The impact of Tehran’s internal dynamics
Factional and ideological differences in Iran have been important drivers of cooperation with the GCC. Gulf policymakers also regularly point to the country’s bifurcated political system, in which the supreme leader rather than the president has foreign-policy authority. After the war with Iraq, internal shifts in Iranian politics during the presidencies of Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mohammad Khatami opened the door to improved relations with the GCC countries and enabled a short period of détente. Both presidents believed in reducing regional tensions as part of a larger vision of economic integration. However, accusations of Iranian and Hezbollah involvement in the Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia in 1996 stalled Rafsanjani’s efforts.10 The GCC countries warmly welcomed the election in 1997 of the reformist Khatami with his ideas for a ‘dialogue among civilizations’. Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia participated in the summit of the Organisation of Islamic Conference in Tehran that same year, and trade and travel among the two countries increased. In 2001, Saudi Arabia and Iran signed a security pact aimed at addressing terror and drug-trafficking issues. Plans were also in place to negotiate a defence agreement. However, the US-led invasion of Iraq, shifts in Iran’s domestic politics and the history of limited trust between Saudi Arabia and Iran stalled progress. During this period of détente, the Gulf states remained disappointed by Iran’s rhetoric as well as its continued support for Hezbollah in Lebanon and for Palestinian radical groups.
Domestic tension between Iran’s hardliners and reformists also exposed differences of opinion regarding the country’s foreign policy strategy. In the context of growing international concern over the country’s nuclear programme, and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the 2005 election of the hardliner Mahmoud Ahmadinejad moved Iran away from Khatami’s policy of engagement and towards a confrontational tone. A decisive policy shift began as Iran sought to protect itself from US military encirclement. Building on its successful model of support for Hezbollah as a military group and political actor in Lebanon, Iran began supporting state and non-state groups in Iraq. The success of this strategy has been widely replicated in Syria too, demonstrating Iran’s ability to gain leverage and capitalize on opportunities. Since the 2011 Arab Spring, the tension between Iran and Saudi Arabia increased through their respective support of sectarian proxy groups in the region. The suspicions of the GCC countries about Iran were exemplified by the comments of King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, published by Wikileaks, in which he expressed a desire that the US ‘cut off the head of the snake’ by launching strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities.11 These suspicions were further demonstrated by comments on relations with Iran, published at the same time, in which Prime Minister Sheikh Hamed bin Jassim al-Thani of Qatar said, ‘they lie to us and we lie to them’.12
10 In 1996, Iran and Hezbollah organized and executed the Khobar Towers bombing, which resulted in the deaths of 19 American military personnel at a US Air Force housing complex in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
11 Colvin, R. (2010), ‘“Cut off head of snake” Saudis told U.S. on Iran’, 28 November, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-wikileaks-iran-saudis/cut-off-head-o… (accessed 18 Aug. 2018).
12 Guardian (2010), ‘US embassy cables: Qatari prime minister: “Iranians lie to us”’, 28 November, https://www.theguardian.com/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/240782 (accessed 23 Aug. 2018).