The shock following the capture of Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro by US special forces in January was felt by many leaders across Latin America, not least Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. The president of Brazil now finds himself in a delicate position: how to resist Washington’s renewed push for hemispherical dominance while absorbing the domestic political cost of his increasingly unpopular Venezuela policy.
In the balance hangs not just a record fourth term for Lula following the general election due in October, but the trade policy on which the country’s economy depends and the ability of US President Donald Trump to assert control over Latin America. For years under Lula, Brazil demonstrated diplomatic ambiguity towards the rule of Hugo Chavez and his successor Maduro, neither explicitly defending them nor denouncing their human right violations.
That line and his failure to condemn the regime following the US raid have become a growing electoral liability. Although Trump hasn’t threatened military action against Brazil – as he did against Colombia and Cuba in the days after the capture – the country is facing increased US pressure. For Lula, the Venezuelan crisis has now become a political yardstick by which voters and opponents assess his commitment to democracy and Brazil’s international alignment more broadly. Without a change of approach, this could cost Lula the election and advance Trump’s agenda on the continent.
Whatever the outcome of the US intervention, Lula faces big problems. Washington will be hoping to control Venezuelan oil resources and create a political opening. That would allow Trump to present Venezuela as proof of his administration’s capacity to resolve regional political crises, thereby reinforcing its hemispheric dominance and diminishing Brazil’s regional standing. But the failure of Trump to achieve his ends in Venezuela would be just as damaging to Brazil.
The collapse of the US intervention could lead to instability within Venezuela, potentially including civil conflict, state fragmentation or prolonged chaos. Should that happen, large numbers of Venezuelans would flee south into Brazil. Between 2018 and Maduro’s fall, 1.4 million people fled the country for Brazil. With neither option acceptable to most Brazilian voters, Lula’s path in the coming months is narrowing. How might he walk this electoral tightrope?
Dwindling leverage in Venezuela
Hours after the US raid on Maduro’s compound, Lula issued a statement saying that Trump’s actions ‘crossed an unacceptable line’ and constituted ‘a very serious affront to Venezuela’s sovereignty’. Lula’s reluctance to condemn the Maduro regime is understandable. His rise to power was an important part of Latin America’s leftist wave of the 2000s, when close ties between Brazil and Venezuela were seen as part of a broader project of regional autonomy, free from US interference.
There is also a belief within Lula’s inner circle that engagement is the only way to retain influence over Caracas and prevent Venezuela from becoming a permanent platform allowing countries such as Iran, Russia and Turkey to exert power in Latin America. But by the time Brazil restored normal diplomatic relations with the Maduro regime in 2023, Brasília had lost much of its influence over Venezuela’s domestic politics.
This leaves Lula in a strategic bind. Rebuilding influence inside Venezuela would require deepening relations with the current authorities; yet doing so risks legitimizing a regime that the Brazilian public overwhelmingly views as illegitimate and authoritarian. Indeed, Lula’s close relationship with Caracas and cautious response to the authoritarian excesses in the 2024 elections have become his administration’s Achilles heel.
The issue now intersects foreign policy, national security and electoral politics in ways that constrains Brazil at a moment when Trump is pushing the limits of US power. Perhaps surprisingly, the demonstration of that power in Venezuela has met with approval from a swathe of Brazilian voters. According to recent polling, 58 per cent of Brazilian respondents said they approve of the US military operation, while only 41 per cent disapproved.
This reflects a broader public judgment that, while Brazilians defended Lula’s government during earlier disputes with the US over trade and the sanctions Trump placed on certain Brazilian Supreme Court justices last year, their support does not extend to shielding a regime in Caracas that systematically violates the rights of its own citizens.
Principled – or evasive?
Lula’s problem is that his government has failed to reflect this distinction clearly. During the 2024 Venezuelan elections, Brasília neither recognized what many observers decried as fraudulent conditions, nor supported strong multilateral pressure. By doing so, Lula has appeared evasive rather than principled. This ambiguity has fed a perception, amplified by the opposition and media, that Lula instinctively protects authoritarians.
Lula hinted as much in March 2024 when asked about the Venezuelan opposition leader María Corina Machado’s disqualification from running in the presidential election in March. He responded by comparing her plight to his own barred candidacy in Brazil in 2018, saying that ‘instead of crying’ he had backed a substitute candidate. The remark was criticized for downplaying the erosion of democratic space in Venezuela. Today, Lula’s Venezuela policy is seen as moral equivocation rather than pragmatic diplomacy.
In a notable contrast to Lula’s stance, Senator Flávio Bolsonaro described Venezuela in January as ‘one of the most extreme examples of how an authoritarian regime can destroy a nation.’ The senator is the son of former Brazilian president Jair Bolsonaro and is expected to run against Lula in October. His efforts to portray Lula as indulgent towards authoritarianism are gaining traction at home and even resonating with voters who support Lula’s social agenda but remain uneasy about his foreign policy instincts.
