Considering all the above factors, even though the corridor of uncertainty is far narrower than has been widely assumed, there remains a non-zero chance that Vladimir Putin may order a nuclear strike on Ukraine. Threats implied by Putin and other senior Russian leaders, and amplified by the rhetoric of other Russian public figures, have until now been shown to be empty. But a change in their delivery, content or context could indicate that they had become more closely aligned with actual intent.
To attempt to prevent that development, the non-zero chance should be reduced still further by reconsidered messaging from the US and its allies regarding the probable outcomes of nuclear use. In particular, this messaging should highlight that, contrary to possible expectations that Russia could control the situation after nuclear use through maintaining escalation dominance, a nuclear strike would in fact unleash processes that would be far beyond Russia’s control because they would involve responses and reactions not just from the US but from across the world. Diplomatic efforts to ensure Russia is convinced of this should include working with countries beyond the Euro-Atlantic area – not limited to China and India – to reinforce multilateral condemnation of nuclear brinkmanship and emphasis from as many parts of the globe as possible
on the disastrous consequences of breaking the nuclear taboo.
The argument for promising grave consequences but remaining vague over what they will be is strong in that this stance maintains flexibility of response and complicates Russian calculus through uncertainty. However, the experience of attempting the same kind of deterrence of Moscow ahead of the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine shows that it also suffers from a lack of credibility: the track record of Western powers combined with the vagueness of the threats to leave Russia unconvinced that the response would be sufficiently significant. This requires a clearer and more unambiguous statement of intent from the US and its allies, that goes beyond a promise of ‘grave consequences’ and instead touches on interests of personal significance not only to Vladimir Putin but also to his senior military leaders.
Continued nuclear threats from Russia are almost inevitable. They may become more strident as their effect wanes with repetition, but a change in their content or delivery would be more significant.
Continued nuclear threats from Russia are almost inevitable. They may become more strident as their effect wanes with repetition, but as noted above, a change in their content or delivery would be more significant. A ramping up of threat language may be accompanied by internal pressure to resort to nuclear use if Russia’s other tools and levers – not just the military campaign in Ukraine, but political and economic campaigns against the West – are seen to be failing. The US is reported to have been delivering ‘private warnings’ to Moscow, but these too were ineffective before February 2022. They should therefore be augmented by public messaging emphasizing not only the inevitability of a highly damaging US response, but also the international repercussions of increased isolation and nuclear proliferation as discussed above. Direct and blunt messaging by Western powers should aim to leave absolutely no doubt that Russia – and Putin personally – have far more to lose from nuclear use than they stand to gain.
In particular, as in any scenario where the desired outcome is deterring or dissuading Russia from some damaging action, it remains vital for Western leaders to refrain from explaining what they will not do in response to that action. Russia’s conviction that it could use nuclear weapons in Ukraine without retaliation in kind from the West will only have been deepened by President Macron’s signalling, in October 2022, that this was a correct assessment. Providing comfort and confidence to Russian planners in this manner by removing worst-case scenarios from their risk calculations makes the world more dangerous. Assurances from major Western powers ahead of time that there would not be a military response to Russia’s plans to invade Ukraine gave the Kremlin a green light to go ahead. Similar assurances over nuclear use will serve only to encourage even more damaging action by Russia.
This is because Russia’s nuclear weapons have been the primary reason why Western powers have tolerated the atrocities perpetrated in Ukraine. In fact, possession of nuclear weapons has granted Russia broad immunity from the consequences of its actions, and Putin has exploited this to the maximum. This recognition of possession of nuclear weapons as a ‘get out of jail free card’ sets a highly dangerous precedent, as it incentivizes other states to acquire or instrumentalize their own nuclear weapons given their obvious benefits in terms of escaping responsibility for aggression at home or against neighbours.
Meanwhile, Western support for Ukraine should be guided by assessments of Russia’s actual nuclear posture, and by the experience of Russia’s reaction to the phases of the conflict to date, rather than by Russia’s use of nuclear weapons as a tool for information operations. The success of Russia’s campaign of altering Western perceptions of escalation and of nuclear danger must be recognized and adjusted for. In particular, there is scant rationale for continuing the present ‘too little, just in time’ approach to providing supplies of weapons systems to Ukraine. This does no more than prolong the war, at immense cost primarily for Ukraine.
One key Russian success has been to replace escalation management with escalation avoidance as the priority in Western thinking. Unhelpful public characterizations of Kremlin thinking make the problem worse. The idea that ‘Putin never de-escalates’ is presented as a simple and unchallengeable fact, despite having little basis in reality. Nigel Gould-Davies, a senior fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, explains that one ‘flaw of red-line orthodoxy is that, in fixating on a state’s escalatory response, it considers only the risks and dilemmas this would impose on an adversary, and not those that the escalating state itself faces’. To put it more simply, the idea has taken root that only Russia can escalate – and that this must be avoided at almost all cost.
Now that Russia’s campaigns have transformed ‘escalation’ into a word that evokes instinctive fear among Western politicians, it can successfully use it to direct Western strategy by triggering that fear on demand. Russia is aided in this by a substantial number of Western voices equating the prospect of Ukrainian success in defending itself with ‘escalation’. And this fear of threatened Russian escalation has prevailed despite repeated demonstrations that Russia conducts escalation at a time when it considers it appropriate or necessary for its own war aims – or failure to meet them – rather than as a response to incremental changes in Western support for Ukraine.
And yet, as further pointed out by Gould-Davies:
In fact, if Russia is allowed to achieve success through nuclear intimidation, this validates the concept of nuclear coercion not only for Moscow but for other aggressive, assertive or rogue states around the world. The inevitable result would be further nuclear destabilization, accompanied by a probable renewed acceleration in proliferation. In this way, rather than being the safe course of action, being influenced by Russian nuclear threats could in fact be the greatest nuclear risk of all.
