Chatham House exterior.
Geopolitics and Security
America’s Crisis of Leadership at Home and Abroad
The Trump presidency is having a corrosive effect on US foreign relations, as the very nature of America as a responsible partner in the international system is challenged.
The 2016 presidential election was an unprecedented moment in US politics – and for American leadership in international affairs. The election of Donald Trump has proven highly disruptive not only for the political establishment but also for those who had previously taken for granted their status as America’s international partners. President Trump’s idiosyncratic style is having an injurious effect on democracy at home and on the US’s global role. For the rest of the world, US domestic affairs are foreign policy. What America is, not only what it does, matters.
In the 17 months since Trump’s inauguration, people have been trying to develop a satisfactory account of his success at the polls. Many of these explanations inevitably turn to structural factors. The Trump phenomenon has been variously interpreted as the product of the country’s relative economic decline internationally; as a backlash inspired by rising inequality, wage stagnation and cultural change, amplified by rural bias in US electoral institutions; or as the improbable outcome of a series of (un)fortunate events in the 2016 electoral process.
Understanding what brought Trump to power sheds some light on whether reductive US unilateralism is likely to become a permanent feature of international relations
These debates are not simply academic. Understanding what brought Trump to power sheds some light on whether reductive US unilateralism is likely to become a permanent feature of international relations. If Trump’s election was a fluke, or if he represents only a minority element of the US polity, and one in decline, the significance of Trumpism should diminish over time. In that case, the logical response for foreign partners would be to stay the course (ignore bad behaviour, reward good behaviour) and invest in productive, even creative, partnerships with the US where possible. But America’s military and economic power remains a stubborn fact for those who would like to work around the current government. And Trump’s brazenness is challenging for those who seek to play the long game.
Any attempt to estimate the future based on the past is bound to be fraught. Regardless of why he has arrived, Trump is now an independent variable, both for America’s democracy and for its foreign policy. Things are unlikely to return to normal when he leaves. His dominant narrative, that America has been taken advantage of by the rest of the world, is popular with his base, laying the foundation for attacks – both rhetorical and through policy – not only on foreign competitors, but also on many of the US’s long-standing partners. At home, Trump has waged an attack on the establishment. This, too, resonates in a country where national identity is defined in no small part by a history of revolution.
Trump’s election is not the first event in recent years that has taken us by surprise. The end of the Cold War, the 9/11 attacks and the 2008 financial crisis caught the world off guard. In each case, Europe and the US were inevitably drawn together to forge a collective response. Today is different. Trump’s improvisational, zero-sum approach to international relations is driving a wedge through the transatlantic partnership. After an initial year in which many hoped (with some justification) that policy would remain more the same than different – ‘watch what they do, not what they say’ – Trump’s decision in May to withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal, followed only weeks later by the imposition of tariffs on the EU, Canada and Mexico, has been proof that disruption will not be confined to style alone. For now, Europe is at a loss over how to deal with its ever-more-unreliable partner.
Such concerns are all the more significant given that global challenges – the rise of China, demographic change, technological advance (especially automation) – are all developing at pace, and with diminished transatlantic oversight. More immediate problems also are in dire need of a collaborative response: North Korea’s nuclear ambitions; resurgent authoritarianism in Russia, Turkey, Egypt and beyond; and a surge of populism across Europe. If Washington wishes to seek Europe’s assistance on these agendas at some point in the future, it may struggle to do so, as things for Europe are unlikely to have remained the same.
How long the period of transatlantic divergence will last is anyone’s guess. There are multiple reasons to be sanguine about the US relationship with Europe.1 For the time being a measure of cooperation is being driven by common interests and, especially, Europe’s lack of alternatives. But if such pragmatism remains devoid of the shared values that have previously anchored the relationship, it will provide a thin basis for a productive and collective future. The US and Europe may keep their partnership alive in form, but meaningful cooperation will be undermined.
Treading water in international relations is not really an option, or at least not one without consequences. The erosion of international norms, diplomacy and goodwill will not be easy to recover. If America fails to stand up for the rules and institutions that have underpinned the international order and placed the US at the centre of a joint governance venture for more than 70 years, its ability to lead with partners will inevitably be compromised.
The potential ramifications are multiple. First, the absence of US leadership creates the space for other states’ geopolitical gains. China may be under economic pressure from the threat of US tariffs, but it will gain relief from the US’s absence from the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Europe is pragmatic about China and has minimal capacity to secure any space for Western influence in Asia. Taken together, the incentive and the opportunity for China to make a bid for regional hegemony seem obvious.2 In East Asia, the next US president will thus inherit diminished status in a region that has charged ahead economically and in international influence. US capacity to influence the Middle East also seems set to decline even further under Trump’s watch. Europe and the US are divided not only on Iran, but also (more quietly) on Israel. The unravelling of the Iran nuclear deal and the Assad regime’s military gains in Syria look set to bolster Russian influence and encourage further Iranian provocation in the region.
Trump has recognized an economic and social deficit in the US, and his instincts are not wrong
An even more significant factor, perhaps, both for the US and its role in the world is the quality of its democracy at home. Trump has recognized an economic and social deficit in the US, and his instincts are not wrong. Democracy succeeds when citizens are fully part of the social contract. Trust in institutions is also essential to its functioning. Trump has waged a sustained attack on such institutions, from federal law enforcement agencies and the courts to the liberal media, as well as lashing out at some from his innermost circle of advisers. Norms governing the boundary between politics, money and family, and the conduct of the presidency, have been weakened. Civil servants have departed and hiring has slowed. The Republican Party has been thrown into disarray. The legacy of this is uncertain, but trust in US institutions looks set to diminish both at home and abroad. (Already, the Economist Intelligence Unit has graded the US a ‘flawed democracy’ for two years in a row.)3
Polarization and division are also growing worse under Trump’s influence. By 2017, the values gap between Democrats and Republicans had grown to 36 percentage points, up by more than 20 points since 1994.4 Wealth inequality has increased substantially across income, ethnic and racial divides.5 And division is growing. Hate has intensified. Between 2015 and 2016, the number of anti-Muslim hate groups grew from 34 to 101.6 At the same time, rural areas have become even more separate in their outlook from urban America. The cultivation of illiberalism and division in rallies across the country is being mirrored in the courting of authoritarian and populist leaders abroad.
Still, there is room for optimism. Democracy is a practice that requires daily attention. A majority of Americans report that they are paying more attention to politics than they used to.7 Intense contests are being waged on multiple fronts. Trump’s legacies on immigration, the rule of law, money in politics, financial regulation, education, net neutrality, and the separation of church and state are subject to the outcome of battles between a robust civil society (which includes highly focused, well-organized advocates) and specialized interests. Much of this activity is taking place below the radar of the international news media.
Ultimately, the meta-battle that is taking shape is less one of content than one of process: the role of truth (from simple, established facts to widely agreed scientific positions), norms and the rule of law. This is where the quality of America’s leadership and also of its democracy will be tested.
Leslie Vinjamuri is the head of the US and the Americas Programme and the dean of the Queen Elizabeth II Academy for Leadership in International Affairs.
Why Nuclear Weapons Risks are Increasing
A lack of progress on arms control and disarmament – as well as a volatile international scene – has renewed fears of nuclear weapons use. The risks are significant and should be taken seriously.
Risk is defined as the product of the probability and the consequence of an event occurring. The high risks associated with nuclear weapons have always been dominated by the ‘consequences’ component of the risk equation. When impacts are overwhelming, however small the likelihood of an event so long as it isn’t zero, the risks are high. Throughout the Cold War, there were several near-accidents and near-deliberate detonations of nuclear weapons, but thanks primarily to good luck and the good judgment of some key individuals, the worst dangers of the nuclear stand-off between the US and the Soviet Union were avoided. Could such good luck and judgment still hold today?
In the 1960s, as a result of the growing concerns about nuclear weapons, Ireland introduced a UN General Assembly resolution that resulted in the 1968 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The NPT was a grand bargain in which the states that did not possess nuclear weapons promised never to develop or acquire them, to only develop peaceful forms of nuclear energy, and to subject themselves to safeguarding inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In return, the possessors of nuclear weapons promised to negotiate nuclear disarmament in good faith, along with disarmament in other weapons categories, and not to transfer or assist with nuclear weapons technologies. All states party to the NPT could then share in safeguarded nuclear technologies for peaceful uses.
When impacts are overwhelming, however small the likelihood of an event so long as it isn’t zero, the risks are high
At that time, the NPT was given a lifespan of 25 years – a decision that, in retrospect, betrays a touching faith in commitments to disarmament. In 1995, the Treaty was extended indefinitely as part of a suite of commitments to a) the complete elimination of nuclear weapons; b) a strengthening of the NPT review process; and c) progress towards a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction. Nearly 25 years later, none of those commitments has resulted in substantial progress. In the run-up to its 50th anniversary in 2020,8 the NPT is in trouble again.
In part, this turbulence has been caused by proliferation in states both outside and inside the NPT. Outside, following their nuclear tests in 1998, both India and Pakistan have cemented their nuclear-armed status, with India having been granted special status for peaceful-use technologies through the Nuclear Suppliers Group and Section 123 of the US Atomic Energy Act. Israel’s nuclear weapons capability is unspoken and rarely challenged by the other nuclear weapons possessors, although it is of considerable concern in the Middle East. None of these countries is likely to ever join the NPT. Although the adoption of more intrusive IAEA inspections has made it far harder for states, inside the Treaty, to use a peaceful nuclear programme to conceal the development of a clandestine military capability, that has not halted proliferation: North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT in 2003, and it was concerns about Iran’s programme that led to the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
Lack of progress in the step-by-step process in multilateral and bilateral nuclear arms control and disarmament is also playing a major role in destabilizing the NPT. Since 1999, when the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was rejected by the US Senate,9 things have gone badly for multilateral processes except in the humanitarian domain. Efforts to control landmines, small arms and light weapons, cluster munitions and the arms trade have formed the only pathway for progress on conventional forces. Such efforts in the humanitarian domain rather than in the traditional disarmament process have led to more than 120 countries negotiating the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons10 – they have done so with a sense of purpose and urgency not seen since the NPT days of the 1960s. In contrast, since the US’s withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002, bilateral nuclear controls and regional conventional arms control involving Russia and the US have all but run into the ground – this is despite the agreement of New START in 2010.
With social and broadcast media employed to trade insults and threats, it seems likely that military exercises could lead to misinterpreted signals and the escalation from rhetoric to missile attack
This sorry state has formed the backdrop to an increase in the salience of nuclear weapons in military doctrines in Russia and the US, involving the development of new nuclear weapons programmes in both countries – which in turn increases the possibilities of proliferation and even of nuclear weapons use. Throughout the Cold War, nuclear weapons were seen as the ‘weapons that could not be used’ – they were for the purposes of deterrence only. Their innate terrifying effects were seen as the foundation of this deterrence. In recent years, this consensus has weakened – with over 70 years having passed since the use of nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, decision-makers may be unaware of the devastating immediate and long-term effects of such weapons. During the 2016 US election campaign, Donald Trump asked why a US president would not consider the use of nuclear weapons; in the same year, the UK prime minister, Theresa May, stated her resolve to use nuclear weapons; and President Vladimir Putin has frequently made clear the Russian readiness to use them.
