Risk Perception and Appetite in UAE Foreign and National Security Policy

Research paper

Published 1 July 2020

Updated 15 December 2020

ISBN: 978 1 78413 413 6

— Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed al-Nahyan, Abu Dhabi’s crown prince and deputy supreme commander of the UAE armed forces, attends the opening of the International Defence Exhibition and Conference at the Abu Dhabi National Exhibition Centre on 17 February 2019. Photo: Getty Images.

Peter Salisbury

Former Senior Consulting Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme

The UAE has emerged as an influential player in regional power politics over the past decade. This paper sheds light on Abu Dhabi’s ambitions to play a key role in shaping political and governance structures across the region, and in securing trade routes in its wider neighbourhood as an economic hub linking East Africa and South Asia.

6. Stretched to Capacity? A Small Circle of Decision-makers

The strong point of view expressed by Emirati leaders, and the clarity with which they pronounce on regional matters, often leads to a sense that Abu Dhabi is working from some form of master plan formulated by the Bani Fatima – i.e. that its policies are shaped by a long-term strategic vision. Yet this may be misleading, or at least conflates a broad vision for the region with a carefully defined strategy.

From the full set of interviews with UAE officials, foreigners who have worked for the UAE government, analysts, diplomats and other foreign officials with experience of working in the UAE, a picture of MbZ’s governing style has emerged in the research process for this paper. The crown prince relies on a small inner circle of trusted advisers – about a dozen people in total, in many accounts – to provide him with policy options and to make the case for their individual points of view. This process includes input from diplomats working abroad – who can give a sense of the likely impact of decisions in foreign capitals – and research and analysis commissioned from UAE ministries and the constellation of consultancies, think-tanks and research centres that have taken root in the UAE over the past decade.

Most prominent among these advisers are four of MbZ’s full brothers: the ministers of foreign affairs (Abdullah) and presidential affairs (Mansour), national security adviser (Tahnoun) and intelligence chief (Hazza). Hamdan, the eldest of the Bani Fatima who was once seen as the de facto leader of the group, has been somewhat marginalized since the mid-2000s for reasons that remain opaque and are the subject of wide speculation. Members of the Bani Mouza – the sons of another of Sheikh Zayed’s wives – also hold key roles both at the federal level and within the Abu Dhabi Executive Council. Particularly influential are Saif bin Zayed, the interior minister, and Hamed, the managing director of the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority. The rise of the Bani Fatima has coincided with an easing-out of the old guard from key ministries – many of them tied to Sheikh Khalifa – and the recruitment of a new cadre of civil servants whose outlook transcends tribalism and political loyalty. One UAE official commented:

Part of our approach to grappling [new regional realities] has been a growing empowerment of experts and technocrats in our government. Our leaders take a much more balanced, deliberate, consultative approach than they are sometimes given credit for by outside observers.90

The priority for MbZ is to have competent individuals in key positions. ‘Sheikh Mohammed invests in individuals who can achieve impact as much he does institutions that can implement,’ according to one formerly UAE-based consultant who cited as examples Yousef al-Otaiba, the UAE’s ambassador to the US, along with figures like Khaldoon Khalifa Al Mubarak, the CEO and managing director of Mubadala Investment Company, Abu Dhabi’s sovereign wealth fund, and chairman of City Group, the holding company for Manchester City and other football clubs, which has become an important instrument of the UAE’s ‘soft’ power.91 Ali al-Shamsi, the UAE’s intelligence chief, also plays an important role.92 Some observers argue, however, that there is a distinction between the relative influence of the Bani Fatima, other royals and the so-called muwathafeen, or ‘employees’ of the al-Nahyan.93

The UAE also relies on external talent to fill capacity gaps of the kind that are common in young and fast-developing countries. The higher reaches of the UAE military include Mike Hindmarsh, the commander of the UAE Presidential Guard (which includes the country’s Special Forces, which have played a key role in military operations abroad). In the economic field, Maurizio La Noce, the former CEO of the oil and gas division of Mubadala, is said to be an important confidant of the crown prince. Furthermore, the Bani Fatima have come to rely on a number of ‘fixers’, as described by one former consultant: individuals with ties to influential figures and groups abroad. Perhaps most prominent among these is Mohammed Dahlan, the former security chief of Gaza, who is now an ‘adviser’ to MbZ. As one Western official put it, Dahlan is ‘seemingly everywhere right now’, from Gaza, Egypt and Libya to Serbia and Somalia.94

Diplomats, UAE officials and others have all observed that a core challenge for Abu Dhabi is that the number of people involved in decision-making is very small and thus at times overstretched: a consensus figure is that around 10–20 people are positioned to propose and debate policy with MbZ, who is in practice the ultimate decision-maker. ‘The decision-makers don’t get much sleep,’ in the words of one UAE official.95 This can create policy vacuums, and a sense of disconnect among civil servants whose job it is to work on research, analysis and policy formulation.96 Particularly when Abu Dhabi is dealing with multiple crises, its way of operating tends to become more tactical and reactive.

