Chokepoints and Vulnerabilities in Global Food Trade

Policymakers must take action immediately to mitigate the risk of severe disruption at certain ports, maritime straits, and inland transport routes, which could have devastating knock-on effects for global food security.

Chatham House report Published 27 June 2017 Updated 18 May 2023 ISBN: 978 1 78413 230 9

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Pedro Miguel locks along the Panama Canal. Photo: Gonzalo Azumendi via Getty Images.

Rob Bailey

Former Director, Energy, Environment and Resources Programme

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Laura Wellesley

Former Senior Research Fellow, Environment and Society Centre

2. Chokepoints in Global Food Trade

Key points

Global dependence on maritime chokepoints has increased since 2000, particularly in respect of internationally traded wheat and maize supplied by Black Sea producers to China and other growing markets in Asia.
Poor infrastructure quality and lack of investment are constraining operations in six critical coastal and inland chokepoints. Located in Brazil, the US and the Black Sea region, these chokepoints connect major crop-producing regions to global markets.
Trends in the transport sector – including the opening up of alternative shipping routes and the containerization of dry bulk goods – may ease the pressure on certain trade chokepoints in the future, but the overall picture will remain one of increasing systemic reliance on 14 critical junctures.

Increasing reliance on trade to meet food demand brings increasing dependence on the infrastructural backbone of transnational trade networks. While a growing body of literature explores systemic and compound risks in interconnected food markets and evaluates the potential for localized shocks to cascade through international supply chains,57 physical trade channels and chokepoints are rarely considered in any detail or depth. Below, we introduce 14 chokepoints that are of global strategic importance to food trade and estimate the share and volume of trade in maize, wheat, rice, soybean and fertilizers that passes through these chokepoints each year.

2.1 Maritime chokepoints

2.1.1 The eight maritime chokepoints

By virtue both of their geographical location and geo-economic value, eight maritime chokepoints stand out as systemically important to international trade in commodities (food and other agricultural products, as well as energy, minerals and metals). The specific relevance of these chokepoints to global food markets reflects the fact that they lie along transnational routes linking major grain and fertilizer exporters, transit centres and importers in food-deficit regions (see Figure 7). The likely costs and/or delays associated with rerouting trade, should one of these chokepoints be closed, are such that their functioning may be deemed critical to maintaining secure supply and price stability in global food markets.

Figure 7: Annual maritime chokepoint throughput of maize, wheat, rice and soybean by volume, 2015

— Sources: Chatham House Maritime Analysis Tool; Chatham House (2017), resourcetrade.earth (2015 data).

A large share of global trade in strategic crops passes through one or several of these chokepoints. Fifty-five per cent of internationally traded maize, wheat, rice and soybean is shipped through at least one maritime chokepoint.58 A smaller but nonetheless significant share of this trade – 11 per cent – relies on transit through one or both of the maritime chokepoints for which no alternative route exists: the Turkish Straits and the Strait of Hormuz. In terms of weight, annual throughput of grain ranges from 24 million tonnes (via the Strait of Hormuz) to 108 million tonnes (via the Strait of Malacca).

Fifty-five per cent of internationally traded maize, wheat, rice and soybean is shipped through at least one maritime chokepoint

Figure 8: Annual maritime chokepoint throughput of maize, wheat, rice and soybean as a share of total trade, 2015

At an aggregate level, the Panama Canal and the Strait of Malacca, two of the key gateways linking Western and Asian markets, see the most significant annual throughput of the four strategic crops.

Looking at the data commodity by commodity, the Panama Canal, Turkish Straits and Strait of Malacca emerge as the most critical chokepoints in terms of throughput as a share of global trade in specific crops. Around a fifth of global soybean exports and a sixth of global maize exports transit the Panama Canal each year; much of this trade originates in the US and Brazil and is destined for Asian markets. At the same time, a fifth of global wheat exports and a sixth of global maize exports pass through the Turkish Straits, reflecting the importance of the Black Sea producers for global export markets. And over a quarter of global soybean exports – of which a large proportion is destined for the rapidly expanding pig and poultry markets in China, East Asia and Southeast Asia59 – transit the Strait of Malacca, along with 20 per cent of internationally traded rice (see Figure 8).

These same maritime junctures are also critical for global fertilizer trade (see Figure 9). A high proportion of potassium chloride – the most heavily traded fertilizer – transits maritime chokepoints: 25 per cent passes through the Strait of Gibraltar; 32 per cent through the Suez Canal and the Strait of Bab al-Mandab; and 25 per cent through the Strait of Malacca. These flows are dominated by China-bound shipments from Belarus, Russia and Canada, China being the second-largest importer of potassium chloride after the US. Maritime chokepoints are also important for phosphate trade: 32 per cent of trade in diammonium phosphate (DAP), one of the most widely used phosphate fertilizers,60 transits the Strait of Malacca each year.

Figure 9: Share of global trade in fertilizers passing through key maritime chokepoints, 2015

— Sources: Chatham House Maritime Analysis Tool; Chatham House (2017), resourcetrade.earth (2015 data).

Note: Refers only to fertilizer products accounting for more than 3 per cent of total fertilizer trade in 2015. MAP stands for monoammonium phosphate, DAP for diammonium phosphate.

Box 3: Estimating flows through maritime chokepoints

In this report, a maritime chokepoint is defined as a narrow corridor, connecting two bodies of water along international sea lines of communication (SLOCs), that is liable to congestion or blockage and for which no expedient alternative maritime route exists. The eight major maritime chokepoints we selected were identified through analyses of international transport networks,61 heat-maps of global shipping based on vessels’ Automatic Identification System (AIS) data,62 and expert judgment from the maritime industry. An overview of their location and width is provided below (Table 1).

Table 1: Overview of maritime chokepoints

Chokepoint	Littoral state(s)	Linked bodies of water	Width at narrowest point (km)
Panama Canal	Panama	Pacific Ocean–Atlantic Ocean	0.3
Dover Strait	UK, France	Atlantic Ocean–North Sea	33
Strait of Gibraltar	Spain, Morocco	Atlantic Ocean–Mediterranean Sea	13
Turkish Straits	Turkey	Mediterranean Sea–Black Sea	1
Suez Canal	Egypt	Mediterranean Sea–Red Sea	0.2
Strait of Bab al-Mandab	Djibouti, Eritrea, Yemen	Red Sea–Arabian Sea	32
Strait of Hormuz	Oman, UAE, Iran	Arabian Sea–Persian Gulf	48
Strait of Malacca	Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore	Indian Ocean–South China Sea	2.5

Estimates of agricultural and fertilizer trade passing through these chokepoints are presented throughout this report. These are based on the Chatham House Maritime Analysis Tool (CH-MAT), which couples a global database of bilateral trade flows with a set of assumptions on the physical maritime trade routes used to transport bulk agricultural products between geographical regions, in order to estimate annual throughput at each of the chokepoints.

This is the first set of estimates of its kind in the literature on food trade and food security. The CH-MAT allows us to estimate the weight or value of flows passing through these chokepoints, both at the global aggregate level and in terms of bilateral flows between countries or regions. A more detailed methodology can be found in Annex 1.

The importance of each maritime chokepoint depends not only on the volume of trade that passes through it each year, but on its strategic importance to connectivity, whether at a global, regional or national level. We can divide the eight maritime chokepoints into three separate categories of ‘criticality’ according to the availability of alternative routes (see Figure 10):

Moderate. An alternative route is available that offers only a minimal delay for shipments (though potentially less favourable shipping conditions) and does not incur significant additional costs. This applies to the Strait of Malacca and the Dover Strait.
High. The only alternative route is one that would incur a significantly longer transit time and significantly higher shipping costs. This applies to the Panama and Suez canals, the Strait of Gibraltar and the Strait of Bab al-Mandab.
Very high. No obvious alternative maritime route is available. This applies to the Strait of Hormuz and the Turkish Straits.

