The UK’s initial strategic ‘tilt’ to the Indo-Pacific was announced and pursued at a time when the nation was riven over its referendum decision to exit the EU. The concept was often interpreted in public policy debates as an ambition to ‘replace’ the UK’s relationship with the EU, including by rethinking Britain’s military links, security priorities and economic ties. This has never been a realistic proposition. But it would also be a mistake to view focusing on the Euro-Atlantic or Indo-Pacific as a binary choice. The two regions’ security, diplomatic and economic issues are deeply interconnected. Evolving geopolitical dynamics – such as growing China–Russia ties – and the globalized nature of manufacturing and supply chains mean the idea of a world divided into isolated theatres does not hold. The risk is of UK policymakers assuming that measures introduced to date as part of the ‘tilt’ constitute a finalized and fully formed Indo-Pacific strategy, rather than the preliminary foundations of a multi-dimensional, longer-term approach that will require further development. One example of a category error of this kind is seeking to be involved in regional groupings or agreements such as ASEAN or the CPTPP without the necessary sense in government of how the UK’s presence can be influential, or how UK diplomats can be used to best effect.
While not a decisive force balancer, the UK brings a unique offering as a security partner because of its potential, as the possessor of one of the world’s few high-tech militaries, to help regional allies build up their own capabilities.
The ‘tilt’ has also often been debated in terms of the UK’s military presence or contribution in the Indo-Pacific. Unavoidably, the UK’s defence priority must be addressing the most immediate, proximate threat: Russian aggression in Europe. Doing so will require rebuilding UK forces so that they can better mitigate the risks from Russia and counter Russian capabilities. This will mean significant investment in upgrading the UK’s relatively depleted military, and in boosting Britain’s capacity to meet its commitments to NATO. Yet despite the heavy resource commitment this implies, the UK can still play an important security role in the Indo-Pacific. While not a decisive force balancer, the UK brings a unique offering as a security partner because of its potential, as the possessor of one of the world’s few high-tech militaries, to help regional allies build up their own capabilities.
The UK could also do more to coordinate with European partners on Indo-Pacific issues, for example by amplifying any European military presence in the region. Several European states face similar dilemmas to those of the UK in terms of prioritizing foreign policy commitments and the optimum deployment of military assets: these states share similar interests in maintaining a predictable and secure Indo-Pacific, yet – also like the UK – lack the resources individually to devote sufficient attention to the region while dealing with urgent security challenges closer to home (for example, Russia’s war on Ukraine). The UK could work with like-minded European states to ensure that offers to Indo-Pacific states on building military, security or coastguard capacity are complementary – rather than consisting of disconnected projects generated by each government. The UK could also seek to help Europe present a united front on the shaping and enforcing of norms around trade and digital governance, and could collaborate with European partners on supplying development investment to Indo-Pacific recipients so that the consolidated impact of aid budgets is maximized despite reduced funding in many donor states.
Finally, the UK needs a strong Indo-Pacific strategy to buttress its China strategy, and vice versa. While the UK has limited capacity to shape China’s actions directly, it can influence the broader regional environment in which China operates. By offering viable alternative cooperation arrangements, and by working with other (i.e. non China Indo-Pacific) governments in the region to shape and enforce norms around trade and governance, the UK can, in effect, give such states the option of having more partners than just their dominant neighbour.
In that spirit, this paper offers suggestions for a refreshed UK approach to the wider region outside of China. It is intended as a complement to a separate recent Chatham House paper: What the UK must get right in its China strategy: Resilience, flexibility and autonomy as core principles for engagement, by William Matthews. We do not set out here an exhaustive list of everything the UK should attempt across this vast, diverse expanse of the world. Instead, we will suggest some priorities and a framework for thinking strategically about the Indo-Pacific. We will also outline how the UK can better ‘join the dots’ across its bilateral relationships, its interactions with relevant international organizations, and its involvement in other initiatives affecting (or focused on) the Indo-Pacific.
