Systems analysis of Kufra reveals the intricacies of a conflict economy shaped by geography, historical legacies, social dynamics, and a blend of licit and illicit activities. Kufra’s transition from an agricultural hub to a militarized, economically driven cross-border town began long before the 2011 uprising, but subsequently accelerated due to external pressures, internal conflict and the collapse of state authority. It is in this context that migrant smuggling and TIP have flourished in Kufra. This section seeks to expand upon these findings through the systems analysis in Figure 4. As with all systems analyses in this paper, complex social dynamics have been simplified to the greatest extent possible for clarity.
A local dispute over territory with national and transnational aspects
A dispute over territory lies at the heart of social dynamics in Kufra. The town comprises two principal social groups: Arabs and Tebus. While there are no publicly available statistics, the Arab community in Kufra is believed to number around 55,000 people, of which only approximately 5,000 are from non-Zway Arab tribes. The indigenous Tebu community is believed to number less than 10,000.
Physical segregation is an ongoing problem. Kufra’s communal make-up has long been a source of tension. Enduring rifts remain, either at a group level, for example Tebu vs Zway, or at a subgroup level, for example Awlad Amira vs Menaya. Within Kufra, residential areas are physically divided between Tebu and Zway, and Zway residential areas are also divided by familial branches, a tradition that goes back to the pre-1969 administration of Kufra. Under the Gaddafi regime (1969–2011), several mixed residential areas were built for military families. However, after the 2011 conflict, the two communities were again fully separated into respective residential blocks.
Authority over Kufra is disputed. Tebu groups argue that they should be recognized as indigenous to Kufra and its surrounding areas and, consequently, should have at least equal opportunities to those of the Zway and other Arabs.
Authority over Kufra is disputed. Tebu groups argue that they should be recognized as indigenous to Kufra and its surrounding areas and, consequently, should have at least equal opportunities to those of the Zway and other Arabs.
On the other hand, the Zway’s perception of the Tebu as ‘less Libyan’ has not only fuelled ethnic tensions but has also influenced the struggle for control over smuggling routes and access to resources. It contributes to the justification of exclusionary practices in local governance and the distribution of resources, reinforcing the Tebu’s sense of marginalization and their historical grievances against the state and other Libyan communities.
The Tebu post-2011 political awakening
One of the most prominent grievances post-2011 is the Tebu’s quest for an effective role and involvement in local government, and the Zway’s efforts to maintain exclusivity of the system. As shown in the systems analysis in Figure 4, the Tebu’s involvement in the 2011 conflict triggered a political awakening and a revival of their claims of land ownership. This set the Tebu on a collision course with the Zway. Local governance structures in Kufra also exacerbated tensions owing to poor representation, development and service delivery for the Tebu. Zway control of these structures was, and is, perceived as a social prerogative.
In the aftermath of the 2011 revolution, a spate of identity-based criminality and violence occurred. This included killings and kidnappings, looting of shops, and the hijacking of property and possessions, which ultimately expanded into a short-lived conflict.
2015 conflict and the re-emergence of Zway dominance
In 2015, the Tebu community sought to address its marginalization by local government. The Tebu used the widening national-level political divisions to convince the eastern Libya-based rival national government, known as the Interim Government, to approve the establishment of a parallel Tebu local governance authority in Kufra and nearby Rabyanah Oasis. This decision directly fuelled the discontent of the Zway community, which contributed to the outbreak of renewed violence in the same year. Over 100 people are believed to have been killed in the fighting and hundreds of others were displaced. The Zway ultimately expelled Tebu armed forces from Kufra and prevented the establishment of the Tebu authority, retaining Zway dominance over local government.
Local security services also remain closely connected to the Zway leadership. These include the town’s security directorate (which is akin to a police unit) and Subul al-Salam, an armed faction affiliated with the Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF) of Khalifa Haftar, an armed commander who has risen to dominate eastern Libya and large parts of southern Libya in the post-2011 period. The Tebu community was left without any armed factions in Kufra to represent it.
Kufra’s economy and the growth of migrant smuggling
It was not a collapse of Kufra’s formal economic sector in the post-2011 period that drove the rapid expansion of migrant smuggling and trafficking. Prior to this period, the local economy, which has historically been dependent on trans-Saharan trade, had already deteriorated and transformed due to political and security factors. A critical element of the local economy was Kufra’s agricultural sector, which had been a key focus of state development efforts from the 1960s to the 1980s. However, the impact of war with Chad (1978–87) and international sanctions following the Lockerbie bombing in 1988 saw the character of the local economy change and agricultural production fall. Kufra emerged as a militarized area, where the state created military installations for war with Chad and where Gaddafi-funded revolutionary armed elements, such as the Palestinian Liberation Organization, created bases for their operations.
The decline of state-run enterprises in agriculture
As shown in Figure 5, the production of crops by the state-run Kufra Agricultural Project was clearly in decline ahead of the revolution. Wheat production peaked in 1985 at 27,099 tonnes, falling to 1,100 tonnes in 2011, while barley production fell from a peak of 9,000 tonnes in 2000 to 400 tonnes in 2011. A 2007 UN study found that agriculture was the third largest sector in terms of employment in Kufra, after public administration and education, yet it was ‘not a profitable sector’ in terms of wealth creation, job supply or trade.