Figure 10: Maritime chokepoint criticality

Looking beyond the global level, it is also important to consider the importance of specific chokepoints for individual regions or countries (whether exporters or importers). For example:

Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Egypt lie on the Mediterranean Sea, sandwiched between the Strait of Gibraltar to the west and the Suez Canal and Strait of Bab al-Mandab to the east. Seventy per cent of wheat imports into these four countries pass through at least one chokepoint for which there is no convenient alternative.
Seventy-seven per cent of wheat exports from Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan must pass through the Turkish Straits. And 39 per cent of those exports have to continue through both the Suez Canal and the Strait of Bab al-Mandab to reach the Indian Ocean and their destinations beyond.
The Panama Canal links the US’s main maize and soybean export hub on the Gulf of Mexico coast to Asian markets. The canal handles 36 per cent and 49 per cent respectively of the US’s exports of these two commodities.
India, the second-largest consumer of phosphate fertilizers after China,63 and the largest importer of diammonium phosphate (DAP), is dependent on China for 58 per cent of its DAP imports. One hundred per cent of this trade has to pass through the Strait of Malacca.

Other maritime chokepoints are of little systemic importance but matter to particular importing countries or regions. The Danish Straits, for example, are a series of three shallow channels connecting the Baltic Sea to the North Sea. They are of significance to the global oil trade64 and also a major thoroughfare for the Baltic states. Tough navigating conditions mean collisions are relatively common in these straits.65

The Kerch Strait is another chokepoint of regional significance. Bordered by the Crimean Peninsula to the west and the Taman Peninsula to the east, it connects the Black Sea to the Sea of Azov. The strait is a major export channel for Black Sea grain, oil, minerals and timber, and is now under the control of Russia. Ukraine’s announcement of a lawsuit against Russia concerning the latter’s alleged violation of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) signals the value of the Kerch Strait to Ukraine’s future as a global commodity exporter.66

Dependence on maritime chokepoints has climbed since the turn of the century

2.1.2 Increasing systemic importance of maritime chokepoints

2.1.2.1 Rising dependence at the global level

Dependence on maritime chokepoints has climbed since the turn of the century. In 2000, a total of 42 per cent of global grain exports was shipped through one or several of the maritime chokepoints; in 2015, that total had risen to 55 per cent. The majority of this growth in traffic has been in wheat and maize, supplied by Black Sea producers to China and other booming markets in Asia. In the case of the Strait of Malacca, the most rapid rise in throughput (as a share of exports) has been in soybean, again reflecting rapid import growth in Asian countries, principally China.

Figure 11: Annual grain throughput of maritime chokepoints as share of global grain exports, 2000–15

— Sources: Chatham House Maritime Analysis Tool; Chatham House (2017), resourcetrade.earth.

The picture of rising throughput is not uniform, however. Certain maritime chokepoints (e.g. the Dover Strait, Strait of Hormuz) handle a similar share of global grain trade today compared to a decade ago, whereas at others there have been pronounced increases in traffic. For example, between 2000 and 2015, annual throughput as a share of global grain exports rose rapidly for the Turkish Straits, Suez Canal, Strait of Bab al-Mandab and the Strait of Malacca (see Figure 11). This was a consequence of growth in trade between the Black Sea, the Middle East and Asia.

2.1.2.2 China’s increasing reliance on international markets

China’s rapidly growing demand for imported soybean has important ramifications for trade through the Panama Canal and the Strait of Malacca – two of the gateways linking China with North American and South American soybean producers – and will continue to stimulate throughput increases in the coming years.67 Between 2000 and 2013, the proportion of China’s soybean imports shipped via the two chokepoints rose from the equivalent of 8 per cent of domestic consumption to 42 per cent for the Strait of Malacca, and from 27 per cent of domestic consumption to 34 per cent for the Panama Canal (see Figure 12).

Figure 12: China’s soybean imports shipped through the Panama Canal and Strait of Malacca, as a proportion of supply for domestic use, 2000 and 2013

— Sources: Domestic supply quantity data from FAO (2016), ‘Food Balance Sheets’, FAOSTAT, data only available up to 2013, http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/FBS (accessed 23 May 2017). Import data from Chatham House (2017), resourcetrade.earth (2013 data).

Today, Chinese imports account for 43 per cent of trade in strategic agricultural commodities shipped through the Strait of Malacca and 39 per cent of those shipped through the Panama Canal (see Figure 13). This share – and China’s strategic interest in the two chokepoints – looks set to be maintained in the future. Chinese demand is expected to account for nearly half of the growth in global food demand by 2050,68 and the country’s soybean imports are expected to exceed an annual total of 100 million tonnes by 2025.69 While the expanded Panama Canal should be able to accommodate increased transit volumes, constraints on space and human resources in the Strait of Malacca may lead to more frequent delays – and potentially collisions – in this already crowded corridor.

Figure 13: Maize, wheat, rice and soybean imports through the Strait of Malacca and Panama Canal

2.1.2.3 Booming trade through the Arabian chokepoints

Annual throughput of food shipments via the Arabian chokepoints of the Suez Canal, Strait of Bab al-Mandab and Strait of Hormuz, en route to markets in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), has grown rapidly in recent years.70 Between 2000 and 2015, the region’s wheat imports arriving through the Suez Canal grew by 120 per cent; those routed through the Strait of Bab al-Mandab rose by 98 per cent. Until 2014 the Strait of Hormuz exhibited a similar upward trend, with a 45 per cent increase in shipments on 2000 levels. (Shipments through the strait dropped by 47 per cent in 2015 as a result of significantly lower Saudi Arabian imports – the result of a boost to domestic wheat production and of a drawdown of large stocks.71 However, volumes are expected to rise again following the completion in 2015 of the country’s domestic wheat production programme.)72 Between 2000 and 2013, the MENA region’s dependence on grain imports through these three chokepoints, measured as a share of domestic supply, rose by around 25 per cent.73

The World Bank predicts that strong population growth will drive a 63 per cent increase in cereal demand across Arab countries over the next 40 years,74 but water scarcity and the limited supply of arable land will constrain domestic production. As a result, cereal imports into the MENA region – already the largest net importer of wheat in the world – are expected to rise by 95 per cent on 2010 levels by 2050.75

2.2 Coastal and inland chokepoints

In this section we consider the importance of export infrastructure connecting three major crop-producing regions with global markets. We focus on the links between coastal chokepoints (port areas of particular importance to food and fertilizer exports) and inland chokepoints (large-scale infrastructure corridors or networks linking producer regions with export hubs on the coast) in Brazil, the US and the Black Sea region (see Figure 14).76

Figure 14: Map of coastal and inland food system chokepoints, and percentage of key crops exported through those chokepoints in 2015

— Note: mt = million tonnes.

Sources: Chatham House Maritime Analysis Tool; Chatham House (2017), resourcetrade.earth (2015 data).

Together, these regions accounted for 53 per cent of global exports of maize, wheat, rice and soybean in 2015. A major interruption at one or more of these inland and coastal chokepoints could clearly have serious consequences for international markets, particularly if it occurs during a harvest season when use of transport infrastructure peaks.

