This month it was reported in the Turkish media that Turkey was in talks to sell its long-unused S-400 Triumf air defence system, with Qatar and the United Arab Emirates mentioned as potential buyers. The purchase would reportedly consist of the two systems, plus 120 interceptor missiles.
The UAE has not commented on the reports, but it would be hardly surprising if the Emiratis were seeking to diversify their air defence portfolio. With the UAE having come under Iranian drone and missile bombardment since the US-Israeli war on Iran began in late February, options to improve the country’s layered air defences are likely to be in high demand.
The UAE already operates the US Terminal High Altitude Area Defence system (THAAD) for missiles at similar altitudes. Acquiring the S-400 would deliver the UAE a uniquely diverse air defence arsenal, with THAAD and the S-400 sitting alongside Russian Pantsir S1 systems in addition to a wide variety of US, South Korean and Israeli systems.
UAE navigates trade-offs
According to the reports, the deal is in a preliminary stage. If concluded, the sale could have adverse consequences for the UAE as it tries to balance its diverse defence partners.
The UAE was previously in an advanced stage of talks to purchase up to 50 F-35 fighter jets from the US. In 2021, the UAE suspended the talks, which had dragged on amid Washington’s concerns over the Chinese company Huawei’s role in the country. However, the prospect of returning to the purchase was left open.
If the UAE purchases the S-400, it is highly unlikely that its prospects of purchasing F-35s could be revived. Washington’s main concern with Turkey’s acquisition of the S-400 was over the potential for sensitive information about the F-35’s stealth profile and electronic warfare signature to be shared with Russia via the S-400’s radar and sensor systems. It’s likely that the US would have similar concerns if the missiles were present in the Gulf.
There is also uncertainty as to whether Moscow would allow the systems to be sold. Under the end-user license, exporting the systems to a third party would require Russian approval. According to Russian sources, the possibility of a sale is still being analysed. Although multiple sources have claimed Moscow views the potential sale to the UAE in a ‘positive light’, keeping the system in Turkey would drive a wedge between Ankara and the West and keep the F-35 out of Turkey’s hands.
Turkey’s search for alternatives
For Turkey, the S-400 saga represents a near-decade long demonstration of the tricky politics of defence technology.
In 2017, while searching for high-altitude air defence options, the Turkish government began talks to acquire either the Franco-Italian SAMP/T, or the US Patriot system. Turkey nearly purchased the Patriot twice. The US State Department even approved its sale in 2018, but the deal fell through after the Turkish government demanded a greater deal of technology transfer than the US was prepared to give.
When poor relations with the French government over Turkish actions in Syria, Libya and the Eastern Mediterranean stalled the possibility of acquiring SAMP/T, Turkey acquired the S-400 from Russia in 2019. The US government promptly suspended Turkey’s role in the F-35 programme and has kept the six aircraft the Turkish government has paid for.
Attempts to solve the S-400 conundrum
Since then, Turkey has found itself stuck with the S-400 and unable to purchase F-35s. Various creative solutions to the issue have been proposed and dismissed.
Turkey selling the S-400s to a third party would require end-user agreement (allegedly now forthcoming from Russia regarding the UAE). One failed proposal was to de-activate the S-400s via the removal of vital components, which in turn would be stored at a site guarded by the US.
Destruction of the systems would have been costly and politically unwise. In September 2025, it was revealed that Turkey had discussed returning the missiles to Russia, which was later dismissed by Moscow.
If the systems are transferred to the UAE, the door will open for Turkey to potentially re-join the F-35 programme. Doing so would have far-reaching consequences for intra-NATO dynamics.
The F-35 problem is the largest blocker to further defence cooperation with Turkey, and solving the issue would enable a deepening of defence industrial integration when Europe needs it most. However, supplying Turkey with the F-35 could potentially exacerbate tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean with Greece and Cyprus, in turn potentially splitting the EU and NATO on defence.
Air defence remains costly
The whole saga is insightful for understanding Turkish foreign policy and defence technology. It shows there are limits to how much has changed in recent years.
Firstly, the situation demonstrates how high-end air defence systems remain stubbornly resistant to innovations in the wider defence ecosystem, including those that have come out of Ukraine.
One remarkable feature of Ukraine’s ability to resist aggression is its fielding of new, domestically produced interceptor drones, long-range one-way attack (OWA) drones, command-and-control systems, and even crude cruise missiles. Driven by startup-style enterprises, these developments have re-shaped procurement cycles and their battlefield deployment.
However, due to the inherently complex nature of firing missiles at missiles, air defence remains a domain that is doggedly resistant to change. As much as the proliferation of ballistic missiles and OWA drones has made carrying out long-range strikes easier and cheaper, air defence remains in the realm of large R&D budgets, state-led procurement, and political approval for sales. While offensive weapons have proliferated, the systems required to protect states from such weapons have not.
Limits of hedging
Because of the highly technical nature of such defensive systems, the saga also neatly encapsulates the limits of Turkish attempts to ‘hedge’ by balancing relations between external powers, especially the US and Russia.
An inability to integrate the S-400 into NATO radar systems prevented Turkey from ever deploying them, in addition to stalling its F-35 procurement. Privately, there is a realization among some within Turkey that their purchase was a mistake.
The main value of air defence systems lies just as much in their effective networking and integration as in the individual systems. Without streamlined command and control, the whole system fails to become more than the sum of its parts.
European opponents of more defence collaboration with Turkey should note that, historically, excluding Turkey from weapons development programmes has not prevented it from acquiring similar systems, whereas including Ankara can constrain its behaviour in other ways.
The S-400 purchase represented a defiant demonstration of Turkey’s ability to go it alone, exercising sovereignty in its procurement choices and balancing itself between its NATO allies and other partners. But the system’s subsequent mothballing, storage, and eventual likely disposal – without ever being switched on – represents the very real limit of such a policy.
The S-400 saga encapsulates the key features of defence technology diplomacy. It demonstrates clearly how, despite changes in the wider market, states rely on hegemonic powers for the technology needed to defeat ballistic missiles. It also shows how, in some cases, there is a limit to hedging between alliance blocs.
Although the S-400 may be a cost-efficient means of bolstering the UAE’s air defences at a time of considerable uncertainty, the UAE would be wise to consider how Turkey buying Russian weapons forced it down a path with consequences for its other alliances.