Trump’s ‘electroshock’ on Ukraine ends the debate: Europe cannot rely on the US for its security

Europe will still hope to make good use of its cards in any peace negotiations Trump plans with Moscow. But now it must decide how to pay for its own defence.

Expert comment Published 14 February 2025 Updated 7 March 2025 4 minute READ

Bronwen Maddox

Director and Chief Executive

The Munich Security Conference begins today with European leaders in a state of shock, following the news that President Donald Trump has spoken directly to Russian President Vladimir Putin in a 90-minute phone call. Trump evidently did so without consulting Ukraine or NATO allies. He announced the call after the fact, along with the news that direct negotiations to end the war in Ukraine would begin ‘immediately’. He proposed a summit in the near future in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. 

With his actions the president has unilaterally lifted Putin’s diplomatic isolation and provoked astounded reactions across Europe. When the initial shock subsides, the significance of the change in US policy that this represents will sink in. The conference has much to consider – but at least certain truths are now painfully clear.

Walking back

Trump’s credentials as a dealmaker are now unquestionably damaged. This week, before any negotiations have commenced, his administration has publicly vowed that Ukraine will not be part of NATO, implied that Russia could keep territory it has taken in its war, and firmly stated that no American troops will defend Ukraine. 

Boris Pistorius, Germany’s defence minister, was the first to make the point that there is no art in any deal that makes the most important concessions before negotiations even begin. Among other defence ministers and intelligence chiefs gathering for the conference, ‘appeasement’ is the term being exchanged, in deliberate recognition of its historical resonance here in Munich.

Yet even that fails to capture the full significance of President Trump’s actions. Trump has made clear that friends and allies count for nothing. He has fundamentally undermined European confidence in US commitment to NATO and the principle of mutual defence – the underpinning of peace and security in Europe for over 75 years. And he has jettisoned the notion that the US should try to set the principles by which the world is ordered. President Trump has made clear that the pursuit of what he sees as immediate US interest is more than a campaign slogan, it is his resolved policy.

As was the case following Trump’s Gaza proposals, US officials attempted to walk back or reframe certain elements of the president’s language: the US might still help contribute to a security guarantee for Ukraine, it was stated. Europe’s leaders will be far from convinced. The damage has been done. Even after the president leaves office it could take years, even decades to repair.

Europe’s response

EU countries and the UK now have immediate, difficult decisions to make: how to support Ukraine; how to defend the European continent; and what form US relations should now take. 

On Ukraine, European countries have a few cards to play. They hold most of the frozen Russian assets which presumably will form part of a negotiation with Putin. They have also been a prime customer for Russian gas. Even if the pressure to buy this cheap energy again is rising (it is an audible issue in the German election campaign), it remains a bargaining point. 

The US has made clear that it does not intend to help defend a line of cessation of fighting between Ukraine and Russia.

But any durable peace requires a convincing security guarantee for Ukraine. That is now imperilled. Besides ruling out NATO membership, the US has made clear that it does not intend to help defend a line of cessation of fighting between Ukraine and Russia, stating that any such defence will have to come from European countries. 

In practice, that is likely to mean a military presence deployed by the UK, France and Poland. But any useful commitment would absorb almost all of the UK’s diminished armed forces. And it is hard to see how any purely European defence of Ukraine could be effective without support from US airpower and missile technology. (The Trump team has hinted this might be available).  

The message is clear – an ‘electroshock’, as French President Emmanuel Macron called it: European countries will have to step up defence spending if they intend to protect themselves from Russian aggression.

European countries…face unpalatable political choices: whether to pare back welfare, health and pension benefits to pay for defence – a hard message to give to voters.

Trump has called for NATO members to spend 5 per cent of GDP on defence – essentially to double military spending. To do that, European countries may have to consider loosening the fiscal rules that have governed their borrowing for more than a decade. 

Beyond that, they face unpalatable political choices: whether to pare back welfare, health and pension benefits to pay for defence – a hard message to give to voters.

For the UK, the choice is similar. Politicians of all parties have been steadfast behind Ukraine. But now they have to work out how to step up defence spending. The government has pledged to commit 2.5 per cent of GDP, up from the current 2.3 per cent – but not said by when. 

Lord Robertson’s review of UK defence is expected to make clear how strained British armed forces are; it is thought to say that the entire UK forces have less than three days’ worth of ammunition. Meanwhile the UK nuclear deterrent absorbs 0.8 per cent of GDP. The government is looking at the benefits bill as one source of paying for other spending, but the politics of securing a reduction are formidable. 

Looking further ahead, the UK and EU have real decisions to make about how much to stay close to the US. A month ago, the choice might have seemed obvious: as close as possible given shared values and commercial interests. Now, it is distinctly less so. Trump’s suggestion that he may place tariffs on countries charging VAT, including the EU and UK, present additional threats.

The UK is trying to walk a careful path. This week it sided with the US in not signing an agreement on AI governance (although it perhaps withheld its signature for different reasons). On the other hand, the UK has criticized Trump’s notion of clearing Palestinians out of Gaza.  

Events this week may give the UK new cause to align more firmly with the EU. Both are likely to explore deeper ties with the Middle East, Africa and parts of Asia. But there are no obvious methods by which European leaders should handle a president who seems determined to rewire international relations and alliances. 

The immediate priority for Europe now, and the Munich Conference, is how best to support Ukraine. But the challenges are much wider than that. It remains to be seen if Europe’s leaders can unify to shore up defence, at a time of political uncertainty in France and Germany. Even if they can, it is far from clear that will be enough to deter an aggressive, badly mauled Russia, absent the might of the United States.