There can be drift, too, on some issues. In Libya, for instance, UAE ally Khalifa Haftar’s advance on Tripoli in mid-2019 may have come as a result of Saudi and US encouragement, and Abu Dhabi was, by multiple accounts, caught somewhat unawares. On other matters there has been overreaction. For example, when the Somali authorities impounded UAE funds in Mogadishu in April 2018, the UAE effectively pulled out of the country and doubled down on its relationships with the breakaway provinces. With hindsight, many Emirati officials now reportedly concede that this was an overreaction, and one that handed the advantage to the UAE’s rival, Qatar.97

Summary table: The UAE and its neighbourhood: foreign and national security policy in aspect

Country	Thematic area	Nature of ruling government	Relationship with central government	Military position	Economic position	Chief rival(s)	Key local allies	Alignment with other regional/international players	Alignment with Western governments
Afghanistan	Counterterrorism cooperation	Internationally backed, nominally technocratic government	Good	Small special forces contingent operates alongside US forces	Some investments	AQ/ISIS	US and Afghan government. Contacts with Taliban leasdership	Close alignment with US/international interests
Algeria	North Africa	In transition after 2019 protests bringing about resignation of long-time President Bouteflika	Growing ties between Abu Dhabi and ruling elite	No military presence	No major investments	AQ/ISIS		Close alignment with Egypt across North Africa
Bahrain	Gulf/Iran/Arab uprisings	Sunni monarchy with close ties to Saudi Arabia	Increasingly close ties with the ruling Al Khalifa	Sent forces as part of Peninsula Shield power projection in 2011; no military presence	Growing investments in infrastructure	Shia-led parties, alleged Iran-backed militants	Al Khalifa family	Closely aligned with Saudi Arabia, US
Djibouti	Trade		Deteriorated rapidly after 2015–16 dispute over ports, military basing	No military presence	DP World pushed out of port in 2016	Muslim Brotherhood	No major allies	Increasingly important player in the Horn of Africa	Increasingly important player in the Horn of Africa
Egypt	Arab uprisings/Muslim Brotherhood	Military establishment-led government run by elected president Abdel Fattah el-Sisi	Close ties with Sisi government, some tensions over failed government reforms	Close military cooperation; UAE special forces have a small footprint in Sinai	Wide-ranging investments including in New Administrative Capital project	Muslim Brotherhood, AQ/ISIS.	Regime	Closely aligned with Saudi Arabia, US	Cooperation with US military across the region
Eritrea	Horn of Africa	Authoritarian government	Attempting to rehabilitate international reputation alongside Saudi Arabia; helped mediate pact with Ethiopia	Military/naval/air base at Assab port, key logistical hub for operations in Yemen	Intention to invest	Iran-linked political insiders	Regime	Working to rehabilitate Eritrea internationally	Working to rehabilitate Eritrea internationally
Ethiopia	Horn of Africa	Authoritatian government	Improving; helped mediate pact with Eritrea	No military presence	Seen as a major potential market	Muslim Brotherhood	Regime	Closely aligned with Saudi Arabia, US
Iran	Iran	Islamic Republic with elected president overseen by Supreme Leader, key role for military establishment	Abu Dhabi is a strong critic of Tehran, and lobbied against Iran nuclear deal in 2016	No military presence	Major trade partner	Regime	No notable allies	Closely aligned with Saudi Arabia, US
Iraq	Iran/counterterrorism	Internationally backed government led by Mustafa al-Kadhimi	Cordial; Abu Dhabi sees Baghdad as too closely aligned with Tehran	Some support for police force	Some investments	AQ/ISIS	US/government	Closely aligned with Saudi Arabia, US
Jordan	Model for military, counterterrorism	Monarchy with close ties to Saudi Arabia, key regional US ally	Close ties between King Abdullah and MbZ; some tensions over Muslim Brotherhood presence	Close military cooperation	Major trade partner	Muslim Brotherhood	Regime	Closely aligned with Saudi Arabia, US
Kuwait	Regional alliance	Monarchy with strong role for parliament	Good – although not great – relations	No military presence	Limited trade, cross-country investment	Muslim Brotherhood	Regime	Closely aligned with Saudi Arabia, US
