As the Trump administration reaches out to Russia and suspends military aid to Ukraine, Europe’s leaders have run out of good options. But what they do have is a short window of opportunity in which to demonstrate that they can adapt to a world of great power politics before Washington and Moscow force a Ukraine peace deal. European countries, including the UK, should actively counter this by engaging China in pursuit of a peace deal that gives Ukraine a seat at the table.
This is undoubtedly an unpalatable prospect for European leaders given Beijing’s continued support for Moscow throughout its invasion of Ukraine. However, the worst possible outcome for Europe would be a US–Russia peace deal later joined by China from which Ukraine and Europe are entirely sidelined.
Europe must be willing to exercise leverage over the US
Engaging China carries risks but need not entail broader alignment with Beijing or detract from the need to mitigate the harmful aspects of China’s influence. China has voiced willingness to develop a peace plan and called for Ukraine and Europe to be present at peace talks. It also has leverage over Russia and can serve as a counter to an antagonistic US. Engagement is a way to gain leverage in a system of great power competition – something leaders in Beijing, Washington and Moscow understand very well but European leaders still fail to grasp.
Europe is a vital partner to the US in countering China’s growing influence, including through alignment on economic and technological competition. Europe must be willing to leverage this against the US to gain the support it needs while it rebuilds its own defence industrial base.
If the US still pushes ahead with its withdrawal from Europe sooner rather than later, giving China a stake in European peace could temper Putin’s willingness to disturb it, buying time for rearmament.
Engaging China would also send an important signal to the US that antagonism of its allies has consequences. Washington’s eagerness to not only engage with but overlook the behaviour of Europe’s most immediate security threat should be met with a demonstration that Europe is willing to engage Washington’s key strategic competitor in response. Rhetorical condemnation of US policy or attempting to woo Trump through appeals to a ‘special relationship’ will not cut it. Europe must retaliate against US abandonment now or risk becoming increasingly beholden to a coercive Washington as American and European interests diverge.
Pushing for a multilateral solution
Beyond leverage there are broader positive incentives for both Europe and China in working together for a peace settlement. While hardly ideal for Europe, China is now the superpower most committed to an international order underpinned by multilateralism. On this point, the two now have more in common than either do with Trump’s US or Putin’s Russia.
Beijing has called consistently for a multilateral solution to the war that would give Europe and Ukraine seats at the table, including in a rare explanation of China’s vote on the recent UN Security Council draft resolution, building on Beijing’s UN-based ‘Friends for Peace’ initiative pursued jointly with Brazil.
Beijing’s efforts have been open to the accusation of being opportunistic and essentially cost-free. China has little directly at stake in the conflict and, while peace seemed far away, could reap the benefits of proposing mediation that it would not have to implement.
However, the EU is one of China’s largest trade partners and Beijing is keen to repair ties with Europe that have been damaged by its economic support for Russia. Like Europe, China does not relish the prospect of closer ties between Moscow and Washington. Although China wishes to tread carefully and maintain its strategically necessary relationship with Russia, there is some room for manoeuvre for Europe – provided the focus is on realistic pragmatic gains, not wholesale realignment.
Both China and Europe should be pragmatic
Cooperating on a multilateral peace plan representative of all parties would give China the chance to show that there is substance behind its aspirational rhetoric on global governance and UN-centred multilateralism. If Europe framed its outreach in such terms, Beijing would need to at least consider the reputational costs of not following through on its professed vision for a world order underpinned by multilateralism, a narrative it has carefully fostered across the Global South.
Nonetheless, bringing a typically risk-averse Beijing to the table would be a big ask as it would entail some appetite for risk in terms of its relationship with Moscow, the unpredictable response of Washington and potential peace-time obligations. But Beijing has proven willing to seize opportunities in the past, including the normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran. A rapidly shifting geopolitical situation requires an ability to rapidly pivot one’s strategy. Just as European leaders need to learn to do this, they should make the case that Beijing should too.