In 2018, the possible use of nuclear weapons has become all too real, with threats from both North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong-un, and President Trump. Missile alert drills have been reinstalled in Hawaii and a ‘real’ alert was broadcast mistakenly in January, leading to 40 minutes of panic and uncertainty.11 That mistake was readily believed because of the increasing hostile rhetoric between the US and North Korea. With social and broadcast media employed to trade insults and threats, it seems likely that military exercises could lead to misinterpreted signals and the escalation from rhetoric to missile attack. Similar tensions in the Middle East could also raise the stakes. US withdrawal from the JCPOA, unless Europe and Iran find a way through the conundrum, could renew the risk of Iran being able to develop a nuclear capability – and thus of an Israeli or Saudi pre-emptive military response.
In this multipolar and increasingly turbulent world, the ‘probability’ component of the nuclear risk equation has grown in significance. Despite near-accidents and near-misses throughout the Cold War, military planners and politicians relied on shared beliefs in the concept of deterrence to assume that nuclear weapons would not be used, however close to the wire things went. With new players in the mix, increased regional instabilities, an environment in which command, control and communication technologies are subject to daily cyberthreats, and the use of social media in preference to quiet diplomacy, these assumptions should no longer be made. As Beatrice Finn, director of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, warned on receiving the 2017 Nobel Peace Prize, nuclear war may only be ‘one tiny tantrum away’.
Patricia Lewis is the Research Director, International Security at Chatham House.
Dialogue, Deal-making and ‘Denuclearization’
Efforts to achieve peace with North Korea and secure its denuclearization will remain fraught with risk and ambiguity.
Ahead of the historic 12 June meeting in Singapore between US President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, commentators, whether hawks or doves, had been gripped by one central question: could any deal from the summit deliver on the US side’s primary demand for comprehensive, verifiable and irreversible (nuclear) disarmament (CVID)? Notwithstanding the bold aspirations of the eventual joint statement, and the characterization of the summit as ‘the opening up of a new future’ between the US and North Korea, it remains unclear whether the two leaders can deliver on the optimism they were so keen to project. The risks to any future negotiating process remain formidable, and the potentially large gains from a settlement must be weighed against the destabilizing impact of Trump’s foreign policy improvisation on an increasingly fragile regional security environment.
Support for renewed diplomatic engagement with North Korea has increased in recent months, in part reflecting the limited impact of coercive measures. Political and economic sanctions (whether bilateral or UN-based), the threat of military action, or a more minimal strategy of containment (the pattern of ‘strategic patience’ favoured by the Obama administration) may have helped to slow the DPRK’s military modernization campaign and/or encouraged the North to return to the negotiating table. Yet it is clear that such measures have been at best partial steps in easing the strategic tensions that have bedevilled Northeast Asia and the two Koreas for the best part of seven decades.
The meeting with the US president, the world’s most powerful leader, represented a clear win for the young North Korean leader, in his mid-30s and barely in power for seven years
The North has remained resilient in the face of tightening economic sanctions, with some informed South Korean observers even suggesting that the DPRK’s economic growth has continued in spite of external pressure.12 Officially, Pyongyang’s leadership has also rebutted claims that the ‘fire and fury’ threats of a more belligerent President Trump were the key factor in encouraging it to agree to talks first with South Korea, most dramatically in the historic 27 April Panmunjom summit, and then more recently with the US.
For the North Koreans, there is little doubt that the prospect of a Trump–Kim summit had been seen as an unambiguous victory. The meeting with the US president, the world’s most powerful leader, represented a clear win for the young North Korean leader, in his mid-30s and barely in power for seven years. Shaking hands with Trump has given Kim status, recognition and legitimacy (especially in the eyes of his own people) – witness Trump’s reference to his new ‘special bond’ with his North Korean counterpart. Appearing on the world stage on nominally equal terms with the US president has bolstered North Korea’s sovereignty and allowed Kim to reinforce his astutely crafted image as a pragmatic and responsible statesman, in sharp contrast to the conventional global view of him as a crude authoritarian, presiding over a brutal and repressive regime at home while playing a dangerous game of nuclear extortion abroad.
Critically, the agreement that has resulted from the summit offers nothing new in terms of laying out a roadmap for progress on denuclearization. It has merely reaffirmed the commitment of the 27 April North–South Panmunjom Declaration to complete denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, while also expressing commitment to the relatively anodyne goals of ‘peace and prosperity’. With no explicit or binding timetable for delivering on these goals, Kim can potentially play for time, adopting a long-term strategy that may be at odds with what appears to be a more short-term approach on the part of President Trump. By trading the goal of ‘complete denuclearization’ for political normalization, the promise of unspecified ‘security guarantees’ of sorts from the US, and perhaps at some point the prospect of a relaxation of sanctions, Kim can hope to deliver on his twin promises to his people to keep the country militarily secure while promoting economic prosperity.
For Trump, a meeting with the North has allowed the populist ‘art of the deal’ president (ever confident in his ability to spin the outcome of talks to his advantage) to place himself in the media spotlight and deliver a political win to his support base ahead of the November mid-term elections. His post-summit press conference remarks were effusive, but offered little to support his optimistic assertion that Kim will deliver on his commitment to denuclearize.
A risk-averse North Korea, distrustful of its long-term US adversary, will be tempted to cheat by concealing its nuclear weapons and long-range missile capabilities
For Trump, reaching so unreservedly for this deal involves potentially serious challenges. The administration appears to lack a coherent strategy for engaging with North Korea (as demonstrated by Trump’s 24 May letter abruptly ‘cancelling’ the Singapore summit), and has shown itself to be sharply divided internally about the longer-term relationship. It remains unclear, for example, how John Bolton, Trump’s hawkish National Security Advisor – long fiercely critical of North Korea – will work cooperatively with Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, who has shifted to a much more dovish posture on DPRK issues since taking up his position in the administration.
Moreover, any denuclearization agreement will involve an extremely long implementation phase – perhaps as long as 15 years, according to Siegfried Hecker, a distinguished Stanford nuclear physicist13 – and will require thousands of inspectors to monitor compliance. A risk-averse North Korea, distrustful of its long-term US adversary, will be tempted to cheat by concealing its nuclear weapons and long-range missile capabilities.
It remains unclear also whether any agreement between the US and North Korea can address the wider challenge of dismantling the North’s stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons, as well as of confronting the threat posed by its substantial conventional forces, including the thousands of short-range missiles trained on Seoul.
Beyond these core questions are the implications for the US’s two key regional allies, South Korea and Japan. Worryingly for both countries, Trump made it clear in his remarks that he was open to the idea of cutting back on the US troop presence in the region. He also announced that he would suspend joint US–South Korea military exercises to avoid any ‘provocation’ to the North. Leaving aside the implications for alliance ties of characterizing US–South Korea cooperation in such negative terms – the alliance, after all, has typically always been described by both sides as defensive in character – it is odd that Trump made this offer without securing any formal concession in turn from the North, other than a non-binding verbal agreement from Kim to dismantle a long-range missile test site. A deal in which Kim caps or dismantles his long-range ballistic missile programme – the means by which materially North Korea can threaten the US directly – in return for wider concessions from the US may be tempting for Trump. But a limited agreement runs the risk of ignoring issues central to America’s allies.
For Japan, the threat from the North’s medium-range missiles is a key concern, as is the unresolved fate of Japanese abductees, civilians kidnapped by North Korean agents in the 1970s and 1980s. Failure to make progress on these issues risks amplifying distrust between Tokyo and Washington. So far, Trump has only said that he believes these issues will be resolved in future meetings, but he has not said how or by when. In light of the ambiguity on these issues, Japan may be encouraged over the long term to pursue a more independent military posture as its own insurance policy against a US seen as increasingly self-interested and unreliable. Such concerns are already arguably encouraging the administration of Shinzo Abe, Japan’s prime minister, to bolster ties with China via the trilateral summit process between Tokyo, Beijing and Seoul (reactivated on 9 May) as a means of hedging against a feared decoupling of alliance ties.
Similarly, in South Korea, there are worries that a transactional Donald Trump may seek to withdraw some of the 28,500 US troops on the peninsula, whether to incentivize the North to reach a deal or simply to minimize US overseas military costs at a time when US public opinion is turning inwards.
All these trends are injecting extra uncertainty into a once stable regional security environment, forcing regional actors to reassess their own national security goals and long-term political alignments. Talking may be the only game in town, but given the complex problems at issue and the inevitably drawn-out future negotiating process, it remains clear that recent first steps, promising as they undoubtedly are, are part of a longer and potentially arduous journey, fraught with risk and unpredictability.
John Nilsson-Wright is a senior research fellow with the Asia-Pacific Programme.
A Nuclear Iran, Manipulated by China and Russia?
Withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal will reduce US influence in the Middle East, in turn enfeebling EU foreign policy and making space for other extra-regional actors to pursue their agendas.
The US’s decision in May 2018 to withdraw from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)14 poses a multitude of risks for non-proliferation and stability in the Middle East. It risks prompting Iran to restart proscribed elements of its nuclear programme. It deprives the US of an opportunity to curtail Iran’s regional ambitions. And, not least, it risks changing the balance of power among extra-regional actors – leaving Russia and China with an opening to deepen their own engagement, and potentially binding Iran into foreign policy dependencies with unknown consequences for regional stability.
Much of the analysis of the US change of position has justifiably centred on the specific risks around Iran’s nuclear programme. President Donald Trump’s long-standing opposition to the JCPOA and eventual decision to withdraw the US from it – with sanctions set to take full effect in November – have damaged the viability of an important non-proliferation agreement. Renewed Iranian work on a nuclear capability is thus in prospect, and a regional arms race more likely again. In short, by casually abandoning the JCPOA, Trump has immediately rendered the region more dangerous in the most literal sense.
But the risks in terms of regional dynamics are equally noteworthy. Three principal factors are at play here. First, Trump’s decision further diminishes the credibility and relevance of the US in the region. It continues a process of disengagement that started with President Barack Obama’s much-discussed ‘pivot’ towards the Asia-Pacific. The pivot was apparent, among other things, in Obama’s cautious approach to the conflict in Syria and failure to intervene over the Assad regime’s use of chemical weapons. Under Trump, diplomacy has been overtaken by an inward-looking ‘America First’ vision that prioritizes US values and interests. Moreover, the US administration’s belief that withdrawal from the JCPOA will weaken Tehran – forcing it to sue for a grand bargain under a new and improved nuclear deal15 – is a pipe dream. Washington has no clear path to success for an upgraded JCPOA, and diminishing political capital with which to pursue such a goal.
Second, the likely collapse of the JCPOA is a major setback for European foreign policy. The signing of the agreement in 2015 was a watershed for the EU, with many policymakers and commentators seeing evidence of the bloc finally becoming an influential international player. Trump has largely undone this progress, exposing the limits of the EU’s powers to either save the nuclear deal or protect Iran (and European companies that deal with Iran) from US sanctions. Iran’s confidence in the EU will suffer. And while Saudi Arabia and the UAE will welcome the demise of the nuclear deal, Gulf Arab states will also have taken note of just how weak Europe has become. European efforts to keep the JCPOA alive will continue, but appear doomed: EU states ultimately place a higher priority on strategic relations with the US than on commercial ones with Iran.
