A ceasefire will not hold unless it is backed by credible policies to persuade Russia that it stands to lose more than it will gain by restarting military action.
General principles
It is vital that any ceasefire agreement is not confused with a permanent settlement of the conflict. An effective, long-term policy of containment to address the Russian threat, given the above-mentioned risks, must be put in place with the goal of forcing a change of calculus in the Kremlin. Such a policy must aim to constrain Moscow’s ability to restart war in Ukraine and curtail other hostile Russian activity elsewhere in the region and beyond.
Ceasefire planners on the Ukrainian side are acutely aware of how Moscow is able to use diplomatic, economic, informational and other forms of pressure to shape outcomes without the need for open conflict.
Therefore, any ceasefire agreement, including provisions for monitoring and sanctions for breaches, needs to be drafted with sufficient precision so that ambiguities cannot be exploited. Russia’s persistent violation of post-conflict agreements is enabled by the failure of negotiating counterparties to consider properly Russian objectives in drafting them. Consequently, some of these violations can be mitigated by ensuring that Russian actions are appropriately constrained by the terms of a ceasefire. It is critical that the means to punish violations are integrated into the monitoring mechanism.
In any pre- and post-ceasefire negotiations with Russia, the fundamental goal must be to ensure that the outcome enhances rather than undermines the security of Ukraine and Europe. The following should not be negotiable:
- Ukraine’s sovereignty;
- Legal recognition of Russian territorial annexations;
- NATO’s charter and already existing security guarantees for other states
of Europe;
- Autonomy of Ukrainian and European, military and security decision-making; and
- Accountability for war crimes.
In exchange for agreeing to a ceasefire, Russia may insist that the final agreement should incorporate wider provisions on European security (and the deployment of NATO forces) based on Moscow’s December 2021 proposals. This would be disastrous for Europe and should not be entertained.
The question of security arrangements, or guarantees, between Ukraine and Europe is not an issue that should be negotiated with the current Russian regime. There is strong mutual interest in military and defence cooperation between Ukraine and its European allies. Ukraine’s added value for European security has been proven by its ability to resist Russian forces. Furthermore, Kyiv possesses combat-ready troops, new integrated systems for the deployment of unmanned capabilities, a strong defence industrial base and cyber defence expertise. All these are critical for strengthening the European pillar of NATO and defending Ukraine.
Finally, the status of the Ukrainian territories occupied by Russia must not be considered resolved. The international community should demand access to these regions for international humanitarian missions and respect for the rights of the populations according to both the Geneva Conventions and the Hague Conventions.
Recommendations for Ukraine
If the war morphs into a ceasefire, there will be little time for decisive action. But swift and planned policy implementation could help Ukraine to alleviate human suffering, strengthen the state through reforms, and integrate the economy into both the EU single market and European defence industrial base.
The following recommendations are priority actions for the brief window of opportunity that may result from a ceasefire:
- Focus on rapid reconstitution of the armed forces. One of the key priorities would be improving the army’s processes for force design and transformation, particularly through recruitment and retention. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defence should integrate best practices from combat brigades across the army to help restore confidence in the leadership of the Ukrainian armed forces. Promoting successful brigade and corps commanders to senior positions in the general staff will provide an opportunity for renewal and can strengthen incentives for service personnel to sign new contracts and choose the army as a long-term profession.
To maintain the best talent in the army requires significant resources, which must be protected in defence budgets. Training to support and sustain the officer corps could strengthen leadership. Rapid demobilization is unlikely, so rotations and the renewal of military personnel will be key to maintaining a dynamic and strong fighting force.
- Sustain and scale defence innovation, grow the defence industrial base and increase global market share of arms sales. Ukraine’s innovative defence industry should gradually look to exports to generate revenue and increase global market share. The 2026 US–Iran war has demonstrated strong demand in the Middle East for Ukraine’s unmanned systems for drone interceptions.
Kyiv has proven combat-ready technology. The defence sector employs around 2.8 million people, and approximately 1,000 private companies produce various autonomous defence systems. The leading companies are also producing long-range missiles, artillery systems, combat vehicles and electronic systems that constitute a significant economic sector. Ukraine’s internal regulations for export licensing of weapons and dual-use technology must ensure a level playing field to boost competition for defence technology to thrive and become a driver of economic recovery. The interagency commission under the National Security and Defence Council should streamline the process for issuing export licences and establish clear rules for technology transfers. These should correspond to Ukraine’s defence needs and development of the sector but avoid creating new vested interests.
