Budget pressures have taken a heavy toll on the British army, threatening the UK’s ability to be a serious partner on NATO’s eastern border and potentially undermining its leadership role in the alliance. The army has been relegated compared to the other branches of the UK military, even as Russia’s increasingly aggressive behaviour has emphasized the importance of land-warfare capabilities. That downgrading must be reversed: the army requires increased resources to replenish its ammunition, replace kit sent to Ukraine, modernize equipment and boost recruitment.
A leading role on the eastern flank
The army has already played a crucial role in NATO’s response to Russian bellicosity. The UK has served as the framework state, or leader, for the multinational battlegroup in Estonia since the 2016 summit decision to forward-deploy personnel and equipment along NATO’s eastern flank. This was a significant intensification of NATO’s defensive capabilities, (although the UK had already been pushing back against Russian aggression by providing support to NATO partners Georgia and Ukraine).
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 led the alliance to increase its military presence in Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. For the UK, this meant deploying an additional temporary second battlegroup to Estonia from January to December 2022. In addition to the increase in personnel, the UK sent air-defence systems and helicopters that remain in the country.
These changes have been welcomed by the Estonian government and mark the UK out as one of eight framework nations taking on increased responsibilities for NATO readiness along its eastern flank.
Falling behind
Now this leadership role is in question. Despite increasing the defence budget since 2022, the UK has fallen behind other NATO member states that also increased spending over this period.
At least 23 out of 32 NATO member states will meet or exceed the alliance’s defence spending goal of 2 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2024. That is good news for NATO’s ability to better deter Russia and to continue to support Ukraine. However, for the UK, this means that it is no longer a standout performer. In 2021, defence spending of 2.29 per cent of its GDP made it the fourth highest spender compared to the size of its economy in NATO. In 2024, it has fallen to ninth place, spending 2.33 per cent.
While all three branches of the military play a vital role in NATO, it is the army that takes a lead role for the so-called enhanced forward presence, a key part of the strategy for countering the Russian threat. Yet the British army has had to accept large personnel cuts in recent years, which could weaken the UK’s role in NATO and its importance on the eastern flank.
Keir Starmer’s new government is unlikely to change its predecessor’s stated ambition of being an active and committed NATO ally. But it is doubtful a leadership role can be reconciled with army cuts, especially at a time when many other NATO member states are expanding their armies.
A way forward
The increase in Russian grey-zone actions since the war in Georgia in 2008 has shown that Russia does not limit itself to conventional warfighting. Moscow has also been active in the hybrid domain, conducting deniable acts of sabotage on NATO member states’ territory, particularly in countries where multinational battlegroups are stationed, as well as in the Baltic Sea.
This provides the UK government with a possible way forward. By investing more in the army’s ability to analyse, deter and counter hybrid threats, the UK will remain an important NATO partner and improve its own resilience.
This is an area where the army could build on investments made in recent years. However, the focus should shift from expecting cyber capabilities to replace some traditional functions towards better integrating conventional and newer cyber and information warfare capabilities. Hybrid threats will only continue to grow in importance, and the UK so far has not invested enough to in its abilities to deter and counter them.
This will need to go hand in hand with increasing investment in the service responsible for defence on land – a crucial objective for NATO’s eastern flank that will endure. The UK must improve its ability to recruit and retain troops. This will require, among other things, expensive investments in soldiers’ housing to improve standards.
The army also requires a range of equipment updates, including to its fleet of armoured vehicles. The ongoing war in Ukraine has also shown the need to invest in drones and theatre air defence systems.
Investing in additional equipment will also include taking a closer look at industrial policy in the UK and ensuring that UK industry is able to keep pace with the demands of the defence environment.
Recent news about the potential downgrading of the furnace at Port Talbot steelworks would have implications for the UK’s domestic steel production. This could have a knock-on effect on the reliability of defence supply chains and might require the UK to import steel from abroad.
The UK’s close working relationship with the Estonian government provides a good basis to increase its understanding of hybrid threats, and to learn how to deter and counter them.