence; removed US tactical nuclear weapons from the Korean Peninsula in 1991.
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Opened formal diplomatic relations in 1992, two years after Russia–ROK ties were established.
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Nordpolitik: reached out to North Korean allies (Russia and China); inter-Korean dialogues at prime ministerial level; Inter-Korean Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation signed in 1991.
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Kim Young-sam
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1993–98
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Democratic/Liberal (Conservative)
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Globalization policy (segyehwa); emphasized US–ROK alliance in dealing with the first North Korean nuclear crisis; tensions between autonomy and sustaining the US–ROK alliance.
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Developed economic and political cooperation; high-level exchanges; China–ROK ties seen as a means of resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis.
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Harder stance and worsening inter-Korean relations following North Korean threat to withdraw from Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1993. Critical of 1994 US–DPRK Agreed Framework negotiations.
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Kim Dae-jung
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1998–2003
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Millennium Democratic (Progressive)
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Supported Clinton administration’s North Korea policy; US–ROK relations declined under George W. Bush; Seoul’s push for US–DPRK normalization unsettled Washington.
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Bolstered engagement with China in line with the Sunshine Policy; perception of ROK tilting towards China.
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Sunshine Policy centred on reconciliation with North Korea without a quid pro quo; muted criticism of North Korean human rights abuses. The first inter-Korean leader-to-leader summit with Kim Jong Il took place in 2000.
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Roh Moo-hyun
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2003–08
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Uri Party (Progressive)
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Maintained alliance but sought greater foreign policy autonomy; emphasized regional security. US–ROK relations declined following the death of two South Korean schoolgirls by a US army vehicle in November 2002.
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Increased economic cooperation; pursued ‘balanced and pragmatic’ diplomacy; fissures in China–ROK ties pertaining to disputed territories and North Korean refugees.
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Furthered the Sunshine Policy. Kaesong Industrial Complex opened in December 2004; hosted the second inter-Korean summit in 2007 despite North Korea’s first nuclear test on 9 October 2006.
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Lee Myung-bak
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2008–13
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Grand National (Conservative)
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Strengthened military and economic cooperation with the United States. US–ROK Free Trade Agreement signed in 2012.
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Poor China–ROK relations. Relations with Beijing were largely economic. Summits between Lee Myung-bak and Hu Jintao took place in Seoul and Beijing in 2010 and 2012.
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Hardline stance; ended Sunshine Policy; assistance to North Korea was conditional on denuclearization; no inter-Korean summitry.
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Park Geun-hye
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2013–17
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Saenuri (Conservative)
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Pro-US; approved the deployment of the US THAAD system in South Korea in July 2016.
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Initially warm ties. Summits between Xi Jinping and Park Geun-hye in 2013, 2014, 2015 and 2016. Considerable worsening in Sino-ROK ties after THAAD deployment.
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Trustpolitik: conditional engagement with DPRK, but tougher stance following North Korean provocations. Kaesong Industrial Complex, while re-opened in 2013, was closed by Park in 2016 after North Korean nuclear and missile tests.
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Moon Jae-in
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2017–22
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Democratic (Progressive)
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Sought to win US support for inter-Korean engagement; US–ROK ties deteriorated owing to Moon prioritizing relationship with North Korea; mediated between Trump and Kim Jong Un during US–DPRK summits in 2018 and 2019.
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Pursued an ‘equidistant’ foreign policy between US and China. Pledged ‘three Nos’: no additional deployment of THAAD in South Korea; no participation in a US-led missile defence network; and no involvement in a trilateral military alliance with the US and Japan.
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Prioritized engagement with North Korea, marked by three inter-Korean summits in 2018; peace-oriented diplomacy; suspension of some US–ROK military exercises. Comprehensive inter-Korean Agreement Pact signed in September 2018.
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Yoon Suk Yeol
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2022–25
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People Power (Conservative)
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Strengthened relations with the US and the US–ROK alliance (as outlined in the Washington Declaration of 2023); reinforced trilateral security with Japan through the Camp David summit.
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Relations cooled; harder line on China, prioritizing security over economic concerns.
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Hardline stance; resumed military drills; focus on deterrence; revoked South Korea’s participation in the Comprehensive inter-Korean Agreement Pact.
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Sources: Nilsson-Wright (2022), Contested Politics in South Korea; Chung, J. H. (2006), South Korea’s Strategic Thinking toward China: From Park Chung Hee to Roh Moo Hyun, Brookings Institution, 18 October 2006, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/20061018.pdf; Suh, J. J. (2009), The Lee Myung-bak Government’s North Korea Policy: A Study on its Historical and Theoretical Foundation, Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, https://repo.kinu.or.kr/bitstream/2015.oak/1372/1/0001396359.pdf; Snyder, S. A. (2018), South Korea at the Crossroads: Autonomy and Alliance in an Era of Rival Powers, New York: Columbia University Press.