Exit the US (and EU) … enter Russia and China
The third factor is that the absence of US and EU leadership creates a void that others – notably Russia and China – will be only too eager to fill. Indeed both countries have already been positioning themselves to play more prominent roles in the region.
Since the Arab Spring, Russia has sought to demonstrate its dependability as an ally to various Middle East states, and as a force for ‘stability’. Elements of this agenda are expedient for Iran. Russia’s ruthless military support for Bashar al-Assad has helped to reassert control in Syria; Moscow is also driving the related de-escalation process – managing talks with Israel, Turkey, Iran, the US and Assad himself.
China has made clear to the international community that it is preparing to fill any political and diplomatic vacuum left by the US
Although it strongly supports preservation of the JCPOA, Russia stands to gain should the deal collapse. Russian trade with Iran is currently limited – worth about $2 billion annually – but economic relations are developing.16 Consolidation of Russian influence in Tehran could enable Moscow to secure lucrative defence, aviation and energy deals. From Tehran’s perspective, such support offers a means of circumventing Western sanctions and keeping the economy afloat. However, the price is a potential increase in economic and political dependency on Russia, which might amount to a reduction in Iranian military and economic activity in Syria.
China, too, is pursuing economic engagement with Iran as part of its wider strategic thrust into the Middle East. It is positioning itself to step in should US sanctions deter Western investors. For instance, the announcement by French oil firm Total of its intention to pull out of a project in the South Pars gas field, the world’s largest, potentially opens the way for its Chinese partner PetroChina to increase its presence.17 China is also the largest buyer of Iranian crude oil, a role that provides Iran with a measure of insulation from US sanctions and consolidates the bilateral economic relationship.
More broadly, China has made clear to the international community that it is preparing to fill any political and diplomatic vacuum left by the US. Beijing has appointed special envoys to Syria and the Middle East peace process, underlining its determination – like Russia – to ensure ‘stability’ in the region in order to further long-term strategic and economic interests.
Endgame: a reshaped Middle East?
These shifts could reshape geopolitical dynamics in the Middle East, creating uncertainty and risks for Iran and more widely. Declining US interest and focus will mean greater competition among Iran and its neighbours. Unable to rely on the US for security guarantees, authoritarian states throughout the region may be forced into transactional economic and security-based relationships with Moscow and Beijing. Some are likely to welcome this as a short-term opportunity – especially as support is unlikely to be accompanied by conditionality on human rights and democratization.
However, over time such realignments are likely to bring their own pressures. Russia’s adeptness at navigating the divided regional landscape to its benefit is already on display. Its relations with Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar have all strengthened since 2014; Moscow also has bilateral agreements with Turkey, Israel and Syria, as well as with Iran. This complex web of relationships speaks to an overlapping of obligations and dependencies that is likely to create discord – or worse – rather than harmony.
Beyond potentially kick-starting a revived quest for a nuclear capability that will set it against the US, the collapse of the JCPOA may herald a new era in which Iran is bound into relationships of external dependency
For Iran itself, the implications are bleak. Beyond potentially kick-starting a revived quest for a nuclear capability that will set it against the US, the collapse of the JCPOA may herald a new era in which Iran is bound into relationships of external dependency – with China, in the long term, likely to surpass Russia in influence – in order to protect itself and advance its regional interests. These shifts will close down the domestic space for political and economic reform, forcing elite unity as a regime-preservation mechanism. With elections approaching in 2020 and 2021, such pressures could allow hardliners to make a comeback, further institutionalizing policies of regional conflict.
It is ironic that in 1979 Iran’s revolutionary leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, articulated a foreign policy vision around the idea of a non-aligned Iran that was ‘neither East nor West’. The country’s nuclear programme in part reflected this imperative, with the leadership regarding it as an essential defence against US influence and hostile neighbours. Yet nearly 40 years later, it is the action of a US president that has effectively forced Tehran – almost against its will – to relinquish part of its cherished independence and go east.18
Neil Quilliam is a senior research fellow with the Middle East and North Africa Programme (MENAP). Sanam Vakil is an associate fellow with MENAP.
A New Kind of Transatlantic Rift
Proposed EU retaliation against US policies on Iran and trade risks further weakening US commitment – already eroded under Trump – to guaranteeing European security.
Outraged by a series of decisions by the Trump administration that will have an adverse impact on Europe, many leading political figures and commentators are calling for a tough new approach to relations with the US – one that would make use of the EU’s considerable economic power to impose costs on America. But such confrontation would be a huge gamble, and its advocates do not seem to have thought through the implications. Europe has no serious alternative to the US security guarantee. Economic measures against the US – for example, the imposition of retaliatory tariffs on American exports – could further undermine the US commitment to European security.
After the shock of the election of Donald Trump in 2016, Europeans seemed initially to reassure themselves that the ‘adults’ in the administration would prevent him from acting on his worst instincts. Now most of those moderating influences have quit or been fired – and in the past few months Trump has begun to implement the kinds of policies he had always threatened to. The reality is finally dawning in the EU that Trump’s bite may actually be as bad as his bark. European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker recently said that the US was turning on Europe ‘with a ferocity that can only surprise us’ – even though Trump had been telegraphing the policies he is now implementing for years.19
The reality is finally dawning in the EU that Trump’s bite may actually be as bad as his bark
In March, the Trump administration decided to impose a 25 per cent tariff on steel imports and a 10 per cent tariff on aluminium imports. Though the measure targeted China (which the US accuses of dumping steel and aluminium) on national security grounds, the EU failed to secure a permanent exemption from the tariffs. The Trump administration’s subsequent decision in May to abandon the nuclear deal with Iran – and to impose new sanctions that would affect companies that continue to do business in Iran – was the last straw for some Europeans. Writing in the Washington Post, former Swedish foreign minister Carl Bildt called it ‘a massive assault’ on the sovereignty of Europe.20 The German news magazine Der Spiegel even called for Europe to join the ‘resistance’ against Trump.
Specifically, many are now urging the EU to use its economic power against the US. The EU has announced it will impose retaliatory tariffs (or ‘balancing’ tariffs, as the EU calls them) against US imports. The European Commission has drawn up a list of US goods to which the tariffs will apply. The choices target the home states of influential members of the Republican Party – for example, the list includes bourbon whiskey, which is produced mainly in Kentucky, Senate majority leader Mitch McConnell’s state. European leaders seem to think they can fight fire with fire – and perhaps force the Trump administration to back down.
For many Europeans, this is a matter of pride. ‘European sovereignty in foreign affairs can hardly survive passive compliance with the new dictates from the White House,’ Bildt wrote. Some even seem to see the current situation as an opportunity to realize the dream of a more powerful, united Europe that could act as a counterweight to the US. The idea goes back to the Suez crisis in 1956, when the West German chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, is supposed to have told the French prime minister, Guy Mollet: ‘Europe will be your revenge.’21 It animated the thinking behind the development of a common European foreign policy and even the creation of the European single currency, which was meant to challenge the predominance of the dollar.
Those calling for a tougher foreign policy seem almost to have forgotten that their security depends ultimately on the US – in particular on the UK–US nuclear deterrent
However, the sort of tough approach to the US that many in the EU are now advocating would be reckless and short-sighted. The fact that, soon after the US announced it was withdrawing from the nuclear deal, oil firms BP and Total indicated they would pull out of Iran suggests little confidence, for instance, in proposed ‘blocking measures’ to shield European companies from the reach of US sanctions. Europe also has much more to lose from the escalation of a trade war than the US has: the EU is more dependent than the US on external demand as a driver of economic growth and has a large and growing trade surplus with the US. In particular, export-dependent Germany would be what Financial Times columnist Wolfgang Münchau has called the ‘weakest link’ in any confrontation over transatlantic trade.22 The big fear is the imposition of US import tariffs on European cars – which Trump has already threatened in a tweet.23 The US Commerce Department is currently carrying out an investigation into auto imports.
However, there is also an even greater vulnerability for Europe. Those calling for a tougher foreign policy seem almost to have forgotten that their security depends ultimately on the US – in particular on the UK–US nuclear deterrent. Trump has already created radical uncertainty about the security guarantee, and it is this uncertainty that makes the current situation qualitatively different from previous rifts in the transatlantic relationship.24 We also know that Trump is prepared to make linkages between economic and security issues in an unprecedented way. The risk here is that he will respond to EU opposition over policy or to perceived provocation by creating further doubt about whether the US would come to the defence of its European allies in a crisis. With a NATO summit in July 2018 providing a potential focal point for transatlantic differences, it is not difficult to imagine Trump tweeting ‘we’ll see what happens’ in such a situation.
Europeans seem unable to believe that such conditionality linking economic and security policy is possible. In reality, it has always tacitly underpinned the transatlantic relationship – at least, in American strategic calculations. The difference is that Trump has now made this explicit. He has already suggested that an exemption from the new tariffs may depend on whether European members of NATO spend 2 per cent of GDP on defence, as they have committed to. In short, everything is now on the table. Whereas previous US presidents sought to use economic tools to build alliances, Trump seeks to use alliances to win concessions on economic issues.25 In relation to the EU, the US has what in conflict situations is sometimes called ‘escalation dominance’ – that is, it always has more scope to escalate than its opponent has.
If Europeans had a serious alternative to the US security guarantee, calling Trump’s bluff might be a viable strategy. But although EU member states have taken some small steps, since the election of Trump, to further develop a European defence policy, these are based on the assumption that Europe can continue to depend on American military power.26 Given this reality and the difficulty of uniting EU member states around opposition to the US, they could still back down – though it is hard to imagine Europe, and especially Germany, accepting voluntary export restraints as South Korea has done. But if European outrage does translate into action, it risks creating further uncertainty about the US security guarantee – which, since the election of Trump, is already hanging by a thread.
Hans Kundnani is a senior research fellow with the Europe Programme.
Centralization of Power Under Xi Poses New Risks
By inextricably linking China’s ambitions to his leadership, Xi Jinping could imperil decision-making and policy responsiveness at a time when the external context is ever more difficult to navigate.
China’s Xi Jinping seems domestically unassailable. The ‘decision’ in March by the National People’s Congress to remove the presidency’s two-term limit, in place since 1982, signals that Xi is here to stay.27 Centralizing power in this way will be a mixed blessing. Xi has truly cemented his leadership within the party; but he has also exposed himself and the country to wider risks – at a time when China faces colossal challenges, both domestically and in its relations with the rest of the world.
Among the most significant of these risks are around economic growth. Xi benefited from the work of his predecessors, who built up a vast economy. The ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ – covered in depth elsewhere in this publication – is China’s most current and high-profile expression of its economic success and intent. However, maintaining momentum will be a challenge. Domestically, Xi’s administration will need to manage China’s transition from a largely manufacturing-based economy to one more centred on services and consumption. This may entail some slowdown, with a shift in emphasis from high rates of growth to high quality of growth and investment in new sectors. Xi’s political longevity will rest on keeping the all-important middle class in work during this process – this implies the need for GDP growth rates of around 6 per cent annually for the next decade, far from assured in the current economic landscape.28
The Chinese authorities will also need to deal with serious environmental challenges. Pollution and poor air quality are already a blight in many Chinese cities. Attempts are being made to address these issues,29 but failure to deliver more progress could see a ‘bottom-up’ challenge to the dominance of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in state affairs and governance.
