The UK should work with selected allies and partners to deter Chinese aggression, but it cannot escape the need to engage with China in many areas. At times this will necessitate diverging significantly from US positions on China – even at considerable political cost – when it is in the UK’s interests to do so.
In a geopolitical landscape in which the post-1945 international rules-based order is rapidly decaying, and in which China has increasing influence due to both its own power and the relative decline of the US, several challenges stand out as priorities for the UK:
- Managing China–US competition. A severe deterioration in relations between China and the US could put unwelcome pressure on the UK to choose a side. Where the UK relies on critical Chinese supply chains, for instance, their continued use could raise tensions with the Trump administration or a future US administration, or even prompt US retaliation.
- Improving resilience to China shocks. Disruption to the UK economy and to diplomatic relations with China could occur in the event of a China–Taiwan conflict, a protracted US–China trade war, unforeseen domestic events in China, or other shocks. In some instances, the UK will need stronger contingency arrangements to cope with such eventualities.
- Deterring Chinese ‘grey zone’ activities. These operations are designed to coerce other actors while falling short of outright war. China’s continuing use of grey-zone operations in the East and South China Seas threatens established maritime conventions, and could create wider geopolitical disruption and escalatory risks if Beijing’s growing economic interests prompt the expansion of grey-zone activities into other regions.
- Managing a rising nuclear threat. China’s expansion of its nuclear arsenal is contributing to an increasingly uncertain global security environment, amid a worsening outlook for non-proliferation. This is at a geopolitical moment when nuclear coercion has resurfaced in the context of the Russia–Ukraine war, and when the US is planning for possible conflict with a peer-level competitor (China) for the first time since the Cold War.
- Responding to Chinese coercion or military threats against UK allies and partners, including Taiwan. Various factors would likely increase such threats: Beijing’s perception of any provocations by Taipei; US efforts to contain China’s military development; US military commitments elsewhere presenting perceived opportunities for Chinese action or reducing the credibility of US deterrence; and continued volatility in the international environment, given that countries are more frequently resorting to armed conflict.
The UK’s relationship with China could become much more difficult as a result of rising China–US competition, or if Chinese threats against Taiwan intensify. These potential geopolitical shocks, up to and including PRC forces invading Taiwan, would bring global economic and security consequences. There is little the UK can do, especially on its own, to make such eventualities less likely. However, it can work with other countries to shape the wider environment of China–US competition and develop responses to Chinese aggression. It can do more to model shock scenarios and anticipate their likely impacts so that the UK’s society, economy and institutions can build resilience accordingly. Working with Taiwan is an important part of such contingency planning, as is continued engagement with Indo-Pacific partners (including those with rival territorial claims to those of China in the South China Sea).
How China–US competition affects the UK
The US is unique in its strategic goal of containing China’s rise in order to preserve its own globally dominant position. This means US interests often inherently diverge from those of even Washington’s closest allies, including the UK. This uncomfortable dynamic is exacerbated by the fact that the second Trump administration has taken a significantly more transactional approach in relations with US allies, and that its attempts at economic coercion and threats to withdraw security support have likely irrevocably damaged trust. Meanwhile, the US administration – notwithstanding a range of internally divergent views on China – has singled out China as the primary target in an aggressive trade war.
The long-term decline of US power in relative terms makes the current situation unlike previous US retreats from internationalism. Indeed, even before Trump, US strategy was shifting away from global leadership and towards more narrowly defined US interests: Barack Obama’s ‘pivot to Asia’ was just one example. The current shift in US foreign policy outlook is not only a matter of political choice. It is a function of the limits of US economic power, and of the limits of the US’s ability to keep committing to a global military presence. The UK should expect this trend of a less globally engaged US to continue. UK policymakers should also allow for the probability that China – though unlikely to have the willingness or resources to assume a US-style dominant role – will take advantage of this trend to expand its own global influence and pursue a reputation as the more multilaterally minded global power.
The UK cannot afford to lock in dependence on the US at the expense of access to supply chains and technologies essential for economic prosperity.