- Significantly increase the stockpile of defensive interceptors, based on the minimum required to protect critical energy systems over winter (October–April). Assuming 20–30 missile attacks per day, this would imply Ukraine should amass around 5,500 defensive interceptors on an annual basis. The increase of the US’s own military activity in the Middle East could lead to shortages of the US-made Patriot missile. Therefore, Ukraine should source artillery batteries from other countries, such as the IRIS-T system from Germany.
With assistance from European companies on missile guidance and radar systems, Ukraine’s major domestic defence contractors, especially Fire Point, could work to develop cheaper air defences. This would require setting up a joint air-defence project that would benefit both Ukraine and Europe.
- Maintain clear focus on human-centred recovery and critical energy infrastructure. Efforts to reinvigorate the resilience of people, institutions and the energy system will be key to societal recovery. Ukraine must plan for a decentralized energy system that takes into account the potential for renewed Russian attacks. This means rapidly increasing battery storage, cogeneration (the simultaneous production of electricity and heat), renewables and better connectivity with the EU energy market.
To boost the labour force, there should be a focus on increasing employment among people with disabilities, IDPs and veterans. In the first instance, housing and critical infrastructure must be rebuilt so parts of the refugee population can return. Well-being policies, especially mental health support, should be a priority in social services.
- Continue the fight against high-level corruption, ensuring that new anti-corruption agencies – National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU), Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO), and the High Anti-Corruption Court (HACC) – can work unimpeded. A detailed programme to strengthen the rule of law is listed in the roadmap for cluster 1 of the EU accession process.
Ukraine will need to implement drastic measures to increase the dynamism of its economy to generate income for defence and social recovery for the most acutely affected groups (veterans and their families). The government will have to deregulate certain sectors to allow broader access and create competition, potentially by reforming the Anti-monopoly Committee, increasing property rights protection and enabling privatization where possible to attract FDI.
- Take action to attract more private capital, including FDI, and expand the lending capacity of banks for the private sector. The protection of private property rights is key here. Such measures should include recognition and enforcement of US and EU court decisions, improved arbitration mechanisms for dispute resolution and a dedicated commercial court. For investment in defence, Kyiv should clearly regulate conditions for intellectual property (IP) transfers and expand various types of insurance to cover logistics, exports and production facilities.
- Prioritize programmes for veterans and their families. Making veterans part of the economy and political society is important for social cohesion. After a ceasefire, the total of Ukraine’s veterans (around 2 million) and their family members may reach 5–6 million individuals. Communities, businesses, social services and healthcare institutions should adapt to integrate and accommodate these people, and data should be collected and monitored to evaluate their shifting needs. Kyiv should prioritize retraining, mental health support and spaces similar to veteran hubs in other countries for socialization and peer support.
- Focus on the quality of elections, not speed. The Ukrainian Central Election Commission, parliament, civil society and political parties should carefully prepare for elections. Foremost, security assessments should establish where Ukraine can hold elections. Voter registration needs a thorough update to account for nearly 4 million IDPs, the large number of armed forces personnel and nearly 4 million voters living abroad. Ukraine’s last elections included only half a million voters abroad, so significant capacity to administer overseas voting should be developed quickly.
Given the strong likelihood of election interference by Russia, Ukrainian law on post-war elections should include measures to protect the process from Russian illicit finance, cyberattacks, large-scale information operations, political agents and tampering with voter registration. This will require cooperation from institutions to enable financial monitoring, and support from the Central Election Commission and the Foreign Intelligence Service. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs should have an action plan on how to enable voting for Ukrainians living abroad. Some exchange of practices with Moldova, which has a vast active diaspora, could be helpful. It is key that these elections have an international monitoring mission to certify the quality of the process, this can only occur in a secure environment.
Recommendations for Europe
- Ensure that any ceasefire is properly enforced. In order to be meaningful, ‘security guarantees’ have to include the ability to strike back if Russia breaches the ceasefire. Any foreign reassurance force in Ukraine will be probed and tested by Russian covert or semi-deniable attacks and is likely to suffer casualties. If at that point these foreign forces withdraw, potentially under domestic political pressure from their home governments or populations, the failure to deter Russia would leave Ukraine (and thus Europe) in a worse position than if international forces had not arrived in the first place.
It is essential therefore not only that these forces are sufficiently well-equipped to defend themselves, with appropriate rules of engagement, but also that a national conversation with their home populations has been initiated to make clear the implications of the deployment.
In addition to the requirement for sufficiently powerful assurance forces, any effort at ceasefire monitoring must also be at least as well equipped and resourced as Russian forces. This must include unmanned aerial surveillance that can withstand Russian kinetic and electronic attacks, real-time sensors and a reassurance force that is both equipped to respond to violations and in an appropriate physical location to do so. This should be in addition to support forces deployed in areas away from the frontline as currently envisaged for engineering support, training and the protection of critical infrastructure, thus freeing up Ukrainian army resources to defend the contact line.
