On several public occasions prior to the 20th National Congress, Xi Jinping warned that China is at the mercy of advanced economies regarding several ‘chokepoint’ technologies, and that ‘key core technologies are controlled by others’.
The term technological chokepoints is often used in reference to critical technologies, components or resources that are essential to the functioning of key industries, economies or military capabilities. In this context, chokepoints can be used to limit a country’s access to critical technologies or to gain leverage over other countries or companies.
For China, the most acute chokepoints are high-end components including advanced semiconductors, along with aircraft engines and specialized steel alloy, the production of which is dominated by one or very few companies based in the US or other advanced economies. And, in the context of deepening rivalry between Beijing and Washington, China’s leaders are acutely aware of the massive disruption to supply chains likely to arise in the event of military escalation over Taiwan, which accounts for some 60 per cent of the world’s semiconductor production. Given China’s current dependence on imported semiconductors, it faces a pertinent challenge in balancing a pragmatic need to secure its supply needs with its pursuit of a ‘reunification’ strategy.
A series of newspaper articles published by the state-run Science and Technology Daily newspaper in 2018 indicated that China is dependent on imports of around 35 technologies and key components that are currently overwhelmingly produced in the EU, Japan, South Korea and the US. Of these 35 items, or chokepoints, very few Chinese companies, either state-owned or private, can design and manufacture Chinese versions of these products, let alone compete with overseas counterparts.
As a number of international technology specialists have pointed out, China’s universities and research institutes frequently have a good record of achieving scientific breakthroughs but are rarely able to commercialize the products of their research, leaving the domestic market dependent on imports of similar technologies. Moreover, Chinese companies often have serious doubts regarding the quality of domestically sourced goods, preferring instead to use trusted foreign suppliers for high-end products.
Beijing is proud of China’s technological prowess, and is explicit about its ambition for the country to become self-reliant in critical sectors. The need for self-sufficiency is all the more urgent in the face of US sanctions and efforts, initiated under the Trump administration, to block the work of a handful of Chinese tech companies. The country’s technological strengths are apparent in the form of a huge talent pool of STEM students and generous public grants to fund research, but so too are its weaknesses in terms of its current capacity to overcome technological chokepoints.
Xi’s elevation to the Politburo of the five scientists featured in this paper can be seen not only as a reward for their political loyalty; their appointment is also in recognition of some of the breakthroughs these scientists have been involved in during their past careers, in areas ranging from space science to missile and nuclear technologies.
Of the five ‘new’ scientists, Yuan Jiajun and Ma Xingrui were highly prominent in China’s space industry; Li Ganjie and his colleagues developed China’s advanced pressurized nuclear reactor programme; Chen Jining pioneered interdisciplinary research on environmental science; and Zhang Guoqing’s work advanced military technology for civilian use. For any country to have this level of scientific expertise within its senior political leadership is extremely unusual, and the expectations for these figures to drive new technological breakthroughs in China are clearly high.
In line with Xi’s focus on science and technology, in March 2023 the annual National People’s Congress endorsed the establishment of a new Central Science and Technology Commission. The commission, which sits directly under the CPC Politburo, and which has authority over the Ministry of Science and Technology, is intended to accelerate progress towards China’s goal of scientific self-reliance and to ease China’s technological chokepoints. As at mid-2023, it remains unclear who will head this new body, and who will be on it, as few details have been made public. Meanwhile, its establishment is seen as a direct response to the tough measures adopted by the US designed to dent China’s ambitions of technology supremacy.