The obvious dilemma for the UK is where its loyalties should lie in future, given that the ‘special relationship’ with the US appears much diminished. The solution, this paper argues, is not to abandon the US for China but to recognize and act on the fact that US and UK interests on China will increasingly diverge. As mentioned, China is rapidly catching up with, and in some cases overtaking, the US in certain areas of technology (see Section 3). At the same time, China is maintaining a dominant role in global manufacturing. The UK cannot afford to lock in dependence on the US at the expense of access to supply chains and technologies essential for economic prosperity; this requires that the UK keep economic channels with China open, even at the risk of provoking US attempts at coercion.
Nor is economic security the only issue at stake for the UK. The miliary dimension of rising China–US tensions is just as difficult to navigate. The UK will increasingly need to work with European partners on defence. Militarily, the UK and the US do not share immediate common interests in relation to China. A direct conflict between the UK and China, for instance, is foreseeable only in the event of an active choice on the part of the UK to become involved in a distant conflict (such as over Taiwan). That said, China’s expansion of its nuclear arsenal raises global security risks, including risks around nuclear coercion as well as escalation in the Indo-Pacific. In the event of heightened nuclear tensions or armed confrontation between China and the US, the real or perceived link between the UK’s nuclear weapons capabilities and those of the US could place the UK at risk from China. Although the UK has the opportunity to leverage its role as a P5 nuclear power to help mediate between China and the US on arms control, this would require convincing Beijing that London’s position – and by extension the UK’s nuclear deterrent – is genuinely independent.
Given the risks inherent in rising China–US competition, including the risk of the UK being coerced from both sides, it is in the interests of the UK to move towards an explicitly autonomous foreign policy position. This would include ensuring that UK policies on the limits of economic and technological engagement with China are similar to those on engagement with the US, and vice versa. This does not mean remaining neutral on all matters involving China (or indeed the US), or refraining from alignment when national interests converge, but the UK has little to gain in the long run from taking sides across the board, including in the current China–US trade war.
Many UK allies and partners face a similar challenge. In working with them to balance China and the US, the UK can draw on a long tradition of foreign policy designed to maintain stability through a balance of power in and beyond Europe. In a world in which China and the US are global actors with their own interests, and Russia presents an ongoing threat to European security, a pragmatic and flexible approach to cooperation with China and the US will be necessary to mitigate the risk of any two (or even all three) powers aligning against the UK and its other allies. Such pragmatic flexibility should be favoured over broad-brush designation of China as an ‘adversary’ or ‘strategic competitor’. While UK cooperation with China on some issues may seem unpalatable, it may sometimes be necessary – for example, to counter the risk of Russia and the US aligning on the future of Ukraine, to the detriment of European (and Ukrainian) interests.
Countering Chinese aggression
The UK and its European allies share a common interest with Indo-Pacific partners when it comes to upholding norms such as freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. The UK should continue to work with partners to uphold these norms, including through freedom-of-navigation operations (FONOPS) and joint exercises such as those conducted under the Five Powers Defence Arrangements.
China’s actions in the South China Sea and around Taiwan are characterized by the gradual intensification of ‘grey zone’ tactics – operations such as air and naval patrols, land reclamation, activities of the China Coast Guard and Maritime Militia, cyber operations and undersea cable-cutting – which intimidate rivals and assert China’s dominance while falling short of warranting a military response. The advantage of such tactics for China is that they are difficult to deter (and in some cases, such as with undersea cable-cutting and cyber operations, allow plausible deniability); moreover, the longer they go on, the more escalatory it would be to attempt to stop them. One result is that preventing the South China Sea from becoming a de facto area of Chinese territorial waters in the long term is increasingly unlikely.
This should be of serious concern to the UK and its partners, including in Europe, due to the precedent this sets. China already has the world’s largest navy, which over the coming decades will develop an enhanced capacity to conduct operations further and further from China’s own waters. As China’s global economic interests continue to widen, Beijing is likely to perceive an increased need for such operations to protect maritime trade routes and combat piracy. Moreover, China’s fishing fleet, also the world’s largest, is active across the globe. If Beijing believes that other countries will not respond decisively to grey-zone coercion, it is possible that it will extend such operations with the aim of reaching fisheries and other maritime resources in the exclusive economic zones of countries further afield, including in Europe. The UK should work with partners now to establish credible deterrence, including clear red lines on Chinese grey-zone activities, and to articulate the costs that would be imposed on China as soon as those red lines are crossed.
