‘Trump could blow up the summit if Europe doesn’t deliver’
Kurt Volker, US Ambassador to NATO from 2008 to 2009 and Donald Trump’s US Special Representative for Ukraine from 2017 to 2019
Some Europeans think Trump wants to weaken NATO. The opposite is true. His pressure on allies to spend more on defence is about the US doing relatively less, and Europe more. There is value in showing unity towards Putin or Xi Jinping. But Trump is more interested in results than process: since unity often means identifying the lowest common denominator and taking the least possible action, Trump is willing to sacrifice some unity to get a bigger result.
It seems clear NATO will agree on a target of 5 per cent of GDP on total defence expenditures: 3.5 per cent in hard defence budgets, 1.5 per cent in complementary spending, ie infrastructure. Everyone should announce plans for how they will move in that direction. Europe should have a training and equipment programme and security assurances for Ukraine. If there’s a ceasefire, Keir Starmer and Emmanuel Macron’s ‘coalition of the willing’ as a deterrent to Russian attacks is a good initiative. Also, Europe could improve drone capacity in the Baltic states, learning from Ukraine.
But we should not be complacent. Trump will focus on the summit at most a week before it takes place, and if there isn’t a big enough deliverable that benefits the US, he could blow it up as he did in 2018.
‘3.5% may be the new spending target – but over what period?’
Shashank Joshi, defence editor, The Economist
Europe has lots of troops, light infantry and aircraft, including F-35s. But as the Ukraine war has shown, its weaknesses are heavy armoured units that protect troops against artillery and drones, and air and missile defence. The Europeans now know how they depend on the US for enablers to make those forces combat capable. For instance, Britain and France gave Ukraine Storm Shadow and Scalp missiles, but realized Ukraine was struggling to use them against difficult targets without US intelligence.
Yet Europe needn’t replace every American capability. It can mitigate losses in more modest ways befitting our budgets and security situation. We don’t need global intelligence coverage, for instance, and it may be that our military technology need only be sufficient to match the Russians’.
Importantly, the discussion with the US about what it will be withdrawing from Europe won’t happen until later this year. So the summit will discuss spending targets without a clear sense of the gaps. Also if the target is 3.5 per cent, is that over 10 years or 20, fiscal conditions permitting? Those are quite different; I’ll be looking for timelines.
John Healey, British Defence Secretary, is shown a Storm Shadow missile at a factory ahead of the UK government’s Strategic Defence Review. Photo: Dan Kitwood / Pool/ AFP via Getty Images.
‘Put NATO membership for Ukraine back on the table’
Kajsa Ollongren, former Minister of Defence and Deputy Prime Minister of the Netherlands. She is an associate fellow, Europe Programme, Chatham House
What we need most is a successful summit as a necessary step to keeping the United States engaged in NATO and with the war in Ukraine. First, Trump should attend – I think he will. Then, Europe must show unity and to do that, we have to agree a new, increased defence-spending target. There will also need to be a push to burden-shifting from the US to Europe, including Canada. I’d like to get an honest answer from the Americans about their planning. The US has 20,000 troops on a rotational basis in Europe – if they withdraw, we need a plan to take over these positions.
The same goes for specific US capabilities in Europe – like heavy lifting, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance – that we don’t have. Something that isn’t talked about much now is NATO membership for Ukraine. This has been promised but seems to be off the table as far as the US is concerned. When Ukraine comes out of this war, it will have the most capable armed forces in Europe. The Ukrainians have combat experience in large scale warfare using new technologies introduced on an unprecedented scale. It’s important to re-open that door to NATO membership, in the interests of Ukraine’s and Europe’s security.
‘The EU–UK security pact will bolster unity – that’s important’
Catherine Ashton, former High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
There is discussion about what level of defence spending should be announced at the Hague, but the summit should also reflect on how willing Europe is to create an industrial strategy for defence. For instance, attention must be paid to securing essential software upgrades from private-sector companies for military equipment – that could get political.
As for keeping America on side, NATO’s European members are working out who might best ensure President Trump backs the role of the alliance against the threat of Russia, cyber-warfare and the relationship with China. Giorgia Meloni, Italy’s prime minister, is seen as that person, but is understandably reluctant to carry the blame if those messages are not well received.