- Deepen defence cooperation and integrate Ukraine into shared deterrence, such as NATO’s Eastern Sentry and the EU’s Eastern Flank Watch and Drone Defence Initiative. Ukraine could contribute to the cost-effectiveness of continent-wide defence against drone attacks, especially by sharing its technology of drone interceptors, radio electronic systems and hubs that operate at the intersection of armed forces, drone producers and training centres. The EU’s Drone Alliance with Ukraine envisages €6 billion for production and development. These innovations and capabilities should be combined with European arsenals; integrating lessons from the battlefield in Ukraine into building combined systems with drones and AI technologies. The unravelling of the US commitment to European security is quickly reinforcing the belief in several European capitals that Ukraine is a valuable security ally.
- Invest in Ukraine’s defence industrial base at scale and speed. EU defence cooperation instruments, such as SAFE and the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP), should be mobilized to take advantage of the opportunities Ukraine presents for European security. A separate instrument to channel financial support to Ukraine’s defence industry under EDIP should be swiftly established, with funding potentially derived from the profits or principal of Russian assets in the EU frozen by sanctions. The EU should also engage the UK in the new iteration of SAFE.
Both proceeds and the principal of frozen Russian sovereign assets should be used to strengthen Ukrainian and European defence posture, including ongoing funding for Ukrainian defence as the frontline of Europe.
- Sanctions and energy supply. Any alleviation of sanctions should be done entirely separately from the ceasefire agreement: it would be unwise to give Russia the opportunity to claim that (re)imposing sanctions is a breach of the ceasefire agreement. It is key to maintain the post-2022 packages of EU sanctions on Russian oil, gas and its military-industrial complex. Curtailing the income from hydrocarbons is a key measure in any containment policy to address the threat from Moscow. This could be achieved by restricting the shadow fleet of oil tankers, banning EU companies from providing insurance, shipping or port access to vessels carrying Russian crude oil, and an embargo on Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG). The temporary easing of sanctions on Russian crude, due to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, should not become a permanent measure as this will fuel the Russian war economy.
- Safeguard freedom of navigation in the Black Sea and maintain and expand alternative logistics routes on the Danube River. Actively engage Türkiye, Romania and Bulgaria in strengthening maritime security. Increase the frequency of operations carried out by the Mines Countermeasures Black Sea Task Group to demine the Black Sea.
- Implement the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine at the Council of Europe to prosecute Russian military and political leaders. To boost the authority of the initiative and make it operational, states should join the Enlarged Partial Agreement on the Management Committee of the Special Tribunal. While the tribunal is set up under the Council of Europe framework, any state can join the tribunal initiative. The participation of geographically dispersed nations is crucial: it will make the tribunal more international in nature and restate the global prohibition of aggressive wars. States should also fund the Special Tribunal Advance Team, which is developing the tribunal’s legal and logistical infrastructure. Finally, states should provide sustainable financing to the tribunal for, at least, several years, to ensure its thorough and uninterrupted procedures and fair trials.
- Maintain momentum on Ukraine’s integration into the EU. Ensure that progress is merit-based and pure, unrelated to the national interests of countries like Hungary and Slovakia, which have both manipulated the process to gain advantages. Ukraine should be supported in terms of expertise and funding to deliver reform. As suggested during the informal meeting of top EU ministers in Lviv in 2025, such ‘frontloading’ of the accession process would mean Ukraine is given all necessary technical support both to meet membership status requirements and progress negotiations on legal reforms without having to wait for formal unanimous approval at the Council of the European Union.
- European societies should be better informed by their governments about the nature of the threats emanating from Russia and what is required to defend against them. Political leaders must guard against the temptation to believe that a ceasefire means Russia will halt its aggressive policy and that a return to the status quo ante is possible, including the restoration of pipeline gas deliveries from Russia. If high energy prices persist, Moscow is certain to work hard to influence public opinion in key European countries to rebuild the energy bridge between Russia and Europe.
- Communication channels with Russia. Leading European countries must keep open channels of communication with both the Russian government and society. The limits of government-to-government dialogue must be clearly defined so that they do not undermine the principle of deterring Russian aggression against Ukraine. Managing relations is not the same as rebuilding them, but the absence of relations risks leaving damaging Russian positions unchallenged. Equally, contacts with those parts of Russian society either opposed to the war or unenthusiastic about it could bring long-term gains. The Russian diaspora in Europe can play an important role in this process. Difficult decisions will need to be made about visa policy to encourage interaction with the younger generation of Russians whose lives will extend for decades beyond those of the current Russian leadership.
