Conclusion
The EAEU suffers from a lack of commitment and enthusiasm from its member states. The union is mainly a Russia-led project but other members have exercised significant influence over its direction. Kazakhstan, the country least dependent on Russia, has been the most effective in making its voice heard. However, this limited sway is easily negated whenever Russia’s broader interests are at stake. The nature of the relationships between Russia and other member states gives Russia a free hand to pursue its agenda inside and outside the EAEU.
Real economic benefits of a union such as the EAEU are derived not from tariff changes but, above all, from removing non-tariff barriers. Accordingly, the potential benefits of the EAEU depend on tackling non-tariff barriers and the modernization of domestic institutions and policies.67 Russia has been keen to establish the union but has not shown the same enthusiasm for, or indeed necessary investment in, strong supranational institutions. The architecture as well as the modes of operation of Eurasian integration make it highly unlikely the EAEU will stimulate a profound transformation of policies and institutions of member states. To date, dynamics of integration are at odds with the ‘grand narrative’ of the union and time alone is unlikely to remedy the shortcomings. This requires a commitment, above all from Russia, to not only cease undermining the cohesion of the EAEU but also spearhead regulatory and institutional modernization.
Regardless of its multiple shortcomings, the EAEU should not be dismissed out of hand. For Russia, the EAEU is the primary vehicle for realizing a global geopolitical agenda. Despite Moscow’s unwillingness to be bound by common rules, the utility of the EAEU remains high. For other member states, even with modest economic benefits (at best) and an inability to tame Russia, there remain sufficient reasons to participate. In theory, the members could resort to the ultimate option – withdrawal from the bloc. However, the risk to Russia of members withdrawing from the regime is mitigated by member states’ dependence on it. Bluntly speaking, with Ukraine’s example in mind, an ‘exit’ from the Eurasian bloc is too risky. Thus, the Eurasian ‘integration game’ is unlikely to cease any time soon, bar some dramatic political changes in the member states, especially Russia.
The project has become an institutional, regulatory and economic reality. However, this paper demonstrates that this reality is exceedingly complex, not least because all member states seek to minimize commitments and maximize flexibility within the common regime. Satisfied with having created a union, Russia is not preoccupied with making it work. Members, in turn, put a premium on flexibility because the union does not deliver economically and yet the ‘exit’ option is simply not viable. The divergent interests of member states have hollowed out the union from the inside.
Therefore, the Eurasian project is likely to stumble on and will continue to be promoted as a Eurasian replica of the EU, merely experiencing some ups and downs, typical of any integration project. However, with tailored individual deals between Russia and other member states, the lacklustre commitment of its members, and weak institutions, there is little to inspire confidence that the Eurasian project is capable of delivering on its grand promises.
67 For example, see Tarr, D. (2016), ‘The Eurasian Economic Union’.