6. Conclusion and Recommendations
Map 4: Divisions, front lines and trade routes
—
Map 4: Divisions, front lines and trade routes
Yemen has become a ‘chaos state’ – a nominal entity that exists largely as lines on a map and as a concept in newspaper reports and policymaker briefings. In reality, it more closely represents a region of mini-states at varying degrees of war with one another, and beset by their own complex internal politics and conflicts.
The groups that hold the balance of power in this chaos state do not correspond directly to those that have been engaged to date by the UN and international powers. In the lived reality of most Yemenis, the erstwhile Houthi–Saleh alliance and the government of President Hadi have been just two actors among many operating in the country. President Hadi, moreover, is widely perceived as a bit player whose importance is derived largely from legal technicalities, external support and access to resources rather than from hard-earned internal legitimacy.
The lines between state and non-state security and governance actors, and between the licit and illicit economies, already blurry before the war began, have become increasingly indistinguishable. Yemenis’ faith in internationally agreed rules and norms has been shaken by the actions of the Saudi-led coalition, and by those of UAE troops operating in the south, as well as by US counterterrorism operations across the country – all actions that have been carried out with apparent impunity. Legitimacy and, arguably, regional sovereignty are now earned at local level rather than conferred by national or international writ.
Yemen’s few revenue-generating resources (its oil and gas fields, and the infrastructure used to transport, process and export hydrocarbons), its economic institutions, and its maritime and overland trade chokepoints have become the main sources of political and military power. They are likely to be the focus of growing, if as yet little analysed, armed and political struggle even should a negotiated political solution be achieved.
As in similar contexts, no ‘algorithm’ exists for transforming Yemen’s chaos state into a functioning, Westphalian model of ‘statehood’ in the two- to three-year time frame that many Western and foreign officials wish for. But in the current context, the incentives for cooperation in the peace process as proposed are limited. Any deal between the Houthis, Saleh loyalist forces and the Hadi government that excludes all other Yemeni groups is all but guaranteed to trigger renewed conflict if careful provisions for a new, genuinely inclusive political process are not embedded into an agreement.
It is also unlikely that any new nationally accepted leader – a ‘national champion’ – will emerge who can bring the country together through personal charisma. The international community’s experience of dealing with President Hadi during the transition and since the civil war began should make it especially mindful of the limitations of this approach.
Finally, any approach that ignores the role and nature of external actors and interests in Yemen cannot be successful. The mediation process must include incentives for third parties to act in good faith to support a negotiated political settlement – and punitive measures if they do not.
Policymakers should use Table 2, alongside the digital map produced as part of this project and hosted on the Chatham House website (https://yemen-map.chathamhouse.org), as a starting point to guide strategy, and to formulate a joined-up approach. They should build on the table and the map to guide conversations about what a post-conflict political and economic settlement might look like. A more inclusive map would include, for example, local non-governmental organizations, civil society organizations and women’s groups.
Beyond this, the international community should do the following:
- Support the recalibration of the current UN-led mediation process and expand it, formally or informally, to three equally weighted tracks that:
- Address the role of third-party states – not limited to Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Iran, the US, the UK and France – in directly or indirectly prolonging the war and sponsoring military actors.
- Support mediation between the parties formally considered by the UN Security Council as principal belligerents (the Houthis, Saleh loyalists and the Hadi government), and communicate to them the need to expand their participation in the current peace process.
- Acknowledge subnational and local political and conflict dynamics by engaging with key military and political leaders from each governorate, and with the senior leaderships from the current subnational divisions: the Houthi-controlled highlands and west coast; the tribal territories of Al Jawf, Mareb and Al Bayda; the separatist tribal south; Aden; Hadramawt (coastal and northern); and Al Mahra. Consider outreach to the Saba regional council, the Southern Transitional Council and other similar regional initiatives. Integrate these groups into the broader mediation process.
- Prioritize localized mediation and ceasefires, as well as other measures aimed at de-escalation, with a focus on Taiz, Al Bayda, the Bab al-Mandeb coast and Mareb/Al Jawf through direct engagement with key military leaders in these locations, alongside existing initiatives.
- Consider sponsoring the formation of, and support for, local councils in areas not directly affected by conflict. Consider developing mechanisms to allow communication and information flows between these councils and the international community. Apportion resources appropriately to allow for this expanded remit.
- Ensure that the economy and humanitarian situation are no longer used as political bargaining chips by any party to the conflict or by the international community.