For the moment, concentration of power seems to have created an appearance of unity and accelerated decision-making. But therein lies the paradox. Removing presidential limits places immense pressure on Xi and those around him. They will take the blame if things do not go to plan. With decision-making reliant on so few people, there are already signs that lower-level officials are becoming over-cautious. The danger is that the whole system (including the key leaders in the central CPC and government organs) could become hostage to localized agendas, diverting attention from strategic issues.
Beyond domestic concerns, China also has to navigate a more challenging world. By any measure, Xi has been fortunate in leading China at a time when, after decades of struggle, the stars seem aligned in the country’s favour. The outside world, particularly the US, seems consumed by introspection, confusion and lack of direction. Within China, by contrast, members of the expanding middle class, whatever their thoughts on Marxism-Leninism, believe in Xi when he says that the most important task for the country is to reacquire its ‘great nation’ status. This is a powerful, unifying and mobilizing message for a country which, within living memory, has suffered starvation, isolation and widespread poverty. Yet the prospect of greater Chinese influence is precisely what worries its neighbours.
Success in the short to medium term, and possibly even in the long term, turns on China being a deeply interconnected part of the international system rather than an autonomous, separate actor
At the regional level, such concerns have reinvigorated competition to define the Asia-Pacific space. In 2007, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe suggested formalizing multilateral collaboration through the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. He hoped to bring together three of the region’s liberal democracies (India, Australia and Japan) with the US to promote shared security goals. The ‘Indo-Pacific’ identity associated with this dialogue did not materialize into anything concrete at the time, but it is back in vogue. Although a little nebulous, the term seems to recognize the region’s extensive maritime space (linking the Indian and Pacific oceans in a way not fully captured by the designation ‘Asia-Pacific’) and offers a values-led proposition: democracy and the rule of law, respect for sovereignty, open markets, and security and stability in the maritime and land spaces. This represents an open challenge to China’s own conception of its neighbourhood and role within it. Proponents of an Indo-Pacific grouping argue that it is necessary as a bulwark against China.30 However, the concept is still thin – elaboration is needed on what it might mean in practice for relations between these countries and China.
At the broader international level, the increasing unpredictability of the external context poses new challenges. The Trump presidency is upending many of the assumptions about the US’s role in Asia. Bilateral engagement has been superseded by more brittle, transactional contacts. In March 2018, the US imposed steel and aluminium tariffs on China. These and other measures, such as excluding Chinese companies from the US market, are set to increase. Moreover, while China appreciates some aspects of the US security presence in the region, it continues to want more legitimate strategic space. Its building of permanent structures in the South and East China seas has antagonized Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines, and risks reviving deep-seated antipathies. The greatest risk is that Trump’s adventurism will extend to foreign policy on Taiwan, forcing Beijing to act. For China, no matter what the consequences, asserting its claim over Taiwan is an essential issue of national pride.
Geopolitical agendas aside, China’s technology and innovation deficit means a need for collaborative external relations, notably with the EU and above all the US. A deterioration of these complex relations could have an immensely negative impact, as China needs open markets and the ability to import goods and services to support economic growth and development. Success in the short to medium term, and possibly even in the long term, turns on China being a deeply interconnected part of the international system rather than an autonomous, separate actor.
The assumption in the past four decades has been that China’s greatest challenges were internal. But, as with so much, Xi’s China is a different place to what has existed before. Even as China seeks to deepen and extend its foreign policy engagement, it will not be able to control all the pieces. At both regional and global levels, China will need to display greater dexterity as its role in the international community increases. It is striking that China’s rise in political and economic influence has occurred as a highly centralized and authoritarian state. This is completely against the grain of international consensus, which sees democratic norms and traditions as the best way to maximize political and economic strength. However, as China seeks a bigger footprint and greater influence in the world, the world will expect more openness and internal transparency from China.
The test will be whether China can continue to grow and meet the needs of its population, while opening up its political system and being a constructive actor in efforts to address international challenges. The signals, so far, are mixed. In some areas – such as internet governance, climate change, peacekeeping – China is playing a greater role and seeks to work with others. However, the domestic sphere remains largely unreformed, with restrictions on freedom of expression and suppression of other human rights still prevalent.31 An inability to address these issues will make it difficult to build trust with allies and collaborators.
It is clear that China is facing extremely complex challenges that require high-quality engagement with international actors and strategic policymaking. President Xi has already proved himself extremely decisive, with a strong vision for the country. It is an open question now whether the centralization of power will provide the quality of policy and engagement that China will desperately need in order to be effective in a rapidly changing world.
Champa Patel is head of the Asia-Pacific Programme. Kerry Brown is an associate fellow with the Asia-Pacific Programme.
Stagnation in Russia is Raising Geopolitical Risks
Putin’s failure to improve growth prospects makes further tensions with the West more likely, while the policy reforms needed to revitalize Russia’s economy are nowhere in sight.
Economic stagnation in Russia is contributing to geopolitical risk by encouraging – and, to an extent, dictating – the Kremlin’s pursuit of a belligerent foreign policy. As the deep reforms needed for Russia to achieve sustainably higher growth are unpalatable domestically, President Vladimir Putin has instead adopted the time-honoured diversionary tactic of stoking nationalism and emphasizing external threats. This does nothing for the economy, and makes further geopolitical entanglements likely.
On any reckoning, the Russian economy is underperforming. Real GDP growth was just 1.5 per cent in 2017, according to the preliminary official estimate, and little improvement on this anaemic rate of expansion is in prospect.32 The IMF forecasts growth of around 1.5 per cent annually into the 2020s.33 Commentators may argue over definitions, but this amounts to ‘stagnation with a plus sign’.
Nor is this a sudden problem. Since 2008, through two recessions and some years of modest growth, GDP has increased at an average annual rate of just 0.7 per cent.34 Russia’s share of world output has declined since 2012. With output per worker about one-half of that in Germany, the economy has the potential for rapid expansion that could help it catch up with the developed West.35 But for reasons outlined below, the potential remains unrealized. Meanwhile, the country’s prospective growth is probably not enough to deliver perceptible gains in public welfare.
These economic vulnerabilities carry geopolitical risks for the NATO countries and Nordic neutrals. The Putin leadership no longer presents itself to Russian citizens as the bringer of rapidly increasing material wealth. The record no longer permits it to do so. Instead, the leadership positions itself as the defender of a beleaguered national fortress, ready to do battle with the nation’s enemies. In support of this narrative, Moscow demonstrates its strength by displays of military force and by the deployment of cyber and other means of undermining trust and cohesion in Western societies.
The annexation of Crimea, the support for separatists in Ukraine’s Donbas, the intervention in Syria and the conduct of military exercises on Russia’s western border are all examples of military muscle-flexing. Each has its own rationale: the protection of Russian-speaking minorities, the support of an ally, the need to test new equipment and new formations. At the same time, all send a message to the Russian people: Russia is great again, and needs to be, to defend its people; hardship on the home front is something that has to be put up with in a besieged fortress. Cyberattacks, whether on Estonia in 2007, on Ukraine in 2017 or on other targets at other times, have been a different form of display: look, we can assert ourselves in sophisticated ways, humiliating our foes, and we can do it deniably.
Is the link between external aggression and domestic support likely to be durable? That depends in part on whether the rally-round-the-flag message continues to convince
The leadership has so far accepted a certain level of economic damage from sanctions in the pursuit of its geopolitical ambitions. This makes sense because it is understood, at least by the technocrats and probably by Putin himself, that Russia’s main economic problems are home-grown – but the West and its sanctions are a handy scapegoat. It is conceivable that there is some level of externally inflicted economic pain that would force a rethink of the country’s external policies, perhaps a cutting off of Russia from the SWIFT financial transactions system. But the resilience of the Russian people and Putin’s need to avoid any semblance of ‘defeat’ make this doubtful. Moreover, SWIFT is not controlled by the US; and though the US is immensely powerful in its dealings with its allies, it might well not be able to carry them with it in much further ratcheting up of economic warfare.
Is the link between external aggression and domestic support likely to be durable? That depends in part on whether the rally-round-the-flag message continues to convince. It also depends on how long the Russian economy will suffer from stagnation.
On neither front can the leadership feel entirely confident. The immediate causes of weak growth are that labour and capital inputs have been stagnating or worse. Employment in recent years has been approximately flat36 – the result of demographic trends that will not be reversed until the late 2020s. At the same time, an injection of private investment that could stimulate growth and improve productivity has not materialized. In 2012 Putin called for labour productivity to rise by 5 per cent a year in 2011–18, yet the outcome was an average of less than 1 per cent.37 Fixed investment in 2017 was 8 per cent down on 2012,38 despite major public works projects.
That private capital is staying on the sidelines is unsurprising, given the encroachment of the state. The public sector’s share of the economy was just under 40 per cent in 2006, but by 2016 it had risen to 46 per cent.39 The hand of the state is visible in other ways, too. Charging entrepreneurs with ‘economic crimes’, a standard way in which officials collude with the victims’ business rivals to seize control of companies, has been on the increase. Such asset-grabbing is built into the Putinist social system. Business confidence will not readily return.
Should these and other deficiencies prolong stagnation, it would not augur well for tensions between Russia and the West. To keep up the rally-round-the-flag atmosphere at home, Moscow would need to continue acting provocatively abroad. This would not mean deliberately starting a war, which would be in nobody’s interest. But it would mean some mixture of cyberattacks, propaganda and other forms of self-assertion that – as Mathieu Boulègue argues elsewhere in this publication – increase the risk of unintended conflict.
Meanwhile, stagnation carries domestic risks for Russia. Another six years of sluggish growth, up to the end of Putin’s new presidential term, would entail more unkept pledges: on poverty reduction, increased pensions and increased real wages. That would test support for the regime, especially if the popular appeal of the ‘besieged fortress’ message were to fade. In 2024 there has to be either a successor to Putin as president or a smart piece of constitutional engineering to keep him in power. Either way, that will require a difficult political manoeuvre. It will be all the more difficult if by then public attitudes have begun to resemble those of the Soviet population in the late Brezhnev era: cynical and apathetic.
Radical reform could revive the economy, but it too has its risks. The strengthening of the rule of law, in particular, would help restore economic dynamism. But it would do so only over a period of several years, and in the meantime could be a source of conflict within the elite, aligning those officials who benefit from weak property rights against reformers.
For that reason, reform is unlikely and stagnation is likely to continue, with risks both for the wider world and for Russia itself. A sustained further increase in the oil price would alleviate the problems associated with stagnation, but would not resolve them.
Flatlining: Russian GDP growth, actual and forecast
— Source: IMF (2018), World Economic Outlook Database, April 2018 http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2018/01/weodata/index.aspx.
Flatlining: Russian GDP growth, actual and forecast
Philip Hanson is an associate fellow with the Russia and Eurasia Programme.
Preventing ‘Signal Failure’ Between Russia and NATO
The risk of military or political miscalculation leading to conflict is rising, as Russia continues to seek to destabilize the West through non-military means and a bolder force posture, and as the line between peacetime and wartime activities blurs.
