What Haitians want from the next phase of UN and international support

Improving security: short-term challenges, long-term issues and the role of the international community

A majority of Haitians (50.7 per cent) believe their security situation is ‘better’ or ‘much better’ (see Figure 1). This perception in part likely reflects the arrival of the first wave of GSF personnel in April 2026 – replacing the discredited former Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission.

However, other contextual factors may also have shaped public opinion. Most notably, from December 2025 to February 2026 the Haitian National Police (HNP) intensified its own attacks on gangs and gang leaders, in preparation for the phased deployment of the full set of GSF forces. The HNP’s operations – supported by the army and international forces, according to the UN – killed a reported 1,343 gang members,5 disrupted gang alliances and fractured one of the main gang coalitions, Viv Ansanm. These blows to criminal organizations, along with the ‘anticipation effect’ created by the arrival of an advance team of GSF soldiers from Chad, may have contributed to survey respondents’ positive perceptions of security.

Figure 1. Haitians already feel that their security is improving

— Source: Chatham House/Q-Q Research Consultants nationwide survey of 1,332 Haitian adults conducted in May 2026.

That sense of security varies, however, and the positive aggregate national perception is not universally replicated at the regional level. Citizens in Haiti’s south – one of the regions hardest hit by gang control and violence – are more likely to report feeling less safe than they did before. Compared to a national aggregate figure of 45.6 per cent of respondents who feel security has deteriorated, no less than 67.7 per cent of residents in the south of the country believe they are less secure now.6 (The survey shows no large differences regarding perceptions of security in the community by gender.)

Haitian public opinion towards the GSF is modestly positive. There is a plurality of support (49.5 per cent) for the GSF (see Figure 2), although the difference between this share and the share of respondents who disapprove of the GSF (43.6 per cent) is within the 95 per cent confidence interval.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, people in regions that have suffered the highest levels of violence are more supportive of the GSF’s presence in the country. Nearly 68 per cent of respondents from the south of Haiti approve or strongly approve of the UN/multinational security force. Age-related differentials are also noteworthy: at a national level, when the survey results are disaggregated by age, young people between the ages of 18 and 29 show the most support for the GSF, with 58.4 per cent reporting that they ‘approve’ or ‘strongly approve’ of it.

Figure 2. Haitians are split in their approval of the GSF, with citizens in areas affected by the violence more supportive

Figure 3. Popular confidence in whether the GSF can accomplish its goals is less clear

Welcoming the presence of the GSF in Haiti is not the same as believing the UN-mandated force will solve the country’s security crisis, however. Only a minority of Haitians – 36.5 per cent – have ‘some trust’ or ‘a lot of trust’ that the GSF will fulfil its mission (see Figure 3).

Haitian demands for public policy: beyond hard security

Security remains, by a large margin, the number one priority for Haitians. In the survey, 81.3 per cent of respondents cite security as one of their top three priorities, with 48.3 per cent listing it as their number one. The top three security priorities cited by respondents are dismantling armed groups, protecting the population, and reforming the police and state security apparatus. These reforms will be complicated, however, and must be organized to a clear timeline.7

Issues beyond hard security are important, too. When asked to select their priorities for improving community security from a list of seven options, respondents ranked education (69.1 per cent) and healthcare (67.4 per cent) in the top three.

Figure 4. Haitians want to see gang leaders and members brought to justice

One of the most striking findings of the survey is the desire that gang leaders and gang members responsible for the violence and collapse of law and order in Haiti face justice. Almost two-thirds of respondents (64.5 per cent) support prison time for gang leaders and members (Figure 4). An unsurprising corollary of this is that very little support exists for potential political deals that could allow gang leaders and their key lieutenants to reintegrate after a negotiated peace. On the idea of granting amnesty to armed group members, 66.9 per cent of respondents are not in favour (see Figure 5). Moreover, when asked, 61 per cent of Haitians either ‘disagree’ or ‘strongly disagree’ with permitting gang leaders and members to engage in a process of contrition and reintegration – even though exactly this sort of process has often formed the keystone for the negotiation of peace agreements (both successful and failed) in other countries, such as Colombia.8

Respondents are hostile, above all, to the idea that a peace settlement or elite bargain could enable gang members to have a seat at the table politically. There is broad rejection of the idea of government representation for gang leaders and members: 83.4 per cent of Haitians either ‘disagree’ or ‘strongly disagree’ with this as an option. In addition, 73.6 per cent of respondents reject the idea of offering gang leaders or members money to lay down weapons and disband.

