Beyond foreign relations, North Korea–Russia military cooperation will have profound consequences on two key domestic objectives pursued by the Kim Jong Un regime: first, increasing the quality and quantity of North Korean nuclear and missile capabilities; second, and related, reinforcing the regime’s control over its population of just over 26 million people by boosting North Korea’s self-perceived status as a ‘full-fledged nuclear state’. Even if the eventual end of the Ukraine war reduces Russia’s need for North Korean artillery, missiles and troops, Pyongyang will look to capitalize on its resurrected relations with Moscow to strengthen its domestic nuclear weapons development. Questions remain as to whether the missiles tested by North Korea to date have contained technology directly supplied by Russia.
Yet Western countries are rightly concerned by recent tests that have demonstrated a noticeable improvement in the scope and sophistication of Pyongyang’s capabilities, with North Korean missiles flying higher and remaining airborne for longer. In 2022, North Korea launched over 90 ballistic and cruise missiles – more than in any other previous year. Two such launches were of the Hwasong-17 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) on 27 March and 18 November. These missiles have an operational range of up to 15,000 kilometres and, therefore, could potentially reach the US mainland. Meanwhile, amid North Korea’s ongoing cash-for-weapons exchange with Russia, Kim Jong Un accelerated the development of his nuclear programme by upgrading North Korea’s nuclear doctrine. In September 2022, Kim passed a new law that lowered the threshold and widened the conditions under which North Korea would resort to using nuclear weapons. Under this new doctrine, nuclear weapons could be used in the event of a nuclear or non-nuclear attack by ‘hostile forces’ on ‘the command-and-control system over the state nuclear forces’. The possibility of using nuclear weapons for offensive purposes was also mentioned for the first time.
As Putin’s need for North Korean munitions has become increasingly urgent, North Korea has benefited not just from receiving financial and food assistance but also, most likely, Russian advanced missile and military technology. While the specific nature of cooperation on the latter remains unknown, the probable provision of military technology has provided a useful opportunity for Kim Jong Un to strengthen North Korea’s nuclear development and self-perception as a nuclear state.
Taking advantage of the inability of international institutions to constrain its heightened nuclear and missile development, not least due to North Korea securing Russian support, the Kim regime refused numerous calls by the administration of US president Joe Biden for talks ‘without preconditions’, including in July 2023, after Pyongyang had conducted its second test of a solid-fuel Hwasong-18 ICBM. At that time, the missile had the longest flight time of any North Korean missile, completing 1,001 kilometres at a maximum altitude of 6,648 kilometres. This capability was subsequently surpassed by a new, solid-fuel Hwasong-19 ICBM, launched on 31 October. The Hwasong-18 and Hwasong-19 launches raised questions of Russian involvement, such as whether the missile had been supplied by Russia directly; created indigenously with technology transferred by Russia; or if North Korea had itself acquired missile technology illicitly, without the knowledge of the Kremlin. Comparable speculation again arose in November 2023, after North Korea successfully launched a reconnaissance satellite following repeated failed attempts earlier that year.
In these specific cases, the likelihood that Russian technology was used is low, particularly as Kim had met Putin less than two months before the latter satellite launch. Nonetheless, the greater possibility of Russian expertise and technology being provided both now and in the future will have severe consequences for the security of the Korean peninsula and for the broader global nuclear non-proliferation regime. Upgraded relations between Pyongyang and Moscow mean that any North Korean acquisition of information about Russian capabilities, which previously happened through illicit channels, will likely now take place with the Kremlin’s active support. Although the specific technology that Russia intends to provide – or has already provided – to North Korea remains unknown, several interviewees for this paper concluded that North Korea actively seeks technology to perfect its second-strike capability.
