Regional and international partners need to carefully craft their Ethiopia re-engagement policies and work collaboratively to support the implementation of the CoHA, ensuring accountability that brings the widest possible benefits internally and to the Horn region.
As has become evident, during the conflict in Tigray and more recently in the context of Sudan, continental and regional mechanisms on their own have proved ineffective at resolving protracted conflict, while Ethiopia’s Western partners have limited leverage when it comes to conflict resolution in the region. The Tigray conflict provides a lesson in the benefits of greater consolidation and coordination of efforts by continental, regional and Western actors – and the need for them to work in tandem to prevent and resolve security crises in the Horn of Africa. Such introspection should inform enduring commitments to the implementation of the CoHA and sustainable peace in northern Ethiopia, with practical and hands-on monitoring of cessation arrangements in the region, and it should include a consideration of innovative approaches for engagement with regional actors.
The international community can take several immediate steps towards consolidating the gains of the CoHA. Ethiopia’s international partners must recommit to monitoring and supporting the implementation of the agreement, including by providing financial backing and technical resources to both the AU and IGAD – as has been demonstrated by the government of the UK – and other actors should follow suit. Renewed engagement with Ethiopia needs to be more nuanced, with much-needed financial support and debt relief being tied to agreed objective benchmarks, notably on comprehensive peace and accountability. This will help to build and maintain political support for compromise within the GFDRE.
Ethiopia’s Western partners, notably the EU, UK and US, need to maintain the push for justice and accountability as they begin to resume development assistance, since dealings between the GFDRE and the TPLF to date offer little insight as to the commitment of both parties to this crucial issue for the people of northern Ethiopia. Now is the time to ensure that the relative peace in Ethiopia does not come at the expense of accountability. The provision of sustained and broad humanitarian access in Tigray and other parts of northern Ethiopia is vital to demonstrate the utility of the CoHA and to ensure that moderate voices in the TPLF and wider Tigray region retain the upper hand. At the same time, it is important to secure aid delivery so that it reaches those most in need; neither diversion of aid nor political manipulation should be tolerated.
Tackling wider regional dynamics over the medium to long term is a much more challenging prospect. The analysis in this paper points to three priorities that can bolster a sustainable resolution to the Tigray crisis, and which should be supported by Ethiopia’s international partners. If correctly sequenced and coordinated, the following recommendations offer Western partners, including the EU, UK and US, as well as the AU and IGAD a potential route to removing the regional obstacles to delivering a sustainable CoHA in Tigray. Kenya, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and China all have business and geopolitical interests in Ethiopia and can all offer access points and opportunities to influence Ethiopian thinking. The recommendations can also reduce the risk that the Tigray conflict will pivot into renewed hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea, either directly or via proxies.
- Attempts should be made to moderate the role of Eritrea. The influence and leverage maintained by Eritrea over the GFDRE, as well as over stakeholders within the Amhara and Afar regions, will continue to deter any meaningful progress in implementing initiatives to end the Tigray war. The Eritrean government has historical, personal and geopolitical motives to stay involved in Tigrayan and wider Ethiopian politics, with intentions that go beyond defeating the TPLF. Any meaningful political process requires the total withdrawal of Eritrean forces from Tigray and the lessening of Eritrea’s influence within the Ethiopian body politic. Here, the role of the GFDRE is crucial. It needs to ensure that the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Ethiopian state is maintained, and it should clearly communicate this priority to Eritrea. In the longer term, the nurturing of deeper trust between the GFDRE and the Tigrayan administration, including on security sector reforms, will be needed to keep Eritrea within its own borders. For this to be achieved, it is important for international partners to work with the GFDRE and the AU mediation team. AU High Representative Obasanjo’s call, in late 2022, for Eritrea to withdraw from Tigray was a step in the right direction (this call was echoed by the British ambassador to Ethiopia in August 2023), and strengthening the role and coverage of the AU monitoring, verification and compliance team will be required to ensure this comes into effect.