One of the more worrying aspects of the increasingly strained relations between Russia and NATO is the risk of one side miscalculating the other’s intentions. Russia’s more assertive foreign policy agenda, its evolving capabilities and the nature of the methods it now employs against the West increase the risk of such miscalculation, and thus of policy and tactical errors. Unless multiple stakeholders take concerted steps to address this risk, there is a higher likelihood that an unforeseen incident could spark disastrous military escalation and lead to war between Russia and NATO allies.40
The type and degree of miscalculation of course matter. One way of looking at this is to distinguish between ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ miscalculations. The former consists of errors in day-to-day political relations, communication, and interpretation of the other side’s military doctrine and security perceptions. ‘Hard miscalculation’ is likely to occur around military-to-military relations, threat-reduction arrangements and deterrence activities.
The reasons for this heightened risk are manifold. The first relates to the increased incidence of Russian brinksmanship – such as jets routinely buzzing NATO surface vessels on the Black Sea and Baltic Sea, provocative air manoeuvring over Syria,41 and an assertive force posture and military exercises in the European shared neighbourhood. Should any such activity trigger accidents, it will test the limits of both Russian and NATO restraint in averting tit-for-tat reaction and military escalation.
The second, related reason is the evolution of Russia’s methods of destabilization. In what Russian military planners call an ‘initial period of war’,42 Moscow uses a well-established toolbox of destabilization methods43 in the pursuit of full-spectrum warfare. Full-spectrum warfare represents a continuum from what are termed ‘non-military, sub-threshold activities’44 through to ‘cross-domain military probing’45 – for instance, cyberwarfare – all the way up to full-scale nuclear conflict. In addition to nuclear and conventional forces, Russia’s threat to the West thus encompasses an ever-more-comprehensive array of non-military activity such as soft power engagement, coercive diplomacy and sophisticated information warfare.46 The dangerous effect of all this has been to blur the line between peacetime and wartime activities.
A key aspect of the approach is to probe and provoke adversaries, but not enough to cause military escalation that exceeds the Kremlin’s tolerances. Russia is increasingly testing NATO resolve over commitments to collective defence, specifically in respect of arms control.47 More often than not, Russian destabilization efforts fall beneath NATO’s calibrated ‘pain threshold’ for military response. However, there is no guarantee that this will remain the case, and the potential for unintended escalation is all too clear.
The third factor behind the rising risk of miscalculation in the Russia–NATO relationship concerns Moscow’s geopolitical preoccupations. Russia claims that NATO is conducting a strategy of encirclement and interprets this as a fundamental threat to its interests, which are based on preserving a ‘sphere of influence’ against the expansion of NATO capabilities in the European shared neighbourhood. The same narrative is fuelling a ‘besieged fortress’ mentality among Russian decision-makers. While Russia has been nursing the same grievances against the West since the 1990s, what has changed in recent years is the Kremlin’s ability to assert itself and make its intentions a reality. Russia’s agenda, in this context, is to damage the post-Cold War security architecture in order to affirm its own security and foreign policy agenda in Europe and beyond. This is further increasing the risk of miscalculation as heightened tension becomes the ‘new normal’ in the relationship between Russia and NATO.
Russia’s agenda is to damage the post-Cold War security architecture in order to affirm its own security and foreign policy
agenda in Europe and beyond
Finally, the risk of miscalculation is compounded by the inadequacy of existing threat-reduction arrangements and confidence-building mechanisms. Protocols such as the NATO–Russia agreement on preventing Dangerous Military Activities (DMAs) and the OSCE Vienna Document of 2011 are ambiguous in their wording and application, and can seldom be invoked in times of escalation. For the Kremlin, such arrangements only offer a Western-based approach that does not take Russia’s proclaimed ‘legitimate security concerns’ into consideration. The current Russian leadership has a clear incentive to continue on its path of military assertiveness and its pattern of sub-threshold destabilization, such as the nerve agent attack on Sergei Skripal and his daughter in Salisbury on 4 March 2018.
In light of Russia’s aggressive behaviour, Western deterrence is paramount. Russia should not be led to believe that it has superiority across certain operational domains of war, such as cyberwarfare or air defence capabilities. This will require coherence and unity among NATO allies.
Risk reduction in deterring Russia is equally important, and should be carried out in a calibrated way while not provoking the Kremlin into confrontation. Channels of communication need to remain open, especially back channels and Track 2 dialogue. This has to be done without offering undue concessions or sacrificing Western values to accommodate the Kremlin. Further down the road, technical arrangements for escalation management will be crucial, especially if Russia seeks to secure military advantages in the shared neighbourhood and beyond, or explicitly uses provocative rhetoric around nuclear deterrence.
Keeping in mind Russia’s ever-more-multifaceted belligerence, the likely scope for improving the Russia–NATO relationship is limited. The relationship is likely to remain in ‘damage control mode’ for the foreseeable future, and the risk of miscalculation is likely to increase.
Mathieu Boulègue is a research fellow with the Russia and Eurasia Programme.
‘Internationalist’ Isolation – Brexit’s Paradox for UK Foreign Policy
Brexiteers’ aim of using independence from the EU as the basis for a sort of swashbuckling globalism seems likely to have the opposite effect – leaving the UK less influential.
‘Out, and into the world.’ This was how the Spectator magazine pitched its support for the Leave campaign in 2016, echoing a slogan from the 1975 referendum on the same issue. For some supporters Brexit, though frequently portrayed as an inward-looking revolt, would in fact allow the UK to reconnect with old partners and embrace new opportunities.
This aspiration stands mired in the challenges of withdrawal from the EU. The risk is that Britain, rather than becoming a more nimble and effective power, sees its influence diminish. The extent to which this happens will depend on several factors: whether Britain can agree an orderly exit and smooth transition; whether it can maintain its constitutional integrity and minimize economic dislocation; whether it can build a new partnership with the EU and key member states that maintains practical security and foreign policy cooperation; and whether it is willing to invest the resources or develop the vision needed to remould its foreign policy for life outside the bloc.
The risk is that Britain, rather than becoming a more nimble and effective power, sees its influence diminish
Such a vision could take a variety of forms – indeed, there are pronounced differences between the leaders of Britain’s two main parties on many foreign policy fundamentals. But at present, the signs point not to reimagined internationalism but to the likelihood that Britain will become more insular and distracted. Brexit is a national project of political change that is consuming the majority of the time, energy and political capital of the government and civil service. Uncertainty still surrounds many aspects of this process. The government has already created two new departments; one estimate suggests that by March 2019 it will spend more than £2 billion on preparations for leaving the EU.48 Brexit absorbs policy bandwidth, leaving less room for a broader foreign policy agenda or for addressing the domestic issues – healthcare, education, infrastructure, productivity, technological transformation – that will shape prosperity in the coming decades.
Moreover, the worries about the UK’s capacity and international leadership predate Brexit.49 Resources at the Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO) have been cut consistently in recent years – with its budget declining by 21.6 per cent in real terms between 2010 and 2015.50 As a result, its efforts have been subsidized by the UK’s development budget, meaning the FCO’s activities have become skewed towards countries where its expenditure qualifies as development spending.51 The FCO has 4,500 UK diplomatic staff – comparable in numbers to the council of a London borough – and a budget equivalent to less than 0.1 per cent of GDP with which to pursue an amorphous and loosely defined ‘global Britain’ strategy. Atrophy is also evident when it comes to defence. Public spending on defence fell by almost a fifth between 2010 and 2015.52 While spending has stabilized since then, the pressure on capabilities remains intense. Investment in defence and diplomacy is still only a means to an end, but reduced resources undermine the foundations for foreign policy choices in future.
These trends have implications for the free-trade ambitions to which many hopes have been pinned. For some Brexit advocates, an independent trade policy is the greatest potential prize to be gained from leaving the EU. However, too much faith has been placed in the capacity of a new trade policy to transform Britain’s economic fortunes, and there are several reasons to be deeply sceptical of its likely effectiveness. First, once the UK is outside the single market and customs union, trade with the EU will inevitably be subject to higher costs and barriers. Prospects for increased trade with non-EU countries are clouded, moreover, by unresolved questions over access to markets with which the EU already has existing trading agreements. The clear risk – and indeed the widespread expectation among economists – is that any growth in trade outside Europe will not make up for the loss of trade with the EU.
Second, just as importantly, the multilateral trade architecture is itself under threat, with the US under Donald Trump retreating from free trade. Britain needs greater realism about what an independent seat at the World Trade Organization can achieve in such circumstances. It is unrealistic to expect the UK to quickly sign bilateral trade deals with multiple other partners – particularly while its long-term trade relationship with the EU remains unresolved, and given the government’s limited experience of and capacity for negotiation. In any event, the most obvious short-term targets for bilateral trade and investment deals, such as Australia and New Zealand, are unlikely to make much difference to overall trade volumes.
Too much faith has been placed in the capacity of a new trade policy to transform Britain’s economic fortunes, and there are several reasons to be deeply sceptical of its likely effectiveness
Finally, the domestic politics of trade are likely to become more contested. Efforts to liberalize trade in ways that compromise standards (such as on food and agriculture), or that open currently protected markets (such as the National Health Service), would likely be the subject of intense political fighting, putting the brakes on ambitions for deregulation. Similarly, the UK may face domestic resistance if perceived economic necessity leads a government to make concessions with unsavoury regimes in return for trade deals and export contracts.
The wider picture
At a minimum, Brexit will mean a loss of influence over the direction of EU policy in areas that will continue to matter to Britain: not just the EU’s common foreign and defence policies, but also areas such as energy, climate policy and financial regulation. These are issues that transcend national boundaries, and on which the EU is often a driver of global standards. Britain will work to maintain key bilateral relationships, with France and Germany in particular. But the overlapping interests, bargaining and habitual institutional cooperation that are essential elements of EU membership will evaporate, surely resulting in such relationships being downgraded. The damage – both economic and diplomatic – will be amplified if Brexit is chaotic rather than managed.
The broader international context adds to the risks of leaving the EU. Brexit threatens to unbalance Britain just as the international environment is becoming more malign. For more than 40 years, the country’s foreign policy has been built upon an active role in an integrating Europe, and on a close relationship with a US committed to and invested in Europe’s security. Britain has chosen to leave the EU, while the US under President Trump is increasingly leaving its allies behind. The result is that the fabric of the transatlantic relationship is being unpicked. Britain has never had to confront the reality of a US government not only with which it disagrees, but whose worldview is fundamentally different. The risk is not so much a conscious uncoupling of the special relationship, but that Britain will be forced to respond repeatedly to a US in active opposition to its foreign policy goals. All this is amid a wider global rebalancing of economic and political power that makes Britain’s privileged position in international structures look even more of an anachronism.
Over the longer term, Brexit could yet spark a useful reassessment of the UK’s international role. It could lead the country to revisit assumptions that have guided its foreign policy for a generation. It could close the gap between government rhetoric and reality, leading to foreign and domestic policies that are more coherent and self-reinforcing. It could focus Britain on making globalization work for all its citizens. And, conceivably, Brexit could end up rendering the UK a more flexible and adaptable power. But at present, the opposite seems more likely: a distracted and insular UK becomes less relevant and influential, adrift from Europe, at loggerheads with the US, domestically divided, unsure what it wants, and unwilling or unable to invest in the tools of effective diplomacy.
Thomas Raines is a research fellow with, and the programme manager of, the Europe Programme.
Subcontracting the State
The rise of armed groups – nominally government-affiliated but effectively autonomous – in Libya, Syria and Iraq is undermining state-building and stabilization, and likely to perpetuate conflict.