Yet in addition to Haitians opposing gang leaders being politically rewarded for their brutal de facto control over large parts of the country, there is notable resistance even to the integration of gangs’ rank-and-file ‘foot soldiers’ into civilian life. This is despite the fact that around 50 per cent of this cohort are estimated to be children.9 The age of gang members did not feature in the survey questions; nonetheless, it is well known that children participate in gangs, and respondents would certainly have been aware of this fact.

Respondents are hostile, above all, to the idea that a peace settlement or elite bargain could enable gang members to have a seat at the table politically.

The widespread reported recruitment of minors by gangs presents one of the key transitional justice challenges for policymakers, given the concerns and complexities the issue raises in terms of ensuring the treatment of juvenile criminal suspects complies with international law. The 2007 Paris Principles state that children should be treated ‘primarily as victims of offences against international law’ and that ‘[w]herever possible, alternatives to judicial proceedings must be sought, in line with the Convention on the Rights of the Child and other international standards for juvenile justice’.10 This underscores the need for a carefully calibrated process of consultation and public education around DDR, to ensure that citizens not only understand the critical distinction between minors and adults when it comes to criminal justice, but also that measures to reintegrate rather than punish child gang members are not met with undue community opposition. All this implies a need to create a separate process for juveniles, with its own provisions and guidance around issues of accountability, and with clearly defined protocols for the judicial processing of under-age gang members.

Figure 5. Haitians are not supportive of amnesty for gang members

Haitians’ ambivalence towards reintegration indicates the need to foster better public understanding of distinctions between ‘amnesty’ and DDR; the latter could and should include some formal process for providing evaluation, education and psychosocial support to gang members who wish to be reintegrated into society, as well as a mechanism for working with communities to ensure reintegration is accepted by local residents.

The mandate of the UN Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH) includes support for designing DDR methods. These will need to take into account international law, the Paris Principles, and the need for gang-member reintegration to be peaceful, conducive to stability, and responsive to citizens’ perceptions and concerns. Lessons from other countries, including in Latin America, Central America and Africa, can potentially be adapted to the Haitian context, and can shed light on the benefits and potential pitfalls of different approaches to DDR.11

Despite suspicion of the political and ethical compromises that can accompany DDR, a large majority of Haitians nonetheless believe that it is important to create jobs for gang members in the formal economy. Just under 60 per cent of respondents ‘approve’ or ‘approve strongly’ of the idea of creating formal, legal employment opportunities for former gang members.

These attitudes give hope to the idea that a viable path exists for the social reintegration of gang members who have been caught up in the country’s security crisis, especially given that rank-and-file members have often been implicated in criminal activity as a result of indiscriminate, violent recruitment by gangs. The findings also underline popular recognition of the fact that economic development is essential for Haiti’s broader security.

Haitians’ attitudes towards elections, voting and their political class

There has not been an election in Haiti for 10 years, and no elected officials have occupied any government position – from local to national – for three years. The international community has pressed for an electoral timetable, despite concerns over security, institutional capacity and political fragmentation – as well as the risk that holding elections too soon could open the way for gang leaders, whether directly (through running their own gang-linked candidates) or indirectly (through coercion or bribery of candidates), to gain government representation. At the same time, Haitians are overwhelmingly supportive of elections and want them soon. The hurdles and risks, though, remain.

Figure 6. After years of unelected government, Haitians believe elections are important

Figure 7. A majority of Haitians support holding elections before the end of 2026

With 82.9 per cent of respondents preferring elections to be held in 2026 or 2027 (see Figure 7), the recent announcement of 13 December 2026 as the date for the first round of the next presidential election is a welcome step. But it may be difficult to accomplish all the tasks required to hold this first round of voting by then.