- To achieve sustainable peace, Eritrea’s interests will also need to be considered. Contested territories such as Badme, which had been awarded to Eritrea in 2000 by the EEBC, will not willingly be returned to Tigray by the Eritrean government. The best way forward for both countries would be to implement the EEBC decision: current facts on the ground, as well as continued steps towards sustainable peace, as laid down in the CoHA, provide an opportunity for the acceptance of this decision in Tigray. However, if Eritrea refuses to leave other occupied parts of Tigray – particularly given the GFDRE’s insistence on it doing so – then there is potential for another confrontation. In this scenario, the Ethiopian government would be concerned that Eritrea might seek to instrumentalize disenfranchised armed groups as proxies against it.
Western countries have no direct leverage over Eritrea. But they can engage the UAE and Saudi Arabia, states which have a measure of good relations with Eritrea and which have an incentive to proactively ensure that the CoHA is respected. Stronger coordination between Western partners and the Gulf countries on Horn of Africa policymaking is needed to address the many overlapping layers of interests and actors. Neither China, Russia nor Türkiye played a significant role in concluding the CoHA – this is unsurprising in the case of Russia, given its current focus on its war in Ukraine, but more surprising in the case of China and Türkiye. There may be an opportunity for Western partners to engage China to support implementation of the agreement – given its strong ties with both Eritrea and Ethiopia and the appointment in 2022 of its own special envoy for Horn of Africa affairs.
- The Sudan–Ethiopia border dispute centring on Al Fashaga must be addressed with a view to a sustainable solution. The Al Fashaga dispute and contestation over the border is the most significant factor in the unstable relations between the two countries. Without a commitment to working towards a resolution of this dispute, it is unlikely that the GFDRE will have the capacity to address the fundamental challenges facing it in Tigray and the Amhara region – including in the contested areas of Western Tigray/Welkait. Amhara elites see Western Tigray/Welkait as consolation for losing the fertile farmlands of Al Fashaga. As Sudan descends deeper into a political and security quagmire, it is important to ensure the peaceful and orderly movement of goods and people across the mutual border. Thus far, Prime Minister Abiy has not shown an interest in exploiting the vulnerabilities in Sudan. Restraint on the part of the GFDRE should continue until avenues can be restored for dialogue with Sudan that can resolve these issues conclusively. The Ethiopian government should also continue to work to support IGAD–AU peace initiatives in Sudan.
Recent positive communications between the Ethiopian and Sudanese leaderships, in spite of heightened tension along the mutual border, have offered an opening for traction on this issue. As the continental and regional bodies tasked with peace and security in the region, the AU and the IGAD have an opportunity to redeem themselves and to work towards resolving the considerable insecurity in the Horn of Africa region. However, for this to happen the international community needs to throw its weight behind the efforts of these two blocs, notably by formally extending and expanding the mandate of the AU’s High Representative for the region (until recently, Obasanjo) to cover the Ethiopia–Sudan border issue and by connecting this with the work of a reformed IGAD, under Ethiopian executive secretary Workneh. Both offices could support trust-building between the Sudanese and Ethiopian governments.
To date, the position of successive Sudanese regimes has been that any resolution to the dispute must begin with an acknowledgment of the boundary as demarcated in 1903 by Major Gwynn. Recognition and delimitation of the boundary by Ethiopia could arise from discussions around joint trade and border development, as well as security in the area, and the reaching of a formalized agreement that is closer in concept to the soft border arrangement that existed between the two countries for the decade prior to the death of Meles in 2012. Such a deal would require the technical and financial support of international partners. As a former colonial power, the UK had an involvement in both the demarcation of the contested Ethiopia–Sudan border in 1902 and the shaping of the current geopolitical context of discussions around the Nile waters. The strength of its bilateral engagements in the Horn of Africa, notably in Ethiopia and Sudan, places the UK in a favourable position vis-à-vis most other external parties when it comes to supporting technical options for finding a sustainable resolution to the boundary dispute: however, the reduction in UK foreign aid to Africa, including Ethiopia and Sudan, is a disadvantage. International intervention on this issue would be best served through a triangulation of efforts between influential partners, such as the UAE, who have previously proposed an initiative to resolve the border dispute between Ethiopia and Sudan and have the means to finance the process. One challenge for the UAE’s involvement will be the perception that it has taken sides in the Sudan war. Multilateral bodies including IGAD and the UN Development Programme also have border development programmes in the Horn of Africa, and their active involvement is vital to resolving the issue.