The capacity and efficiency of loading and unloading operations, storage facilities and external connections at ports are key determinants of food transport costs

The accumulation of apparently minor interruptions is also important. The capacity and efficiency of loading and unloading operations, storage facilities and external connections at ports are key determinants of food transport costs. The impact of inland delays on transport costs is estimated to be seven times greater than that of delays to ocean shipping.77 Inefficiencies can cause deliveries to be delayed by weeks, leading to higher costs and spoilage of crops and fertilizers from heat and moisture.

2.2.1 Connecting farm to port in ‘breadbasket’ regions

The following section looks in more depth at three coastal and three inland chokepoints, located in Brazil, the US and the Black Sea region. Each illustrates a range of challenges and constraints to secure and efficient chokepoint operation.

2.2.1.1 Brazil’s inland road network and southern ports

Brazil is the world’s largest exporter of soybean, and the majority of its exports are shipped from the ports on the southeast coast (see Figure 15): together, the ports of Santos, Paranaguá, Rio Grande and São Francisco do Sul handle just under a quarter of global soybean exports.78 Linking these export hubs to the fertile producing regions inland is a crumbling network of roads, an estimated 70 per cent of which are in poor condition79 and only 12 per cent of which are paved.80 Alternative export routes are limited: the escarpment that forms Brazil’s Atlantic coastline is a natural obstacle to port development,81 while the sparsity and poor quality of the roads hinder the movement of soybean exports up to the northeastern port of Santarém.82

Figure 15: Brazil’s inland road network and southern ports

— Sources: Data for primary roads from MapCruzin (2017), ‘Brazil Highways’, http://www.mapcruzin.com/free-brazil-arcgis-maps-shapefiles.htm (accessed 19 Jun. 2017). Data for soybean production from USDA, FAS, International Production Assessment Division (2012), ‘Brazil: Soybean Production by State’, http://www.roachag.com/Portals/0/Research/Soybean_Production2012_State_Brazil_Geo.pdf (accessed 19 Jun. 2017).

The Brazilian government has embarked upon an ambitious US$100 billion programme of regulatory and infrastructure development in an effort to expand capacity, improve efficiency and lower transport costs.83 It has taken steps to encourage private investment in its ports, loosening previously restrictive regulations on private concessionaires and introducing a range of tax and credit incentives, including infrastructure bonds, to encourage further private investment.84 But this comes after decades of underinvestment. The density of road and rail networks remains less than half that of other key emerging economies,85 and major ports in the south of Brazil are already at full capacity.86

The long distances from major producing regions to the coast, coupled with poorly maintained roads, result in very high transport costs compared with the US. The cost of trucking soybean from Mato Grosso, where nearly two-thirds of soybean for export to China are grown, to the seaport of Santos is estimated to account for around 20 per cent of the landed cost of soybean shipments to Shanghai.87 The economic impact of these inefficiencies is significant: according to one estimate, logistics costs associated with undercapacity and transportation delays were equivalent to 12 per cent of Brazil’s GDP in 2012.88

2.2.1.2 US inland waterways, rail network and Gulf Coast ports

Agricultural land in the US Midwest – among the most productive in the world – is linked to ports on the US’s Gulf Coast, east coast and Pacific northwest coast by an expansive network of waterways, railways and roads. Around 60 per cent of US agricultural exports are transported from farm to port via the 12,000-mile inland marine transportation system (IMTS) – a network comprising the Mississippi River and its major tributaries; the Ohio River basin; the Great Lakes–St Lawrence Seaway; the Gulf Intra-Coastal Waterway; and the Snake River and Columbia River systems in the Pacific northwest (see Figure 16).89

Around 60% of US agricultural exports are transported from farm to port via the 12,000-mile inland marine transportation system

This inland waterway network is ageing and congested.90 For example, the Upper Mississippi River and Illinois Waterway system is projected to reach 90 per cent of its annual throughput capacity by 2020, leading to delays and a significant proportion of traffic shifting to other transport modes.91

Significant shares of US wheat exports (around 63 per cent) and overall grain shipments (29 per cent) are transported by rail, and this network is equally strained:92 30 per cent of railway corridors are expected to be above capacity, and a further 25 per cent near or at full capacity, by 2035 unless significant improvements are made.93

Of the three port areas linked by these inland transport corridors, the most important for global food and fertilizer trade is the Gulf Coast. Over half of US grain exports are shipped from this region, accounting for 20 per cent of global maize exports, 17 per cent of global soybean exports and 4 per cent of global wheat exports. Shipments from Gulf Coast ports also account for 3 per cent of global fertilizer exports.

Figure 16: US inland waterways, rail network and major ports

— Sources: Data for rail network from Natural Earth (2015), ‘Railroads’, http://www.naturalearthdata.com/downloads/10m-cultural-vectors/railroads/ (accessed 19 Jun. 2017). Data for Mississippi and major tributaries from Natural Earth (2015), ‘Rivers, Lake Centerlines’, http://www.naturalearthdata.com/downloads/50m-physical-vectors/50m-rivers-lake-centerlines/ (accessed 19 Jun. 2017). Data for wheat, maize and soybean production from USDA, National Agricultural Statistics Service (2016), Crop Production 2015 Summary, https://www.usda.gov/nass/PUBS/TODAYRPT/cropan16.pdf (accessed 19 Jun. 2017).

Investment in infrastructure in the US is severely lacking; the country has one of the largest infrastructure investment deficits – the gap between the investment needed and investments already committed – in the G20.94 The funding gap for inland waterways and ports through to 2025 is estimated at US$15.8 billion, and at US$43 billion through to 2040.95 For surface transportation – roads, railways and bridges – the gap is even greater, at US$1.1 trillion through to 2025, and US$4.3 trillion through to 2040.96 Budgetary constraints have caused long-term maintenance programmes and preventative action to be replaced by a reactive ‘fix-it-as-it-fails’ policy, with the result that repairs regularly interrupt traffic and the reliability of the country’s ageing transport networks is further impaired.97 A reported backlog of over 500 planned inland navigation projects to be undertaken by the US Army Corps of Engineers will alone cost an estimated US$38 billion to complete.98

Investment in infrastructure in the US is severely lacking; the country has one of the largest infrastructure investment deficits in the G20

2.2.1.3 Black Sea ports and railways

Global wheat and maize supply increasingly depends on a handful of major export routes from the Black Sea region. However, chronic underinvestment in infrastructure raises questions about the viability of expansion plans.

Figure 17: Black Sea ports and railways

— Sources: Data for maize- and wheat-producing areas: USDA Joint Agricultural Weather Facility (2017) – Ukraine (wheat): https://www.pecad.fas.usda.gov/rssiws/al/up_cropprod.htm?country=Ukraine&commodity=Wheat; Ukraine (maize): https://www.usda.gov/oce/weather/pubs/Other/MWCACP/Graphs/ukraine/ukraine_corn.pdf; Russia (wheat):  https://www.usda.gov/oce/weather/pubs/Other/MWCACP/Graphs/russia/russia_wheat.pdf; Russia (maize):  https://www.pecad.fas.usda.gov/rssiws/al/rs_cropprod.htm; Romania (wheat): https://www.usda.gov/oce/weather/pubs/Other/MWCACP/Graphs/eur/romw_wht.gif; Romania (maize): https://www.usda.gov/oce/weather/pubs/Other/MWCACP/Graphs/eur/romcrn.gif. (All data accessed 19 Jun. 2017.) Data for rail network: Natural Earth (2015), ‘Railroads’, http://www.naturalearthdata.com/downloads/10m-cultural-vectors/railroads/ (accessed 19 Jun. 2017).