The conflicts in Libya, Syria and Iraq involve a wide array of armed groups competing for power, and representing a myriad of agendas. Some of these groups are recognized by state authorities yet retain their own command structures, making them hybrid entities that blur the line between the ‘state’ and the ‘non-state’. Weak governments in Libya, Syria and Iraq see these actors as necessary components of the security sector. Indeed, at times such groups work with, or partially substitute for, the state. But they are also a source of systemic insecurity, and are accumulating political and economic interests. This will inhibit state-building and stabilization.
The enduring presence of autonomous militias is impeding the ability of the state to exercise authority in all three countries. These groups are incentivized by the dynamics of conflict to perpetuate themselves and secure their positions in the state architecture. As a result, they do not necessarily accept the authority of the official entities they ostensibly serve. With access to heavy military equipment outside the state security apparatus, they engage at times in direct military confrontation with state or other non-state or hybrid actors.
Benefiting from state affiliation and access to resources, the region’s hybrid actors pursue financial gains and perpetuate war economies that are becoming almost ubiquitous
In Iraq, for example, the Kurdistan Region’s Peshmerga, recognized by the 2005 constitution, compete at times for territory against Shia paramilitary groups under the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU), also legally recognized by a November 2016 law passed by the Iraqi parliament.53 In Libya, most armed groups are affiliated to the state (indeed, their members continue to receive public-sector salaries), despite often being in antagonistic relationships with one another.54 In Syria, groups such as the National Defence Forces (NDF) sometimes have the upper hand over the regime military, with the latter at times requiring permission from the former to enter areas under NDF control.
Benefiting from state affiliation and access to resources, the region’s hybrid actors pursue financial gains and perpetuate war economies that are becoming almost ubiquitous. In Libya, governance dysfunction and security fragmentation have increasingly pushed economic activity into the informal sector. In this environment, networks of militias, corrupt businessmen and politicians profiteer by smuggling fuel or people, diverting state resources and running protection markets.55 Many groups do so under the pretext of generating revenues to provide services, such as local security. Similarly, in Iraq, hybrid groups and affiliated political actors perpetuate the war economy by smuggling goods, including oil and gas.56 Their access to arms allows them to coerce business elites and tribes. In Syria, the rise of pro-regime armed groups is supporting a new class of warlords and elite political and economic players who are making increasing demands from the state. Official resources are coming under strain as the government scrambles to accommodate the economic interests both of its foreign patrons – Russia and Iran – and of domestic actors.57
Governments from Baghdad to Tripoli have been unable to cope with the proliferation of armed groups in increasingly competitive security markets. It has become common for communities, politicians and political parties to employ their own militias. In Iraq, Kurdish leaders rely on their Peshmerga, Shia leaders rely on the PMU, and Sunni leaders rely on tribal forces. In Libya, the UN-backed Government of National Accord needs Tripolitanian militias to guarantee its presence in the capital but has limited control over them.58 In Syria, Russia has led attempts, through the creation of the Fifth Assault Corps, to exert governmental authority over Iran-backed volunteer militias. However, the long-term prospects for achieving control appear dim.
Hybrid armed groups in Libya, Syria and Iraq
|
Group |
Country |
Description |
|---|---|---|
|
Libyan National Army (LNA) |
Libya |
The LNA is fragmented and its chain of command is disputed. Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar commands LNA forces in the east of the country, although his coalition includes a wide range of other militias that operate under the LNA banner. |
|
Tripoli-based militias |
Libya |
Four principal militias control the capital: the Tripoli Revolutionaries Brigade, the Nawasi Brigade, the Special Deterrence Forces, and the Abu Salim Unit. Each is part of the state security apparatus yet pursues its own interests. The relationships between the groups can be unstable. The UN-backed Government of National Accord relies on these groups to maintain its presence in the capital. |
|
National Defence Forces (NDF) |
Syria |
A government-affiliated auxiliary militia supported by Iran, the NDF started as a group of individuals who took part in intimidating anti-government protesters in 2011, and whom the opposition referred to as shabeeha (‘thugs’). |
|
Local Defence Forces (LDF) |
Syria |
These Iran-supported, government-affiliated militias, composed of local residents, operate in their original geographic areas rather than nationally. Unlike their NDF counterparts, LDF members are registered with the Syrian Arab Army. |
|
Counter-Terrorism Service |
Iraq |
This special force under the Iraqi Special Operations Forces has an autonomous position under the National Security Council, which is accountable to the Prime Minister’s Office. |
|
Peshmerga |
Iraq |
The Peshmerga are recognized by the 2005 Iraqi constitution. |
|
Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) |
Iraq |
This umbrella organization of some 50 paramilitary groups includes predominantly Shia fighters, but also a small number of Sunni, Turkmen, Shabak, Yezidi and Christian fighters. It is recognized by an Iraqi law passed in November 2016 as an independent armed force accountable to the prime minister. |
|
Sunni tribal forces |
Iraq |
These local militias at times receive funding from the government or the PMU to support the fight against salafi-jihadist groups linked to ISIS. |
In each country, the next year will provide important indications over the extent to which the state can restore its authority. In Iraq, following the military defeat of ISIS, the government is likely to struggle to establish complete command and control over the PMU. In Libya, talks on reunifying the national army risk sparking military escalation between groups included and those excluded. In Syria, government-aligned armed groups are forming a parallel structure to the state.59 And while Iran supports a model that keeps state institutions weak, thereby increasing its influence in the country, Russia is unlikely to tolerate this in the long term. Instead, it will favour sustaining strong institutions under Russian oversight. This carries the potential for increased tension between pro-regime armed actors on the ground.
In each of these cases, it is difficult to foresee centralized command and control over hybrid actors being established. The result is likely to be fragmented and unstable security environments. The weakness of traditional armed forces and the rise of hybrid security actors risk prolonging or aggravating the fragmentation of the state, which will thus be forced to accommodate rival interests in any post-conflict settlement or stabilization programme. Hybrid security actors are thus likely to be an enduring feature within the region’s political, security and economic landscape – presenting a challenge to Western policymakers’ conceptions of which groups should be considered legitimate actors, and complicating assessments of the trade-offs involved in engaging with them in any conflict settlement.
Lina Khatib is the head of the Middle East and North Africa Programme (MENAP). Tim Eaton and Renad Mansour are research fellows with MENAP.
Fighting Fire with Fire
Artificial intelligence promises better tools for combating cyberthreats, with approaches that incorporate human feedback into adaptive systems showing particular promise.
The emerging debate – both in public and expert circles – on the future of cybercrime is mostly cautionary in tone. Amid an abundance of concerns about the scale and complexity of the threat, and of the challenges of addressing it, a number of factors stand out. These include a growing shortage of cybersecurity professionals;60 the increasing sophistication, availability and affordability of malicious software tools; and the risks associated with the growth of the Internet of Things, expected to result in 20 billion vulnerable connected devices being in use by 2020.61
Yet while multiplying cyberthreats and our growing dependence on technology make networked systems more vulnerable in some respects, technology also offers an opportunity to build resilience. Developments in artificial intelligence (AI)62 and its subset, machine learning (ML),63 offer particular encouragement on this front.
While multiplying cyberthreats and our growing dependence on technology make networked systems more vulnerable in some respects, technology also offers an opportunity to build resilience
AI and ML are being increasingly recognized as crucial for cybersecurity. First and foremost, this is because of their potential to overcome the inherent limitations of traditional cybersecurity software, which has to be programmed to recognize specific types of malware or particular activities that may expose vulnerabilities. When new threats or vulnerabilities arise, a program has to be rewritten to respond to them. In comparison, AI systems are smart, proactive and potentially limitless in their ability to adapt to the evolution of cybercrime tools and threats.
Beyond these fundamentals, key challenges for protecting networked systems include the continuous proliferation and variety of security threats; the overwhelming amounts of data that need to be analysed to identify, evaluate and respond to potential cyberattacks; and the abundance of false positives that are generated in this process.64 AI can help in this by acting independently and autonomously, assisting human analysts in processing huge volumes of data so that incident response time can be shortened, the accuracy of cybersecurity alerts enhanced, and developments in the threat landscape tracked.65
As well as using AI to address software vulnerabilities, some IT security firms have harnessed its power to identify threats at the human and hardware levels. By building up a cyber ‘pattern of life’ for an organization, AI can detect activity that is nominally authorized but anomalous. Potentially, this could be used to reduce organizations’ vulnerability to insider threats or negligence. This is significant in that the human element is typically one of the weak points in any cybersecurity approach.
Largely automated AI- and ML-based solutions are likely to be cornerstones of IT security frameworks in the future. A recent survey of 9,500 business and technology executives in 122 countries found that 27 per cent planned to invest in cybersecurity safeguards that use AI and ML in 2018.66
Despite the expected growth in such solutions, cybersecurity will still have to interact with and complement the work of people. The signs are that this can become a two-way process, with AI and ML helping cybersecurity professionals to do their jobs more efficiently, and human operatives feeding their own insights into AI and ML systems to help the technology improve its capabilities. An MIT research project67 showed how AI with input from human experts, referred to as ‘analyst intuition’, was able to predict 85 per cent of cyberattacks – roughly three times the normal success rate – and considerably reduce the number of false positives. In effect, human feedback ‘teaches’ the intelligent system, thus improving its accuracy and in turn helping it to teach itself better. As a result, the system becomes progressively smarter. That said, as an evolving technology, AI-based cybersecurity will require continuous investment of resources to remain effective.
Largely automated AI- and ML-based solutions are likely to be cornerstones of IT security frameworks in the future
The flipside to the rise of AI is that more intelligent and autonomous systems will make cybersecurity threats more potent. AI could expand existing threats, introduce new ones and even change the character of certain threats.68 AI cybersecurity systems will have to respond to these challenges. We can thus expect a variation on the traditional ‘arms race’ between cybercriminals and cybersecurity professionals, extended into the world of AI. Predictions for 2018 claim that AI will make both cyberattacks and cyberdefence more powerful.69
Despite the concerns about more potent threats, some experts believe that the nature of AI – specifically, its applicability to ‘big data’ – is more suited to defensive operations rather than offensive ones.70 As things stand, those trying to use AI to boost cybersecurity seem to have the edge over those seeking to use such technology in the pursuit of criminal endeavours or other assaults on the integrity of networked systems.71 This might change. Nonetheless, the tireless nature of the machine, combined with the cognitive power of the human mind, presents a real opportunity for building better defences against growing and more sophisticated cyberthreats.72
Joyce Hakmeh is Cyber Research Fellow with the International Security Department and co-editor of the Journal of Cyber Policy.
Contagion-proofing for Cities
As cities become more vulnerable to biological threats, the need for robust emergency planning is increasing. Can experience from Lagos offer lessons for other cities?
Rapid and unplanned urbanization is increasing the risk of a major biological incident and affecting the ability of authorities to respond effectively, particularly in the developing world. In 1960, for example, only 15 per cent of people on the African continent lived in cities, but by 2010 the share had risen to 40 per cent.74 Control of infectious diseases when they spread to cities is complicated by high population density, the mobility of populations (e.g. through daily commutes),75 and the abundance of transit connections with other urban areas and countries. Despite these concerns, recent field experience offers some useful indications of how cities could improve preparedness and emergency planning frameworks.
