Dim prospects for regional security
Regional security, or the lack thereof, remains the prevailing challenge facing the Middle East. The withdrawal of the US from the JCPOA has increased the possibility of more violence and escalation. The different dynamics between Iran and the Gulf states show that ties across the Persian Gulf are opportunistic and constrained by limited economic integration, a long history of mutual suspicion, and frustration with Saudi dominance on the part of the other GCC members. Without an overarching, unified GCC policy towards Tehran, bilateral military cooperation with the US has also helped the GCC countries carve out independent strategic relations with Iran. Similarly, fragmentation within the GCC has provided Iran with an opportunity to buffer against calls for its economic and political isolation. Iran’s ties to the smaller Gulf countries have provided Tehran with limited economic, political and strategic opportunities for diversification that have simultaneously helped to buffer against sanctions and to weaken Riyadh. However, Tehran does recognize the limitations to its links in the Gulf. Above all, these relationships ultimately highlight internal GCC tensions, as acutely demonstrated by the Qatar crisis, and the constraints on Iran’s Gulf policy. That said, the extent of Iran’s ties with these states and their leaders could promote de-escalation and détente. For example, the other GCC countries could facilitate shuttle diplomacy between Iran and Saudi Arabia. But this would first require the Gulf states to resolve the Qatar crisis and address their own differences – two very lofty ambitions that in the absence of regional will and US pressure will be hard to achieve in the short run.
Despite President Trump’s commitment to Saudi Arabia and Israel, the Gulf states should note that he has also lamented the cost associated with US involvement in Middle East conflicts and has continued to retreat publicly from the Syrian war, foreshadowing the continuation of a US disengagement from the region that was already evident during the Obama administration.
In the current climate of maximalist demands by Saudi Arabia and the UAE designed to pressure Iran into making concessions or risk collapse, it is more critical than ever that both sides consider the geopolitical shifts currently underway and their implications. Despite President Trump’s commitment to Saudi Arabia and Israel, the Gulf states should note that he has also lamented the cost associated with US involvement in Middle East conflicts and has continued to retreat publicly from the Syrian war, foreshadowing the continuation of a US disengagement from the region that was already evident during the Obama administration. In the absence of US leadership, Russia and China will gain in regional influence. Middle Eastern states will no longer be able to rely solely on the US for their security and will have to diversify their ties with these and other actors. The potential for crisis and increased competition heralds many risks and opportunities for the Gulf states, but ultimately it signals that regional security will eventually be in regional hands.41 Moreover, the Qatar crisis has revealed the deep fissures and fragmentation of the now more or less defunct GCC. The Gulf bloc uniting Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the UAE against Qatar has also alienated Oman and Kuwait. Without accommodation and resolution of the Qatar crisis, relations among the Gulf countries will remain fragmented and encourage further regional instability.
Under increased pressure from Washington and from within the region, Tehran is slowly acknowledging that resolving regional tensions is a necessary ingredient for its domestic and regional stability. Iran’s solution, as argued by Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, to its tensions with the Gulf states is the creation of a ‘security networking structure where small and large states in the Persian Gulf contribute together to a regional security framework’.42 This would include a non-aggression pact as a means to build trust and cooperation, and require confidence-building measures where countries would commit to ‘common principles and standards’ and the creation of distinct ‘baskets’ to address the various security, economic and humanitarian issues separately. Most importantly, this takes into account the security concerns of the smaller Gulf states and acknowledges that collaboration and partnership is needed among all states of the region, rather than just those of Iran and Saudi Arabia. Such an idea, built on the model of the Helsinki process that ultimately resulted in the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), is not new, but it remains a worthy goal. Sultan Qaboos of Oman promoted regional security as early as 1976, as did UN Security Council Resolution 598 in 1987, which brought an end to the Iran–Iraq war. The fracturing of the GCC should provide an opportunity for the Gulf states to come together under a new framework. Political will and patience on both sides is needed to create a Gulf-wide process.
In the current climate and under the umbrella of President Trump’s support, Saudi Arabia has shown no appetite for such engagement, instead hoping that greater multilateral pressure on Iran will weaken it and perhaps force it to accept all-or-nothing demands and abandon its support for proxy groups throughout the region. Saudi Arabia is unlikely to alter its position until there is a change in Iran’s leadership upon the death of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei or its own political transition takes place resulting in Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman becoming king. Ultimately, direct negotiation with high-level buy-in between the two countries is the only route to long-term regional security. Their last period of détente from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s was shepherded by King Fahd and Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia and presidents Rafsanjani and Khatami of Iran.
The countries on both sides of the Persian Gulf must be willing to engage in dialogue and be ready to discuss their wide-ranging differences, including the future of US security guarantees to Arab Gulf states and Iran’s defensive strategy of support for regional proxy groups. Additionally, each must know what they wish to achieve from negotiations. Unlike Iran’s leadership, which is more prepared to begin talks, Saudi Arabia’s leaders have yet to draw their red lines. Moreover, Saudi policymakers and analysts, buoyed by their renewed sense of confidence that the unified anti-Iran alliance will weaken Tehran, offer no realistic solutions. In order to make progress the thinking behind any discussions cannot be zero-sum. There are many areas where Saudi Arabia and Iran could find common cause, including de-radicalization, environmental degradation, and drug and human trafficking. Iran, in its repeated calls for dialogue, has recognized that resolving its portfolio of differences with Riyadh is key to dialling down wider tensions with Washington. Tehran’s base line objective is to obtain its own security guarantees and an independent relationship with Riyadh.
In a region long mired in conflict, it is time for both sides of the Gulf to acknowledge the changing regional landscape and the nexus between regional and domestic stability. To be successful and durable, regional de-escalation will ultimately require recognition and compromise, not capitulation, on the major security issues before addressing the economic and humanitarian portfolios. This will require the smaller Gulf states, as well as extra-regional actors, to learn from the historical creation of the OSCE and encourage Iran and Saudi Arabia to recognize the exigencies of the changing regional geostrategic landscape and to move beyond short-term calculations and one-upmanship in favour of long-term stability.
41 Quilliam, N. and Vakil, S. (2018), ‘A Nuclear Iran: Manipulated by China and Russia?’, in Ward, A. (2018), ‘Chatham House Expert Perspectives 2018: Risks and Opportunities in International Affairs’, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, Special Report, https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2018-06-19-chatham-house-expert-perspectives-2018.pdf (accessed 10 Jul. 2018).
42 Zarif, M. J. (2018), ‘FM Zarif’s speech at 2018 Munich Security Conference’, 18 February, http://realiran.org/read-full-transcript-of-fm-zarifs-speech-at-munich-security-conference-2018/ (accessed 12 May 2018).