Regional tensions through a historical lens
Difficult relations between Iran and the Gulf states are not a new development. Throughout recent history, disagreements have arisen due to internal political developments, sectarian and ethnic differences, and strategic and territorial rivalries. Extra-regional influence and interference, first by the UK and then the US, has also impeded regional ties. As a result of the Iranian revolution, recent relations have been more fraught than friendly.1 While sectarian differences between predominantly Shia Iran and the Sunni Gulf leadership, as well as Persian–Arab differences, are regularly mentioned as the principal drivers of tensions, such interpretations are particularly reductivist. Iran’s large population of 80 million people (more than that of the GCC states combined) and its religious ideology that challenges monarchical tradition and legitimacy, which it initially promoted as part of its post-revolutionary foreign policy, have generally been perceived by the Gulf states as threats to stability.2 Over the years, the impact of Tehran’s soft power, sectarian incitement, sensationalist media, and frequent interference in Arab affairs have overshadowed the short periods of improved relations and the conciliatory efforts of individual leaders. Gulf rulers have also contributed to this state of affairs by continuing to use Iran as a convenient scapegoat to distract their populations and externalize domestic problems.
Iran’s attempts to bolster its reach in the region date back to the 6th century BC, under the Achaemenid Empire. Persian influence eventually dwindled in the 7th century AD only to resurface again when the Safavid dynasty took control of Bahrain from Portugal in 1602.3 Iran’s direct regional influence receded again by the 18th century, although the movement of people as well as religious and cultural ties continued to grow. When the British came to the region in 1820, ties between Iran and the Arab Gulf states were cultivated through specific ruling families supported by the British. Under Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in the 20th century, Iran re-emerged as a dominant power in the Gulf. After the British withdrawal from east of Suez in 1968, the US adopted a strategy in which Iran and Saudi Arabia were treated equally as the two allies responsible for regional stability, and US arms sales to both increased significantly. While the countries became known as the ‘twin pillars of the Gulf’, quiet competition commenced between them during this period, with Iran seeking to be the bigger partner.
In advance of the British withdrawal, Iran took a more aggressive position vis-à-vis Bahrain and the UAE. In 1968, it attempted, unsuccessfully, to claim Bahrain as being historically part of Iran.4 In 1971, it seized three strategically important islands (Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs) that were historically part of the newly created UAE, and it continues to hold them. In 1972, Iran came to the assistance of Sultan Qaboos to quell a Marxist rebellion in Oman’s Dhofar province. While Oman saw this intervention as positive, the rest of the region perceived Iran as being expansionist.5
In 1981, the Gulf states formed the GCC, a political and security alliance that instituted a collective security framework. However, some states saw this as merely an extension of Saudi leadership over its smaller neighbours, which bred frustration.
The Iranian revolution was a decisive turning point, shifting relations away from a pattern of quiet competition to one of overt tensions. As a result, the Gulf states felt deeply threatened by the overthrow of the Pahlavi monarchy and by Iran’s revolutionary message, incitement of Shia unrest and subversive political and terror activities. This led the Gulf states to support Iraq against Iran in the 1980–88 war. In 1981, the Gulf states formed the GCC, a political and security alliance that instituted a collective security framework. However, some states saw this as merely an extension of Saudi leadership over its smaller neighbours, which bred frustration.6 Oman, Dubai and, to a lesser extent, Qatar maintained relations with Iran during this period, demonstrating a tendency for independence that has continued.
The growing US involvement in regional security since 1979 is another key factor for increased tensions between the Gulf states and Iran. The former have long relied on the US security guarantee while the latter wholeheartedly opposes US influence in the region. US–GCC security cooperation was formalized during the Iran–Iraq war but grew significantly after the 1990 invasion of Kuwait by Iraq. The US has operational bases in, and defence agreements with, Bahrain (home of the US Fifth Fleet), Qatar (home of the forward headquarters of US Central Command), the UAE, Kuwait and Oman. All of these countries host US troops and benefit from US arms sales. Domestic politics has limited an overt US presence in Saudi Arabia, but covert cooperation continues. Iran’s perspective is that regional actors should manage regional security issues. The Gulf states, however, perceive this argument as cover for Iran’s own ambitions. At the same time, as well as curbing Iran’s expansion, US security assurances have also prevented intra-GCC tensions becoming out of hand, as seen when Qatar made the most of its military agreement with the US to protect itself from potential Saudi aggression in 2017.