Eritrea and Sudan, the principal regional actors in relation to the Tigray conflict, have both historically had charged relations with Ethiopia. Their diverging interests present distinct challenges for Ethiopia and must be carefully balanced in the process of consolidating peace.
Eritrea
Eritrea remains a major force in Ethiopia’s political and security dynamics. Eritrea’s explicit motivation for engaging in the Tigray war has been the elimination of the TPLF and, by extension, the removal of any perceived threat to the Eritrean government emanating from Ethiopia. This threat had been synonymous with the Ethiopian federal state, of which the TPLF was the leading partner until 2018.
Eritrea is arguably the only one of the primary belligerents in the Tigray war to have achieved some of its goals: a significant weakening of the TPLF and the devastation of northern Ethiopia, including the near-decimation of Tigray’s economy. Eritrea has also captured territory that it has long claimed along its shared boundary with Tigray, some in line with that which was delimited by the Eritrea–Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC) in the 2002 Algiers Agreement, which was fully accepted by the GFDRE in 2018. Eritrea has used its alliance with the Abiy administration and its participation in the war as pretexts to encroach into vast areas of northern Ethiopia. Until April 2021, both Ethiopia and Eritrea consistently denied the presence of Eritrean forces in Tigray despite mounting evidence – not only of their presence, but also of their involvement in gross human rights violations against civilians in the areas they captured. In February 2021 the UN under-secretary-general for humanitarian affairs claimed that up to 40 per cent of Tigray’s territory was controlled by Eritrean forces. Eritrea has also sought to build strong links with elements of certain Ethiopian subnational ethnolinguistic groups. This signifies that Eritrean president Isaias Afewerki has crafted a contingency to protect his interests in Ethiopia, with or without the consent of Prime Minister Abiy and the GFDRE.
Confidential reports suggest that the relationship between the Ethiopian and Eritrean governments has deteriorated considerably since the signing of the CoHA, with tension between the two countries increasing due to Eritrea’s exclusion from the negotiation process. Moreover, since the signing of the CoHA, Ethiopia has openly expressed a desire to play an active role in the Red Sea region and to secure its own access to the sea. Prime Minister Abiy is reported to have said that Ethiopia will seek to secure direct port access, either peacefully or by force. This will have caught the attention of Eritrea’s leaders, given that Ethiopia lost access to two Red Sea ports – Assab and Massawa – and became landlocked when Eritrea seceded from Ethiopia in 1991.
No matter how this conflict is finally resolved, neither Ethiopia nor Tigray will recover quickly from it. Many Amhara elites believe that the TPLF helped the GFDRE in its fight against Fano insurgents in Amhara region in August 2023, and this is likely to complicate the reconciliation and reconstruction process. The CoHA will likely see the TPLF and other Tigrayan nationalists remain in control of Tigray, contrary to Eritrean aspirations that they will be completely defeated. The GFDRE has also agreed to ensure the withdrawal of Eritrean forces and the protection of Ethiopian territorial sovereignty. Reports have suggested the withdrawal of Eritrean troops from a few cities and towns in Tigray, which could be a step in the right direction. However, Eritrean forces remain present and active, notably in rural parts of northern Tigray, and dispute is likely to continue over contested areas on either side of the border.
Eritrean interests therefore remain pivotal to consolidating peace in Tigray, while presenting a significant diplomatic challenge. Only a handful of countries have enough influence with Eritrea to attempt to moderate their policy in Ethiopia – and it is unclear if they would be willing to pursue this leverage. Eritrea enjoys support from China, Russia, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, including for its infrastructure, logistics and military equipment. Saudi Arabia and the UAE were also key players in achieving the landmark 2018 peace deal between Ethiopia and Eritrea that reversed decades of enmity. China, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are also among the largest investors in Ethiopia, and consequently have increasing influence, as well as a shared interest in a more stable Horn of Africa region.
