At the time of writing, the SAF has maintained control in River Nile and Northern states, the three states in eastern Sudan (Gedaref, Kassala, and Red Sea), and until recently held much of the contested Gezira, White Nile, and Sennar states in central Sudan, as well as part of Blue Nile state. The RSF remains in firm control of the five states of Greater Darfur, except for El Fasher, capital of North Darfur, which it has held under siege since April 2024. Through an offensive that started in autumn 2024, the SAF recaptured significant territory in central Sudan including Wad Madani, capital of Gezira, in January 2025, and other parts of Gezira and Sennar states. The SAF has also sought to consolidate control over Khartoum, having largely removed the RSF from Omdurman, Bahri and areas along the eastern bank of the Blue Nile River. Both the SAF and the RSF also have armed groups allied to them that hold territory in parts of the country, such as the SAF-aligned Joint Darfur Forces (JDF) in North Darfur, or the recently RSF-associated Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) led by Abdelaziz al-Hilu in South Kordofan and Blue Nile.
Sudan’s conflict gold is deeply intertwined with the wider region. The civil war has, to varying degrees, impacted Sudan’s seven neighbouring countries, and been influenced by them and regional powers further afield.
Sudan’s conflict gold is also deeply intertwined with the wider region. The civil war has, to varying degrees, impacted Sudan’s seven neighbouring countries, and been influenced by them and regional powers further afield. For example, the SAF accrues rents not only through taxing exports and imports transiting Port Sudan, but also by receiving support from foreign governments such as Egypt, Qatar and Türkiye, including via the sale of strategic commodities such as gold. In its effort to control the supply chain of gold, the RSF has extended its economic operations beyond Sudan’s borders, selling primarily to the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which has consequently become a key backer. The spillover effects of the war into neighbouring countries such as Chad, Egypt, Libya and South Sudan, have included the displacement of millions of refugees, and the smuggling of gold across Sudan’s porous borders – some of which has facilitated the import of fuel, military supplies and mining inputs (such as equipment and chemicals). Such economic processes not only connect Sudan to the neighbouring region, but they facilitate the supply chains that fuel and sustain the conflict.
This paper argues that Sudan’s war should be analysed as part of a transnational or regional conflict ecosystem, which consists of ‘multiple overlapping and intersecting networks of power and authority’. Actors within these networks, such as armed groups or national governments, compete for ‘ideological, military, economic and political authority’, and extend their influence beyond the nation state. The gold sector, although overtly economic, is closely linked to the contested authority between the SAF and the RSF, and intersects with political, security and ideological networks. Moreover, these interconnected networks are cross-border and challenge traditional binary hierarchical structures, such as state versus non-state, formal versus informal, and licit versus illicit.
In pursuit of their own interests, the Gulf states, notably the UAE and Saudi Arabia, as well as other regional powers, such as Egypt, have had a significant influence on Sudan’s conflict, through support to one or other warring party. It is increasingly clear that these regional states’ long-term strategic interests – in Sudan and the broader Horn of Africa and Red Sea region – are in part shaped by economic drivers. Sudan’s lucrative gold sector is also interconnected with flows of other commodities (such as fuel, land, agricultural products and livestock) and broader geostrategic relations. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have made multi-billion-dollar agricultural investments in Sudan to secure food for their populations. Safeguarding these investments, including long-term food security for their citizens, has driven both countries to intervene in Sudan’s conflict. The UAE seems to be fully backing the RSF, and Saudi Arabia has had a more prominent role in mediation efforts, while tacitly supporting the SAF-controlled authorities.
Sudan’s conflict responds to, and is exacerbated by, the broader regional context, which is in turn shaped by the contestation between Saudi Arabia and the UAE over regional hegemony and Red Sea dominance. The UAE’s interventions in Sudan are informed by its desire to become a middle power and global logistics and financial hub, including for high-value commodities such as gold and fuel. These interventions are emerging in an increasingly multipolar world order defined by multi-alignment, evolving spheres of influence and declining US hegemony. Consequently, the fluid alliances and interests of regional states involved in the war makes the search for a viable ceasefire and political settlement more difficult to navigate. Such complex interactions between economic, security, geopolitical and ideological networks form part of Sudan’s regional conflict ecosystem and are another reason why Sudan’s gold matters as a source of conflict.
About this paper
This research paper outlines the ways in which Sudan’s gold sector intersects with both internal and external conflict dynamics, and how it forms a central component of a transnational conflict ecosystem that is worsening Sudan’s civil war. The paper first examines the role of gold within Sudan’s war, the history of attempts by state security and other armed actors to control the sector, and how economic competition, including over gold, was a triggering factor in the current war. It then analyses the gold sector in SAF-controlled areas – in particular, how the de facto authorities have sought to redirect the gold trade through Egypt – and then examines the gold sector in RSF-controlled areas, including in the group’s Darfur heartlands, as well as the ways the commodity trade connects to actors across the borders with Chad, Libya and South Sudan. The paper then looks at how these dynamics fit into a regional conflict ecosystem through ‘inside-out’ and ‘outside-in’ mechanisms, and how Sudan’s gold both impacts its neighbours, notably in Egypt and the UAE, and shapes regional policy towards Sudan.
The paper concludes by offering recommendations for effective and sustainable policy and programmatic interventions to address the war in Sudan, given the need to navigate the broader ecosystem in which the conflict operates. Some recommendations are aimed at policymakers in regional states, including the UAE and Egypt, while others are for international partners seeking to restore peace in Sudan and the broader region. The latter include the UK, the US and the EU, along with like-minded states and multilateral bodies such as the African Union (AU), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the UN.
Methodology
Field research for this paper was conducted in Sudan and neighbouring countries between 2021 and 2024. In Sudan, field data was collected in Khartoum, North Darfur, Gedaref and Kassala states. Primary data collection was carried out in Kufra, southern Libya, Egypt and Ethiopia. The bulk of field research consisted of over 30 semi-structured key informant interviews, both in person and by phone. This was supplemented by data from two workshops: the first, on Sudan’s war economy, was organized by Chatham House and C4ADS in August 2024. The second workshop, on conflict trends in eastern Sudan and regional implications, was organized by the Cross-Border Conflict Evidence, Policy and Trends (XCEPT) project and held in Nairobi in November 2024. Desk-based research examined a variety of secondary sources, including academic and policy research on local and regional dynamics, official documentation, trade data, and news sources from Sudanese and international outlets.
The sampling for the key informant interviews sought to represent a broad range of actors and interests engaged in the political economy of Sudan and the gold sector specifically. This included government officials (at national and local levels), armed actors, regional and international diplomatic actors, academics, policy analysts, businesspeople, gold traders and civil society representatives. A limitation of the study, due to restrictions on time and resources, was not conducting research in other parts of the broader region, such as Chad, Eritrea, South Sudan, or the Arabian Gulf.