Cities that are able to perform their ordinary functions even when under stress are more likely to be resilient to biological threats
The need for resilience to biological threats – whether disease outbreaks or the malicious use of infectious agents by non-state actors – is of concern both because of the serious health implications for local populations and because of the potential role cities play in amplifying the risks. Infectious diseases can spread at exponential rates within and from cities – as was illustrated by the case of the late Patrick Sawyer, Nigeria’s first reported patient during the Ebola virus outbreak in 2014. It was calculated that, after Sawyer flew from Liberia to Lagos and collapsed in the airport, he generated 898 possible contacts (both primary and secondary) with other people.76
Several of the risk factors that determine vulnerability to biological incidents are associated with aspects of uncontrolled urbanization. These include the spread of informal settlements and slums, poverty, energy insecurity, and challenges around food and water security – vulnerabilities in each of these areas have potentially cascading effects on biological safety and security.77
Assessing risks and learning lessons
How likely is it that city-level failure to prevent the spread of infectious agents will result in a national or international disaster? A key determining factor is the level of resilience in individual cities. Cities that are able to perform their ordinary functions even when under stress are more likely to be resilient to biological threats.78 Often this means having substantial resources (both human and financial capital) and adequate disaster preparedness (such as trained emergency personnel).
The nature and scope of response mechanisms are also important. Urban preparedness to mitigate biological threats involves more than just a ‘health-based approach’ (such as ensuring adequate healthcare facilities). It requires a broader vision: rethinking city planning and infrastructure, coordination and communication among local stakeholders, and robust implementation of security measures such as screening people and restricting travel, while ensuring that affected communities are not deprived of their social and human rights.79
It is vital that cities work with anthropologists and other experts so that emergency planning frameworks can be developed that are medically effective while respecting local traditions
The experience of Lagos, Nigeria’s largest city, in responding to the 2014 Ebola outbreak offers some lessons in good practice. First, prior to the outbreak, the Nigerian Centers for Disease Control and Prevention had established training courses for medical epidemiology experts, public health laboratory staff, and veterinary epidemiology experts on disease surveillance, detection and tracing.80 Second, the municipal authorities were able to mobilize resources quickly, using the Lagos Emergency Operations Center’s experience in tackling endemic polio outbreaks; they successfully adapted their existing polio programme to the Ebola crisis.81 A third factor was the involvement of the private sector.82 The Aliko Dangote Foundation, a local philanthropic organization, provided financing for an emergency operations centre, sponsored training for health personnel and paid salaries for the centre’s staff for six months.83 At the same time, the Ebola Private Sector Mobilisation Group, a coalition of nearly 50 companies with assets and interests in West Africa, supported affected areas by donating emergency and sterilization equipment.84 Fourth, national and international bodies such as the World Health Organization and Médecins Sans Frontières engaged directly with local authorities and communities, including slums. Community leaders played a significant role in raising public awareness and providing education about the virus. Finally, Lagos had its own financial resources, and thus did not rely on federal funding and support for initiating response at the beginning of the outbreak.85
The extent to which these lessons can be applied in other cities around the world will vary. Success in reducing vulnerabilities will depend on a number of factors, including future decisions in urban design and the effectiveness of efforts to tailor emergency planning to cities’ diverse circumstances. The development of local strategies is particularly important. Whereas some cities, such as London or New York, have city-level plans for responding to both general emergencies (e.g. natural disasters) and specific emergencies (e.g. pandemic influenza outbreaks),86 this is seldom the case in cities in developing countries. Many lack adequate city-specific plans, instead relying on national emergency action plans. Yet a one-size-fits-all approach is not helpful in mitigating biological threats, given differences in the composition of cities’ populations and in cultural rituals (for instance, over funerals and burials). Following local customs and the advice of community leaders can sometimes seem more important for city residents than observing medical advice. This can increase the risk of disease spreading.
To support or improve resilience in such instances, it is vital that cities work with anthropologists and other experts so that emergency planning frameworks can be developed that are medically effective while respecting local traditions. The International Security Department and the Centre on Global Health Security at Chatham House, together with Sandia National Laboratories, are working with cities in Africa to create different frameworks with local stakeholders to ensure city preparedness and readiness. Understanding what type of emergency planning framework is needed in each particular city, and working on creating such a framework with local stakeholders, will be essential for ensuring preparedness and readiness.87
Beyza Unal is a senior research fellow with the International Security Department.
1Wickett, X. (2018), Transatlantic Relations: Converging or Diverging?, Chatham House Report, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/transatlantic-relations-converging-or-diverging.
2 Lind, J. (2018), ‘Life in China’s Asia: What Regional Hegemony Would Look Like’, Foreign Affairs, March/April 2018, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-02-13/life-chinas-as….
3 The Economist (2018), ‘Democracy continues its disturbing retreat’, 31 January 2018, https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2018/01/31/democracy-continues…-
disturbing-retreat.
disturbing-retreat.
4 Doherty, C. (2017), ‘Key takeaways on Americans’ growing partisan divide over political values’, Pew Research Center, 5 October 2017, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/10/05/takeaways-on-americans-growing-partisan-divide-over-political-values/.
5 Kochhar, R. and Cilluffo, A. (2017), ‘How wealth inequality has changed in the U.S. since the Great Recession, by race, ethnicity and income’, Pew Research Center, 1 November 2017, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/11/01/how-wealth-inequality-h….
6 Potok, M. (2017), ‘The Year in Hate and Extremism’, Southern Poverty Law Center, 15 February 2017, https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/intelligence-report/2017/year-hate-and-extremism.
7 Pew Research Center (2017), ‘Political Typology Reveals Deep Fissures on the Right and Left’, 24 October 2017, http://www.people-press.org/2017/10/24/1-partisanship-and-political-engagement/.
8 The NPT came into force in 1970.
9 Cerniello, C. (1999), ‘Senate Rejects Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; Clinton Vows to Continue Moratorium’, Arms Control Today, Vol. 29, September/October 1999, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/1999_09-10/ctbso99.
10 Bendix, A. (2018), ‘122 Nations Approve ‘Historic’ Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons’, The Atlantic, 8 July 2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/news/archive/2017/07/122-nations-approve-hi….
11 Associated Press (2018), ‘Hawaii worker who sent missile alert was ‘100% sure’ attack was real’, Guardian, 3 February 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/feb/03/hawaii-worker-sent-miss….
12 See Nilsson-Wright, J. (2018), ‘Predicting chaos: the debate on denuclearization is not over’, Global Asia, Spring 2018, Vol. 13, No. 1, https://www.globalasia.org/v13no1/focus/predicting-chaos-the-debate-on-….
13 Broad, W. J. and Sanger, D. E. (2018), ‘North Korea nuclear disarmament could take 15 years, expert warns’, New York Times, 28 May 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/28/us/politics/north-korea-nuclear-disarmament-could-take-15-years-expert-warns.html.
14 The JCPOA, signed in July 2015, is an agreement between Iran and the E3 (Germany, France and the UK) plus the US, Russia, China and the EU. The agreement requires Iran to place curbs on its nuclear programme. For details, see Arms Control Association (2018), ‘The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) at a Glance’, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/JCPOA-at-a-glance.
15 A revised deal would seek to address US concerns about ‘sunset clauses’ in the JCPOA, and the limited nature of the JCPOA-mandated inspections regime. It would also seek to end Iran’s ballistic missile programme and wider interference in the Middle East.
16 Financial Tribune (2018), ‘US Sanctions to Help Russia Overtake Europe in Iran Trade’, 3 June 2018, https://financialtribune.com/articles/economy-domestic-economy/87589/us-sanctions-to-help-russia-overtake-europe-in-iran-trade.
17 Total (2018), ‘US withdrawal from the JCPOA: Total’s position related to the South Pars 11 project in Iran’, press release, 16 May 2018, https://www.total.com/en/media/news/press-releases/us-withdrawal-jcpoa-totals-position-related-south-pars-11-project-iran.
18 Radio Tehran (1980), ‘Khomeini: “We Shall Confront the World with Our Ideology”’, 21 March 1980.
19 Wright, C. (2016), ‘Trump’s 19th century foreign policy’, Politico, 20 January 2016,
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/01/donald-trump-foreign- policy-213546.
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/01/donald-trump-foreign- policy-213546.
20 Bildt, C. (2018), ‘Trump’s decision to blow up the Iran deal is a massive attack on Europe’, Washington Post, 12 May 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/global-opinions/wp/2018/05/12/trumps-decision-to-blow-up-the-iran-deal-is-a-massive-attack-on-europe/?utm_term=.ca8f6e239282.
21 Pineau, C. (1976), Suez, Paris: Robert Laffont, p. 71.
22 Münchau, W. (2018), ‘In a trade war Germany is the weakest link’, Financial Times, 18 March 2018, https://www.ft.com/content/ec775fea-2916-11e8-b27e-cc62a39d57a0.
23 Tweet on 3 March 2018, https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/969994273121820672.
24 See Kundnani, H. (2017), President Trump, the U.S. Security Guarantee, and the Future of European Integration, Policy Brief, German Marshall Fund, January 2017, http://www.gmfus.org/publications/president-trump-us-security-guarantee-and-future-european-integration.
25 I would like to thank Jeremy Shapiro for this point.
26 Since 2017 the EU has set up a small permanent operational headquarters to coordinate non-military missions, and a European Defence Fund to increase research and development spending and coordinate defence procurement. It has also launched permanent structured cooperation (PESCO), a political framework to help EU member states develop military capabilities together and improve their ability to deploy them.
27 Buckley, C. and Meyers, S. L. (2018), ‘China’s Legislature Blesses Xi’s Indefinite Rule. It was 2,958 to 2’, New York Times, 11 March 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/11/world/asia/china-xi-constitution-term-limits.html.
28 See World Bank Data on China, http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/china/overview.
29 Ewing, J. (2018), ‘Tough Tasks for China’s New Environment Ministry’, The Diplomat, 17 March 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/03/tough-tasks-for-chinas-new-environment-ministry/.
30 Rej, A. (2018), Reclaiming the Indo-Pacific: A Political-Military Strategy for Quad 2.0, ORF Occasional Paper, Observer Research Foundation, March 2018, https://www.orfonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/ORF_OccasionalPaper_147_Quad_FinalForUpload.pdf.
31 For example, see the publications on the Chatham House project on ‘China and the Future of the International Legal Order’, https://www.chathamhouse.org/about/structure/international-law-programme/china-future-of-international-legal-order-project.
32 IMF (2018), World Economic Outlook Database, April 2018, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2018/01/weodata/index.aspx.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.; and Russian Federal State Statistics Service (2018), ‘Zanyatost’ i bezrabotitsa’ [Employment and unemployment], http://www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat_main/rosstat/ru/statistics/wages/labour_force/#.
36 Russian Federal State Statistics Service (2016), ‘Labour force size and composition’,
http://www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat_main/rosstat/en/figures/labour/.
http://www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat_main/rosstat/en/figures/labour/.
37 OECD Data (2017), ‘GDP per hour worked’, https://data.oecd.org/lprdty/gdp-per-hour-worked.htm#indicator-chart.
38 Author’s calculation based on Russian Federal State Statistics Service (2016), ‘Fixed capital investments’, http://www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat_main/rosstat/en/figures/investments/.
