The LAAF exploited the weakness of civilian authorities in eastern Libya to dominate the ‘state’ space. The selection of a new, national government threatens to undermine the LAAF’s privileged access to resources.
The growth of the LAAF must be seen in the context of the development, and division, of state structures in Libya. Operation Dignity aligned with the faction of the House of Representatives (the legislature elected in 2014) that relocated to Tobruk in eastern Libya and re-formed the Interim Government. This provided the LAAF an opportunity to exert leverage over fragmented civilian authorities with weak vertical ties to their social bases. The LAAF’s ability to tap into the narratives of counterterrorism and its portrayal of itself as ‘the army’, aided the development of such ties. While this system worked to the advantage of the LAAF, the weakness of the economy in eastern Libya – the inability to sell oil or access international finance without going via Tripoli authorities and a lack of capital – led to the development of a system reliant on burgeoning debt. In recent years, this has placed limits on the financial support that the LAAF could tap.
The March 2021 selection of a new Government of National Unity (GNU) has broken the LAAF’s hold over the networks of power within civilian authorities in areas under its control. This is likely to lead to a series of bargaining processes as eastern-based actors and communities seek access to state rents through GNU affiliates directly, rather than through the auspices of the LAAF. At the time of writing, the extent to which the GNU will facilitate funding to the LAAF is unclear, casting the LAAF’s ability to sustain its patronage networks in further doubt.
Subverting state authorities
The House of Representatives, dominated by its speaker, Agila Saleh, operated in the east of the country as the vehicle that legitimized the LAAF’s formal ‘state’ power, albeit on a contested basis. Since 2015, it has passed a raft of legislation that enables the LAAF to acquire powers to overtake the competencies of the Interim Government, to access significant revenue and to increasingly cannibalize the public and private sectors. Key legislation includes the January 2015 creation of the post of general commander of the armed forces (to which Haftar was appointed in March 2015), the anti-terrorism law of the same year and two laws on military investment in 2016 and 2018.
Between 2014 and 2021, Saleh dominated the legislative agenda of the House of Representatives, which had been reduced in size and subject to consistent procedural violations and a lack of due process. Haftar is, according to the legislation that created his position, subject to the oversight of Saleh. However, this is not the case in practice. Following the UN-mediated Libyan Political Agreement in 2015, Saleh worked with Haftar to undermine the newly established GNA. The formation of a Defence Committee in 2016 established a mechanism to directly channel funds from the eastern authorities to the LAAF, supplementing the salaries received from Tripoli-based authorities for those individuals already on the payroll prior to the 2014 split. This mechanism has provided the means through which the Central Bank of Libya (CBL) branch in al-Bayda could provide financial support. The governor of the al-Bayda branch reported in 2019 that one-third of its spending had been directed to the LAAF over the previous three years.
The LAAF has progressively sought to subvert the governing authorities in eastern Libya, making clear Haftar’s desire to ‘become’ the state. The process through which the LAAF has sought to expand its powers and ultimately replace civilian government shows this. Following the launch of the offensive on Tripoli in April 2019, Saleh declared a ‘state of mobilization’, triggering additional procedures for resourcing the LAAF. In October 2019, he authorized the LAAF general command to move ahead with implementation of its mobilization plan, which was announced on television by Aoun al-Ferjani, head of the LAAF’s Control Authority and one of Haftar’s closest allies. Subsequently, a communiqué attributed to the LAAF announced that all taxes and customs duties collected by state institutions and state-owned companies would come under the control of a newly created LAAF Mobilization Authority. However, while some funds were raised – including a reported LYD 200 million (approximately $140 million, according to the exchange rate at the time) from telecoms companies – the budgets of schools and other state services were not diverted to the LAAF as Ferjani had declared. The Mobilization Authority has not been formally constituted.