The most important part of the recent EU–UK Security Pact is the political declaration, because it relinks the EU and Britain and will bolster the feeling that nations are standing together. Also, the chance to participate in the €150 billion SAFE fund is a practical way of getting money we don’t have into the UK economy.
‘We must counter countries downplaying Russia’s threat’
Hanna Shelest, Director of Security Programmes at the Foreign Policy Council Ukrainian Prism
Transatlantic unity is extremely important to Ukraine, but we also need to take advantage of growing European ambitions within NATO. For us, an alliance that is not wholly reliant on the United States is crucial because we know the main challenges are in Europe, so the responsibility should also be here. Ukraine understands that we need to do something regarding the positions of Hungary and Slovakia, where domestic policies are undermining the recognition of the Russian threat. Russia mustn’t be allowed to manipulate NATO’s discourse. We want this to be an open conversation inside NATO, not just a question for Ukraine.
The European Union and NATO must also discuss cooperation in a more pragmatic way. The simple question of logistics – the so-called Military Schengen – requires a practical conversation to understand military needs. We have three years of experience in moving weapons and munitions around Europe. Those lessons we learned about transport infrastructure have to be put into practice.
Volodymyr Zelenskyy with Keir Starmer and Emmanuel Macron during their visit to Kyiv in May. Expectations are mounting that the ‘coalition of the willing’ will play a key role in the future of European security. Photo: Stefan Rousseau/ WPA Pool/Getty Images.
‘Will Merz and Trump get along or have a White House moment?’
John Kampfner, author, journalist and fellow at the Institute of Advanced Study in Berlin
Unlike his predecessor Olaf Scholz, Germany’s new chancellor Friedrich Merz is determined to project a more forthright Germany on the European and global stages and arm Ukraine more fully. I’m optimistic that with Merz alongside Emmanuel Macron, Keir Starmer and other European leaders, the ‘coalition of the willing’ should start to look more impressive as a support to NATO and the European Union. Merz has already shown, rhetorically at least, that he is willing to take a more forthright approach to Russia.
Thanks to the relaxation of the constitutional debt brake, Germany will be borrowing a lot more for defence. Some engineering and auto companies, including car firms, are considering recalibrating factories for defence purposes. This will enable Germany to produce more weaponry, send more weapons to Ukraine and be more visible in European leadership.
But hurdles remain. Merz and Trump are straight-talkers with a tendency to shoot from the hip. Will they get along or have a painful White House ‘moment’? Merz’s wish to send Taurus missiles to Ukraine is opposed by his Social Democrat deputy chancellor. Some parts of public opinion are edging closer to a more robust approach; when Merz talks of Germany becoming ‘the biggest military power in western Europe’, others remain squeamish.
‘We must sew up the holes in the Russia sanctions’
Ben Hodges, former Commanding General, US Army Europe 2014-2017
The best way to ensure that Russia never attacks Europe is to help Ukraine not just survive but defeat Russia. For instance, much more could be done economically to degrade Russia’s ability to wage war. Russia can’t produce high grade steel, so it depends on China for precision weapon components, and they’re getting drones from Iran and ammunition from North Korea. Sanctions have an effect, but there are always countries – including the United States – where companies look for workarounds. German exports to Kazakhstan have skyrocketed, for example.
If you are serious [about defeating Russia] then you must sew up the holes in the sanctions. As for increased defence spending, it’s assumed that means more F-35 fighter-bombers, for instance. But the most important thing is to increase readiness, and that starts with changing the culture of readiness of your armed forces. In the Cold War, the mindset was be prepared to fight tonight. We should look at: levels of training, readiness of equipment and personnel, and whether there are enough people to man formations.
‘We need bigger armies to fight our enemies in close combat’
HR McMaster, National Security Adviser to Donald Trump from 2017 to 2018
A lot of what President Trump wants to do [in NATO] aligns with European priorities,
especially efforts to expand the industrial base and improve supply chain resilience. A big agenda item should be demonstrating how the United States and Europe can bolster defence capacity together.