Today, 60–65 per cent of Russian and Ukrainian grain exports are transported by rail to six ports on the Black Sea coast (see Figure 17).99 Shipments from these ports also account for around 26 per cent of global wheat exports and 15 per cent of global fertilizer exports each year. Many railway lines, processing facilities, intermodal corridors and port facilities suffer from poor infrastructure quality. Grain storage facilities are at full capacity.100 Poor handling facilities and ageing loading equipment contribute to high freight costs, delays and congestion. Partly as a result, farm-to-port logistics costs in Ukraine are 40 per cent higher than in Western Europe.101 Costs are even higher in Russia and Kazakhstan; because of this, where possible, exports from both countries leave via deep-water ports in Ukraine and Estonia (where competition for capacity is less intense and rail freight rates are lower).102

According to Gazprombank, part-owned by Russian energy giant Gazprom, upgrading and expanding Russia’s infrastructure to maintain economic growth would require US$25–40 billion in private investment by 2020, of which 70 per cent would be needed for transport networks.103 Ukraine, meanwhile, requires investment of at least US$5 billion in storage facilities and US$1.2 billion in new railway rolling stock by 2023.104 In Kazakhstan, businesses have identified limited transport infrastructure as the key obstacle to expanding agricultural production.105 In addition, the whole region has suffered from underinvestment in inland waterways,106 despite their potential to unburden the creaking railways and to move large volumes of goods at relatively low cost.

Overall, this combination of rising exports and underinvestment is putting infrastructure in the Black Sea region under growing strain. While the region’s ports and railways have recently attracted investment from major agribusinesses, including US firms Cargill and Bunge,107 government funding for broader infrastructural upgrading is likely to remain limited owing to budget deficits, high levels of public debt and lower oil prices.108 Mismanagement and corruption also limit prospects for a major, high-quality infrastructure development programme. More importantly still, the ongoing conflict in Ukraine perpetuates a high-risk environment for new investments.

A combination of rising exports and underinvestment is putting infrastructure in the Black Sea region under growing strain

2.2.2 Shifting dynamics

The dramatic rise of Brazilian and Black Sea producers has led to a steady reduction in the US share of global grain exports,109 and a corresponding decline in the global food system’s dependency on US inland and coastal chokepoints. The flipside is that dependency on Brazilian and Black Sea coastal and inland chokepoints has increased. Between 2000 and 2015, Brazil’s share of global wheat, maize, rice and soybean exports rose from 6 per cent to 17 per cent; in the Black Sea, the increase was from 2 per cent to 14 per cent (see Figure 18).

Figure 18: Exports of maize, wheat, rice and soybean from the US, Brazil and Black Sea region, 2000–15

2.3 Trends and changes in the transport sector and food technology

This section considers how a shift in the nature of trade and transport, and the advancement of disruptive technologies, could change the outlook for food production and trade.

2.3.1 Emerging routes

The Arctic is by far the most-discussed alternative shipping route. In theory, it offers the prospect of new trade channels as climate change melts sea ice and opens up a Northern Sea Route (NSR). Use of the NSR could reduce sailing time between northwestern Europe and northeast Asia by 44 per cent, with a 20–30 per cent saving in transport costs.110 A viable NSR would avoid both the Panama Canal and passage via the Mediterranean, Middle East and Strait of Malacca, though it could also result in the Bering Strait emerging as a new chokepoint. At its narrowest point, the strait forges a 90-km channel between mainland Russia to the west and Alaska to the east, punctuated by Russia’s Diomede Islands.111 The strait is already an important access point for oil and gas operations in the Chukchi and Beaufort seas, and for the Red Dog zinc and lead mine in Alaska.112 Commercial activity is rising: between 2008 and 2012, the number of large vessels transiting the strait more than doubled.113

The Northwest Passage (NWP), skirting the northernmost coastline of Canada, offers a second potential Arctic trading route. It could cut the sailing distance between the US east coast and East Asia by up to 20 per cent, and between northwestern Europe and Asia by up to 30 per cent.114

Alternative shipping routes have been proposed that would ease the pressure on today’s chokepoints, but each depends on the development of huge infrastructure projects with significant environmental and social risks

Neither the NSR nor the NWP is expected to be a viable option for bulk vessels until 2050 at the earliest, however, and doubts remain over the degree to which commercial traders would accept the navigational risks.115 Even with a significant increase in Arctic shipping, the importance of South American and Black Sea food exports in meeting future Asian demand growth – together with the concentration of fertilizer capacity in and around Eastern Europe and the MENA region – is such that the Mediterranean and Arabian chokepoints will play a critical role for decades to come.

Other alternative shipping routes have been proposed that would ease the pressure on today’s chokepoints, but each depends on the development of huge infrastructure projects with significant environmental and social risks. China is the key potential provider of finance to such projects, which include the following:

The interoceanic railway across Brazil and Peru. This would create a new trans-Pacific export channel for soybean grown in southern Brazil and the increasingly productive agricultural regions of Argentina and Paraguay. Effectively, the railway would open up an alternative to current routes from Brazilian ports on the Atlantic coast, instead enabling soybean shipments to be transported by rail to the Peruvian coast and from there directly across the Pacific to Asian markets.116 Preliminary estimates suggest that the railway, when operational in 2025, could support a third of total soybean exports from Brazil to China.117 However, the project has already faced numerous objections, from both non-governmental and official bodies, due to the social and environmental risks of completing a major infrastructure project in the Amazon basin.118
The proposed Nicaraguan Canal megaproject. This would connect the Caribbean (and thus the Atlantic) with the Pacific – relieving pressure on the Panama Canal. However, construction stalled in 2015, a year after the project started, following protests from indigenous groups and NGOs concerned about environmental impacts, and amid apparent financial difficulties.119
The Kra Canal. This is one of the trade corridors planned as part China’s ‘Belt and Road’ initiative. The Kra Canal would cut across the Malay Peninsula in southern Thailand and so provide an alternative to the Strait of Malacca for east–west trade. Singapore’s continued prominence as a trans-shipment hub is nevertheless likely to dampen the impact of the Kra Canal on traffic through the Strait of Malacca.

2.3.2 Shipping trends

Our estimates of flows passing through maritime chokepoints are based in part on the assumption that global trade in grain and fertilizers uses dry bulk vessels chartered for single, point-to-point voyages. This contrasts with container shipping, where vessels follow predetermined routes with numerous pick-up and drop-off ports of call.120 Currently only a small proportion of grain trade is containerized. Such trade primarily involves high-value commodities for which shipment traceability is important, or small shipments for which the use of a dry bulk vessel would incur disproportionately high freight costs and long storage times.121

Standard practice could change in the coming years, however, as containerization of dry bulk goods is on the rise. Where export volumes are low, for example from emerging maize and wheat producers in sub-Saharan Africa, containerized parcel services already enable several exporters to share the capacity of a given vessel when none can afford to charter the entire ship.122 Small-scale producers in sub-Saharan Africa might be able to harness these services to export their goods using the continuous flow of empty containers returning to Asia.123 This could conceivably support rapid growth in ‘South–South’ trade between emerging markets, reducing the dependence of Asian importers on European, North American and South American producers, and on the trade chokepoints that punctuate these supply chains.

2.3.3 Disruptive technologies and trends in the food system

Over the past decade rapid technological change has occurred, in the food sector and beyond, that could transform the global food system. Game-changing breakthroughs in crop science and genome-editing, and efficiency improvements in transport and logistics, have coincided with a shift in consumption trends around the world.