In April 2020, Haftar gave a speech in which he claimed a popular mandate for military rule. The statement came more than three months after the LAAF had imposed a blockade of eastern oil ports, and only weeks before the collapse of its Tripoli offensive. It also came at a time when Saleh was putting forward to the international community his political plan to agree the formulation of a unified government, a direct challenge to Haftar, who effectively had controlled international negotiations for eastern Libya since 2017. The lack of support from Russia and Egypt for Haftar’s announcement of military rule may explain its failure to be implemented.
The collapse of Haftar’s Tripoli offensive in June 2020 led to further efforts to bolster the position of Saleh in international negotiations. The image of a beleaguered Haftar given second billing to Saleh at a June 2020 press conference in Cairo illustrated this. Haftar was pushed to support the initiative of his now rival. However, the threat posed by Saleh was constrained by his limited capacity to control eastern constituencies. As speaker of the House of Representatives, Saleh has sought to present himself as the man who can deliver for the interests of tribal factions in the east.
While civilian authorities remained in place, pro-Haftar groupings in the House of Representatives diluted what remained of oversight mechanisms.
While civilian authorities remained in place, pro-Haftar groupings in the House of Representatives, most notably from the National Sovereignty Bloc, diluted what remained of oversight mechanisms through their positions on committees and support for the military takeover. One notable member of the bloc is the member for Benghazi, Tariq al-Jarushi, who is the son of the senior LAAF commander Saqr al-Jarushi. Tariq has been a prominent supporter of the LAAF agenda in the House of representatives. Another example is Said Sbaqa, a member of the Martyrs, Wounded and Missing People Affairs Committee. Sbaqa is noted as someone who will oppose any discussion that negatively impacts the committee in the House of Representatives. Several members of the House of Representatives have developed close personal relations with Haftar. A prominent example is al-Salihin Abdul Nabi Saad, a member for Tobruk, who sits on the Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation Committee and has openly supported Haftar. These political actors have tied their political fates to Haftar’s fortunes and are part of the LAAF’s extended network.
The LAAF has worked to subjugate state institutions operating in areas under its control, which has brought it into conflict with the Interim Government. Haftar’s relationship with Interim Government Prime Minister Abdullah al-Thinni was tense. And, as financing and liquidity tightened in 2020, relations between the two sides worsened. In particular, a dispute emerged over allocations of funding to the LAAF. Interim Government Finance Minister Kamal al-Hassi was detained by the LAAF for reportedly refusing to sign off on the paperwork for this funding. The LAAF publicly accused Hassi of financial mismanagement.
Disputes over the LAAF’s commercial engagements through its Military Investment Authority (MIA) led Thinni to issue a letter in June 2020 to his ministers instructing them to cease cooperation with that body. This was followed up by a similar letter from Minister of Interior Ibrahim Bushanef. The letters clearly state that the Interim Government believed the LAAF’s commercial activities violated the law.
Economic capture and rent distribution via the Military Investment Authority
The LAAF’s MIA is its vehicle for economic expansion in the public and private sectors. The military investment law, passed by the House of Representatives in 2016, facilitated the development of this body. Its founding represented a shift in the LAAF’s vision of its role and a clear effort to mimic the model in neighbouring Egypt (that is, emphasizing a prominent role for the military in the economy). Haftar appointed General Mohamed al-Madani al-Fakhri as the MIA’s chairman in June 2017. As the former interior minister of the Interim Government, he is a key figure in the LAAF network and the architect of much of its economic model. Fakhri was replaced in December 2019 but continues to be closely connected with the LAAF’s economic activity. Aoun al-Ferjani and Saddam Haftar are also closely linked to the MIA, illustrating once again the pre-eminence of Khalifa Haftar’s inner circle across all key spheres. Saddam Haftar married Fakhri’s daughter in November 2020.
