Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine has led to a concerning renewed partnership with North Korea. In accounting for this development, two narratives have dominated academic and policy-related discussions. The first narrative suggests that the burgeoning cooperation between North Korea and Russia is little more than a short-term, transactional relationship, contingent on the Ukraine war, for which North Korea has been providing Russia with artillery and other weapons. In contrast, the second account portrays relations between Moscow and Pyongyang as longer-term in nature, going beyond a mere cash-for-weapons exchange. Instead, this narrative suggests that the two states intend to develop a formal alliance, possibly also involving China, as part of a sustained ideological and strategic challenge to the US’s leadership of the post-war international order.
Drawing on extensive interviews with current and former South Korean officials, together with recent high-level statements from North Korea, Russia and China, this research paper argues that the relationship between North Korea and Russia is more complex than suggested by either of those two narratives. While the foundations of the revived partnership between North Korea and Russia were predominantly transactional – and remained so in the early part of the Ukraine war – subsequent actions by both countries, especially after the first year of the war, reveal a longer-term relationship that is both strategic and ideological, particularly given Pyongyang’s firm commitment to accelerating its missile and nuclear weapons programmes.
Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, relations between Russia and North Korea have evolved rapidly to the point that, in October 2024, NATO secretary-general Mark Rutte confirmed that North Korea had deployed troops to western Russia. This deployment followed a ‘comprehensive strategic partnership’ treaty between the two states, signed by Russian president Vladimir Putin and North Korean supreme leader Kim Jong Un in June. This milestone treaty made clear that the two countries would not only assist each other in the event of any external aggression, but would strengthen cooperation in the military, technological and security domains.
Russia’s need for assistance in its war on Ukraine has allowed North Korea to leverage the situation for its own short-term advantage, in helping to satisfy Russia’s immediate requirement for weapons – whether artillery or ballistic missiles – in return for food aid and financial assistance. Beyond the short term, however, North Korea is also likely to receive advanced technological and military assistance from Russia – the extent of which, concerningly, remains unknown – and has already gained Russia’s unwavering support in the UN Security Council.
The mutual relationship also serves the wider purpose of both states in seeking to undermine and erode the institutions and legitimacy of the US-led international order. By leveraging Russia’s permanent membership and veto power on the UN Security Council, and by preventing the institution from devising – let alone enforcing – sanctions against them, the two countries can escape from the consequences of sanctions-violating activities, while also demonstrating a united ideological front against the US and its allies.
Other important factors, however, must also be considered with respect to the future trajectory of the relationship: namely, the domestic goals of North Korea’s supreme leader, Kim Jong Un, and the role of China.
North Korea’s cooperation with Russia is tethered to the fundamental domestic goal of the Kim Jong Un regime – its own long-term survival.
North Korea’s cooperation with Russia is tethered to the fundamental domestic goal of the Kim Jong Un regime – its own long-term survival, central to which is the expanded pursuit of nuclear weapons and missile capabilities. As Kim Jong Un continues to accelerate North Korea’s nuclear and missile development programmes, any possible technological support from Russia will allow his regime to enhance the scope and sophistication of these programmes. At the same time, Kim Jong Un will use the propaganda value of these advances to strengthen his regime’s social and ideological control over North Korea’s population. At present, Pyongyang has no desire to abandon its plans for the development of advanced missile and weaponized nuclear capabilities. Indeed, it only seeks to increase the quality and quantity of its nuclear weapons and delivery systems. Nevertheless, what makes North Korea’s current nuclear development and security cooperation with Russia particularly concerning is that North Korea exhibits no appetite for engaging in dialogue with South Korea or the US, nor for any talks that seek denuclearization.
Meanwhile, China remains North Korea’s largest trading partner, but has adopted a cautious approach to North Korea’s turn towards Russia. China seeks to maintain its influence over the Korean peninsula, while also siding with Russia and North Korea in opposing the West’s response to the Ukraine war. China’s actual view on the deployment of North Korean troops to assist Putin’s war effort remains unknown. Nevertheless, the burgeoning bilateral relationship between two of its close partners is likely to pose a significant challenge which China cannot simply ignore.
With so many unknown variables – not least the possibility of North Korea sending additional troops to fight in Russia’s ongoing war with Ukraine – the increasingly entrenched nature of North Korea–Russia cooperation poses clear risks to regional and global stability. These risks include the prospect of North Korea procuring advanced military and missile technology from Russia, which it could use in any provocations directed against South Korea or even the US; and, more concerningly in the long term, a fundamental undermining of the UN as a core global security institution in the post-war international order.