Working with Taiwan
Taiwan is the most notable victim of Chinese grey-zone aggression. As Chinese military operations around the island become routine, there is a growing risk that credible deterrence of eventual Chinese conquest becomes impossible. Given Taiwan’s status as a valued partner of the UK, the dangerous precedent that allowing Chinese aggression sets, and the dire consequences of an outright China–Taiwan war, it is in the UK’s interests to help deter Chinese aggression towards Taiwan as far as possible.
While the UK is not able to do so militarily, it can do so to some degree diplomatically. China ultimately seeks to conquer Taiwan, but would prefer not to resort to war. Beijing cares about international opinion, especially given its ongoing attempts to present itself as a more reliable global leader than the US. China has also successfully used diplomatic means to persuade other countries across the Global South to shift their official stance on Taiwan. The UK should work with its allies to push back against these efforts, for example by engaging Beijing’s partners across the Global South.
The UK should continue to treat Taiwan as a valued partner and de facto country in its own right, while maintaining the pragmatic official line on the ‘One China’ policy and resisting any attempt by Beijing to undermine UK engagement with Taiwanese entities. Taiwan plays a global economic and technological role, and the UK should seek to assist Taiwan in participating in international forums and initiatives wherever possible in line with the above considerations.
The UK should actively seek deeper cooperation with Taiwan, through unofficial channels, on areas of shared interest and concern. This could include sharing best practice on cybersecurity threats. There is also an opportunity for both sides to benefit from each other’s experience on strengthening civil liberties and democratic norms in the face of technological challenges, including cyber and disinformation threats. Additionally, the UK and Taiwan should cultivate people-to-people ties, such as through academic exchange and tourism.
Recommendations
In light of the above challenges, this paper recommends that the UK government take the following steps to respond to the risks to UK interests presented by rising China–US rivalry, China’s claims to Taiwan, and internationally disruptive Chinese maritime activities:
- Adopt an explicitly autonomous position in response to China–US strategic competition. This should include being willing to align with either side pragmatically where necessary to balance the great powers against each other, based on what best serves UK interests. The UK should encourage a similar approach on the part of European allies. This does not automatically entail adopting a neutral position: for example, it remains in the UK’s interests to work with the US to deter Chinese aggression in the East and South China Seas.
- Act as a mediator between Beijing and Washington, using the UK’s status as a P5 nuclear power, to de-escalate tensions and help manage risks of nuclear expansion.
- Work with allies and partners to establish and coordinate clear deterrence and follow-through on any expansion of Chinese grey-zone actions threatening maritime norms. Credible deterrence methods should be carefully explored and may range from coordinating targeted sanctions to interdiction of Chinese vessels violating the sovereign rights of other countries’ exclusive economic zones. Given the scale of China’s maritime activity and the precedent this has set in the East and South China Seas, a strong collective response to any expansion of Chinese grey-zone actions will be necessary in the first instance. China’s success in asserting its claims in the South China Sea is partly attributable to a failure to coordinate action among ASEAN member states and the reluctance of other powers such as the US and Japan to offer a more robust response. The result is that current efforts to push back against China at best slow, rather than prevent, the growth of its grey-zone operations in the region.
- Coordinate with allies and partners on the UK’s contribution to deterrence and countermeasures in the event of Chinese aggression against Taiwan and/or China’s rival claimants in the South China Sea, with a focus on non-military involvement where possible.
- Work with Taiwan to better understand and respond to the economic, security and military threats posed by China now and as China’s global influence grows. This could include sharing best practices in areas such as cybersecurity.
- Encourage Taiwan’s participation in international forums as far as possible. This should include working with third countries to enhance Taiwan’s international standing and increase diplomatic costs for actions against Taiwan by China.