The MIA expanded rapidly under Fakhri’s leadership. It is now engaged in a wide variety of fields, from agricultural projects to road and infrastructure building and export of scrap metals. On 5 December 2017, Haftar wrote to Thinni to announce his intention to bring 96 projects – in agriculture, production and heavy industry – under the ‘protection’ of the LAAF. The provisions of Law 3 (2018) that officially establishes the MIA are wide-reaching and vague. No clear accountability mechanisms are in place, with oversight provided only by Haftar as the LAAF’s general commander. The advantages of this arrangement to the MIA are considerable. For example, the law states that it is exempted from export taxes and administrative fees, which gives companies and entities owned by the LAAF a significant competitive advantage. The law grants a large number of legal powers to the MIA, allowing it to invest in projects of its choosing, to establish companies, to open offices and accounts overseas, and to seek loans and credit, among other things.
Through this framework, the MIA provides a springboard for the LAAF’s interventions in the public and private sectors to benefit its networks and ensure that profitable businesses must operate through the LAAF. The dynamics at play in the public sector are illustrated by the MIA’s attempts to sell subsidized fuel to the international market, which demonstrates how it oversteps its contested legal mandate. In September 2019, the eastern authorities announced the formation of a parallel Brega Petroleum Marketing Company (BPMC) breaking away from the Tripoli-based BPMC. This was used by the LAAF as a means of obtaining control of the fuel sector. In November 2019, the MIA and the BPMC signed a contract handing responsibility for fuel distribution from BPMC to the MIA. The MIA then signed an onward contract with a newly formed UAE-based ship charterer Emo Investment Trading and Marketing of Oil and Derivatives LLC to sell fuel. The MIA planned to create a floating fuel station that would sell fuel from the Libyan coast to commercial non-Libyan clients. This would ensure a significant profit for the MIA because it was either receiving the fuel at heavily subsidized rates or not paying for it at all. It would also mean that fuel intended for the Libyan market at subsidized rates would be sold internationally. However, international pressure forced the MIA to abandon the project.
The distribution of economic rents among key LAAF commanders and affiliates is notable in the property sector and also within illicit markets. The MIA’s expansion into the Fezzan and its attempts to control major agricultural projects illustrate these dynamics. As part of its westward expansion, the MIA established a Chamber of Commerce for West and South Libya. This is headed by Salem Maatuq al-Zadma, the brother of Battalion 128 commander Hassan Maatuq al-Zadma. Under the name Agricultural Projects Protection Force, southern units of Battalion 128 took control of the Maknusa and Irawen agricultural projects in May 2020.
A similar process took place in Kufra through the MIA’s establishment of the Kufra and Wahat Development and Investment Agency in January 2019, but this has fallen prey to conflict among rival LAAF factions. Then-MIA head Fakhri appointed the LAAF Kufra Military Zone commander, General Belgasim al-Abaj, as the agency’s director. However, Abaj’s decision to place a local construction fund under the new local MIA entity led to a backlash. The move encroached on the financial interests of the LAAF-affiliated Subul al-Salam Brigade that dominates the city. Saddam Haftar sought to mediate. In October 2020, Abaj was summoned to Benghazi for questioning in developments that appear directly related to the factional conflict. It is unlikely he will return to a leadership position in the LAAF. The incident illustrates the balance that the LAAF command seeks to strike through the distribution of rents and the uneasy relations between elements of its alliance, as well as the limitations of seeking to centralize command structures of a local group such as Subul al-Salam. Abaj, a Gaddafi-era intelligence official, was regarded with suspicion by Subul al-Salam, particularly for his perceived conciliatory approach to relations with the local Tebu community, with whom Subul al-Salam has poor relations.
The emergence of a new national executive threatens LAAF interests
The emergence of a new national executive in Libya in March 2021 represents an unfolding realignment of structures and powers that has broken LAAF dominance of the state sector and threatens to reverse its gains. On 5 February 2021, a new Government of National Unity (GNU), under the leadership of Prime Minister Abdul Hamid al-Dabaiba and President of the Presidency Council Mohamed al-Menfi, was selected through the auspices of the UN-led Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF). The GNU was approved by the House of Representatives – sitting in both Tripoli and Benghazi – on 10 March, making it the first unified Libyan government since 2014. Over the course of March 2021, the two pre-existing governments – the UN-recognized Government of National Accord (GNA) and the internationally unrecognized Interim Government – handed authority over to the GNU.