39 Centre for Strategic Research (2018), ‘Effektivnoe upravlenie gosudarstvennoi sobstvennost’iu v 2018-2024 gg. i do 2035 g. [Effective management of state property in 2018–2024 and until 2035], https://www.csr.ru/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Doklad_effektivnoe_upravlenie_gossobstvennostyu_Web.pdf.
40 Marten, K. (2017), Reducing Tensions Between Russia and NATO, Council on Foreign Relations, Council Special Report No. 79, March 2017.
41 Frear, T. (2018), Lessons Learned? Success and Failure in Managing Russia-West Incidents
2014-2018, Euro-Atlantic Security Policy Brief, European Leadership Network, April 2018.
2014-2018, Euro-Atlantic Security Policy Brief, European Leadership Network, April 2018.
42 Gerasimov, V. (2013), ‘The Value of Science Is in the Foresight: New Challenges Demand Rethinking the Forms and Methods of Carrying out Combat Operations’, Voyenno-Promyshlenniy Kurier, February 2013.
43 Giles, K. (2016), Russia’s ‘New’ Tools for Confronting the West: Continuity and Innovation in Moscow’s Exercise of Power, Research Paper, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/russias-new-tools-confronting-west.
44 Non-military, sub-threshold activities are those that fall beneath the accepted threshold of collective defence according to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.
45 Adamsky, D. (2015), Cross-Domain Coercion: The Current Russian Art of Strategy, Proliferation Papers, No. 54, Institut Français des Relations Internationales, November 2015.
46 Helmus, T., Bodine-Baron, E., Radin, A., Magnuson, M., Mendelsohn J., Marcellino, W., Bega, A. and Winkelman, Z. (2018), Russian Social Media Influence: Understanding Russian Propaganda in Eastern Europe, RAND Corporation, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2237.html.
47 Williams, H. (2018), ‘Avoiding nuclear anarchy’, The World Today, April 2018,
https://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/twt/avoiding-nuclear-anarchy.
https://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/twt/avoiding-nuclear-anarchy.
48 Owen, J. and Lloyd, L. (2018), Costing Brexit: what is Whitehall spending on exiting the EU?, Institute for Government, March 2018, https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/cost-of-brexit-what-whitehall-spending-insight-final-vb_1.pdf.
49 See, for example, the report of the UK Foreign and Security Policy Working Group, Strengthening Britain’s Voice in the World, November 2015, https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/strengthening-britain-s-voice-world.
50 National Audit Office (2017), ‘A Short Guide to the Foreign & Commonwealth Office’, presentation, October 2017, https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Short-Guide-to-the-Foreign-and-Commonwealth-Office.pdf.
51 House of Commons (2017), Sir Simon McDonald, Oral evidence: FCO Budget and Capacity and Annual Report 2016–17, HC 573, 15 November 2017, http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/foreign-affairs-committee/fco-budget-and-capacity-and-annual-report-201617/oral/73792.html.
52 Dempsey, N. (2018), UK Defence Expenditure, House of Commons Library, Briefing Paper (CBP 8175), 22 February 2018.
53 Mansour, R. (2018), ‘More Than Militias: Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces Are Here to Stay’, War on the Rocks, 3 April 2018, https://warontherocks.com/2018/04/more-than-militias-iraqs-popular-mobilization-forces-are-here-to-stay/.
54 Cole, P. and Lacher, W. (2014), Politics by Other Means: Conflicting Interests in Libya’s Security Sector, Small Arms Survey, October 2014, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/283044897_Politics_by_Other_Means_Conflicting_Interests_in_Libya’s_Security_Sector.
55 Eaton, T. (2018), Libya’s War Economy: Predation, Profiteering and State Weakness,
Research Paper, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 12 April 2018,
https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/libyas-war-economy-predation-profiteering-and-state-weakness.
Research Paper, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 12 April 2018,
https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/libyas-war-economy-predation-profiteering-and-state-weakness.
56 Arango, T. (2017), ‘Iran Dominates in Iraq After U.S. ‘Handed the Country Over’’, New York Times, 15 July 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/15/world/middleeast/iran-iraq-iranian-power.html.
57 The Syria Report (2018), ‘Economic Competition Raises Tensions Between Moscow, Tehran and Damascus – Reports’, 23 January 2018, http://www.syria-report.com/news/economy/economic-competition-raises-tensions-between-moscow-tehran-and-damascus-%E2%80%93-reports.
58 Lacher, W. (2018), ‘Tripoli’s Militia Cartel’, German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), No. 20, April 2018, https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2018C20_lac.pdf.
59 Khatib, L. (2017), ‘Iran Is Building a Base of Post-War Influence in Syria’, Syria From Within, Chatham House, June 2017, https://syria.chathamhouse.org/research/iran-is-building-a-base-of-post-war-influence-in-syria.
60 Information Systems Audit and Control Association (ISACA) (2016), ‘2016 Cybersecurity Skills Gap’, https://image-store.slidesharecdn.com/be4eaf1a-eea6-4b97-b36e-b62dfc8dcbae-original.jpeg.
61 Hung, M. (2017), Leading the IoT: Gartner Insights on How to Lead in a Connected World, Gartner, https://www.gartner.com/imagesrv/books/iot/iotEbook_digital.pdf.
62 As defined by John McCarthy, one of the founders of AI research, AI is ‘getting a computer to do the things which, when done by people, are said to involve intelligence’. Harvey, B. (1997), ‘Artificial Intelligence’, https://people.eecs.berkeley.edu/~bh/v3ch6/ai.html.
63 Machine learning is a subset of artificial intelligence and is defined as ‘the science of getting computers to act without being explicitly programmed’. Bell, L. (2016), ‘Machine learning versus AI: what’s the difference?’, Wired, 1 December 2016, http://www.wired.co.uk/article/machine-learning-ai-explained.
64 ‘False positive’ is an expression commonly used in cybersecurity to indicate that a file or setting has been flagged as malicious when in reality it is not. Snyder, J. (2004), ‘What is a false positive?’, Network World, 20 December 2004, https://www.networkworld.com/article/2327896/lan-wan/what-is-a-false-positive-.html.
65 Kelley, D. (2016), ‘Cognitive Security to the Rescue? Study Predicts 3x Adoption in the Next Few Years’, Security Intelligence, 3 November 2016, https://securityintelligence.com/cognitive-security-to-the-rescue-study-predicts-widespread-adoption-in-the-next-few-years/.
66 PwC (2018), ‘The Global State of Information Security Survey 2018’, https://www.pwc.com/us/en/services/consulting/cybersecurity/library/information-security-survey.html.
67 Conner-Simons, A. (2016), ‘System predicts 85 percent of cyber-attacks using input from human experts’, MIT News, 18 April 2016, http://news.mit.edu/2016/ai-system-predicts-85-percent-cyber-attacks-using-input-human-experts-0418.
68 Brundage, M. et al. (2018), The Malicious Use of Artificial Intelligence: Forecasting, Prevention, and Mitigation, https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/3d82daa4-97fe-4096-9c6b-376b92c619de/downloads/1c6q2kc4v_50335.pdf.
69 PwC (2018), ‘2018 AI predictions 8 insights to shape business strategy’, https://www.pwc.com/us/en/advisory-services/assets/ai-predictions-2018-report.pdf.
70 Hern, A. (2018), ‘Growth of AI could boost cybercrime and security threats, report warns’, Guardian, 21 February 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/feb/21/ai-security-threats-cybercrime-political-disruption-physical-attacks-report.
71 The Canadian Press (2017), ‘With cybercrime costing $3B annually, AI can improve chances of finding hackers’, CBC, 8 December 2017, http://www.cbc.ca/news/business/ai-hacking-canada-1.4437427.
72 Bond, S. (2017), ‘Artificial intelligence and quantum computing aid cyber crime fight’, Financial Times, 25 May 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/1b9bdc4c-2422-11e7-a34a-538b4cb30025.
73 The author thanks Timothy Wright for his research assistance with this article.
74 UN Habitat (2015), Sustainable Urban Development in Africa, p. 2, https://unhabitat.org/sustainable-urban-development-in-africa/.
75 For population mobility in West Africa, see Campbell, L. (2017), Learning from the Ebola Response in cities: Population movement, ALNAP, https://www.alnap.org/help-library/learning-from-the-ebola-response-in-cities-population-movement.
76 Bureau of Public Service Reforms of Nigeria (2015), How Nigeria Contained Ebola: Lessons for Institutional Reform, p. 7.
77 Neiderud, C.-J. (2015), ‘How urbanization affects the epidemiology of emerging infectious diseases’, Infection Ecology & Epidemiology, 5(10).
78 World Health Organization (undated), ‘What is a healthy city?’, http://www.euro.who.int/en/health-topics/environment-and-health/urban-health/who-european-healthy-cities-network/what-is-a-healthy-city.
79 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights West Africa Regional Office (2014), A human rights perspective into the Ebola outbreak, http://www.globalhealth.org/wp-content/uploads/A-human-rights-perspective-into-the-Ebola-outbreak.pdf.
80 Nigerian Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (undated), ‘Nigeria: How Being Prepared Avoided a Tragedy’, https://www.cdc.gov/globalhealth/security/stories/nigeria-prepared-for-outbreaks.html.
81 Vaz, R. G., Mkanda, P., Banda, R., Komkech, W., Ekundare-Famiyesin, O. O., Onyibe, R., Adiboye, S., Nsubuga, P., Maleghemi, S., Hannah-Murele, B. and Tegegne, S. G. (2016), ‘The Role of the Polio Program Infrastructure in Response to Ebola Virus Disease Outbreak in Nigeria 2014’, The Journal of Infectious Diseases, 1 May 2016, pp. 140–46, https://academic.oup.com/jid/article/213/suppl_3/S140/2236430.
82 Federal Ministry of Health (undated), ‘The Declaration of Nigeria as Ebola Virus Free – Hon. Minister’s Address’, http://www.health.gov.ng/index.php/component/content/article/9-uncategorised/201-the-declarationof-nigeria-as-ebola-virus-free-hon-minister-s-address.
83 Out, A., Ameh, S., Osifo-Dawodu, E., Alade, E., Ekuri, S. and Idris, J. (2017), ‘An account of the Ebola virus disease outbreak in Nigeria: implications and lessons learnt’, BMC Public Health, Vol. 18, No. 3, 22 September 2017.
84 Ebola Private Sector Mobilisation Group (undated), https://www.epsmg.com/media/6219/epsmg-contributions-flyer-2015-final.pdf.
85 Unal, B., Harper, D. and Spencer, J. (2017), ‘Strengthening Urban Preparedness and Resilience against Biological Threats: Needs Assessment in African Cities’, meeting summary, 14–15 December 2017, https://chathamhouse.soutron.net/Portal/Default/RecordView/Index/172474.
86 London Resilience Partnership (2014), London Resilience Partnership Pandemic Influenza Framework, Version 6.0, February 2014, https://www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/gla_migrate_files_destination/LRF_PanFlu_Framework_6.0.pdf. See also Ackelsberg, J. (2011), ‘Biological Preparedness and Responses in New York City: Information Sharing During Emergencies’, presentation, 8 September 2011, NYC Health.
87 You can find more information on the project page: https://www.chathamhouse.org/about/structure/international-security-department/strengthening-urban-preparedness-and-resilience-against-biological-threats.