This briefing note is the result of a collaborative research process with the Zimbabwean private sector, government representatives, industry organizations and experts, drawing on best practice and senior-level insights to identify policy options for long-term economic revival and expansion in Zimbabwe, and pathways for inclusive development.
Introduction
The government of Zimbabwe has emphasized its commitment to economic reform, rebalancing the economy and attracting international investment. Its Vision 2030 sets out its ‘core values’ and aspiration for Zimbabwe to achieve upper-middle-income status by 2030; in line with this, the Transitional Stabilisation Programme (TSP) lays out a detailed short-term policy reform agenda, including proposals to stabilize the economy, reform or privatize state-owned enterprises (SOEs), improve the business climate to attract international private-sector investment, and reduce corruption. It targets ‘immediate quick-wins’ in order to ‘lay a robust base for economic growth for the period 2021-2030’.1 Central to this are macroeconomic stability, growth and institutional reforms.
The government’s approach to economic reform, entailing austerity and some market-oriented reform ambitions, is bold and in some areas contentious. Short-term crisis management has, understandably, been prioritized over long-term policy formation, as the economy is currently suffering acute cash, water and electricity shortages. But it is vital that the government does not lose sight of its long-term objectives. Converting ambition into real economic growth will require clear and consistent policy, and building trust between citizens, businesses and government.
The envisaged transition to a private-sector-led economy, whereby the role of the government will shift from that of ‘player’ to ‘referee’, represents a significant rupture in Zimbabwe’s long post-independence history of state intervention in, and management of, the economy.
The economic reform process is seeing more public-private partnerships and wider consultations between government and the private sector. Such engagement is positive, but the extent of the state’s role in driving economic change will likely remain a question in the reform agenda.
Moving from a planned to a market-driven economic model will face resistance, notably around the need to protect the poorest members of society through state subsidies and government-set prices for electricity and basic foodstuffs. Most Zimbabweans rely on small-scale agriculture and informal trade or mining, and their livelihoods are acutely vulnerable to rushed and/or ideologically driven policy. Restructuring Zimbabwe’s economy is necessary, but the process needs to be pursued carefully and will take time. It will also require finding an appropriate balance between state- and private-sector-driven economic change.
All the same, there are significant short-term opportunities for growth in the private-sector – with the goal of increasing formal employment and improving livelihoods, while also relieving pressure on state resources – if the state can act to reduce burdensome bureaucracy as well as opportunities for rent-seeking. This will be contingent on clear, consistent and coherent policy formation, including targeting abuse and corruption. In particular, the state will need to move away from large-scale, ‘prestige’ projects: these have historically been poorly managed, creating huge opportunities for corruption and significant vulnerabilities to changing environmental conditions, especially in the hydroelectric sector. Small-scale, flexible and green technologies, including micro generation, can help to bridge Zimbabwe’s yawning infrastructure gap and help build resilience to the negative impact of a rapidly changing climate.
Despite the 2013 constitutional requirement that the state should involve citizens in policy formulation,2 private-sector voices have often gone unheard. This may now be changing, however. A Presidential Advisory Council (PAC)3 was established in 2019, bringing together business leaders from diverse sectors to advise the government on economic policy; and the Tripartite Negotiating Forum between business, the civil service and government is also a critical platform for dialogue. The private sector appears willing to engage, and should serve as a reservoir of creativity.
This briefing note is a contribution to this process of engagement. It highlights the issues raised and policy suggestions presented during the Zimbabwe Futures 2030 research project in 2019,4 which brought together representatives of Zimbabwe’s private sector, government, industry and business organizations, experts and other stakeholders to identify priority areas and policy options to drive inclusive economic growth.
President Emmerson Mnangagwa came to office in 2017 following a military backed transition of power from former President Mugabe, and won a national election in August 2018, inaugurating what is now termed the ‘New Dispensation’. Despite ongoing party political opposition and demonstrations challenging the legitimacy of the new government,5 the administration still has a window of opportunity for reform and, with the TSP, has laid out an ambitious blueprint for change. There is an urgency and a willingness from stakeholders to contribute to creating a better economic environment, now and with the 2030 planning horizon in mind.
The briefing note does not seek to offer a comprehensive policy programme or solve the political challenges facing Zimbabwe. Rather, it focuses on key concerns within the framework to 2030. It first sets out the economic context and offers solutions for the most important short-term macroeconomic challenges facing Zimbabwe, and then explores long-term policy options to support private-sector-driven development to 2030, including infrastructure for water, electricity and rail services. Agriculture, mining, and tourism value chains are identified as potential drivers of growth that require clear policy support. The importance of secure land rights and the creation of pathways to formality for Zimbabwe’s predominantly informal workforce are also underscored. The paper does not go into detail on specific issues of beneficiation, or diverse manufacturing, as these were not discussed in detail during the research process. However, there is a clear need for greater research and discussion with private sectors, and government on developing beneficiation processes and value-addition activities.
1 Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe (2018), Transitional Stabilisation Programme: Reforms Agenda: October 2018 – December 2020, Harare, http://kubatana.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Transitional-Stabilisation-Programme-Final.pdf (accessed 6 Sept. 2019).
2 Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe (2013), Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment No. 20, https://www.parlzim.gov.zw/images/documents/Constitution-of-Zimbabwe-Amendment_No_20_-_14-05-2013.pdf (accessed 6 Sept. 2019).
3 Office of the President and Cabinet (2019), ‘President Sets Up Advisory Council’, 31 January 2019, http://www.theopc.gov.zw/index.php/362-president-sets-up-advisory-council (accessed 18 Sept. 2019).
4 An overview of the Zimbabwe Futures 2030 process is given on p. 2 of this paper.
5 The opposition MDC contested the results of the 2018 elections, and have continued to deny President Mnangagwa’s legitimacy. The MDC has so far refused to participate in the multiparty Political Actors Dialogue (POLAD), insisting on a neutrally mediated party-to-party dialogue with ZANU-PF. ZANU-PF in turn has pointed to the MDC and ZCTU’s encouragement of national demonstrations, and has accused both organizations of fomenting chaos in the guise of democratic protest. The report of the 2018 Motlanthe commission of inquiry into post-election violence made recommendations for government, the security sector and civil society on pathways to de-escalation.