Regional reverberations
Iran’s perceived ascendancy and influence in regional events continued to stir insecurities. After the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq, Iran found an opportunity to increase its leverage and influence in the country through its strategic and divisive relationships, stoking regional fears of a ‘Shia Crescent’.13 Tensions intensified following the Arab Spring. Protests in Bahrain in 2011 led to a Saudi-UAE intervention to bolster the domestic political order, a move that revealed the deep anxieties of the Gulf leaders about their countries’ political stability. Iran was not involved in the protests in Bahrain, but Saudi, Emirati and Bahraini leadership linked the sectarian nature of the protests to Iran’s growing regional influence. The impact of the Arab Spring protests should be considered alongside Tehran’s defence of Bashar al-Assad in Syria’s civil war and of the conclusion of the JCPOA. These developments were also seen as confirmation of the US administration’s abandonment of its Gulf partners in favour of Iran. Beginning in 2015, Saudi Arabia’s military campaign against the Houthis in Yemen became yet another area of regional concern.14 Furthermore, the death of Iranian pilgrims during a stampede at the Hajj, in September 2015, and the execution in Saudi Arabia of the Shiite cleric Nimr al-Nimr, in January 2016, which was followed by a mob attack on the Saudi embassy in Tehran, brought tensions to a boil, with Riyadh and most GCC capitals severing ties with Iran.
Pursuing its long-time role as the Gulf mediator, Kuwait sought to dial down tensions and open the door to dialogue in January 2017. Its foreign minister is said to have demanded the cessation of Iranian meddling in the Gulf as a prelude to wider negotiations.15 However, the ascendance of Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman in Saudi Arabia and the implementation of his anti-Iranian foreign policy has, for the time being, closed the door to further negotiations. The outbreak of the Qatar crisis in 2017 further disrupted GCC mediation efforts with Iran and highlighted divisions within the bloc. The withdrawal of the US from the JCPOA has exacerbated the already complicated regional dynamics.
The ascendance of Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman in Saudi Arabia and the implementation of his anti-Iranian foreign policy has, for the time being, closed the door to further negotiations.
In the context of prevailing distrust, individual leadership efforts to improve relations have been curtailed by historical factors, pressure from Saudi Arabia, and the nature of recent tensions in the region. Against this backdrop, it is hard to imagine how regional disputes can be settled. A closer examination of Iran’s bilateral relations with Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and the UAE – Bahrain has not been included due to its limited ties with Tehran – demonstrates the unique dynamics among the Gulf states, which allow Iran some limited room for manoeuvre, and identifies where opportunities may exist for a de-escalation in the region.
13 The term was first used by King Abdullah of Jordan in 2004.
14 Kinninmont, J. (2015), Iran and the GCC: Unnecessary Insecurity, Research Paper, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/iran-and-gcc-unnecessary-insec….
15 Reuters (2017), ‘Kuwait to deliver message to Iran on dialogue with Gulf Arab states’, 24 January, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-kuwait/kuwait-to-deliver-message-to-iran-on-dialogue-with-gulf-arab-states-idUSKBN1582GF (accessed 23 Aug. 2018).