Eritrea has consolidated its relationships with Russia and China since 2018, with both countries’ foreign ministers making visits to Asmara – in the case of Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov, as recently as January 2023. Isaias’s visit to China in May 2023 featured a red carpet, a guard of honour military procession and a 21-gun salute, and during his visit to Moscow in early June he defended Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Sudan
Sudan and Ethiopia have a long history of regional rivalry, often played out through proxies and the provision of support to the other’s regime opponents. The two countries severed ties following the foiled assassination attempt in 1995 in Addis Ababa against Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak, which Ethiopia blamed on Sudan. Relations recovered in 1998 after the outbreak of the Ethiopian–Eritrean war, and remained cordial through to the independence of South Sudan in 2011 and the death of Ethiopian prime minister and former president Meles Zenawi in 2012. The acceptance of Ethiopia’s deployment of forces as part of the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), following the dispute between Sudan and South Sudan over the territory, as well as its fierce rejection of the arrest warrant issued in 2009 by the International Criminal Court against Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir, were key markers in determining the positive relationship between the two countries during the Meles–Bashir era.
However, shifts in the bilateral relationship occurred following the emergence of new governments and leaderships in both countries in 2018 and 2019. Relations deteriorated substantially when Sudan was accused of taking advantage of the Ethiopian government’s distraction following the outbreak of the Tigray conflict, moving to occupy the disputed borderland territory of Al Fashaga. Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, chair of Sudan’s Sovereign Council and commander-in-chief of the SAF, argued that the decision to take over Al Fashaga aligned with Abiy’s request for Sudan to close its border with Tigray following the start of the war. Ethiopia has alleged that Sudan supplied arms to the TPLF during the conflict – a claim denied by both the TPLF and the Sudanese military – although the SAF did maintain close relations with the TPLF during the war, providing safe haven to ex-Tigrayan UN peacekeepers who sought asylum in Sudan and later fought the ENDF and allied forces from eastern Sudan.
Should a Sudanese military leadership be consolidated through war, there is a risk that it may seek to use the issues around both the GERD and Al Fashaga as a tool to garner national sympathy and mobilization, or as a bargaining chip in a continued proxy conflict.
The devastating war in Sudan is again likely to alter the dynamics of relations between Ethiopia and Sudan, and the calculations of their leaders, although the strategic interests remain the same. The return of a civilian government in Sudan would probably see a focus on domestic matters and on immediate concerns, including reconstruction efforts. Should a Sudanese military leadership be consolidated through war, there is a risk that it may seek to use the issues around both the GERD and Al Fashaga as a tool to garner national sympathy and mobilization, or as a bargaining chip in a continued proxy conflict. The Sudanese military regime has sought to paint the IGAD Quartet heads of state mediation efforts, which include Ethiopia, as being sympathetic to the RSF. According to well-placed sources, Abiy is working in tandem with Dr Workneh Gebeyehu, the chief executive of IGAD and former Ethiopian minister of foreign affairs, to create a workable peace process behind closed doors. Ethiopia has also facilitated a soft border arrangement whereby more than 27,000 people managed to cross from Sudan into Ethiopia between 21 April and 22 May 2023. Ethiopia is concerned that the prolonged crisis in Sudan could lead to increased arms-trafficking, other forms of illicit trade and the establishment of ‘safe havens’ for anti-government insurgent groups along its border with Sudan.
Historically, however, Sudan has been anxious about Ethiopia being close to Eritrea, particularly given Eritrean involvement in eastern Sudan (including through groups such as the Beja), and about the alliance between Eritrea and elements in Ethiopia’s Amhara region. Despite some media reporting of clashes along the border following the outbreak of conflict in Khartoum, Ethiopia is trying to remain neutral in the Sudanese conflict. Abiy seems interested in resolving the issue amicably, despite calls from some Ethiopian constituencies to use the security vacuum in Sudan to restore lands which are alleged to have been annexed through force. The future of the contested Al Fashaga region remains uncertain, as does what these interlinked dynamics might mean for regional peace.
Divergences remain between Ethiopia and Sudan over the GERD, informed by Sudan’s strengthened relationship with Egypt in the past few years. This relationship is largely dictated by the historical link between the armed forces of both countries, which signed a military cooperation agreement covering training and border security in 2021. Differences may intensify as the need for negotiations and data exchanges on overspill flood releases from the dam becomes more urgent. Sudan’s demands over the GERD are limited and largely technical, but further progress on alignment has been prevented by Ethiopian anger over the occupation of Al Fashaga. Burhan’s visit to Ethiopia in October 2022 signalled a détente, which was consolidated by Abiy’s reciprocal visit to Sudan in late January 2023. However, there has yet to be any demonstrable or tangible change in Ethiopian-Sudanese relations following the start of the war in Sudan.