Regional insecurity
Conflict resolution
Tanzania’s military contribution to addressing regional insecurity has been a central component of its foreign policy since independence. This is now being tested by two neighbouring conflicts that cut across its regional commitments:
- Conflict in the eastern DRC. Personnel from the Tanzania People’s Defence Force (TPDF) have been deployed in the eastern DRC since 2013, when, alongside fellow SADC members Malawi and South Africa, they formed the Force Intervention Brigade – a specialized offensive component of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. At a heads of state summit in Nairobi in June 2022, the EAC agreed to deploy its own EAC Regional Force (EACRF) in the DRC to suppress resurgent militia violence. Tanzania did not raise objections publicly, but conspicuously was represented at the summit by the high commissioner to Kenya, rather than the president herself or a minister – reflecting government concerns over potential overlap with the existing TPDF deployment. Tanzania subsequently attempted to leverage alternative offers of support to the EACRF, including seconding an experienced army general to the EAC headquarters in Arusha.
- Insurgency in northern Mozambique. Since 2017, Mozambique’s northern region of Cabo Delgado, which borders Tanzania, has suffered a violent insurgency led by an armed group known locally as Al-Shabaab. At the peak of the insurrection in early 2021, Mozambican president Filipe Nyusi visited Tanzania but failed to secure commitment for a military intervention from Magufuli. Samia reversed this decision soon after taking office as president, endorsing SADC’s decision in June 2021 to deploy a regional force. (Tanzania contributed 274 troops.) Suggestions had arisen in Mozambique by early 2022 that this SADC contingent was ineffectual, a problem ascribed to unpopularity with local communities and a lack of intent to engage beyond self-protection – in marked contrast to Rwanda’s bilateral military presence. Subsequently, however, relations between Nyusi and Samia have become notably closer, with two state visits by Samia to Mozambique in 2022 resulting in a bilateral agreement, under which a new TPDF contingent of 300 troops was deployed in December.
Tanzania’s previous approach to the insecurity on the border with Mozambique seldom strayed into the diplomatic realm, instead treating the issue as an internal matter for suppression. Though the Tanzanian security services are highly influential in this area, and information surrounding the conflict is strictly controlled within Tanzania, the increased initiative among politicians to strengthen high-level ties with Mozambique is an overdue shift of foreign policy back towards economic diplomacy, particularly considering the importance to Tanzania of a proposed $40 billion natural gas project in its southern region of Lindi.
In relation to the eastern DRC, Tanzania has shown diplomatic agility to avoid joining the ineffectual EACRF, which eventually withdrew at the end of 2023. Yet there is a need to reflect on the long-term implications of limited engagement. President Samia’s first regional leadership position is as the chairperson of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation for 2024. As Tanzania continues with its own dual intervention in Mozambique while lending its support to a newly agreed SADC mission in the DRC for 2024, its reluctance to engage fully on EAC security issues may amplify a perception of divided loyalties.
Mediation
Despite its geographical scale, Tanzania’s record of internal peace and support for liberation have enabled it to be viewed as a non-threatening regional player – helping to unlock an important mediation role. Examples include: Burundi, where Nyerere and Mkapa each led or facilitated peace processes in the 1990s and 2016 respectively; Kenya, where following the 2007-08 post-election violence, Kikwete made a crucial intervention in his capacity as African Union (AU) chairperson; in the DRC, where Mkapa acted as AU special envoy during talks in 2008–09; in the case of Rwanda’s civil war in 1992; and in hosting negotiations in Arusha in 2007 over a Uganda–DRC boundary dispute. After leaving office as president, Kikwete was appointed AU high representative for Libya in 2016 and has chaired the SADC panel of elders since 2021.
Despite its geographical scale, Tanzania’s record of internal peace and support for liberation have enabled it to be viewed as a non-threatening regional player – helping to unlock an important mediation role.
Magufuli’s public rebuke of such diplomatic efforts as a ‘burden’ – a stance compounded by his deep suspicion of Kikwete and other senior figures in CCM – brought a notable decline in Tanzania’s mediation role from 2016 to 2020. Under Samia’s presidency, there have been signs of revival: for example, talks between Ethiopia’s federal government and Oromo rebels were held in Zanzibar in April 2023, though Tanzania did not fulfil any formal mediation function.
Refugees and human rights
Nyerere’s Tanzania was among the most welcoming countries in Africa for refugees, and present-day officials continue to emphasize this historical record as a foreign policy asset. However, Tanzania’s commitment has wavered in recent years, as seen in Magufuli’s CRRF withdrawal in 2018 and accusations of intimidatory treatment and forcible returns of Burundian and Mozambican refugees between 2017 and 2021.
The perception of wavering commitment partly reflects a failure of foreign policy to coordinate among overlapping and sometimes contradictory regional, local and international interests. Magufuli’s approach to Burundian refugees prioritized ties with Burundi’s government, while the alleged refoulement of northern Mozambican refugees in 2021 aligned with Tanzania’s internalized response to the conflict. Ultimately, Tanzania’s refugee population is small relative to those of several neighbours, and while funding support is insufficient, maintaining a hostile approach to refugee populations might both worsen this situation and undermine Tanzania’s appeal to historical solidarity.
Similar trends are visible in Tanzania’s 2019 decision to prevent individuals and NGOs from filing cases against it at the AfCHPR – a move motivated by the increasing volume of judgments raised against the Tanzanian government in the court. President Samia has indicated a willingness to review this stance as part of her broader agenda for governance reforms, but no action has yet been taken to fully rejoin the court. Given that the AfCHPR is hosted on Tanzanian soil, in Arusha, the withdrawal itself may be more detrimental to the country’s external image than the number of cases it had accumulated.
