The current debate on the future of European defence is rightly focused on hard-security questions: ammunition stocks, air and missile defence, drones, intelligence, cyber capabilities, defence-industrial production, NATO burden-sharing, long-term support for Ukraine, etc. None of this is optional. It will make European rearmament costly and politically demanding. But it is a strategic imperative.
The problem is that military capability alone will not ensure Europe’s long-term security. European societies have become increasingly exposed to direct targeting. Cyberattacks, critical-infrastructure sabotage, supply-chain disruptions, disinformation and efforts to undermine popular trust in public institutions, among other threats, have all noticeably proliferated across the continent in the past decade. Europe’s adversaries – and, at times, even its traditional ally, the US – have sought to weaponize weaknesses outside the purely military domain, with the results variously seen in energy supply disruptions, food supply vulnerability and, in the case of the US in particular, economic coercion.
Military capability alone will not ensure Europe’s long-term security. Cyberattacks, critical-infrastructure sabotage, supply-chain disruptions, disinformation and efforts to undermine popular trust in public institutions have all proliferated in the past decade.
The security threats Europe now faces pose a complex challenge as they remain, in most cases, below the threshold of armed conflict and are difficult to respond to in conventional military ways. The topography of security, so to speak, is changing. The traditional battlefield remains central – as Russia’s war against Ukraine reminds people every day – but a country can now be seriously weakened far behind the front line.
This creates a gap in societal preparedness, one largely overlooked by policymakers across the continent. In most European countries, citizens still tend to be treated as beneficiaries of security rather than as participants in resilience – the phenomenon is more obvious as one moves westwards across the continent, further from Russia’s borders (citizens of Spain or France, for instance, tend to be much less included in resilience mechanisms than is the case in Sweden or Finland, whose comprehensive-security models are the most advanced in Europe). The problem extends beyond matters of citizens’ individual preparedness. Local authorities and mayors are often the first to respond to a crisis, yet in many cases they remain only loosely connected to national security planning, if involved at all. Most governments depend on private operators to keep essential infrastructure functioning under pressure, yet too often such operators are involved only episodically in strategic consultations rather than being integrated into preparedness systems and crisis planning.
Considerable differences in how European states understand security add to the complexity of the problem. Threat perceptions vary from one country to another. These differences shape strategic policy direction and budget planning. They influence which risks populations consider credible. The ability to take collective action is impaired because a particular crisis may not fit every country’s established understanding of security. This makes what could be termed a common European ‘grammar’ of security and threat difficult to agree upon.
A further challenge is that public finances are under strain across the continent. Governments have committed to spending more on defence, but they cannot answer every security challenge through professional armed forces and national procurement alone. Fragmented voluntary military service schemes at national level, such as those being developed in France and Germany, risk duplicating costs without creating the scale or cross-border experience needed for a genuinely European strategic culture.