Prior to his election, Lee Jae-myung made controversial remarks about South Korea’s ‘ironclad’ alliance with the US. In December 2021, he opposed the additional deployment of batteries for the US Terminal High-Altitude Aerial Defence (THAAD) missile system in South Korea, and criticized his conservative counterparts for being ‘too conscious’ of the US in terms of paying too much attention to Washington’s demands. Lee also derided the US Forces Korea – which has been stationed in Seoul since 1950 – as an ‘occupying force’, and dismissed trilateral defensive military exercises between Washington, Seoul and Tokyo as a ‘pro-Japanese act’.
Yet, to the surprise of South Korean conservatives, Lee’s initial statements after his election signalled a possible departure from his earlier criticisms. Instead of repeating his comments, Lee called for Seoul to strengthen bilateral and trilateral relations with Washington and Tokyo while maintaining ties with Moscow and Beijing. This early approach, branded by the Lee government as ‘pragmatic’, indicates somewhat cautious continuity with the foreign policy of the Yoon administration, which stressed the need to strengthen US–South Korea and US–South Korea–Japan ties while reducing economic dependency on China. Recent separate summits between Lee and Shigeru Ishiba and Donald Trump, respectively, highlight how the Lee administration also seeks to maintain the status quo in South Korea’s relations with Japan, at least in the short term.
Lee’s outreach to global leaders has hitherto been successful. When Lee met Ishiba on 23 August 2025, the two leaders issued the first joint South Korea–Japan statement in 17 years, in which they pledged to work with the US ‘toward[s] the complete denuclearization of North Korea’ while bolstering bilateral economic cooperation in artificial intelligence, hydrogen and ammonia. Although unresolved historical disputes continue to afflict relations between Tokyo and Seoul, both leaders pledged to cooperate in resolving the ‘abductions issue’, referring to North Korea’s abduction of Japanese citizens in the 1970s and 1980s. Following Ishiba’s resignation on 7 September, the election of Sanae Takaichi as Japan’s prime minister, on 21 October, raises questions as to the future cooperation between Seoul and Tokyo, given how Takaichi’s conservative politics stand in contrast to Lee’s ultimately progressive agenda, despite Lee’s embrace of ‘pragmatism’.
The first 100 days of Lee Jae-myung’s presidency have witnessed noticeable attempts to pursue an inter-Korean policy akin to those of Lee’s progressive predecessors.
On the Korean Peninsula, the first 100 days of Lee Jae-myung’s presidency have witnessed noticeable attempts to pursue an inter-Korean policy akin to those of Lee’s progressive predecessors. In his address on 15 August to commemorate the 80th anniversary of the end of Japanese rule over the peninsula, Lee stressed that Seoul had ‘no intention of engaging in hostile acts’ towards Pyongyang. These early indications suggest that the new government intends to take a softer stance towards North Korea compared to his conservative predecessor, Yoon Suk Yeol.
Although the presidency of Lee Jae-myung is in its early stages, the Lee administration will need to clarify its ‘pragmatic’ foreign policy, given the lack of bipartisan consensus within South Korea on the definition of the term. South Korean progressives tend to define ‘pragmatism’ as being in opposition to an ideological foreign policy, which they believe Yoon Suk Yeol and his government pursued through its consistent emphasis on South Korea’s commitment to upholding values of freedom, peace and prosperity. For the Lee government, emphasizing this distinction serves as a key tool to appeal to Lee’s voter base. In contrast, for some conservatives, pragmatism is seen as reflecting a strategy of equidistance between Washington and Beijing, an approach practised by the Moon Jae-in government (the last progressive administration to govern South Korea prior to Lee’s election) that many believe failed to bear fruit. Indeed, the Lee government should look to learn from criticisms of Moon, not least that he was too focused on North Korea, as was demonstrated by three inter-Korean summits in 2018, which alienated the US and catalysed increasingly divergent perceptions of the North Korean threat between Washington and Seoul.
One of the many challenges that the new government will face, however, is the extent to which great power politics will dampen the Lee administration’s instincts for more drastic foreign policy change, especially in relation to China and the US. As the next section of this research paper will detail, the unpredictable nature of the second Trump administration’s policies towards its Northeast Asian allies, together with heightened Sino-US competition – and the resultant effects on global order – will limit Seoul’s flexibility, not least in the short term.