Table 2: Incentives for peace
|
Territory |
Governorates/ regions |
Key political institutions/ groupings |
Influential external parties (in order of relevance) |
Key power centres |
Key individuals |
Incentives for cooperation in peace process |
Incentives to spoil |
Incentives to maintain status quo |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
Highland/West Yemen
|
Hajja, Sana’a, Amran, Hodeidah, Dhammar, Mahweet, Raymah, Ibb |
Supreme Political Council, Revolutionary Council |
Iran, Russia |
Houthis |
Leader: Abdelmalek al-Houthi Military commanders: Abu Ali al-Hakem, Abdulkhaleq al-Houthi, Abdulkarim al-Houthi, Yousif al-Madani Political representatives: Saleh al-Samad (SPC president), Mohammed Abdelsalem, Mehdi Mashat |
Low |
High |
High |
|
|
|
|
Saleh-GPC (weakened post-December 2017) |
Leader: Ali Abdullah Saleh (deceased) Military commanders: Maj. Gen. Mohammed al-Atafi (minister of defence, loyalties unclear), Tariq Saleh (Republican Guard, deceased) Political representatives: Sultan al-Barakani, Aref al-Zuka (deceased), Yasser al-Awadhi |
Moderate |
Moderate |
Low |
|
|
Northern Tribal Areas
|
Al Jawf, Mareb, Al Bayda |
Saba regional council |
Saudi Arabia, UAE |
Tribal coalition |
Leader: Sultan al-Aradah (governor of Mareb) Military/key tribal leaders: Ali al-Qabli Numran, Thiab al-Qabli, Ghaleb al-Ajda (Murad tribe), Influencers: Abdul Wahid al-Qabli (GPC) |
Moderate |
Moderate |
Moderate |
|
|
|
|
‘Legitimate’ military |
Military leaders: Brig. Gen. Ahmed Hassan Jubran (Third Regional District commander), Maj. Gen. Taher Ali al-Auqaili (chief of staff, Mareb-based), Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar (vice-president), Maqdashi (former army chief of staff) |
Low |
High |
High |
|
|
‘Separatist Tribal South’
|
Al Dhale, Lahj, Abyan, Shabwa |
Southern Transitional Council |
UAE |
|
Al Dhale: Governor: Fadhl al-Jadi Military leaders: Aydrous al-Zubaidi, Shelal Ali Shayea, Maj. Gen. Muqbil Saleh (33rd Armoured commander), Balegh Abass Muhsen al-Humaidi (head of police) |
Low |
High |
High |
|
|
|
|
|
Lahj: Governor: Nasser al-Khubaji Military commanders: Maj. Gen. Fadl Hassan (commander, Fourth Military Region), Brig. Gen. Thabet Muthanna Naji Jawas (Anad Axis commander), Brig. Pilot Adel Halimi (supreme commander, Southern Resistance), Col. Mukhtar Ali Muthna, Brig. Gen. Hadar al-Shuhouti (commander, Lahj Security Belt), Saleh al-Nubi (commander, Radfan Security Belt) Influencers: Murad Ali Mohammed Abdul Hai Alhalmi, Qasem Asker Jubran, Wadah al-Halimi, Sheikh Saif bin Mohammed, Fadl al-Uzibi (leader, Ubaiza tribe), Sheikh Abdulrahman bin Ahmed al-Naqib (leader, Yafa tribes) |
Low |
Moderate |
High |
|
|
‘Separatist Tribal South’
|
|
|
|
|
Abyan: Governor: Abu Bakr Hussain Salem Military leaders: Abdulatif al-Sayed (commander, Security Belt Forces), Brig. Gen. Abdullah al-Fadhli (Abyan chief of security) |
Moderate |
Low |
High |
|
|
|
|
|
Shabwa: Governor: Brig. Gen. Ali bin Rashid al-Harthi Former governor: Ahmed Lamlas Military leaders: Maj. Mohammed Salem al-Buhair al-Qamishi (commander, Shabwa Elite Forces), Brig. Gen. Aziz Nasser Salem al-A’teqi (commander, 30th Infantry Brigade), Brig. Gen. Khaled Ali al-A’thmi al-Himyari (commander, Shabwa Elite Forces at Balhaf), Brig. Gen. Awad Masoud Ahmad al-Dahboul (director of police), Mufarrah Buhaibah (26th September Infantry Brigade, key in battle for Bayhan) Key tribal leaders: Saleh bin Farid al-Aulaqi (Shabwa) Influential: Maj. Gen. Nasser Ali al-Nouba (former head of local military axis) |
Moderate |
Low |
High |
|
|
Hadramawt
|
Coastal Hadramawt |
Southern Transitional Council, Hadramawt Tribal Confederation |
|
|
Key leader: Maj. Gen. Farah Salem al-Bahsani (governor) Military leader: Maj. Gen. Farah Salem al-Bahsani Influential: Ahmed bin Breik (former governor) Tribal leader: Amr bin Hubraish (Hadramawt Tribal Confederation) |
Low |
Moderate |
High |
|
Northern Hadramawt |
|
UAE, Saudi Arabia |
|
Key leader: Sultan Osama al-Qathiri (mayor of Seiyunn) Key military leader: Maj. Gen. Mohamed Saleh Taimus, First Military District Influential: Brig. Gen. Abdulrahman al-Halili (former commander of first regional military axis) |
Moderate |
High |
High |
|
|
Al Mahra |
Al Mahra |
|
|
|
Key leader: Rajeh Saeed Bakreet (governor) Military leaders: Abdullah Qahtan (chief of security), Brig. Gen. Mohammed Yahya al-Qadhi (commander, 137th Infantry Brigade), Brig. Gen. Abdullah Mansour (commander, 123rd Infantry Brigade), Col. Thabit Qasim Abdulla (commander, Mahra Air Base) Influencers: Sheikh Abdullah al-Afrar, Salem bin Abdullah bin Ashour, Shaykh Saad Ali Muqbil bin Khudda |
Moderate |
Moderate |
Moderate |
|
Taiz |
Taiz |
Revolutionary Council, Supreme Political Council |
|
|
Leader (political/governance): Abdullah al-Noman, Ali Mohammed al-Ma’amari (governor in exile) Military: Sadeq al-Sarhan (regular military), Abu Abbas (Salafi), Sadeq Mayhoub Hassan (Islah) |
Low |
High |
High |
|
Salafist groups |
Aden, Taiz, Saudi–Yemen border |
N/A |
UAE, Saudi Arabia |
|
|
Low |
High |
High |