Although most Haitians have the current documentation needed to vote, there are important generational differences. After years of the country not holding elections, those who lack voter ID largely consist of young people between the ages of 18 and 29. While 88.8 per cent of respondents hold National Identification Office (ONI) cards (Figure 8), just 41.4 per cent of people in the critical 18–29 age segment have them.

Figure 8. Most Haitians already have voter cards, except young people

Figure 9. A large majority of Haitians claim they will vote in the elections

Figure 9 suggests that voter turnout could be high, as 85.1 per cent of respondents describe themselves as ‘a bit likely’, ‘most likely’ or ‘very likely’ to vote. That said, given the low levels of turnout in the past, this combined share is likely to be a ceiling at best; in reality, turnout could be considerably lower, especially if security remains an issue, open political and personal feuds continue among political leaders, and party fragmentation persists. A determining factor could be the extent to which credible measures are in place to ensure the integrity of elections. When asked in an open-ended question what would give them confidence in the democratic process and encourage their participation in potential future elections, a majority of respondents cited the presence of objective, honest election monitors as a key consideration (although responses to this question did not specify whether monitors should be domestic or international).

Figure 10. Trust in Haiti’s current political class is low

One area that seems largely to unite popular opinion is disgust with many of the politicians perceived as self-interested and as having contributed, or at least as having failed to tackle, Haiti’s multidimensional crisis. More than 75 per cent of respondents lack faith to one degree or another in their politicians – either professing to having ‘very little trust’ or ‘no trust at all’ in the country’s political class (see Figure 10). Only 2.9 per cent have ‘a lot of trust’ in politicians. Trust varies by age, with young people even more sceptical than the rest of the population: 81.5 per cent of this cohort say they lack confidence in the political class.

This lack of faith is an indication of the need for broader electoral reform. It also serves as warning of potential flashpoints of unrest during the preparations for, holding of and aftermath of future elections.

United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (2026), ‘Report of the Secretary-General’, S/2026/325, 14 April 2026, https://www.un.org/sexualviolenceinconflict/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/…ons-integrated- office-in-haiti-report-of-the-secretary-general/8788fc76-904c-49e0-abe6-6bab89bcf2de.pdf.
Samples were drawn from three broad regions: the North, which includes the North, Northeast and Northwest departments; the Centre, which includes the Artibonite, Centre and West departments; and the South, which includes the Grand Anse, Nippes, Southeast and South departments.
For a more detailed analysis of the steps and priorities for institutional sector reform, please see Maggi, R., Sabatini, C. and Farsari, A. (2026), A roadmap for security and governance reform in Haiti: How to address multilateral breakdown and state collapse, Research Paper, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2026/01/roadmap-security-and-governance-reform-haiti.
Farsari, A. and Sabatini, C. (2026), ‘To Fix Haiti, Look to Colombia’, Foreign Policy, 5 June 2026,  https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/06/05/fix-haiti-look-to-colombia.
Dickinson (2026), ‘‘Glimmer of hope’ in Haiti amid shifting gang frontlines’.
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) (2007), ‘The Paris Principles: Principles and guidelines on children associated with armed forces or armed groups’, February 2007, https://www.icrc.org/sites/default/files/document_new/file_list/paris-principles-2007-eng.pdf.
See, for example, Arnould, V.et al. (2024), ‘Pursuing an Integrated Approach to TJ and DDR in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, 26 November 2024, Egmont Royal Institute for International Relations,  https://egmontinstitute.be/pursuing-an-integrated-approach-to-tj-and-ddr-in-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo; Lessons Learned Branch, Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) (2017), SOLLIMS Report: Lessons on Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR), https://nllp.jallc.nato.int/IKS/Sharing%20Public/SOLLIMS_LessonReport_DDR_(Dec-2017).pdf; and Human Rights Watch (2005), ‘Problems in the Disarmament Programs in Sierra Leone and Liberia [1998-2005]’, chapter in report on West Africa,  https://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/westafrica0405/7.htm.

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