Libya	Arab Spring/Muslim Brotherhood/terrorism	Rival governments, internationally backed Government of National Accord (GNA) based in Tripoli	UAE officially recognizes GNA but actively supports its rival, the east-Libya-based LAAF	UAE allegedly supports and advises LAAF	No major investments	Misrata-based Islamist factions, AQ/ISIS	LAAF, affiliated Salafist groups	Closely aligned with Saudi Arabia, France; Washington sceptical of Russian role; has allegedly violated UN sanctions regime
Morocco	Regional alliances/Arab uprisings/Muslim Brotherhood/Counterterrorism	Monarchy with strong role for parliament, elected government	Growing tensions between King Mohammed and MbZ	No military presence	Large-scale investment in real estate	Muslim Brotherhood	Monarchy/business elite
Oman	Historical tensions	Autocratic monarchy	Long-standing tensions following earlier border dispute	No military presence	Strong cross-border trade	Regime	Alleged ties to some members of royal family, military establishment
Qatar	Historical tensions/Muslim Brotherhood	Autocratic monarchy	Severed ties in 2017	No military presence	Trade cut off, other than Dolphin gas pipeline	Regime/Muslim Brotherhood	n/a	Closely aligned with Saudi Arabia, in defiance of Western allies
Saudi Arabia	Historical tensions/Muslim Brotherhood	Autocratic monarchy	Close ties between MbZ and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS); tensions between civil services	No military presence	Deepening trade ties	‘Conservative forces’	MbS and inner circle	Closely aligned with Saudi Arabia, US
Somalia	Horn of Africa/Muslim Brotherhood	Elected president in Mogadishu, effectively autonomous governments in Somaliland, Puntland	Deep tensions between federal president Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed (‘Farmaajo’) and Abu Dhabi; deepening ties with autonomous regions	UAE was training special forces, military presence in Somaliland/Puntland	DP World investment in Puntland, Somaliland ports	Muslim Brotherhood, AQ/ISIS/al-Shabaab	Local political, armed actors; Puntland and Somaliland governments
Sudan	Horn of Africa/Muslim Brotherhood/Iran	Military led transitional government	Key backer of military junta, later supporter of civilian-military government	Sudanese forces work alongside UAE military on the ground in Yemen	Large injections of capital into Sudanese economy since 2019 uprising	Muslim Brotherhood	Military junta	Closely aligned with Saudi Arabia, US pushback against support for regime
Syria	Arab uprisings/Iran	Authoritarian government	First Gulf state to reopen its embassy in Damascus, closed since 2012	No military presence	UAE firms reported to be considering investments	Muslim Brotherhood, AQ/ISIS, Iran	Assad regime	Increasingly carving own path
Tunisia	Arab Spring/Muslim Brotherhood	Elected coalition government led by Elyes Fakhfakh	Deepening tensions between Tunis and Abu Dhabi over role of Muslim Brotherhood	No military presence	No major investments	Muslim Brotherhood	Anti-Muslim Brotherhood forces	Increasingly carving own path
Turkey	Muslim Brotherhood	Increasingly authoritarian elected government with Muslim Brotherhood ideology	Deep tensions, particularly since 2017 coup attempt in Ankara	No military presence	Strong trade ties, despite political tensions	Muslim Brotherhood	Military allies	Unclear	Unclear
Yemen	Arab Spring/Muslim Brotherhood/terrorism/Iran	Internationally recognized President Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi based in Riyadh; prime minister Maeen Abdulmalik Saeed; northwest of country, including Sanaa, controlled by Houthi rebels	Deep tensions between Abu Dhabi and President Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi, particularly since August 2019 fighting in Aden	Key player in Saudi-led coalition; main external player on the ground in south Yemen	Investment in power generation, telecomm-unications	Muslim Brotherhood, AQ/ISIS/Houthi rebels, Iran	Southern separatist, salafist groups	Increasingly carving own path	Wariness among some over role

90 Author interview, senior UAE official, May 2019.

91 Author interview, UAE-based consultant, September 2018.

92 Author interviews, two Western diplomats, one regional observer, February 2017–June 2019.

93 Author interview, former royal court adviser, May 2018.

94 Author interview, Western official, September 2018.

95 Author interview, senior UAE official, May 2019.

96 Author interviews, three Western officials, two analysts, three UAE officials, February 2017–June 2019.

97 Ibid.

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Risk Perception and Appetite in UAE Foreign and National Security Policy

Peter Salisbury

6. Stretched to Capacity? A Small Circle of Decision-makers

Summary table: The UAE and its neighbourhood: foreign and national security policy in aspect