Each of these factors has the potential to disrupt current patterns of production, demand and trade, lessening dependence on today’s trade networks and chokepoints, and opening up new opportunities for managing the risk of food shocks (see Box 4).

Box 4: Potential game-changing disruptions in the food system

New methods of environment-controlled agriculture are emerging that limit resource inputs and protect against climate damage, disease and pests. Hydroponics (water-based systems that do not require soil and that deliver optimal supplies of nutrients to plants through fortified water solutions), aeroponics (soil-less systems, using minimal water, in which plants are fed nutrient-rich solutions at timed intervals) and aquaponics (combining aquaculture and hydroponics to cultivate fish and plants in one closed-loop system) are already in use to grow fruit and vegetables.

Use of such systems is expected to expand rapidly.124 They allow for food to be produced in urban and peri-urban centres where demand is high, lessening dependence on rural–urban transport connections and, potentially, on imported food. Scaling up these systems could help dampen the rapid rise in demand for imported food that has been driven by urbanization, particularly in Asia, in recent years. In the near to medium term, environment-controlled agriculture could provide a buffer for urban populations in the event that imported supply is disrupted.

With rapidly falling costs, genome-editing technologies such as CRISPR could soon be employed across the globe on ‘orphan crops’ such as sorghum and millet, as well as on cash crops such as soybean and maize.125 This would enable farmers to diversify production and would support yield growth in regions where agro-climatic conditions have, until now, stunted expansion and intensification.

Alternative means of fertilization are under development. Enabling nitrogen fixation by grain crops could radically reduce modern agriculture’s dependence on artificial fertilizers.126 Research is under way into two distinct approaches to doing so. One uses microbial-based products in which bacteria and fungi serve as natural fertilizers, insecticides and fungicides. Major agribusiness and pharmaceutical firms, including Bayer, DuPont and Monsanto, have invested in research and development around these products;127 the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation is also funding research in sub-Saharan Africa.128 Should start-up costs fall, these technologies could offer a low-cost alternative to imported fertilizer, which is prohibitively expensive for many small-scale producers in developing countries.129

The other alternative approach to fertilization involves experimental genome-editing technologies that are designed to mimic in grains the nitrogen-fixing capacity of legumes. Research in this area is also receiving Gates Foundation support. If hoped-for advances are made in the coming years, the gains in crops yields in developing countries could be massive.130

Refrigeration allows for strategic stockpiling to regulate supply over the course of a season or year, and to create a buffer against sudden supply shocks

Industrial disruptions in the fertilizer sector may also occur as use of renewable energy sources takes off. Assuming that the environment-controlled agriculture, genome-editing and alternative fertilization technologies mentioned above are not deployed at scale in the near term, renewable energy could transform the geo-economics of nitrogen fertilizer production. The use of electricity from wind power, biogas and woody biomass has the potential to decentralize ammonia production and extricate countries from globalized supply chains.131 132 Countries that are investing heavily in solar and/or wind power – such as Brazil, China, India, Morocco, the US and Western European countries133 – could ramp up domestic production, precipitating the localization of fertilizer markets. This would reduce the dependence of global ammonia supply on a handful of major production centres.

While not a new technology, cold-chain logistics and cold storage, if deployed at scale, could be a game-changer in developing countries – particularly in remote areas – where the risk of damage to crops and/or stocks from weather is high.134 As well as reducing waste along supply chains, refrigeration allows for strategic stockpiling to regulate supply over the course of a season or year, and to create a buffer against sudden supply shocks.135

Interest in alternative protein products, including cultured meat, is mounting.136 Media attention around the world’s first lab-grown burger and around vegetarian imitations of meat products137 reflects interest in a rapidly evolving sector with the potential to disrupt agribusiness incumbents. Meat alternatives are already on the market in China and the US, with consumption expected to grow rapidly in global markets.138 Were this nascent industry to materially reduce demand for meat and dairy products, the vast volumes of soybean and maize grown and traded to support livestock production could decline dramatically.

Continued growth in Asian demand for meat would put an increasing strain on the inland and coastal chokepoints of the US and Brazil, as well as on the maritime chokepoints linking them to Asian markets

While not strictly a technological disruption, the nutrition transition unfolding across many middle- and low-income countries is having an appreciable impact on the shape of global grain trade. Rapidly rising demand for protein-rich and calorie-intense foods, most notably meat and dairy products, is driving up demand for grain and fertilizer inputs to support intensive livestock production systems in middle- and high-income countries.139 Global demand for meat and dairy products is expected to rise by 76 per cent and 65 per cent respectively by 2050, with China accounting for a significant share of this growth.140 The boom in pig and poultry production in China has already transformed the global soybean market over the past 15 years.141 It has prompted a dramatic rise in soybean exports from South America, the US and Europe, shipped through the Strait of Malacca and Panama Canal. Continued growth in Asian demand would put an increasing strain on the inland and coastal chokepoints of the US and Brazil, as well as on the maritime chokepoints linking them to Asian markets. On the other hand, if demand plateaus sooner than expected – in response to government efforts to limit meat intake, for example142 – soybean exports from Brazil and the US could diminish.

Disruptive technologies will also create opportunities for more effective and comprehensive risk management in the food system. Machine learning and the Internet of Things will likely have a transformative impact on risk monitoring and forecasting,143 allowing for more expansive and accurate climate predictions and for the modelling of possible disruptions and their cascade effects.144

2.4 Conclusions

As international markets become increasingly integral to food security, so too do the transport networks and chokepoints on which global trade depends: the share of internationally traded grain and fertilizer has increased since 2000, and this trend looks set to continue. Certain countries – most notably those of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and in the Black Sea region – are almost wholly dependent on one or several of the eight maritime chokepoints for access to international markets.

Despite their systemic importance, these trade junctures have received little attention from policymakers and analysts within the context of national and/or global food security. Rising throughput volumes, coupled with a lack of investment – particularly in the inland and coastal chokepoints of the US, Brazil and Black Sea region – are exerting increasing strain on this infrastructure, rendering it more vulnerable to disruption.

In the following chapter, we explore the range of hazards – climatic, security-related and institutional – that threaten the operation of the 14 chokepoints, and consider how these hazards may evolve in the coming years.

57 Benton, T. G., Fairweather, D., Graves, A., Harris, J., Jones, A., Lenton, T., Norman, R., O’Riordan, T., Pope, E. and Tiffin, R. (2017), Environmental tipping points and food system dynamics: Main Report, Global Food Security Programme, UK, http://www.foodsecurity.ac.uk/assets/pdfs/environmental-tipping-points-report.pdf (accessed 22 May 2017); Bailey, R., Benton, T. G., Challinor, A., Elliott, J., Gustafson, D., Hiller, B., Jones, A., Jahn, M., Kent, C., Lewis, K., Meacham, T., Rivington, M., Robson, D., Tiffin, R. and Wuebbles, D. J. (2015), Extreme weather and resilience of the global food system, final project report from the UK-US Taskforce on Extreme Weather and Global Food System Resilience, http://www.foodsecurity.ac.uk/assets/pdfs/extreme-weather-resilience-of-global-food-system.pdf (accessed 24 Mar. 2017); Moser, S. C. and Finzi Hart, J. A. (2015), ‘The long arm of climate change: societal teleconnections and the future of climate change impacts studies’, Climatic Change, 129: 13–26, doi: 10.1007/s10584-015-1328-z (accessed 22 May 2017).

58 All chokepoint throughput figures used in this report are drawn from the Chatham House Maritime Analysis Tool and Chatham House (2017), resourcetrade.earth. See Box 3 and Annex 1.