- Ethiopia’s stabilizing role in the Horn of Africa region should be leveraged. Ethiopia is the largest and most populous country in the Horn of Africa, and has sought to assert a hegemonic diplomatic role in the region. In addition to supporting Somalia’s offensive against al-Shabaab, it played an instrumental role in the peace efforts in both Sudan and South Sudan. Moreover, Ethiopia was the leading provider of troops to UN peacekeeping missions in 2020, with 6,646 personnel as of May, but since the Tigray war it has fallen to 13th place, supplying only 1,483 troops as of March 2023. The main reason behind the reduction is the reputational damage incurred by the Abiy administration as a consequence of the war.
- With the 2022 peace deal between the TPLF and the GFDRE, Ethiopia needs to resume its former place in regional forums. The Tigray war severely undermined Ethiopia’s role and participation in regional, continental and global security, economic, development and environment platforms. Allegations of crimes against humanity, war crimes, genocide and ethnic cleansing have severely affected its reputation, especially the standing of Ethiopian security forces. Ethiopia’s partners need to encourage the federal government to engage more actively in regional diplomatic efforts, including resolving the Sudan war – where Ethiopia can influence outcomes through its role within IGAD.
Conclusion
The Tigray war significantly affected Ethiopia’s foreign policy and regional integration policy, sowing discord between the West and Ethiopia, and, at the height of the conflict, damaging the capacity, reputation and credibility of the GFDRE’s foreign ministry and security forces – two integral institutions of the Ethiopian polity. Having had a reputation as an anchor state in the Horn of Africa region, Ethiopia was increasingly being seen as a promoter of discord and instability within the region.
If the 2022 peace deal between the TPLF and the GFDRE holds and if the violence in some areas of the country can be abated, Ethiopia has an opportunity to resume its former place as a constructive regional player. Ethiopia’s partners need to encourage the Abiy government to engage more actively in regional diplomacy, including with respect to the conflict in Sudan – where Ethiopia can bring influence to bear on the peace process through its role within IGAD and the AU. This will be important for supporting the achievement of regional and continental multilateral solutions to the Horn of Africa’s peace and security challenges, and for increasing the capacity of these mechanisms.
Importantly, while there remains little chance of Western partners engaging with Russia due to the Ukraine war, there is potential for greater collaboration among Western nations, the UAE and Saudi Arabia, as well as between the West and China. From the outset, the Tigray conflict demonstrated a lack of coordination and coherence among the multitude of international actors. Despite the existence of multiple Horn of Africa envoys and special representatives (from the UN, EU, AU, US and UK, among others), all of whom have sought to coordinate and triangulate their priorities with counterparts in the Gulf, engagement across the Red Sea remains patchy and disjointed. Greater efforts should be made to intensify coordination with respect to both Eritrea and Sudan. Long-standing Eritrean grievances against the UN and the US have been amplified in rhetoric emerging from the war, perhaps limiting the direct role that can be played by the Western donor community, but adroit coordination and consensus-building on how best to engage the Eritrean government could reveal possibilities for greater alignment and mutual engagement in the region. Ethiopia’s Western partners should consider more formalized and structured coordination with Gulf countries and China in policymaking towards the Horn of Africa. Until the varying and interlinked situations are addressed more holistically and in closer coordination, the patchwork of actors, influence and interference will continue.