US and European militaries have traded off capacity for technological capabilities, such as stealth fighters and precision strikes. But our potential enemies, especially Russia and China, have developed counter measures to these. We need larger armies, air forces and navies to show our enemies they can’t accomplish their objectives through the use of force or, if necessary, that we can win in sustained combat operations.
Everyone focuses on Ukraine’s drones, but a lot of the fighting in Ukraine looks like the First World War. We must improve our air defences and expand our drone arsenals. But NATO militaries should not fall into the trap of assuming that they can win future wars with long-range capabilities alone. Militaries should also emphasize how to ensure freedom of manoeuvre and achieve overmatch in close combat. Warfare is still ultimately about the control of territory, population and resources and not enough attention is paid to land power as part of capable joint forces.
Donald Trump and Volodymyr Zelenskyy in talks at the funeral of Pope Francis at the Vatican in April. Later that month, the US signed a minerals deal with Ukraine. Photo: Office of the President of Ukraine via Getty Images.
‘Public opinion will be the obstacle to 3.5% defence spending’
Peter Ricketts, former National Security Adviser to the UK government and Chair of the House of Lords European Affairs Select Committee
The best chance of keeping Donald Trump on board with NATO will be firm commitments by other member states to increase defence spending. I hope the UK government will commit at the Hague summit to 3.5 per cent by 2035. Public opinion will be the big obstacle. This level of spending can only be reached by raising taxes and politicians have not been preparing the ground.
The EU–UK Security Pact is very welcome, and part of an accelerating trend for European countries to take more responsibility for their defence. The shape of the landscape is becoming clearer: a ‘coalition of the willing’ of European NATO members doing the operational military cooperation, while the EU coordinates defence industries. This should be welcomed in Washington – we are light years away from the time when America was suspicious about European defence cooperation.
The pact is still work in hand. Britain has to negotiate the details of its access to the EU’s €150 billion SAFE defence investment fund, but the key decision of principle has been made. The consultation arrangements that mean Britain will be in the room helping to shape EU debates on wider foreign and security policy issues will be useful. Britain has real credibility here, including its access to the ‘Five Eyes’ intelligence network.
‘Use the EU’s Article 7 to remove Hungary’s veto’
Gabrielius Landsbergis, Lithuanian Minister of Foreign Affairs from 2020 to November 2024
United States policy [in Europe] has become volatile, which means we have to rethink the way we approach the region’s security issues. The European ‘coalition of the willing’ has to become the ‘coalition of the doing’. How soon? Many say that Europe will be ready in 10 years, but I’m not convinced Putin will give us that much time.
It’s difficult to talk about NATO because the US is redefining its strategic goal. But Europe could do more, even though to some extent it has lost its self-belief. For example, Article 7 [of the Treaty on the European Union] could be implemented to remove the veto from Hungary [in the European Council]. It requires a lot of political manoeuvring, but it could put pressure on Hungary and win us some time. Also, Ukraine’s defensive war is the war Europe would fight without the air superiority provided by F-35s or the industrial output of the US. For example, the Ukrainians have devised ways to develop and test drones. We need to learn those lessons.
‘The coalition of the willing can be the future of European security’
Nathalie Tocci, director of the Istituto Affari Internazionali in Rome and former adviser to the government of Italy and to the EU
NATO can plan for external threats like Russia but it is incapable of planning for the worst if the threat is from within, such as the United States moving on Greenland, leaving NATO or abruptly reducing its presence in Europe. Appropriate discussions are not taking place in NATO because the US is a member. Where should they take place? Perhaps in the ‘coalition of the willing’, which was formed around Ukraine, but could become something that deals with discussions on European security more broadly.
As for Italy, it’s sad that the government’s commitment to Ukraine was never really about Ukraine but about Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni gaining credibility in Washington when Joe Biden was president. Now Ukraine is no longer functional to that goal, which explains why Italy is participating reluctantly in the coalition. This is a problem for Italy not just because Ukraine is important to European security, but because this coalition is the embryo of a new European security architecture.
Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong Un raise a glass during a visit to Pyongyang in June 2024. North Korea is thought to be supplying weapons and troops to support Russia’s war against Ukraine. Photo: Vladimir Smirnov/ Pool/ AFP via Getty Images.