59 Brack, D., Glover, A. and Wellesley, L. (2016), Agricultural Commodity Supply Chains: Trade, Consumption and Deforestation, Research Paper, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/publications/research/2016-01-28-agricultural-commodities-brack-glover-wellesley.pdf (accessed 3 Mar. 2017); Lee, T., Tran, A., Hansen, J. and Ash, M. (2016), ‘Major Factors Affecting Global Soybean and Products Trade Projections’, US Department of Agriculture (USDA) Economic Research Service, 2 May 2016, https://www.ers.usda.gov/amber-waves/2016/may/major-factors-affecting-global-soybean-and-products-trade-projections (accessed 16 Apr. 2017).

60 Farchy, J. and Terazono, E. (2015), ‘India’s economy drives demand for phosphate fertilizer’, Financial Times, 29 May 2015, https://www.ft.com/content/417bf3a8-0538-11e5-8612-00144feabdc0 (accessed 9 Mar. 2017).

61 See, for example, Rodrigue, J.-P., Comtois, C. and Slack, B. (2017), The Geography of Transport Systems, New York: Routledge, https://people.hofstra.edu/geotrans/.

62 AIS is an automatic system for vessel tracking. See, for example, www.shipmap.org.

63 Phosphate fertilizer consumption in tonnes of nutrients for 2014 – FAO (2016), ‘Fertilizers’, FAOSTAT (accessed 9 Mar. 2017).

64 Bender, J. (2015), ‘These 8 narrow chokepoints are critical to the world’s oil trade’, Business Insider UK, 1 April 2015, http://uk.businessinsider.com/worlds-eight-oil-chokepoints-2015-4?r=US&IR=T (accessed 28 Apr. 2017).

65 Baltic Marine Environment Protection Commission (2012), Annual report on Shipping accidents in the Baltic Sea in 2012, Helsinki: HELCOM, http://helcom.fi/Lists/Publications/Annual%20report%20on%20shipping%20accidents%20in%20the%20Baltic%20Sea%20area%20during%202012.pdf (accessed 28 Apr. 2017).

66 Maritime Executive (2016), ‘Ukraine Threatens UNCLOS Suit Over Crimean Waters’, 23 August 2016, http://www.maritime-executive.com/article/ukraine-threatens-unclos-suit-over-crimean-waters (accessed 6 Mar. 2017).

67 Fukase, M. and Martin, W. J. (2016), ‘Who Will Feed China in the 21st Century? Income Growth and Food Demand and Supply in China’, Journal of Agricultural Economics, 67(1): 3–23, doi: 10.1111/1477-9552.12117 (accessed 22 Jul. 2016).

68 Gillson, I. and Fouad, A. (2015), ‘Introduction’, in Gillson, I. and Fouad, A. (eds) (2015), Trade Policy and Food Security: Improving Access to Food in Developing Countries in the Wake of High World Prices, Directions in Development – Trade, Washington, DC: World Bank, https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/20537 (accessed 3 Mar. 2017).

69 Lee et al. (2016), ‘Major Factors Affecting Global Soybean and Products Trade Projections’.

70 Throughput levels dropped in 2010 following the Russian heatwave and subsequent wheat export ban. See Kramer, A. E. (2010), ‘Russia, Crippled by Drought, Bans Grain Exports’, New York Times, 5 August 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/06/world/europe/06russia.html (accessed 21 Mar. 2017).

71 USDA Foreign Agricultural Service (2016), ‘Saudi Arabia Grain and Feed Annual’, 14 March 2016, https://gain.fas.usda.gov/Recent%20GAIN%20Publications/Grain%20and%20Feed%20Annual_Riyadh_Saudi%20Arabia_3-14-2016.pdf (accessed 23 Feb. 2017).

72 Ibid.

73 This is equivalent to an increase of 3 percentage points, from 13 per cent to 16 per cent of supply. Authors’ own calculation based on imports through chokepoints as a share of domestic supply of wheat, maize, rice and soybean. Domestic supply quantity data from FAO (2016), ‘Food Balance Sheets’, FAOSTAT (data only available up to 2013); import data from Chatham House (2017), resourcetrade.earth.

74 Battat, M. and Lampietti, J. (2015), ‘The Grain Chain: Trade and Food Security in Arab Countries’, in Gillson and Fouad (eds) (2015), Trade Policy and Food Security (accessed 8 Jul. 2016).

75 Ibid.

76 The US, Brazil, Russia and Ukraine together export 63 per cent of internationally traded maize, 64 per cent of internationally traded soybean and 32 of internationally traded wheat. While growers in Southeast Asia and China dominate global rice production, only 55 per cent of total exports are shipped beyond regional markets. Chatham House Maritime Analysis Tool; Chatham House (2017), resourcetrade.earth (2015 data).

77 Limão, N. and Venables, A. J. (1999), ‘Infrastructure, Geographical Disadvantage, and Transport’, Policy Research Working Paper No. 2257, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTEXPCOMNET/Resources/2463593-1213976610278/01_Infrastructure_geographical_disadvantage_and_transport_costs.pdf (accessed 6 Jul. 2016).

78 Authors’ calculation based on Chatham House Resource Trade Database and Braun, K. (2016), ‘No hang-ups for Brazilian soybean exports’, Reuters, 19 May 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-brazil-soybeans-braun-idUSKCN0Y910X (accessed 30 Jan. 2017).

79 University of Southern Mississippi (2014), Emerging South American Competitiveness to US Soybean Exports, report compiled for the New Orleans World Trade Center.

80 PwC (2013), ‘Crunch Time For Brazilian Infrastructure’, Gridlines, Spring 2013, https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/capital-projects-infrastructure/pdf/brazil-article.pdf (accessed 28 Apr. 2017).

81 Marshall, T. (2015), Prisoners of Geography. Ten Maps That Tell You Everything You Need to Know About Global Politics, London: Elliott & Thompson.

82 Global Commission on the Economy and Climate (2015), Towards Efficient Land Use in Brazil, http://2015.newclimateeconomy.report/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Towards-Efficient-Land-Use-Brazil.pdf (accessed 8 Jul. 2016).

83 Poulden, G. (2013), ‘Brazil creaks under the strain of meeting Chinese soya demand’, 15 May 2013, China Dialogue, https://www.chinadialogue.net/blog/6013-Brazil-creaks-under-the-strain-of-meeting-Chinese-soya-demand/en (accessed 28 Apr. 2017); Salin, D. L. (2015), Soybean Transportation Guide: Brazil 2014, USDA Agricultural Marketing Service, July 2015, https://www.ams.usda.gov/sites/default/files/media/Brazil%20Soybean%20Transportation%20Guide%202014.pdf (accessed 28 Apr. 2017).

84 OECD/FAO (2015), OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook 2015-2024, Paris: OECD Publishing, www.fao.org/3/a-i4738e.pdf (accessed 24 Feb. 2017); PwC (2013), ‘Crunch Time For Brazilian Infrastructure’.

85 OECD/FAO (2015), OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook 2015-2024.

86 Azoulai, D., Dunlop, H. and Kuettel, B. (2013), ‘Big Bottleneck: A Weak Transportation Network Is Hurting Brazil’s Once-hot Economy’, Knowledge@Wharton, 20 December 2013, http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/big-bottleneck-weak-transportation-network-hurting-brazils-hot-economy (accessed 28 Apr. 2017).