The nature of Haftar’s relationship to the GNU is unclear. While Haftar was not invited to be a member of the LPDF, he retained influence over the process through members of the Forum that were aligned with his camp. At the LPDF, Agila Saleh was considered the frontrunner to lead the new government on a shared ticket with then GNA Minister of Interior Fathi Bashagha. Saleh and Bashagha were defeated in the second round, however, by Menfi and Dabaiba. The defeat of Saleh reduced the threat to Haftar’s primacy, particularly given the limited public profile of Menfi, who hails from the city of Tobruk in eastern Libya.
Haftar has been able to exert influence over the process of government formation through the inclusion of loyal ministers, but his influence has limits. A clear example of this was the ability of Saleh to ensure that Dabaiba changed the composition of his proposed government in order to secure approval from the House of Representatives. On the eve of the House of Representatives vote, the names of a number of ministerial nominees were switched. Among those removed from the list were individuals with close personal links to Haftar. Notably, the Benghazi mayor Saqr Bujwari was dropped at the last minute in favour of Hussein al-Qatrani – who has close ties to Saleh – as deputy prime minister. Qatrani, who hails from the Awagir tribe, has since presided over the handovers of Interim Government ministries to the GNU.
On the security front, the reunification of the Ministry of Interior poses a challenge to the LAAF-dominated architecture in eastern Libya, which has enabled the LAAF to militarize policing and the judicial process. The tensions in this system are illustrated in the challenges of ensuring any kind of process of justice for extrajudicial killings. The Dabaiba government has, however, left the critical post of minister of defence effectively vacant, placing the prime minister himself in charge. Long-standing issues over the supposed chain of command within state-affiliated forces remain undecided.
The terms of the re-assertion of authority by the Tripoli-based GNU remain unclear, creating ambiguity over the impact on the LAAF.
GNU control over the economic institutions of the state imperils the LAAF’s aforementioned financial model of extracting funds from the Interim Government and the eastern branch of the Central Bank of Libya. The reunification of the House of Representatives will also dilute the influence of the pro-LAAF bloc. In January 2021, representatives of the GNA and Interim Government agreed a ‘unified’ budget that would represent an agreement over spending and effectively re-unite the Central Bank of Libya. This was a significant step as the CBL branch in al-Bayda had been running a separate monetary policy to the CBL in Tripoli until that point. As a result, the GNU inherited an agreement over the re-assertion of the Tripoli-based government through CBL reunification and the reunification of government ministries.
Critically, the terms of the re-assertion of authority by the Tripoli-based GNU remain unclear, creating ambiguity over the impact on the LAAF. There are few indications that the GNU is planning to pose a direct threat to the position of the LAAF within security structures in eastern Libya, potentially allowing the status quo to remain. On the economic front, the agreement over budgetary spending represented a ‘consolidated’ budget (i.e. it combined the spending plans of east and west) rather than representing a budget settlement that agreed upon a unified national economic programme. This nuance is important as it speaks to the extent to which the LAAF will be able to directly access resources from state entities as it had done in 2015–21. While this balance is yet to be determined, it is clear that the LAAF has more limited leverage over the Tripoli-based GNU and CBL than it did over the Interim Government and eastern branch of the CBL, making it likely that its ability to extract funds from the state will be constrained. This may also incentivize LAAF affiliates to negotiate with the officials in charge of that distribution and further weaken Haftar’s hold on power. On the other hand, a potential influx of capital to the east made possible by the appointment of the GNU and its power-sharing formula will provide opportunities for the LAAF to capture further funds, particularly if expenditure is not transparently overseen.