87 Salin (2015), Soybean Transportation Guide: Brazil 2014 (accessed 24 Feb. 2017).

88 PwC (2013), ‘Crunch Time For Brazilian Infrastructure’.

89 Gordon, K., Lewis, M., Rogers, J. and Kinniburgh, F. (2015), Heat in the Heartland: Climate Change and Economic Risk in the Midwest, a Risky Business report, http://riskybusiness.org/site/assets/uploads/2015/09/RBP-Midwest-Report-WEB-1-26-15.pdf (accessed 6 Jul. 2016); Grier, D. (2009), The Declining Reliability of the US Inland Waterway System, Institute for Water Resources, US Army Corps of Engineers, http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/archive/Conferences/MTS/4A%20GrierPaper.pdf (accessed 6 Jul. 2016).

90 Kruse, C. J. and Ahmedov, Z. (2011), America’s Locks & Dams: “A ticking time bomb for agriculture?”, Texas Transportation Institute and Center for Ports and Waterways, report prepared for United Soybean Board, https://unitedsoybean.org/wp-content/uploads/Americas_Locks_And_Dams.pdf (accessed 16 Apr. 2017); United States Department of Homeland Security/Office of Cyber and Infrastructure Analysis (2015), ‘Aging and failing infrastructure systems: navigation locks’, Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience Note, prepared by Operational Analysis Division, 8 December 2015, https://info.publicintelligence.net/DHS-FailingLocks.pdf (accessed 6 Jul. 2016).

91 US Army Corps of Engineers (USCE) (2012), Inland Waterways and Export Opportunities, http://www.lrd.USce.army.mil/Portals/73/docs/Navigation/PCXIN/Inland_Waterways_and_Export_Opportunities-FINAL_2013-01-03.pdf (accessed 6 Mar. 2017).

92 USDA (2013), A Reliable Waterway System is Important to Agriculture, Agricultural Marketing Service, December 2013, https://www.ams.usda.gov/sites/default/files/media/Importance%20of%20Waterways%2012-2013.pdf (accessed 6 Jul. 2016); Envision Freight (2014), ‘The Transportation of Grain’, http://www.envisionfreight.com/value/pdf/Grain.pdf (accessed 6 Jul. 2016).

93 Ibid.

94 Mischke, J. (2015), ‘Infrastructure finance: Myths and reality’, presentation at Chatham House Infrastructure Finance Conference, London, 23 November 2015.

95 US ASCE (2016), Failure to Act: Closing the Infrastructure Investment Gap for America’s Economic Future, prepared by the Economic Development Research Group, Reston: American Society of Civil Engineers, http://www.infrastructurereportcard.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/2016-FTA-Report-Close-the-Gap.pdf (accessed 16 Aug. 2016).

96 Ibid.

97 Grier (2009), The Declining Reliability of the US Inland Waterway System.

98 US Department of Transportation (2015), Beyond Traffic 2045: Trends and Choices, https://cms.dot.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/docs/Draft_Beyond_Traffic_Framework.pdf (accessed 18 Aug. 2016).

99 The six ports are Novorossiysk and Tuapse (Russia), Odessa and Ilyichevsk (Ukraine), Constanta (Romania) and Bourgas (Bulgaria). Centre for Transport Strategies (2014), Ukraine – Agricultural Trade, Transport, and Logistic Advisory Services Activity, Kiev: Centre for Transport Strategies, http://mtu.gov.ua/files/for_investors/Ukraine%20Agricultural%20Trade%20Transport%20and%20Logistic.pdf (accessed 8 Jul. 2016); Renner, S., Götz, L. Prehn, S. and Glauben, T. (2014), ‘The influence of infrastructure on regional wheat trade in Russia: A gravity model approach’, paper for presentation at the EAAE 2014 Congress ‘Agri-Food and Rural Innovations for Healthier Societies’, 26–29 August 2014, Ljubljana, Halle: Leibniz-Institute for Agricultural Development in Transition Economies (IAMO), http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/182840/2/Renner_et_al__2014_EAAE_Poster_Paper_July_1_3.pdf (accessed 8 Jul. 2016).

100 Glauben, T., Belyaeva, M., Bobojonov, I., Djuric, I., Götz, L., Hockmann, H., Müller, D., Perekhozhuk, O., Petrick, M., Prehn, S., Prishchepov, A., Renner, S. and Schierhorn, F. (2014), Eastern breadbasket obstructs its market and growth opportunities, IAMO Policy Brief No. 16, April 2014, http://www.iamo.de/fileadmin/documents/IAMOPolicyBrief16_en.pdf (accessed 8 Mar. 2017).

101 World Bank (2015), Shifting into Higher Gear: Recommendations for Improved Grain Logistics in Ukraine, Report No: ACS15163, Washington, DC: World Bank Group, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2015/09/25016728/shifting-higher-gear-recommendations-improved-grain-logistics-ukraine (accessed 28 Apr. 2017).

102 USDA FAS (2011), Russian Federation: Overview of Russian Grain Port Capacity and Transportation, GAIN Report Number RS1149, https://gain.fas.usda.gov/Recent%20GAIN%20Publications/Overview%20of%20Russian%20Grain%20Port%20Capacity%20and%20Transportation_Moscow_Russian%20Federation_11-3-2011.pdf (accessed 28 Apr. 2017).

103 Ganelin, M. and Vasin, S. (2014), ‘Russian infrastructure: A big ship sails far’, industry report, Gazprombank, 15 July 2014, http://www.gazprombank.ru/upload/iblock/d4c/gpb_russian%20infrastructure_eng_150714.pdf (accessed 16 Aug. 2016).

104 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (2015), ‘EBRD and Ukraine’s agriculture sector partner for reform’, 21 May 2015, http://www.ebrd.com/news/2015/ebrd-and-ukraines-agriculture-sector-partner-for-reform.html (accessed 16 Aug. 2016).

105 OECD (undated), Kazakhstan: Sector Competitiveness Strategy, Competitiveness and Private Sector Development report, Eurasia Competitiveness Programme, https://www.oecd.org/globalrelations/47014312.pdf (accessed 17 Aug. 2016).

106 Deloitte (undated), Infrastructure & PPP in Ukraine, InvestUkraine report, http://ccipu.org/it/argomenti/infrastructure (accessed 17 Aug. 2016); Ganelin, M., Yakovlev, Y. and Tayts, M. (2015), Russian Infrastructure: To build or not to build – that is the question, industry report, Gazprombank, 3 July 2015, http://www.gazprombank.ru/upload/iblock/0ba/GPB_Infrastructure_update_030715.pdf (accessed 16 Aug. 2016).

107 Reuters (2016), ‘Cargill to invest $100 mln in Ukraine grain terminal’, 24 February 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/grains-ukraine-terminal-idUSL8N1631LC (accessed 18 Aug. 2016); Business Ukraine magazine (2016), ‘Ukrainian agriculture infrastructure: US giant Bunge invests USD 280 million into the Ukrainian breadbasket’, 8 July 2016, http://bunews.com.ua/investment/item/ukrainian-agriculture-infrastructure-bunge-invests-usd-280-million-into-the-ukrainian-breadbasket (accessed 8 Aug. 2016).

108 Ganelin, Yakovlev and Tayts (2015), Russian Infrastructure: To build or not to build – that is the question; Ganelin and Vasin (2014), ‘Russian infrastructure: A big ship sails far’.

109 US exports of wheat, maize, rice and soybean as a proportion of global exports have declined from 33 per cent in 2000 to 22 per cent in 2015 – Chatham House (2017), resourcetrade.earth.

110 Aksenov, Y., Popova, E. E., Yool, A., Nurser, A. J. G., Williams, T. D., Bertino, L. and Bergh, J. (2016), ‘On the future navigability of Arctic sea routes: High-resolution projects of the Arctic Ocean and sea ice’, Marine Policy, 75: 300–17, doi: 10.1016/j.marpol.2015.12.027 (accessed 8 Jul. 2016).

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112 US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) (undated), ‘Federal and State Offshore Oil & Gas Leases – Beaufort and Chukchi Seas’, http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/pdfs/permits/openwater/map.pdf (accessed 29 Mar. 2017); Brigham et al. (undated), ‘Bering Strait Region Case Study’.

113 Rosen, Y. (2015), ‘Polar Code Approval Is Timely for Busy Bering Strait’, Pacific Environment, https://pacificenvironment.org/in-the-news/polar-code-approval-is-timely-for-busy-bering-strait (accessed 29 Mar. 2017).

114 Østreng, W., Jørgensen-Dahl, A., Eger, K. M., Mejlænder-Larsen, M., Lothe, L., Fløistad, B. and Wergeland, T. (2013), ‘The Northeast, Northwest and Transpolar Passages in Comparison’, in Østreng, W., Eger, K. M., Fløistad, B., Jørgensen-Dahl, A., Lothe, L., Mejlaender-Larsen, M. and Wergeland, T. (eds), Shipping in Arctic Waters: A comparison of the Northeast, Northwest and Trans-Polar Passages, Springer Praxis Books, doi: 10.1007/978-3-642-16790-4_8 (accessed 18 Aug. 2016).

115 Smith, L. C. and Stephenson, S. R. (2013), ‘New Trans-Arctic shipping routes navigable by midcentury’, PNAS, 110(13): 4871–2, doi: 10.1072/pnas.1214212110 (accessed 18 Aug. 2016); Hansen, C. O., Gronsedt, P., Graversen, C. L. and Hendriksen, C. (2016), Arctic Shipping – Commercial Opportunities and Challenges, CBS Maritime, Copenhagen Business School, https://services-webdav.cbs.dk/doc/CBS.dk/Arctic%20Shipping%20-%20Commercial%20Opportunities%20and%20Challenges.pdf (accessed 18 Aug. 2016); Østreng et al. (2013), ‘The Northeast, Northwest and Transpolar Passages in Comparison’; Farré, A. B., Stephenson, S. R., Chen, L., Czub, M., Dai, Y., Demchev, D., Efimov, Y., Graczyk, P., Grythe, H., Keil, K., Kivekäs, N., Kumar, N., Kiu, N., Matelenok, I., Myksvoll, M., O’Leary, D., Olsen, J., Pavithran, S. A. P., Petersen, E., Raspotnik, A., Ryzhov, I., Solski, J., Suo, L., Troein, C., Valeeva, V., van Rijckevorsel, J. and Wighting, J. (2014), ‘Commercial Arctic shipping through the Northeast Passage: routes, resources, governance, technology, and infrastructure’, Polar Geography 37(4): 298–324, doi: 10.1080/1088937X.2014.965769 (accessed 8 Jul. 2016); Aksenov et al. (2016), ‘On the future navigability of Arctic sea routes’ (accessed 28 Apr. 2017).

116 Ortiz, F. (undated), ‘Brazil, Peru and China and the Inter-oceanic Dream’, Diálogo Chino, http://dialogochino.net/china-is-part-of-an-interoceanic-dream-between-brazil-and-peru/ (accessed 21 Mar. 2017); Elliott, L. (2014), ‘New farming frontiers in Latin America’, Financial Times, 4 July 2014, http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2014/07/04/new-farming-frontiers-in-latin-america (accessed 21 Mar. 2017).

117 Leal, M. (2016), ‘Fears raised over new Amazon railroad’, China Dialogue, 31 August 2016, https://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/9200-Fears-raised-over-new-Amazon-railroad (accessed 5 Apr. 2017).

118 Ibid.

119 Al Jazeera America (2015), ‘Controversial Nicaragua canal project delayed’, 25 November 2015, http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/11/25/controversial-nicaragua-canal-project-delayed.html (accessed 21 Mar. 2017); Morris, D. Z. (2016), ‘Why China and Nicaragua’s Canal Project is Floundering’, Fortune, http://fortune.com/2016/02/29/china-nicaragua-canal (accessed 21 Mar. 2017).

120 Christiansen, M., Fagerholt, K. and Ronen, D. (2004), ‘Ship Routing and Scheduling: Status and Perspectives’, Transportation Science, 38(1): pp. 1–18 (accessed 28 Apr. 2017).

121 Lirn, T. T. C. and Wang, J.-D. (2016), ‘The Determinants of Containerised Grain Shipping’, in Pawar, K. S., Rogers, H., Potter, A. and Naim, M. (eds), Developments in Logistics and Supply Chain Management: Past, Present and Future, pp. 215–230, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan UK, doi: 10.1057/9781137541253_19 (accessed 10 Apr. 2017); Munro, E. (2011), ‘Containers Move High-Value Exports – When do Containers Work Best for the Grain Buyer and the Grower?’, Corn & Soybean Digest, 1 September 2011, http://cornandsoybeandigest.com/issues/containers-move-high-value-exports-when-do-containers-work-best-grain-buyer-and-grower (accessed 10 Apr. 2017).

122 Munro (2011), ‘Containers Move High-Value Exports – When Do Containers Work Best For the Grain Buyer and the Grower?’.

123 Ocean Shipping Consultants Ltd. (2008), Beyond the Bottlenecks: Ports in Sub-Saharan Africa, background paper for World Bank and SSATP, http://www.eu-africa-infrastructure-tf.net/attachments/library/aicd-background-paper-8-ports-sect-summary-en.pdf (accessed 21 Mar. 2017).

124 Business Wire (2016), ‘Global Hydroponics Market 2015-2020 – Market value is anticipated to grow from $19.95 billion to $27.33 billion in 2020 – Research and Markets’, 11 August 2016, http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20160811005565/en/Global-Hydroponics-Market-2015-2020–Market-anticipated (accessed 24 Mar. 2017); pH Hydro (2014), ‘Aeroponics 101: Facts about soilless growing technology’, PowerHouse Hydroponics, 24 July 2014, http://www.powerhousehydroponics.com/aeroponics-101-facts-about-soilless-growing-technology/ (accessed 24 Mar. 2017); Challen, J. (2015), ‘Get ready for organic indoor vertical farms’, Future Ag, 12 November 2015, http://futureag.info/news/get-ready-for-organic-indoor-vertical-farms (accessed 24 Mar. 2017).

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126 Dent, D. and Cocking, E. (2017), ‘Establishing symbiotic nitrogen fixation in cereals and other non-legume crops: The Greener Nitrogen Revolution’, Agriculture & Food Security, 6:7, doi: 10.1186/s40066-016-0084-2 (accessed 24 Mar. 2017).

127 Zhang, S. (2016), ‘Good riddance, chemicals: microbes are farming’s hot new pesticides’, Wired, 21 March 2015, https://www.wired.com/2016/03/good-riddance-chemicals-microbes-farmings-hot-new-pesticides (accessed 24 Mar. 2017).

128 The Conversation (2017), ‘Why microbes are key to solving Africa’s food security crisis’, 30 January 2017, https://theconversation.com/why-microbes-are-key-to-solving-africas-food-security-crisis-71719 (accessed 24 Mar. 2017).

129 Vance, C. P. (2001), ‘Symbiotic Nitrogen Fixation and Phosphorus Acquisition. Plant Nutrition in a World of Declining Renewable Resources’, Plant Physiology, 127(2): 390–97, doi: 10.1104/pp.010331 (accessed 24 Mar. 2017).

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